Caesar's Civil War

HISTORICAL REALITY AND FABRICATION



RICHARD W. WESTALL

BRILL

MNEMOSYNE SUPPLEMENTS HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

Caesar's *Civil War*

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Caesar's *Civil War*

Historical Reality and Fabrication

By

Richard W. Westall

BRILL

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Per M., che ci ha creduto.

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Acknowledgements

Lapidary style is appropriate to a monograph dedicated to the theme of Caesar's *commentarii*, and the subject of the Civil War of 49–48 BCE has perhaps never been more relevant in recent decades. Tyrannies come to power through manipulation of language and a disregard for the truth. Written during the crisis of Italian democracy and published at the crisis of another, what follows is an essay in historiographical interpretation that explores the crisis of the late Republic as reflected in the testimony of one of the protagonists. In so doing, it seeks to establish not only the value of Caesar's *Civil War* (in the original Latin *De bello civili*) for the socio-economic history of the Mediterranean sea united under Roman rule, but also the ways in which the historical record was perverted and falsehood disseminated. As a result, the focus is upon a close reading of the ancient texts. *L'histoire événementielle* is the subject of Caesar's *Civil War*, but the modern reader can and should be aware of what that text can tell us about the *longue durée* as well as the intermediate or recurring phenomena of socio-economic history. As will be argued over the course of this monograph, financial crisis and aristocratic competition together provoked the Roman civil wars that brought an end to the Republic and produced the autocracy of the Empire. It should also emerge that civil war paradoxically made the administrative net uniting the Roman empire all the more coherent and stronger.

Many and significant are the debts that have been incurred in the writing of this monograph. Initially conceived while the author was an undergraduate tutor for Latin, then expressed in very different format as a Ph.D. dissertation, it assumed the present form nearly a decade ago. No book is an isolated monument as regards its genesis, and this is no exception. In varying fortune, there have been many companions along the road.

Three particular notes of gratitude are especially owed. First and foremost, the Oscar Broneer Fellowship allowed the author (as a former member of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens) to spend a year as a fellow of the American Academy in Rome. That was productive and defining. For the experience, especial thanks are owed to William D. Coulson and Elizabeth Gebhard for the administrative decision and financial support. Secondly, graduate study at Stanford University in the early 1990s—with the possibility of a year at Brasenose College—remains a treasured memory. For that experience overall, three professors who were not Roman historians are deserving of especial mention and gratitude for their learning and humanity: Antony E. Raubitschek,

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Abbreviations

ANRW	Temporini, H. et al. (1972–). (eds.) *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Berlin & New York.
DNP	Cancik, H. & Schneider, H. (1996–1999). (eds.) *Der Neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike*, 15 vols. in 17, Stuttgart & Weimar.
EJ	Ehrenberg, V. & Jones, A.H.M. (1955^{2}). (eds.) *Documents illustrating the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius*, Oxford.
ESAR	Frank, T. (1933–1940). (ed.) *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 6 vols., Baltimore.
FIRA	Riccobono, S. et al. ($1940–1943^{2}$). (eds.) *Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani, in usum scholarum*, 3 vols., Firenze.
FGrHist	Jacoby, F. (1923–). (ed.) *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Leiden.
FRH	Cornell, T.J., et al. (2013). (eds.) *The Fragments of the Roman Historians*, 3 vols., Oxford.
HRR	Peter, H.W.G. (1914). (ed.) *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*, 2 vols., Leipzig.
Inscr. Ital.	Degrassi, A. (1931/2–). (ed.) *Inscriptiones Italiae*, 13 vols., Roma.
KHM	Kraner, F., Hofmann, F. & Meusel, H. (1959^{12}). (eds.) *C. Iulii Caesaris Commentarii de Bello Civili*. Afterword and bibliography by H. Oppermann. Berlin.
L&S	Lewis, C.T. & Short, C. (1879). *A Latin Dictionary, founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin Dictionary. Revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten*, Oxford.
LSJ	Liddell, H.G., Scott, R. & Jones, H.S. (1940^{9}). (eds.) *Greek-English Lexicon*; Supplement by E.A. Barber et al. (1968), Oxford.
LTUR	Steinby, E.M. (1993–1999). (ed.) *Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae*, 6 vols., Roma.
MRR	Broughton, T.R.S. (1951–1952, 1986). *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, 3 vols. [Supplement of 1986 together with S.M. Treggiari]. New York, Atlanta.
OCD^{3}	Hornblower, S. & Spawforth, A. (1996^{3}). (eds.) *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford.
OLD	Glare, P.G.W. (1968–1982). (ed.) *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, Oxford.
RE	Wissowa, G. et al. (1893–1980). (eds.) *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Neue Bearbeitung, 84 vols., Stuttgart.
TLL	*Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, (Leipzig 1904–).

For any abbreviations that are not to be found above, readers are referred to the traditional tools of professional bibliographic research in the Classics, viz. *L'année philologique*, *LSJ*, *OCD*^{3}, and *OLD*.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Organized in seven chapters, the main body of this book examines Julius Caesar's *Civil War* as a literary source of information not only for the Roman civil war of 49–48 BCE, but also for the wider context of the late Republic and the socio-economic history of the Roman empire. Since Caesar's work is a piece of literature, it is essential for the historian to identify and analyze those tropes that most seriously affect the representation of contemporary history within a civil war context. Understanding Caesarian historiography is a necessary first step for the modern historian wishing to use Caesar's evidence. Consequently, there is more space devoted here to literary analysis than is usual in modern works dealing with the protagonists and events or socio-economic realities of Roman history. On the other hand, the ultimate goal of this monograph is to extend our knowledge of those factors that contributed to the outbreak of civil war and to elucidate the characteristics of Roman society and economy in the late Republic. Therefore, this essay in historical interpretation has been organized in seven chapters that proceed in geographical and chronological order so as to take readers in sequential fashion through Caesar's narrative and the Roman civil war of 49–48 BCE. Inspired loosely by Herodotus as well as based upon Caesar's *Civil War*, this organizing principle is deployed so as to discuss selected problems that shed light upon the larger literary and historical structures at work.

The recent renaissance of Caesarian studies means that scholars are now theoretically in an excellent position to appreciate the rhetorical structures and artistry that inform Caesar's account of the civil war of 49–48 BCE.[1] Nonetheless, there remains the real risk of accepting uncritically what Caesar writes,

1 As regards the *Civil War*, contributions of note and great utility include the following: J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar. The Civil War, Books 1–2*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1991); idem, *Julius Caesar. The Civil War, Book 3*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1993); C. Damon, "Caesar's Practical Prose," *Classical Journal* 89 (1994) 183–195; W.W. Batstone, and C. Damon, *Caesar's Civil War*, (Oxford Approaches to Classical Literature), (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2006); M. Mayer, "Caesar and the *Corpus Caesarianum*," 189–232, in: G. Marasco (ed.) *Political Autobiographies and Memoirs in Antiquity. A Brill Companion*, (Brill: Leiden 2011); L. Grillo, *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile. Literature, Ideology, and Community*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2012). For the *Gallic War*, recent essential contributions include: K. Welch and A. Powell (eds.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. The War Commentaries as Political Instru-*

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especially if the modern scholar follows the structure created by Caesar himself. Without exception, recent monographs and popular boooks dedicated to the history of the late Republic and dealing with this civil war fail to question the basic premises of Caesar's account.[2] Apparently there is a disjuncture between literary criticism and historical inquiry. However, if one is attentive to issues of literary construction and alert to those small details that contradict Caesar's narrative, then it may just be possible to write a critical history that sheds further, unexpected light on socio-economic structures of the late Republic as well as upon Caesar's behaviour as author and protagonist. A couple of examples may suffice to illustrate the fundamental work that remains to be done.

An example of conscious and flagrant misrepresentation by Caesar that can be corrected by a close reading of Caesar's own text is furnished by the issue of where Caesar's troops were situated at the moment of the outbreak of civil war. Caesar misleads readers into thinking that he had only one legion present in south of the Alps at the time (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.7.8), and, thanks to its being picked up and enunciated in dramatic form by Livy (fr. 32 Weissenborn-Müller = Oros. 6.15.3), this version prevailed in subsequent ancient and modern accounts (e.g. Plut. *Caes*. 32.1; App. *B Civ*. 2.34.136).[3] Disproof is to be had from a seemingly insignificant fact reported within Caesar's own account: the sudden arrival of reinforcements for Caesar besieging Corfinium during the Italian campaign of early 49 BCE (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.18.5). Since their arrival would not have been possible if they had been situated to the north of the Alps at the moment of the declaration of war, it must be concluded that Caesar has dramatically misrepresented his preparations for armed conflict, which is something that has oddly failed to enter mainstream historiography despite the fact that it was recognized long ago.[4] To accept Caesar's narrative without question is

ments, (Duckworth: London 1998); A.M. Riggsby, *Caesar in Gaul and Rome. War in Words*, (University of Texas Press: Austin 2006).

2 E.g. L. Canfora, *Giulio Cesare. Il dittatore democratico*, (Gius. Laterza & Figli: Bari 1999); Y. Le Bohec, *César chef de guerre. César stratège et tacticien*, (Éditions du Rocher: Paris 2001); E. Baltrusch, *Caesar und Pompeius*, (Geschichte kompakt—Antike), (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 2004); A. Goldsworthy, *Caesar. The Life of a Colossus*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London 2006); R. Billows, *Julius Caesar. The Colossus of Rome*, (Routledge: London 2009); C.E.W. Steel, *The end of the Roman Republic, 146–44 BC. Conquest and crisis*, (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh 2013).

3 Cf. T. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, (Weidmann: Berlin 1902^{9}), 3.383; M. Gelzer, *Caesar. Der Politiker und Staatsmann*, Introduction and updated bibliography by E. Baltrusch, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2008), 163 n. 399.

4 For Caesarian misrepresentation, see esp. H.-M. Ottmer, *Die Rubikon-Legende. Untersuchun-*

tantamount to believing that there were weapons of mass destruction present in the Iraq of Saddam Hussein as part of an overall international terrorist plot in 2001 or lending credence to Russian accounts of their own troop movements into Ukraine in 2014.

Another example of the distortion caused by Caesar's narrative, and yet not appreciated by modern readers, concerns the financial crisis that is commonly associated with the civil war of 49–48 BCE. Known primarily through the testimony of Caesar (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.1.2–3; 3.20–22), this crisis is misleadingly said to have been provoked by the civil war, despite the fact that there is a small but incontrovertible body of evidence that points to its having begun prior to the outbreak of war. Contemporaries and later historians refer to a credit crisis that was already underway in the 50s BCE (Cic. *Att*. 5.21.13; Cass. Dio 41.37.2), which indicates that the problem was merely exacerbated by Caesar's invasion of Italia and not in fact caused by that event. This contradicts the commonly accepted picture that is based upon Caesar's depiction of his own attempt to deal with the situation in Italia in late 49 BCE.[5] Indeed, when closely examined, this evidence strongly suggests that it was the preceding financial crisis that in large part provoked the civil war between Caesar and Pompeius Magnus.[6] Caesar in this instance did not intentionally misrepresent the course of the crisis,

---

gen zu Caesars und Pompeius' Strategie vor und nach Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges, (Boldt: Boppard am Rhein 1979); cf. Carter 1991: 165–166; M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César*. (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1966²), 106. As examples of a modern failure to recognize this rhetorical strategy and its implications for the historical record, see Canfora 1999: 163; Baltrusch 2004: 92; Goldsworthy 2006: 457; Billows 2009: 206.

5 M.W. Frederiksen, "Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt," *Journal of Roman Studies* 56 (1966) 128–141; cf. A. Wassink, "Inflation and Financial Policy under the Roman Empire to the Price Edict of 301 AD," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 40 (1991) 465–493, in part. 471; C. Nicolet, "Economy and Society," 599–643 (= Ch. 16), in: J.A. Crook, A.W. Lintott, and E. Rawson (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History. Second Edition. Vol. IX: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 B.C.* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1994²), here 600; Goldsworthy 2006: 497–498; Billows 2009: 214–215.

6 Cf. K. Verboven, "54–44 BCE: Financial or Monetary Crisis?" 49–68, in: E. Lo Cascio, ed., *Credito e moneta nel mondo romano. Atti degli incontri capresi di storia dell'economia antica* (*Capri 12–14 ottobre 2000*), (Edipuglia: Bari 2003); H.-P. Benöhr, "Finanzielle Transaktionen zwischen Cicero und Caesar in den Jahren 54 bis 50 v. Chr.," 21–43, in: H.-P. Benöhr (ed.), *Iuris Professio. Festgabe für Max Kaser zum 80. Geburtstag*, (Böhlaus Nachfolger: Wien 1986); M. Ioannatou, *Affaires d'argent dans la correspondance de Cicéron. L'aristocratie sénatoriale face à ses dettes*, (Romanité et modernité du droit), (De Boccard: Paris 2006); C. Rollinger, *Solvendi sunt nummi. Die Schuldenkultur der späten römischen Republik im Spiegel der Schriften Ciceros*, (Verlag Antike: Berlin 2009).

but the focus upon his own part in its attempted resolution has led modern historians astray. Be that as it may, it is of especial interest that the financial crisis seems to have been generated in part by the usury that accompanied Pompeius Magnus' extension of the Roman empire in the eastern Mediterranean and that there is a clear case for Caesar's being insolvent on the eve of civil war despite his recent, spectacular conquest of Gaul. Both Pompeius' flight towards Egypt (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.103) and Caesar's probable theft of money from the Treasury of Rome (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.1; 1.33.3–4) are merely aspects of a financial crisis in many ways comparable to that caused by banking practices in the wake of the end of the Cold War.[7]

Various themes are explored in the course of this book as we follow Caesar in his 21-month journey across the ancient Mediterranean. After the present introductory survey, which situates this study within the context of recent work on Caesar's *Civil War* and the socio-economic history of the late Republic, there comes a chapter relating the course of events, and then there follow seven chapters that *pari passu* interweave philological and literary analysis with historical investigation. These chapters are arranged in geographical order, so as to reflect the progression of events and the narrative of the *Civil War*. Monographic and not encyclopaedic in treatment, they are meant to show what information may be recovered from Caesar's testimony and at the same time the care that is required in using any particular statement made by Caesar. The *Civil War* is an extraordinarily rich source of information—potentially—if only we approach it in a critical spirit and with a willingness to think beyond what the author wanted contemporaries to see.

In the third chapter (Italia), analysis of passages relating to the issues of demography and inequitable distribution of wealth is complemented by reflection upon the ways in which Caesar misrepresents contemporary history, whether in writing about his own behaviour or that of his opponents. Caesar's narrative is far from being an account *sine ira et studio*, contrary to what seems to have been one of the characteristics of the *Historiae* written a decade later by his former *legatus* C. Asinius Pollio. The paradox is striking, for it was Pollio and not Caesar who chose to highlight items such as the crossing of the Rubicon, a dramatic moment that marked the point of no-return. Whereas Caesar furnishes a narrative that is noteworthy for its avoidance of rhetorical exaggeration and a use of unadorned prose, Pollio wrote in a Latin that was terse

7 For the affair of the Treasury, discussion must commence with the comprehensive and detailed article of L. de Libero, "Der Raub des Staatsschatzes durch Caesar," *Klio* 80 (1998) 111–133.

and crackled with dramatic energy. Yet, the simplicity and lack of pretence that mark Caesar's prose ought not to mislead into easy credence of what he reports. Time and time again, as in the case of the invasion of Italia, Caesar can be shown to have manipulated the historical record. All the same, some of the statistics that he does provide seem to shed a significant light upon the nature of Roman society and economy in the Italian peninsula, if it be kept in mind that partisan aims inform Caesar's choice of what to report and how to do so. For instance, Caesar appears to indicate that Pompeius disposed of 800 slaves and herdsmen in Apulia (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.24.2; 3.4.4). The evidence, which is bedevilled by a problem of textual transmission, seems credible, even though Caesar uses it in order to depict Pompeius as creating a military force comparable to that once fielded by Spartacus. Albeit obliquely, the spectre of a peninsula-wide slave revolt is evoked in order to tarnish the image of Pompeius, who had in fact been the putative conqueror of Spartacus. Extrapolating from the figure given by Caesar, we find that Pompeius may have possessed 700,000 *iugera* in Apulia alone. In like fashion, the promise that Caesar claims L. Domitius Ahenobarbus made to his soldiers in a vain attempt to withstand siege at Corfinium implies for readers that the latter likewise possessed roughly 700,000 *iugera*.[8] Such a figure has little practical signifiance until one realizes that it is the equivalent of 1/250th of the arable surface of the Italian peninsula. This evidence is both convincing and highly suggestive as regards the socio-economic conditions that led to the fall of the Republic.

In the fourth chapter (Hispania), the significance of the Iberian peninsula's gold and silver mines is highlighted at the same time that a more realistic assessment of the influence of *clientelae* is essayed. Modern assessments of the strategic significance of Hispania for the civil war of 49–48 BCE altogether omit to mention the fact that the Iberian peninsula possessed some of the oldest and most productive of the gold and silver mines operative in the Roman world. The wealth of the Iberian peninsula had been fabled since the Archaic period (Anacr. fr. 361 Page), drawing traders from Phocaea and other Ionian cities and giving rise to the legend of Arganthonius (e.g. Val. Max. 8.13 ext. 4). It was the reason that the Carthaginians took an especial interest in developing the resources of this region after the losses of the First Punic War, and, as is cannily opined by the anonymous author of *1Maccabees*, the same rationale informed the Roman decision to occupy this region in the wake of the Second Punic War (*1Macc.* 8.3–4). Caesar was well aware of the financial resources of Hispania, for, aside from his chronically difficult personal finances, he had served there as

8 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.17.3; P.A. Brunt, "Two great Roman landowners," *Latomus* 34 (1975) 619–635.

quaestor in 69–68 BCE and as proconsul in 61–60 BCE. This personal experience of the region, its resources, and its inhabitants informs Caesar's descriptions of communities such as Gades and Corduba. Caesar is at pains to emphasize both his own solicitude for Roman soldiers and the spontaneity with which various groups abandoned the cause of Pompeius' *legati* and went over to Caesar, reporting the pitched battle at Ilerda but making victory in civil war into a relatively bloodless phenomenon. Caesar is also at pains to emphasize the unusual way in which power was exercised by Pompeius, who remained in the vicinity of Rome and used *legati* to govern distant Hispania. Again Caesar draws readers' attention to the military and constitutional aspects of the situation, although well aware of the economic implications. Armies had to be paid, and the Iberian mines were a significant part of the equation. In contrast to the mines, which are not mentioned but ever-present in the background, *clientelae* are mentioned by Caesar and other authors as having influenced the decisions taken in the prosecution of civil war. Despite the importance attributed to this social tie by modern scholars, however, its subsidiary and relatively ineffectual nature are what emerge from Caesar's narrative. Factors other than *clientelae* determined the course of events.

With the fifth chapter (Gallia), the geopolitical significance of Massilia is investigated and the relevance of small allies to the success of Roman imperialism established. Moreover, light is shed upon the cultural and social ties that spanned the Mediterranean, uniting far-flung Hellenic communities. Preliminary to this study of the importance of a non-Celtic community in Gallia, however, is an examination of the totalitarian, all-encompassing language used by Caesar in describing his achievements to the north of the Alps in the 50s BCE. The claim that Caesar himself and his soldiers had conquered the "whole" of Gallia and Germania is specious. Memorably clear but inaccurate, it unjustly consigns to oblivion the contributions of allies such as Massilia. Founded by Phocaean colonists in the sixth century BCE, the Massiliotes could claim to have been faithful allies to Rome since the time of the Tarquins, and Cicero was to say of the city *sine qua numquam* when mentioning the victories that the Romans had won to the north of the Alps. Despite Caesar's silence regarding Massilia in the *Gallic War*, the city's apparent function as a provincial capital and its role as the geopolitical centre of Gallia made it fundamental to the Transalpine plans of Caesar's enemies in early 49 BCE. Hence, both the decision taken by Caesar's putative successor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus to station himself in Massilia when trying to assume command of Gallia Transalpina and the chagrin felt by Caesar at finding that the city had chosen to align itself with his enemies despite the successes of the past decade. Naturally, Caesar's enemies were elated. Indeed, the Massiliotes' decision to close their gates to Caesar

and yet to admit Ahenobarbus constituted not only a military problem, but a fiasco as regards the victorious general's public image. On the one hand, the defection of Massilia threatened to cut Caesar's lines of communication across the western half of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, no less significantly, the struggle of the Massiliotes to assert their freedom (*eleutheria*) highlighted the hollowness of Caesar's claims to be interested in this very concept (*libertas*) when allegedly defending the veto of the tribunes of the *plebs*. Gathered in Thessalonica, at the other end of the Mediterranean, that portion of the Senate that had persisted in considering Caesar a public enemy greeted the news of the surrender of Massilia to Caesar with a decree awarding freedom to the city of Phocaea, the metropolis from which colonists had gone out to found Massilia some five centuries earlier. Diminutive though they were and despite the fact that they very rarely figure in the larger narratives of imperial expansion, communities such as Massilia and Phocaea were fundamental to the creation and maintenance of Empire.

The sixth chapter (Africa) analyzes the question of the legitimacy of the civil war commanders and focalizes upon the crucial issue of the food-supply of imperial Rome. A necessarily preliminary step to this analysis is reflection upon the source of Caesar's narrative for the campaign conducted in north Africa by C. Scribonius Curio in mid-49 BCE. Close examination of Caesar's account and a comparison with that furnished by Appian of Alexandria reveals that, contrary to what is often asserted,[9] the Caesarian legate C. Asinius Pollio cannot have been the source of information for what Caesar reports. Rather, other Caesarian officers (viz. the legate C. Caninius Rebilus and the quaestor Marcius Rufus) and perhaps even correspondence captured in Pompeius' camp at Pharsalus are far more plausible sources. Once it is established that Caesar likely used materials that had already been sent to the Senate, whether in Rome or in Thessalonica, the treatment of the issue of the legitimacy of command becomes all the more clear. There was the matter of providing not only manifest, public signs of the legitimacy of a particular commander (e.g. lictors and *fasces*; acclamation as *imperator*; use of the title of *legatus*), but of delegitimizing the others who sought to affirm their rights as aspiring governors (e.g. P. Attius Varus and his diabolical agreement with Juba). Curiously, there seem to be echoes of the youthful Pompeius Magnus in Caesar's account of the north African campaign of Scribonius Curio. In any case, this debate over legitimacy is a sign of the importance of Africa, which was due to the region's

9 E.g. Carter 1991: 228.

production of grain and worth the expense of raising fresh armies to contend for its possession. Romans present in the province and slaves freed for the emergency were pressed into service by Pompeius' representatives, whereas Curio brought newly raised legions over from Italia. From the ensuing account of the campaign, there emerge scattered statistics and statements that point to the dimensions of the African contribution to the grain of Rome. Most significant is the figure of 200 ships that were 'captured' at Utica by Curio, conceivably carrying a total cargo of 700,000 *modii*.

In the course of the seventh chapter (Macedonia), both the overall nature of the logistics of the Roman army in the late Republic and the precise strategy that Pompeius had originally intended for 48 BCE are delineated. Thanks to undue emphasis upon the perspective of Caesar himself and probably under the influence of visions of Nazi-occupied Fortress Europe in the early 1940s, there has been a striking failure to understand the strategy that informed Pompeius' troop movements in 49–48 BCE. An attempt to remedy this state of affairs has recently been made with the suggestion that Pompeius intended to carry out a blockade of Italia.[10] The thesis is enticing, for it builds upon Pompeius' experiences of the 60s BCE as well as the conduct of his son Sextus Pompeius in 43–36 BCE. However, in order to understand Pompeius Magnus, it is essential to remember yet again that his meteoric rise began in conjunction with Sulla and the civil war of the late 80s BCE. Although naval power was an integral part of Pompeius' overall strategy, it would appear that he was preparing for nothing less than a forceful return to Italian soil in the Sullan manner for the spring of 48 BCE. Caesar seems to have understood this and for that very reason to have felt the need for extreme haste, embarking as many soldiers as possible prior to the close of the regular sailing season and without the usual preparations. On the other hand, both Caesar's lack of logistical support and the considerable abundance achieved by Pompeius serve, by their consequences as described by Caesar, to remind modern readers of the fundamental necessity of supplies for the prosecution of warfare. Grain, weapons, and money all loom large within the narrative furnished by Caesar. Moreover, despite the focus upon fighting and the holding of positions, it is just possible to perceive the contribution made to the Roman army by camp servants and draft animals. In short, through a socio-economic approach, it is possible to achieve a more

10 K. Welch, *Magnus Pius. Sextus Pompeius and the transformation of the Roman Republic*, (Classical Press of Wales: Swansea 2012), 43–57. This masterful essay in historical interpretation, it should be added, successfully redefines how we should look at the figure of Sextus Pompeius.

complete and rounded vision of the realities of the Roman army in the field in the late Republic.

The eighth chapter (Asia) examines the relationship of local panegyric and forensic oratory to Caesar's own historiography and explores the problem of maladministration of the provinces. Twice within his narrative, Caesar emphasizes failed attempts allegedly made by his enemies to seize money kept within the treasury of the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus.[11] These episodes, as related by Caesar, fall within the tradition of forensic rhetoric and its depictions of the corrupt administration of the provinces: from C. Verres as depicted by Cicero through M. Antonius as represented by Augustus in the *Res Gestae*, there was a solid tradition for decrying such behaviour. However, the specific details of Caesar's own career are of relevance. First as an aspiring prosecutor in his youth and then as a mature statesman in his first consulate, when he wrote what proved to be the definitive law *de repetundis*, Caesar repeatedly showed himself interested in the *pax provinciarum* (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.57.4).[12] That the conqueror of Gaul beyond the Alps was accused of committing the same or worse crimes does nothing to diminish the relevance of the subject and contemporaries' awareness of Caesar's avowed stance. When travelling through Asia in the wake of his victory at Pharsalus, Caesar was fêted as a god made manifest to humanity and there can be little doubt that those communities of the East that marked Caesar's victory as the start of a new epoch also produced panegyric in verse and prose that celebrated the victor's arrival as a liberation from the evils of the recent regime that had been imposed by Scipio Metellus and other of his enemies.[13] Indeed, from its position as the unofficial capital of the Roman province of Asia, the metropolis of Ephesus is the most likely place where Caesar learned at first-hand of the alleged abuses committed by his predecessors. It is possible to discern behind Caesar's narrative both the

11 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.33.1–2, 105.1–2.

12 For Caesar's activity as a prosecutor, see M.C. Alexander, *Trials in the late Republic, 149 BC to 50 BC*. (Phoenix Suppl., 26), (University of Toronto Press: Toronto 1990), nos. 140–141; cf. F. Canali de Rossi, *Le ambascerie dal mondo greco a Roma in età repubblicana*, (Istituto italiano per la storia antica: Roma 1997), nos. 195–196. For Caesar's legislation, see B. Santalucia, *Diritto e processo penale nell'antica Roma*, (Giuffrè editore: Milano 1998^2), 157–160.

13 For the celebration of Caesar as a god made manifest: *SIG*^{3} 760; A.E. Raubitschek, "Epigraphical Notes on Julius Caesar," *Journal of Roman Studies* 44 (1954) 65–75. For a new epoch, see in particular W. Leschhorn, *Antike Ären. Zeitrechnung, Politik und Geschichte im Schwarzmeerraum und in Kleinasien nördlich des Taurus*, (Historia Einzelschriften, 81), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1993).

long-established tradition of delivering speeches and poems in honour of the arrival of a distinguished ruler and the important role played by Ephesus in the late Republic as a financial centre for the eastern half of the Mediterranean basin.[14]

The ninth and final chapter (Aegyptus) delineates the credit crisis that provoked war and resolves the issue of the unresolved ending of the *Civil War*. As remarked above at the outset, thanks to a misreading of the Caesarian evidence it is commonly held—despite an awareness of evidence to the contrary—that a credit crisis was provoked by the coming of civil war in January 49 BCE.[15] Admittedly the evidence is far more fragile than that commonly deployed by contemporary economic historians, on account of the rhetorical nature of the literary evidence for individuals and statistics.[16] Nonetheless, it is possible to go beyond the citation of individual statistics and to pose critical questions regarding the solvency of key figures such as Caesar and Pompeius.[17] Investigation of the individual finances for members of the elite in the last decades of the Republic affords abundant confirmation of Caesar's memorable vignettes of heavily indebted leaders intent upon warfare as a means of ameliorating their own financial position.[18] Indeed, this research strongly suggests an underlying structural cause for the civil war of 49–48 BCE: both Caesar and Pomepius themselves were financially overextended and thus "exposed" to their creditors. The Roman practice of usury *vis-à-vis* the provincials and allies is perhaps most dramatically revealed by the episode of the recognition of Ptolemy XII as an ally of the Roman people.[19] This episode, it is worth recalling, not only united the political and financial fortunes of Pompeius and Caesar, but also led both men to visit Egypt in the wake of the "decisive battle" of Pharsalus. Which visit is

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14 For the practice of the panegyric and its tradition, see Men. Rhet. 378.16–23 Spengl; S.G. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity*, (The Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 1), (University of California Press: Berkeley 1981), 17–61.

15 Frederiksen 1966: 128–141.

16 Cf. I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*, (Collection Latomus, 142), (Latomus: Bruxelles 1975); W. Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," *Classical Quarterly* 46 (1996) 222–238.

17 For an individual case-study, see T.P. Wiseman, "The ambitions of Quintus Cicero," *Journal of Roman Studies* 56 (1966) 108–115. For syntheses, see for instance T. Frank (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*. 6 vols. (Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore 1933–1940); P. Kay, *Rome's economic revolution*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014), 195.

18 For vignettes, see for instance Caes. *B Civ*. 1.4.2–3; 3.83.1,4. Ioannatou 2006; Rollinger 2009.

19 R.W. Westall, "Date of the Testament of Ptolemy XII", *Ricerche di Egittologia e di Antichità Copte* 11 (2009) 79–94; idem, "The Loan to Ptolemy XII, 59–48 BCE", *Ricerche di Egittologia e di Antichità Copte* 12 (2010) 23–41.

itself a closing of the circle, for Pompeius and Caesar happened upon an Egyptian civil war that was already in progress and that was due in large part to this Hellenistic kingdom's financial straits. Indeed, it would seem that Caesar initially chose to include the episode of Egypt in the *Civil War* not only because of the death of Pompeius, but also because of his hopes of being able to achieve peace in this instance, and that he abandoned writing the *Civil War* when it became clear that his attempt at mediation between Ptolemy XIII and Cleopatra VII was doomed to failure.

CHAPTER 2

The Civil War of 49–48 BCE

Through his passage of the Rubicon and by entrance into the sleepy coastal city of Ariminum in northeastern Italia early in January 49 BCE, Gaius Iulius Caesar effectively proclaimed the opening of a civil war and thereby initiated a long, tumultuous, and bloody revolution. The evil that men accomplish long survives them. Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, Caesar's erstwhile son-in-law and primary opponent was dead by late September 48 BCE. Caesar himself fell victim to assassination by his collaborators and pardoned enemies in March 44 BCE. All of the other principal figures of the events of 49–48 BCE and the leading statesmen of that generation were by then already dead or very soon to die. Nonetheless, the civil war continued, unabated for another fifteen years. Through the challenge that he posed and the response formulated by his enemies, Caesar set in motion a revolution when he crossed the Rubicon. Taken in defence of his personal interests, this simple act inevitably evoked memories of Sulla's marches upon Rome in 88 and 83–82 BCE.[1] Caesar thus opened a series of armed conflicts—from time to time broken by alleged truces and pacts that allowed for rearming and repositioning—that would only come to an end with the triple triumph of his adoptive son Caesar the Younger in 29 BCE and a new settlement over the years 28–27 BCE. Two decades of civil war constituted a national catastrophe, and one of the results was the transformation of the Republic into the Principate.

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Notwithstanding the infamous statement regarding *res novae* attributed to Caesar at the end of the 50s BCE,[2] there is no evidence in the writings or actions of Caesar prior to 47 BCE to suggest that he was motivated by a desire for revolution.[3] Slander is common coin in politics, and opponents' anachronistic recon-

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1 [Cic.] *Att.* 9.7C.1 (early March 49 BCE), in which letter Caesar pointedly and explicitly disavows any intention of behaving as Sulla had: *quem imitaturus non sum.* This letter, it will further be noted, was addressed in the first instance to Caesar's collaborators C. Oppius and L. Corrnelius Balbus the Elder, so that they might give it as wide a circulation as possible.

2 Suet. *Iul.* 27.2.

3 H. Strasburger, "Caesar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen," *HZ* 175 (1953) 225–264; *idem*, *Caesar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen*, (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1968^2) = *idem*,

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structions that portray behaviour as linear characteristically afford corroboration for the indisposed or ingenuous. Hence, the affirmation that Caesar incited people to hope for civil war ought to be viewed as no more true nor false than Cicero's claim that Caesar went around citing verse from Euripides' *Phoenissae* on the value of tyranny.[4] Caesar did in fact achieve tyranny, and that for an ancient audience was sufficient to demonstrate that such had been his aim from the very outset.[5] But Caesar's strict adherence to legal forms reveals a different reality, wherein the Roman politician sought to maintain formal propriety while maximalising the power that he enjoyed.[6] In short, although desirous of exercising power in uninterrupted fashion and in a way that ran counter to the spirit of the Republic, Caesar cannot be said to have wished to subvert the state. Rather, he was merely emulating Pompeius Magnus.[7] A problem arose from the fact that, in emulating Pompeius, Caesar threatened to surpass his predecessor. Not a covert and irrational desire for revolution or tyranny, but traditional aristocratic competition brought about the civil war of 49–48 BCE.[8]

Caesar's goals were stated in plain language repeatedly in the tense weeks of debate and negotiating that preceded the outbreak of civil war.[9] Caesar wished

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"Caesar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen," 1.343–421, in: *idem, Studien zur alten Geschichte*, eds. W. Schmitthenner and R. Strasburger, 3 vols. (Olms: Hildesheim 1982–1990).

4 Cic. *Off.* 3.82; Suet. *Iul.* 30.5; cf. Cic. *Att.* 7.11.1. Cf. A.R. Dyck, *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis*, (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1996), 41; D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's letters to Atticus*. 7 vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1965–1970), here 4.298–299. It is not without interest that whereas this phrase is cited by M. Gelzer, *Caesar. Der Politiker und Staatsmann*. Introduction and updated bibliography by E. Baltrusch, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2008), 167 n. 15, it does not appear in any of the biographies written in more recent decades. While it is scarcely credible that Caesar said anything of the sort, the appearance of this phrase in ancient evidence does merit consideration, as a reminder of the difference between ancients and moderns.

5 Tyranny: Vell. 2.58.2.

6 For Caesar's observance of legal forms, as regards the dictatorship, see A.E. Raubitschek, "Epigraphical Notes on Julius Caesar," *JRS* 44 (1954) 65–75; cf. Z. Yavetz, *Julius Caesar and his Public Image*, (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life), (Cornell University Press: Ithaca 1983), 204–205. It is worth recalling that such legal formalism was observed in 59 BCE not only by Caesar (e.g. Suet. *Iul.* 20.2, on the consulate of Julius and Caesar) but also by his intractable colleague M. Bibulus (e.g. Plut. *Pomp.* 47.4–5, 48.1–2,4; *Cat. min.* 32.2–3; cf. *Caes.* 14).

7 For the career of Pompeius Magnus, see K.M. Girardet, "*Imperium* und *provinciae* des Pompeius seit 67 v. Chr.," *Cahiers du Centre G. Glotz* 3 (1992) 177–188.

8 The classic formulation remains that of E.S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1974), 498–507.

9 For a detailed review of the evidence see K. Raaflaub, *Dignitatis Contentio. Studien zur Motivation und politischen Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius*, (Vestigia, 20),

to retain *imperium* not only formally, but also in real terms through the possession of a province with its army. He wished to retain *imperium*, moreover, until he had been elected consul and had a chance to celebrate a triumph for the spectacular successes achieved in Gaul, Britain, and Germany in the 50s BCE.[10] Although the evidence is not clear on the specific timetable, it seems implied that Caesar wished to retain *imperium* until the very last day of 49 BCE, so as to enter Rome in triumph on 1 January 48 BCE and to commence his second consulate immediately within that setting.[11] Three considerations buttress such a reconstruction: the language with which Caesar talks of the transition from provincial government to triumph to consulate, the elementary fact that this is the only way whereby he would have been completely immune from prosecution, and the historical example afforded by his aunt Julia's husband Gaius Marius in 105 BCE.[12] Indeed, it is worth observing that thereby he would also have avoided the problems and humiliation endured by Pompeius Magnus upon that great man's return in overweening triumph from the East.[13] Since there were many who perceived politics as a zero-sum game, however, opposition to these goals was solid and enduring.[14] When the tribunes of the *plebs*

(C.H. Beck: München 1974); K. Raaflaub, "Caesar the Liberator? Factional Politics, civil war, and ideology," 35–67, in: F. Cairns and E. Fantham, eds., *Caesar Against Liberty? Perspectives on his Autocracy*, (Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar, 11), (Francis Cairns: Cambridge 2003). Aside from the correspondence of Cicero, the main literary sources are: Caes. *B Civ*. 1.1.1–5.2; Vell. 2.49.1–4; Plut. *Caes*. 31; *Pomp*. 59; *Cic*. 36–37; *Ant*. 5; *Cat. min*. 51; Suet. *Iul*. 29–31; Flor. 2.13.15–17; App. *B Civ*. 2.32–33; Cass. Dio 41.1–3; Eutr. 6.19; Liv. *Per*. 109; Oros. 6.15.2–3.

10 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.7.7 (*cuius imperatoris ductu ... omnem*).

11 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.85.10; R. Morstein-Marx, "Caesar's Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His *Ratio Absentis* in the Approach to Civil War," *Historia* 56 (2007) 159–178.

12 Sall. *BJ* 114.3; Plut. *Mar*. 12. It is worth adding that this behaviour was subsequently emulated by Caesar's *epigonoi* L. Antonius (*cos*. 41 BCE) and L. Marcius Censorinus (*cos*. 39 BCE).

13 For useful surveys, see M. Gelzer, *Pompeius. Lebensbild eines Römers*. Introduction and updated bibliography by E. Herrmann-Otto, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2005), 120–130; T.P. Wiseman, "The Senate and the *Populares*, 69–60 B.C.," 327–367 (= Ch. 9), in: J.A. Crook, A.W. Lintott, and E. Rawson (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History. Second Edition. Vol. IX: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 B.C.* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1994²), here 364–365; T.P. Wiseman, "Caesar, Pompey and Rome, 59–50 B.C.," 368–423 (= Ch. 10), in: J.A. Crook, A.W. Lintott, and E. Rawson (eds.), *The Cambridge Ancient History. Second Edition. Vol. IX: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 B.C.* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1994²), here 372.

14 E.g. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.4 (Cato the Younger, Lentulus Crus, Metellus Scipio, and Pompeius Magnus).

M. Antonius and Q. Cassius used their veto to hinder discussion of a motion that embodied this opposition, talk of using violence upon their persons was a natural consequence.[15] That, however, was merely the last of a series of grave tactical errors. The subsequent flight of these two tribunes of the *plebs* from Rome north towards Caesar in Ravenna would furnish Caesar with a pretext for marching upon Rome.[16] In the repeated declarations that Caesar made to clarify his motivation and restate his goals over the next twenty months, the freedom of the tribunes of the *plebs* and Caesar's honour were consistently and inextricably intertwined.[17]

On 7 January 49 BCE, vituperation and threats of physical violence attended the attempt by the tribunes of the *plebs* M. Antonius and Q. Cassius to hinder a senatorial decree by the use of their power of veto.[18] There followed an emergency decree of the Senate (*SCU*) that enjoined the magistrates and promagistrates in the vicinity of Rome to act so as to secure the safety of the state.[19] Fleeing precipitately from Rome, the two tribunes of the *plebs* encountered Caesar at Ariminum at the break of dawn on 11 January 49 BCE.[20] Having received advance report the previous evening, Caesar, who was stationed nearby in Ravenna, had brought forward that legion most faithful from the years in Gaul—Legio XIII—and staged a dramatic reunion with the fugitive tribunes of the *plebs*.[21] There ensued a cool and methodical occupation of the northeastern seaboard of the Italian peninsula, what some would ingeniously misrepresent as the conquest of the world with a single legion.[22] Caesar left a

15 E.g. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.5.1–2.

16 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.5.5.

17 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.7.1–7, 8; 3.91.2.

18 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.5.1–2,4.

19 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.5.3–4; Cic. *Fam*. 16.11.2; cf. Cic. *Att*. 10.8.8; Liv. *Per*. 109; Cass. Dio 41.3.3–4.

20 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.8.1; cf. J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar. The Civil War, Books 1–2*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1991), 165. For the flight of the two tribunes, who were accompanied by Curio, see also Cic. *Fam*. 16.11.2; *Phil*. 2.51; Lucan. 1.231–295; Suet. *Iul*. 31, 33; Plut. *Ant*. 5.8–9; App. *B Civ*. 2.33.129–133; Cass. Dio 41.1–3; Liv. *Per*. 109; Oros. 6.15.2–3. The date is not expressly stated by Caesar nor any other author, but must be inferred from Caesar's evidence.

21 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.8.1.

22 Oros. 6.15.3 (citing Livy); cf. L. Canfora, *Giulio Cesare. Il dittatore democratico*, (Gius. Laterza & Figli: Bari 1999); R.T. Ridley, "Attacking the World with Five Cohorts: Caesar in January 49," *Ancient Society* 34 (2004) 127–152; cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.7.8, 8.1. For initial stages of the invasion of Italia, aside from the voluminous contemporary evidence of the correspondence of Cicero, the principal literary sources are: Caes. *B Civ*. 1.7–13, 15; Vell. 2.49.4; Plut. *Caes*. 32; *Pomp*. 60; *Ant*. 6; *Cat. min*. 52; Suet. *Iul*. 31–33; Flor. 2.13.18–19; App. *B Civ*. 2.34–35; Cass. Dio 41.4; Liv. *Per*. 109; Eutr. 6.19; Oros. 6.15.3–4.

cohort each in the coastal cities of Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona and himself proceeded south while reinforcements arrived from Cisalpine Gaul, whereas he despatched M. Antonius with five cohorts of the Legio XIII to Arretium so as to block north-south routes to the west of the Appenines and along the Tyrrhenian coastline.[23] As news fragmentarily made its way to Rome and an image of the strategic situation emerged, Pompeius and the consuls decided to abandon the city of Rome and moved southwards. Leaving Rome on 17 January, Pompeius was anything but pellucid about future plans.[24] After a refusal by Cicero to assume responsibility for Capua, he left the consuls in charge of the defence of Campania, while continuing towards Apulia without delay.[25] On 15 February, Caesar advancing south arrived at Corfinium, where L. Domitius Ahenobarbus—ever with an uncanny sense for choosing the wrong strategy—had taken up position despite the pleas of Pompeius.[26] Cognizant of their general's defective strategy, the soldiers defending Corfinium chose to surrender to Caesar despite a more than generous reward offered by Ahenobarbus.[27]

23 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.11.4.

24 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.14.3; Cic. *Att*. 7.10; cf. 8.1.1 (a month after Pompeius' departure from Rome); 8.9a.2. On the other hand, a different note is struck in a letter composed shortly after Pompeius' setting sail from Brundisium: Cic. *Att*. 9.10.2 (*vidi hominem XIIII Kal. Febr. plenum formidinis. illo ipso die sensi quid ageret*). For later accounts of Pompeius' departure from Rome, see Vell. 2.49.4; Plut. *Pomp*. 60–61; *Caes*. 33.4–6; *Cic*. 37.1; App. *B Civ*. 2.37.148; Cass. Dio 41.6–9. For those regarding the departure of the consuls on the following day, see also Plut. *Caes*. 34; Flor. 2.13.21; cf. Suet. *Iul*. 34.1; Lucan. 1.469–522; 2.392–398. It is worth observing that the later historiographical accounts tend to amalgamate the departures of Pompeius and the consuls (e.g. those of Appian and Cassius Dio), which phenomenon probably derives from the imperative to synthesize (e.g. Velleius and Suetonius). It is also worth noting that this is the context for an ominous threat attributed to Pompeius: Caes. *B Civ*. 1.33.2; Plut. *Pomp*. 61.6 (cf. *Caes*. 33.6, rather differently phrased); Suet. *Iul*. 75.1; App. *B Civ*. 2.37.148; Polyaen. 8.23.27; Cass. Dio 41.6.2; cf. Cic. *Att*. 9.10.2 (18 March 49 BCE); 11.6.6 (27 November 48 BCE); Plut. *Cic*. 37.1; Cass. Dio 41.18.5. The Ciceronian testimony confirms that a warning of some sort was issued in the course of abandoning Italia, but falls short of corroboration for Caesar's version (*pace* Carter 1991: 183).

25 Cicero preferred a more modest role limited to the environs of Formiae: Cic. *Att*. 7.11.5. For a detailed and convincing explanation of what transpired as regards Capua at this juncture, see D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's letters to Atticus*. 7 vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1965–1970), here 4.438–440.

26 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.15.6–7 (Domitius), 16.1–4 (Caesar).

27 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.17–22, for subsequent events at Corfinium and a desultory siege. For this episode, see also Vell. 2.50.1; Plut. *Caes*. 34.6–8; Suet. *Iul*. 34.1; *Ner*. 2.2; App. *B Civ*. 2.38; Cass. Dio 41.10–11; Liv. *Per*. 109; Oros. 6.15.4; cf. Lucan. 2.478–525. It is worth recalling that Domitius, expecting no mercy from Caesar, contemplated suicide. That may be a sign

Thus, less than a week after having commenced the siege of a strongly fortified city, Caesar took and entered Corfinium at dawn on 21 February.[28] With the surrender of Corfinium, roughly three legions fell into the hands of Caesar.[29] Integrating them with his own forces and leaving the city intact, Caesar without delay began the march southeast towards Brundisium in an attempt to catch Pompeius before the latter could escape. Pompeius was still in that Italian port when Caesar arrived on 9 March, awaiting the return of the fleet that had taken half of his army and the consuls across the Adriatic sea to the province of Macedonia.[30] Caesar proceeded energetically with the siege of Brundisium, but Pompeius managed to withdraw with nearly all of his remaining soldiers on the night of 17 March.[31] Despite assistance from the townsfolk, Caesar found his victory Pyrrhic at best. Notwithstanding a brilliant and unannounced campaign by Caesar and the onset of winter, Pompeius had managed to withdraw from Italy both with the consuls and with a total of five legions.[32]

Quickly Caesar made dispositions both for the amassing of a fleet at Brundisium and for the occupation of southern Italy and the islands of Sicilia and Sardinia.[33] Then he withdrew to Rome. In the two weeks that elapsed between Caesar's departure from Brundisium and his arrival at Rome, he tried to prepare the terrain by meeting with peers from the Senate along the way. For instance, he corresponded with and actually visited M. Tullius Cicero, who nonetheless remained adamant in opposing Caesar's deployment of an army in order to

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of defect of character. However, as has been remarked, many contemporaries expected Caesar to emulate Sulla and therefore to be vindictive and deadly: Gelzer 2008: 170 n. 34 = Gelzer 1960[6]: 184 n. 34 = Gelzer 1968 (English): 201 n. 2.

28 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.23.1. For the date, see Cic. *Att*. 8.14.1; cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.23.5.

29 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.15.5–7, 17.2; cf. P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1971), 475.

30 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.25.1–3; F. Kraner, F. Hofmann, and H. Meusel (eds.), *C. Iulii Caesaris Commentarii de Bello Civili*. Afterword and bibliography by H. Oppermann, (Weidmann: Berlin 1959[12]), 369.

31 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.25.4–28.2.

32 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.25.2; cf. Plut. *Pomp*. 63.1. Overall, for the siege of Brundisium, see Caes. *B Civ*. 1.24–28; Vell. 2.49.4–50.1; Lucan. 2.607–736; Plut. *Caes*. 35.1–2; *Pomp*. 62–63; *Ant*. 6; Suet. *Iul*. 34; *Flor*. 2.13.19–20; App. *B Civ*. 2.38–40; Frontin. *Strat*. 1.5.5; Cass. Dio 41.11.1, 12.1–14.1; Liv. *Per*. 109; Eutr. 6.19; Oros. 6.15.4.

33 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.4.1; cf. 1.29, 30.2. For grain-producing islands of Sardinia and Sicilia, see Caes. *B Civ*. 1.30–31; App. *B Civ*. 2.40; Flor. 2.13.22; Cass. Dio 41.41.1; Oros. 6.15.7. As for garrisons at the more significant of the ports of southern Italia, see Caes. *B Civ*. 1.32.1; Cic. *Att*. 9.15.1; Cass. Dio 41.15.1; App. *B Civ*. 2.40.

achieve a solution to the political impasse.[34] Acting with a bravado that belied the precarious nature of his situation, Caesar entered the city of Rome and participated in a meeting of the Senate on 1–3 April.[35] An attempt was made to form a delegation to offer terms to Pompeius Magnus and the consuls.[36] When it became clear that nothing would come of this, Caesar abruptly changed tack. Notwithstanding the protests of the tribune of the *plebs* L. Caecilius Metellus, Caesar's men broke into the Treasury and removed the wealth on deposit there.[37] Then, having apparently alienated popular opinion in Rome by this act of open sacrilege at the same time that he accumulated the means to pay for the coming campaigns, Caesar abandoned the city of Rome so as to pass overland in order to deal with Pompeius' generals and the armies that they commanded in Spain.[38]

En route to Spain, Caesar found it prudent to pay a visit to the allied community of Massilia. Commanding access to the river Rhône and the interior of Transalpine Gaul, this Phocaean colony also lay athwart the coastal route leading from Italy to Spain. Therefore, upon arriving towards 19 April, Caesar was vexed to find the city's gates closed to him. The city's council informed him that they were not prepared to choose between Caesar and Pompeius. They preferred a policy of neutrality. However, when L. Domitius Ahenobarbus arrived, in the guise of the new proconsul of Transalpine Gaul and enjoying legitimacy thanks to a recent decree of the Senate, the Massiliotes did admit him into their city. Defining this behaviour as outrageous, Caesar left three legions to conduct the siege and reduction of Massilia, himself proceeding on his way to Spain to deal with Pompeius' armies. Having lost the entire month of May in an inconclusive attempt to secure his rear, Caesar felt that he could no longer afford to delay bringing reinforcement to those of his forces in Spain.[39]

Already, as in the case of Italy, Caesar had stolen a march upon his enemies by ordering some of his Gallic legions to advance into Spain prior to the actual

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34 Cic. *Att.* 9.11a.1; 9.14.3; 9.15.1; 9.15a; 9.16.1,2–3; 9.18.1.

35 For the date, see KHM 1959[12]: 369.

36 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.33.1–4. As will be seen in Chapter 3 (Italia), this passage is a thorny admixture of truth, half-truths, and outright lies.

37 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.33.3; Plut. *Caes.* 35.6–11; *Pomp.* 62.1–2; Flor. 2.13.21; App. *B Civ.* 2.41.163–165; Cass. Dio 41.15–18; Eutr. 6.20. For the sums involved, see Plin. *HN* 33.56; Oros. 6.15.5.

38 For popular opinion regarding the episode involving the treasury, see Chapter 3 (Italia). As for Caesar's *bon mot* regarding the impending Spanish expedition, see Suet. *Iul.* 34.2.

39 For the episode of Massilia, see Caes. *B Civ.* 1.34–36; Vell. 2.50.3; Suet. *Iul.* 34.2; *Ner.* 2.3; Flor 2.13.23; Cass. Dio 41.19; Liv. *Per.* 110; Oros. 6.15.6; cf. Lucan. 3.298. As regards the dates of Caesar's movements, see KHM 1959[12]: 369–370.

outbreak of hostilities. Foresight is in fact indicated by Caesar's having stationed three legions in winter quarters in the vicinity of the colony of Narbo.[40] Under the command of his legate C. Fabius, they had been ordered to seize the initiative, once Caesar had crossed the Rubicon, and they had anticipated the Pompeians by occupying the passes of the mountainous barrier of the Pyrenees. Their advance into Hispania Citerior, however, had been halted at Ilerda by the joint army of Pompeius' legates L. Afranius and M. Petreius. With the passing of time, the situation of the Caesarian forces became more difficult: their extended lines of supply meant logistical problems as Pompeius' forces threatened to isolate and destroy them.[41] This was the situation that confronted Caesar upon his arrival towards 23 June, at the start of what was the beginning of the campaigning season according to the solar year (behind the civil year by roughly two months).[42] When a frontal assault upon the redoubtable defences of Ilerda failed, Caesar withdrew and his enemies followed suit.[43] Over the course of the following month, in marches and counter-marches between the valleys of the river Sicoris and the river Hiberus, Caesar managed to reverse the situation.[44] Cornering the forces of Afranius and Petreius and cutting them off from water and provisions, he compelled these Pompeian generals to surrender. Won without recourse to an engaged battle at the culmination of the campaign, this "victory of Ilerda" was achieved on 2 August.[45] Afranius and Petreius capitulated. Those of their soldiers who were residents of Spain were to be cashiered immediately, and the remainder were to be released from service upon departure from Spain under the watchful gaze of a Caesarian force that escorted them to the border with Gaul.[46] Within a mere 40 days, Caesar had destroyed the main fighting force in Spain commanded by the best of Pompeius' legates.[47] Not surprisingly, this date was to be celebrated as a festival in

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40 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.37.1.

41 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.37.1–3, 40.1–7.

42 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.41.1. For the date, see KHM 1959^{12}: 370.

43 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.42–48.

44 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.65–86.

45 For the date, see *Inscr. Ital.* 13.1.318 (*Fast. Vall.*), 328 (*Fast. Ant. Ministr. Dom. Aug.*); 13.2.30–31 (*Fast. Arval.*), 79 (*Fast. Maff.*), 190–191 (*Fast. Amit.*) 208 (*Fast. Ant. Min.*).

46 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.86–87.

47 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.2.32.5; M. Wistrand, "The date of Curio's African campaign" *Eranos* 61 (1963) 38–44. Of course, the figure of "40" is not a precise statistic: W. Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," *CQ* 46 (1996) 222–238.

Overall, for the campaign against Afranius and Petreius, see the following literary sources: Caes. *B Civ.* 1.37–55, 59–87; Vell. 2.50.4; Plut. *Caes.* 36; *Pomp.* 63, 65; *Cic.* 38; *Ant.*

later years as Caesar's successors re-shaped the national memory of the period of the civil wars.[48]

For his part, Caesar was well aware that the task in Spain was but half completed. There remained M. Terentius Varro, whose two legions in Hispania Ulterior might at any moment constitute the basis for a resumption of hostilities in the Iberian peninsula.[49] Civil war requires a bravado that is insensible to the conventions of civil society. Attached rather to scholarly pursuits and by nature hesitant, Varro was supremely unsuited for the role of leadership that now fell to him.[50] Undecided until events at Ilerda seemed to point to Caesar's total defeat, Varro delayed proper preparations until it was too late for them to be completed prior to the enemy's arrival.[51] Moving in advance of two legions under the command of the tribune of the *plebs* Q. Cassius, Caesar was protected by an elite force of 600 cavalry as he traversed the vast inner spaces of Spain and descended upon Varro's outposts.[52] The locals' response to Caesar's edict calling upon the communities to send representatives to meet him at Corduba was overwhelming, and favourable. The inhabitants and garrison of Gades went over to Caesar, evicting his representative C. Gallonius, and at news of this one of the legions under Varro's command withdrew from his camp so as to occupy the forum of Hispalis and declare their unwillingness to fight against Caesar. Retreating to Italica, Varro found that city's gates closed to him as well, and it was at that point that he sent to Caesar to announce his formal surrender.[53] Systematizing matters in the course of a week between Corduba and Gades, probably in early October, Caesar then sailed back from Gades to Tarraco and from there made his way to Massilia overland.[54]

7; Suet. *Iul.* 34.2, 75.2; Flor. 2.13.26–28; App. *B Civ.* 2.42–43; Frontin. Strat. 1.5.9, 8.9; 2.1.11, 5.38, 13.6; Polyaen. 8.23.28; Cass. Dio 41.20–23.2; Liv. *Per.* 110; Eutr. 6.20.2; Oros. 6.15.6; cf. Lucan. 4.1–401.

48 App. *B Civ.* 2.106.442; Cass. Dio 43.44.6; cf. A. Fraschetti, *Roma e il principe*, (Gius. Laterza & Figli: Bari 2005^2), 15; A.K. Michels, *The calendar of the Roman Republic*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1967), 142; S. Weinstock, *Divus Julius*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1971), 133; P. Herz, "Kaiserfeste der Prinzipatszeit," *ANRW* 2.16.2 (1978) 1135–1200, here 1150.

49 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.38.1; 2.18.1, 20.4.

50 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.17.5; cf. G.O. Rowe, "Dramatic structures in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 399–414, in part. 404.

51 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.17–21.

52 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.19.1.

53 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.20.

54 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.21. Overall, for the campaign against Varro in Hispania Ulterior, see Caes. *B Civ.* 2.17–21; Cic. *Fam.* 9.13.1; Vell. 2.50.4; Plut. *Caes.* 36; *Pomp.* 63, 65; Suet. *Iul.* 34; Flor. 2.13.29; App. *B Civ.* 2.43; Cass. Dio 41.23.2–24.2; Liv. *Per.* 110; Eutr. 6.20; Oros. 6.15.7. As remarked in a

During Caesar's time campaigning against Pompeius' legates in Spain, his legates C. Trebonius and D. Brutus had prosecuted the siege of Massilia, effectively hindering Domitius from using the city as a bridgehead whereby he might take control of Transalpine Gaul. A fleet was built near Arelate so as to complement the siege by land with a naval blockade.[55] Despite the fact that the Caesarian fleet was made of fresh timber and therefore not optimal for use, both the numbers and training of the soldiers on the Caesarian ships gave them an advantage that was translated into a hard-won victory in a first naval engagement in mid-July.[56] A month later a second naval engagement was fought, in the wake of receipt of the news of Caesar's defeat of the forces of Afranius and Petreius in Hispania Citerior.[57] Again victory went to the veteran and more numerous forces of Caesar, and this time Domitius and his collaborators fled from Massilia, abandoning the Massiliotes to their fate.[58] Despite these reverses and the subsequent, initial breaching of the city-walls, the Massiliotes fought on as long as there were sufficient men to provide what seemed a reliable defence. However, once the land forces of Trebonius and Brutus had managed a second time to effect a breach in the walls, the Massiliotes surrendered in earnest. With difficulty restraining their men from sacking the city, Caesar's legates awaited his return from Spain.[59] Arriving towards the end of October and fresh from the creation of an altar upon the Pyrenees to commemorate his victory, Caesar punished the erstwhile allies by having the walls of Massilia torn down and taking possession of the city's treasury, but showed clemency to the

previous note, it should be noted that often these sources (e.g. Velleius) do not name Varro and sometimes only refer in passing to a consequence of the campaign (e.g. Appian). More specifically, for the *conventus* held at Tarraco, see Caes. *B Civ.* 2.21.4–5; Cass. Dio 41.24.3.

55 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.36.

56 Caes. *B B Civ. C* 1.56–58. For the date, cf. KHM 1959[12]: 370 (late July).

57 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.1–5. For the date, again cf. KHM 1959[12]: 371 (late August).

58 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.6–7.

59 For the conclusion of the siege, see Caes. *B Civ.* 2.8–16. Overall, for the Caesarian campaign against Massilia, see Caes. *B Civ.* 1.34–36, 56–58; 2.1–16; Vell. 2.50.3; Suet. *Iul.* 34.2; *Ner.* 2.3; Flor. 2.13.23; Cass. Dio 41.19, 25.1–2; Liv. *Per.* 110; Oros. 6.15.6; cf. Lucan. 3.298. The omission of the Massiliote campaign by Plutarch from his biography of Caesar is perhaps significant as regards that author's willingness to overlook items that might detract from the image that he wishes to project. In the case of Appian, on the other hand, it is curious that reference both to this campaign and to that against Varro is missing. The resulting narrative *lacunae* (App. *B Civ.* 2.42.167, 43.174, where one would have expected passages based on material tantamount to Caes. *B Civ.* 1.34–36, 56–58; 2.1–22) look as though they were caused by a loss of notes by the author in the midst of composition. Apparently Appian kept his notes or materials collected by episode.

Massiliotes themselves by sparing their lives and (so it would seem) personal property.[60] Unlike Sulla at Athens in the mid-80s BCE, Caesar had carefully avoided a bloodbath, thereby encouraging other provincials to hope that they might be treated likewise as the main theatre of civil war now shifted to the Greek-speaking eastern half of the Mediterranean.

Success, however, did not crown all of the campaigns that Caesar and his partisans conducted in 49 BCE. Most serious was the reverse suffered by C. Scribonius Curio in Africa, but the defeat of C. Antonius in Illyricum and the mutiny that Caesar had to face down at Placentia indicated the precarious nature of the gains made to date.

Of these three reverses, Africa was the most clamorous and had the potential to destabilize Caesar's control of the western half of the Mediterranean. Receiving four legions from Caesar, Curio was appointed by the Senate in early April—during Caesar's sojourn in Rome—to secure Sicilia and Africa and thereby assure a stable grain supply for the imperial cosmopolis.[61] To that end Curio had visited Rome while these legions made their way south towards Lucania and the Strait of Messina.[62] Despite the fact that Cato the Younger was active overseeing the construction of a war-fleet and the recruitment of legions, the opposition vanished at Curio's presence, much like snow upon a mid-summer's day. By early May, or so it would seem, the island of Sicilia had been abandoned to Curio's government.[63] The need to assemble sufficient naval stock for transportation and perhaps caution, however, meant that the invasion of Africa, which was the logical next step of this campaign, did not transpire until early August.[64] Crossing over to Africa with only two of the four legions that he had received from Caesar, Curio initially encamped at Castra Cornelia and subsequently moved most of his forces to a short distance from the flourishing city of Utica.[65] Stationed in Utica at the northern extremity of the province of

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60 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.22. Other accounts and allusions include: Cic. *Off.* 2.28; Cic. *Phil.* 8.18–19; 13.32; Strab. 4.1.5 C181; Flor. 2.13.25; Cass. Dio 41.25.3; Liv. *Per.* 110; Oros. 6.15.7. Additional confirmation that the city's juridical status remained as before is to be had from the fact that is listed as a *civitas foederata* in the early Principate: Plin. *HN* 3.34.

61 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.2.

62 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.25.1. As regards the question of the legal status of Curio as an independent commander or a subordinate of Caesar, it is worth observing that the oath (*sacramentum*) was taken to Caesar: Caes. *B Civ.* 1.23.5.

63 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.4–5; Cic. *Att.* 10.16.3; Plut. *Cat. min.* 53.2–4; App. *B Civ.* 2.41; Cass. Dio 41.18.1; Oros. 6.15.7; cf. Lucan. 3.59. For the date, cf. Carter 1991: 31, 181.

64 For the date, see Wistrand 1963: 38–44.

65 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.23–26.1.

Africa, the *de facto* Pompeian governor P. Attius Varus commanded one legion whereas the former governor C. Considius Longus commanded another legion at Hadrumetum at the southern end of Africa.[66] Curio opened the campaign auspiciously enough by destroying a small force in skirmishing outside Utica and commandeering a sizeable fleet of grain ships anchored in the city's port.[67] Curio's men promptly acclaimed him *imperator*.[68] In a subsequent clash, which was a pitched battle between Varus' legion and the forces of Curio, Curio had the better of it despite initial doubts about the loyalty of the rank and file.[69] The siege of Utica was interrupted, however, by the approach of the army of the Numidian monarch Juba. Juba had available four Numidian legions as well as 2000 Spanish and Gallic cavalry, a large number of infantry armed in the local fashion, and 60 elephants. The force was certainly more than 20,000 and may well have been as large as 45,000 men.[70] Alarm turned to jubilant incaution when confused reports led Curio to believe that Juba had been forced to abandon the campaign so as to deal with domestic problems, leaving his deputy Saburra and an under-armed force to bring succour to Varus.[71] Advancing too far too quick and dangerously outnumbered, Curio and his main forces were surrounded and killed.[72] Of those who had been left behind in the camp, few managed to escape by ship to Sicilia and many either drowned as boats capsized or else were subsequently claimed by Juba as the spoils of war.[73] Thus Juba entered Utica as victor in mid- or late August.[74] Not only had the grain supply of Rome not been reassured, but an ally had effectively arrogated to himself the right to determine what occurred within a province.

At the same time that Caesar had entrusted Curio with the task of securing Sicilia and Africa and Q. Valerius Orca with that of securing Sardinia, he had assigned to Q. Hortensius Hortalus and P. Cornelius Dolabella the task of constructing fleets to control the northern Tyrrhenian and Adriatic seas respec-

66 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.23.3,4.

67 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.25.

68 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.26.1; cf. Cass. Dio 42.20.5, for a triumph accorded to Caesar.

69 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.27–35.

70 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.40.1; cf. *B Afr*. 1.4. See also Suet. *Iul*. 66, for a self-consciously hyperbolic report of enemy forces during the African campaign of 47–46 BCE.

71 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.38–39.

72 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.40–42.

73 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.43–44.

74 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.44.3; cf. KHM 1959[12]: 371. For the overall date of Curios' expedition, see Wistrand 1963: 38–44. Overall, for the course of this campaign, see: Caes. *B Civ*. 2.23–44; Suet. *Iul*. 36; Flor. 2.13.30, 34; App. *B Civ*. 2.44–46; Cass. Dio 41.41–42; Liv. *Per*. 110; Oros. 6.15.7, 9.

tively.[75] He had also entrusted the defence of Illyricum to C. Antonius.[76] Hence, when the Pompeian commander M. Octavius sought to contest control of the northern Adriatic, it was nearly inevitable that C. Antonius should deploy his army of 2–3 legions in tandem with the fleet commanded by Dolabella. Things went disastrously wrong on the island of Curicta. Dolabella was defeated at sea, and, after likewise suffering heavy losses on land, Antonius was compelled to surrender.[77] Thus, as of September or October, the Pompeians had wrested control of the Adriatic from Caesar's subordinates. While M. Octavius was in control of the northern stretch, M. Calpurnius Bibulus easily dominated the southern Adriatic.[78] In view of the length and practical difficulties of the land route, an invasion of Italia from this quarter was highly unlikely.[79] However, the strategic situation boded evil for any attempt by Caesar to cross the Adriatic and carry the war eastwards into the province of Macedonia.

In early November, upon being ordered to march southwards to Brundisium so as to embark for Macedonia, veterans of the Caesarian Legio IX rose up in mutiny. The episode occurred while they were passing through the Transpadane city of Placentia. Grievances were multiple and abundantly justified upon an impartial reckoning. Despite Caesar's extraordinary success in having secured Italia, Sicilia, Sardinia, Gaul, and Spain, the destruction of the expeditionary forces led by C. Scribonius Curio and C. Antonius demonstrated that matters hung in the balance, with the final account to be paid by the soldiers themselves. Moreover, whereas these extraordinary successes depended in large part upon the soldiers' potential for self-sacrifice and tremendous physical privation, no rewards had been forthcoming. The prohibition upon sacking a city such as Massilia was deeply resented. Last but not least, years of campaigning to the north of the Alps had inevitably ingrained in the veterans the feeling that they were entitled to take by force that which they desired. Hence, the enticing wealth of communities in Cisalpine Gaul came at an inoppor-

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75 For Orca in Sardinia, see Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.2–3, 31.1. For Hortalus and Dolabella in the Adriatic, see App. *B Civ.* 2.41.166.

76 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.10.5; App. *B Civ.* 2.41.165, 47.191.

77 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4.2, 67.5; Suet. *Iul.* 36; Flor. 2.13.30–33; App. *B Civ.* 2.47; Cass. Dio 41.40; Liv. *Per.* 110; Oros. 6.15.8–9. For discussion of this episode and its representation, see H.C. Avery, "A Lost Episode in Caesar's *Civil War*," *Hermes* 121 (1993) 452–469.

78 For Bibulus in the southern Adriatic, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.5.4.

79 Nonetheless, it should be remarked (1) that Gabinius was to die in attempting to traverse the route in the opposite direction in 47 BCE and (2) a century previously Perseus had been thought by the Romans to be urging Genthius to use this route for taking the war to the Romans (Plut. *Aem.* 9.6–7).

tune moment. Caesar restored order summarily, ordering the execution of 120 alleged ringleaders and proclaiming the disbanding of the remainder of the offending legion. This show of resolve set matters aright, for the soldiers were not prepared to abandon the general who had thus far personally led them to victory. Not normally known for recourse to brutality—indeed he had censured precisely this sort of behaviour on the part of M. Petreius during the Spanish campaign—Caesar employed it to salutary effect at this juncture. Asking for their general's pardon, the legionaries were reinstated, and, in a display of clemency, only 12 troublemakers were executed. Order was thus restored, and Caesar proceeded to Rome so as to make arrangements for his imminent departure from Italy.[80]

Already, as of the second half of October, Caesar had been nominated dictator by the praetor M. Aemilius Lepidus. News of this election, which enabled him to hold the annual elections for consuls and other magistrates as tradition expected, reached Caesar while he was at Massilia.[81] Having quelled the mutiny at Placentia, he made his way to Rome to hold elections and thereby give a semblance of normality to life in the capital. Arriving early in December, he proceeded to hold elections, to appoint assessors to determine the worth of possessions and thereby respond to problems caused by the current credit crisis, to oversee the passage of legislation dealing with unjust convictions obtained during Pompeius' third consulate in 52 BCE, and to celebrate the Latin festival upon the Alban Mount.[82] Any one of these items might have been deemed in normal times to suffice for a month's activities at Rome. Caesar accomplished all three objectives within the space of a mere 11 days, according to his own testimony.[83] Election of the magistrates gave the Republic a full set of people (82 in total) empowered to oversee the regular functioning of the Roman state for the coming calendar year of 48 BCE.[84] As Caesar himself emphasizes, he himself was elected consul for a second time, having observed the legal requirement

80 For the episode of Placentia, see Suet. *Iul.* 69; App. *B Civ.* 2.47.192–195; Frontin. *Strat.* 4.5.2; Polyaen. 8.23.15; Cass. Dio 41.26–35; cf. Lucan. 5.246. As is well known, Caesar altogether omits any mention of this disagreeable *contretemps*.

81 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.21.5; Cass. Dio 41.36.1; cf. Flor. 2.13.21; Eutr. 6.20.1. Other reports, riddled with inaccuracies, include: Plut. *Caes.* 37.2 (elected by Senate); App. *B Civ.* 2.48.196 (elected by *populus* after arrival in Rome).

82 For Caesar's activities, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.1–2; Plut. *Caes.* 37.1–2; Suet. *Iul.* 35, 42.2; App. *B Civ.* 2.48; Cass. Dio 41.36–39.

83 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.2.1.

84 For the number of magistrates, see A.W. Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1999), 104 (two consuls), 108 (eight praetors), 130 (two curule

that ten years pass between one consulate and another.[85] Therefore, it was now as duly elected head of the Roman state that Caesar would confront his enemies in the Balkans. The appointment of assessors allowed Caesar to disprove those who maliciously claimed that he was intending to resort to debt cancellation, and legislation allowed him to accept the services of those partisans who had been convicted and suffered a loss of legal rights under Pompeius.[86] Last, but hardly least, the attention shown to holding the Latin festival at the Alban Mount in time-honoured fashion emphasized Caesar's concern that the regular worship of the gods not fall into abeyance even in the midst civil war.[87] Having shown due reverence for the gods, at the conclusion of a year of successes and at the start of yet another undertaking, Caesar assured divine benevolence towards himself and the state that he now represented. Having accomplished these various objectives, he departed from Rome for the port of Brundisium around 21 December 49 BCE.[88]

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Arriving at Brundisium in short order, Caesar used the last opening furnished by good weather prior to the onset of winter. Since the civil calendar was nearly 60 days in advance of the solar year, early January was tantamount to early November.[89] With the onset of winter, the sailing season was at an end and even the relatively brief crossing of the Adriatic from Italy to Greece a perilous undertaking.[90] Embarking 7 legions without all of their usual paraphernalia,

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aediles), 135–136 (twenty quaestors), 139 (twenty-four military tribunes and twenty-six civil functionaries).

85 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.1.1; G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani. Elenco cronologico con una introduzione sull'attività legislativa dei comizi romani*, (Società editrice libraria: Milano 1912), 351 (*Lex Cornelia de magistratibus*).

86 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.1.2–5; M.W. Frederiksen, "Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt," *JRS* 56 (1966) 128–141.

87 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.2.1; Cass. Dio 41.14.4 (conceivably relating to the year that followed); cf. Weinstock 1971: 321–323. Weinstock canvasses three possible explanations—omission by the consuls of 49 BCE, ritual error or portent during their prior performance, or an especial honour for Caesar—and opts for the last of these three as the most likely. That reading, which involves comparison with Camillus, seems fanciful.

88 For the date, see KHM 1959[12]: 372 (opting for 13 December); cf. J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar. The Civil War, Book 3*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1993), 142.

89 See P. Brind'Amour, *Le calendrier romain. Recherches chronologiques*, (Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa: Ottawa 1983).

90 It is worth adding that this past year, when a ferry caught fire on the coast of Albania,

so as to carry as many men as possible for the crucial gambit of opening a beachhead in Macedonia, Caesar set sail from the port of Brundisium on 4 January 48 BCE.[91]

On the following day, Caesar and his men effected a landing at an Epirote coastal site known by the name of Palaeste. In the shadow of the Ceraunian mountains, he disembarked the whole force of 7 legions without losing a single ship.[92] Both the timing and the choice of beachhead were inspired, as Caesar avoided problems with the fleet of M. Calpurnius Bibulus and the garrison at Oricum. By the time that Bibulus was aware of what was transpiring, it was too late to take action and he was reduced to venting his rage upon the fleet as it sought to make the return voyage to Brundisium so as to bring over the other half of Caesar's troops.[93] As for the garrison in Oricum, they and their commanders were expelled by the natives upon receipt of the news of Caesar's arrival.[94] Marching north upon Oricum forthwith, Caesar held the city by 6 January at the latest. Continuing north in haste, with a view to taking control of the western end of the Via Egnatia, he arrived at Apollonia some two to three days later. News had by now reached Pompeius—thanks to the peace proposal made through L. Vibullius Rufus—that Caesar had managed to cross the Adriatic and anticipate Pompeius' dispositions for the winter. Although he had been about to reach Dyrrachium, Pompeius now turned southwards and forestalled Caesar's advance upon this important harbour and site of magazines. Finally, around 10 January, they confronted one another across the river Apsus.[95] Pompeius enjoyed the benefit of extensive preparations and a more numerous army, as well as the reinforcement afforded on occasion by the naval squadrons operating in the Adriatic, but Caesar was firmly ensconced in the western part of the province of Macedonia and posed a threat by his ability to circumvent Pompeius and move east as well as south.[96] Both sides settled down in improvised winter quarters for a war of attrition.

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rescue operations were hindered by waves which were reported to reach a height of 80 meters.

91 For the date, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.6.1. As is usual in the *commentarii*, Caesar eschews dates except when indicating the moment at which operations commenced.

92 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.6.3. For other, later accounts: Vell. 2.51.2; Plut. *Caes*. 37.3–9; *Pomp*. 65; *Ant*. 7; Suet. *Iul*. 35; App. *B Civ*. 2.49–54; Cass. Dio 41.44.2–4; Liv. *Per*. 110; Eutr. 6.20.

93 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.7–8.

94 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.11.3–4.

95 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.12–14. For the activity of Vibullius, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.10.1–11.2.

96 For the preparations of Pompeius, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.3–5. In terms of an overview or personal details, for the situation obtaining in the East between March 49 BCE and January

Impropitious for sailing or extended marches and regular combat, the winter season is characteristically a period of inactivity.[97] This incentive to inaction was reinforced by the fact that Caesar's opponents had amassed a vast fleet at Corcyra and stationed garrisons along the whole of the Epirote coastline.[98] Receiving contradictory missives that ordered for their immediate embarkation and alternatively counselled caution, Caesar's legates at Brundisium dared not put to sea since they were likely to be destroyed by the enemy's blockade, if not by the elements, and the enemy likewise found themselves constrained to an unpleasant vigil upon the shores of Epirus.[99] Indeed, the supreme commander of the naval forces blockading Caesar's army, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, succumbed to illness and perished.[100] That part of the enemy fleet that was despatched to Italy to deal with the Caesarian forces at Brundisium likewise proved engaged in a bootless venture. Unable to seize control of the port of Brundisium, they were eventually compelled by a dearth of drinkable water and supplies to abandon their mission and to return to Corcyra and the Balkan coastline.[101] In the meantime, while Caesar had been concerned to find sources of food for his army present and future, the river Aspsus held firm as a dividing-line between the armies of Caesar and Pompeius, despite the latter's numerical superiority.[102] It would appear that at this time Pompeius disposed of roughly 45,000 legionaries and another 7,000 cavalry whereas Caesar had only 20,000 legionaries and 500 cavalry.[103] Notwithstanding this disparity, Pompeius was prepared to wait for summer, when dry weather would allow for hunger and battle to finish off Caesar's expeditionary force.

Quietly desperate for the arrival of reinforcement from Italia in the form of the second half of the expeditionary force, Caesar sent frequent letters to Q. Calenus and M. Antonius calling upon them to come to his assistance.[104]

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48 BCE, see also Vell. 2.51.1; Val. Max. 1.8.10; Plut. *Pomp.* 64–65; *Cat. min.* 53–54; *Brut.* 4; App. *B Civ.* 2.49.200–205; Cass. Dio 41.43–44, 55.3–4; Oros. 6.15.11; cf. Lucan. 5.120–236.

97 See discussion below in Chapter 7 (Macedonia).

98 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.5.2–4.

99 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.14–18.

100 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.18.

101 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.23–24.

102 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.13, 19, 30. Overall, for this first phase of engagement between the forces of Caesar and Pompeius, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.13–19; Vell. 2.51.3; Plut. *Caes.* 38; *Pomp.* 65; *Cic.* 38; Suet. *Iul.* 35; Flor. 2.13.35–37; App. *B Civ.* 2.55–56; Cass. Dio 41.45–47; Oros. 6.15.18–21.

103 For the forces of Caesar, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.2.2. For those of Pompeius, paradoxically much more meticulously reported, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4.

104 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.25.2–3, where it is Pompeius who is said to have sent numerous missives to the forces operating at Brundisium; see also App. *B Civ.* 2.57, 58.

The story that Caesar attempted to cross back to Italia surreptitiously, but was blocked by unfavourable winds,[105] is a malicious invention on the part of a hostile historian.[106] Had Caesar's soldiers had the faintest suspicion that their general intended to abandon them, Caesar would quickly have met with an end similar to that of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium the year before, and his head would have been proffered in response to T. Labienus' expression of the sole condition for peace.[107] Trying to incite his subordinates to dare to face the wintry crossing, Caesar bided his time on the windswept, mountainous coast of Epirus as best possible.

In the meantime, matters in Italia were far from pacific. While Calenus and Antonius defended their position at Brundisium from attack by Scribonius Libo, economic distress in the city of Rome and throughout the Italian peninsula afforded ample opportunity for the ambitious and troublesome. Two individuals in particular were discontented with the Caesarian dispensation and sought to use general discontent to their personal advantage: M. Caelius Rufus and T. Annius Milo.[108] That these men were both close friends and former collaborators of Cicero may not be without relevance. Cicero himself, in the camp of Pompeius Magnus in Epirus, was no less of a problem for the other side, constantly criticising the present course of action and future aspirations of his peers.[109] But the situations were different. Cicero as a consular former governor awaiting the permission of the Senate to celebrate a triumph was merely a voice shouting into the wind; Caelius with his praetorian *imperium* could pretend to represent the legitimate interests of current authority, and Milo as an exile who had not received pardon in December of the previous year could equally well claim to represent the interests of Caesar's enemies. In short, there was the potential for a fifth column arising in Italia at the very moment when Caesar was blocked in Epirus. Seeking to aggrandize his position by popular legislation dealing with rents and delinquent loans and thereby addressing the current

105 Val. Max. 9.8.2; Plut. *Caes.* 38; *apophth. Caes.* 9; *de fortuna Rom.* 6; Flor. 2.13.37; App. *B Civ.* 2.56.234–57.237, 150.625; Cass. Dio 41.46; cf. Lucan. 5.497–677.

106 W.H. Friedrich, "Caesar und sein Glück," 1–24, in: O. Hiltbrunner, H. Kornhardt, and F. Tietze (eds.), *Thesaurismata. Festschrift für Ida Kapp.* (C.H. Beck: München 1954), 23; cf. Gelzer 2008: 194 n. 177 (= 1968 [English]: 229 n. 1). However, as is shown by its earliest surviving witness, it gained currency through a dramatic, positive re-interpretation by Livy.

107 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.19.8.

108 Cf. Carter 1993: 2.160, which notes Cassius Dio's "fuller and less partisan account" but fails to observe that the narrative frame is altogether wrong.

109 Plut. *Cic.* 38.

credit crisis in a manner more aggressive than that adopted by Caesar, Caelius found himself persistently frustrated by Caesar's consular colleague of 48 BCE: P. Servilius Isauricus. Consequently, he attempted to take precedence over the *praetor urbanus* C. Trebonius by means of popular agitation in discontent at the latter's rulings, with recourse to the use of physical force within the Forum Romanum. At this point, Servilius obtained from the Senate the passage of an emergency decree that permitted him to prevent Caelius from further exercise of his functions as praetor. Not to be silenced, Caelius set forth for the south, claiming that he wished to meet with Caesar. Allegedly acting in conjunction with Milo, or thus Caesar and the later historical record claim, Caelius nonetheless failed to effect a juncture in Campania that would have made use of Milo's vast troop of gladiators. Milo was suppressed near Compsa by a legion acting under the order of the praetor Q. Pedius, and some weeks later Caelius was likewise killed when seeking to undermine the loyalty of the Gallic and Hispanic cavalry stationed in the southern port city of Thurii.[110] Thus, for the time being growing discontent in Italia was repressed and held at bay.

At last, apparently in late March or early April, Calenus and Antonius committed to the Adriatic sea with their reinforcement of Caesar's expeditionary force.[111] According to the civil calendar, spring began on 10 April 48 BCE.[112] Although that calendar was some 60 days in advance of the solar year, Caesar seems to have acted as though the two were synchronized. In any case, now the other half of the expeditionary force arrived in Epirus. The passage of the Adriatic, of course, was not without incident. While a miraculous change of wind may be discounted, it is worth remarking that of the ships within the Caesarian convoy two stragglers were surrounded by the Pompeian blockading fleet. That ship containing 220 recruits incautiously surrendered, to end by being executed for their mistaken choice of allegiance. The other ship, which carried 200 veterans, negotiated for time and managed to escape so as to rejoin the rest of the expeditionary force.[113] Having effected a landing at a locale known as Nymphaeum, which lay to the north of Lissus and Dyrrachium, Antonius and Calenus moved south with their force of 4 legions and 800 cavalry so as to effect a reunion with Caesar's force.[114]

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110 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.20–22; Vell. 2.68.1–2; Plin. *HN* 2.147; Cass. Dio 42.22–25; Liv. *Per.* 111; Oros. 6.15.10.

111 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.25.1; Suet. *Iul.* 35 (*per quattuor paene menses*).

112 For the date, cf. KHM 1959[12]: 373 (27 March).

113 For the contrasting fates of these two ships, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.28.

114 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.29.2. Overall, for the arrival of the expeditionary force of Antonius and Calenus, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.23–30; Plut. *Caes.* 39.1; *Ant.* 7; App. *B Civ.* 2.56–59; Cass. Dio 41.48.

Matters were complicated by the fact that both Pompeius and Caesar at more or less the same moment became aware of the impending arrival of the force led by Calenus and Antonius. Aware that the winds had carried this force to a site to the north of Dyrrachium, Pompeius and Caesar abandoned their opposed positions upon the river Apsus so as to march northwards. It would appear that Pompeius was concerned primarily with maintaining the logistical line that linked his camp to the city of Dyrrachium, where immense stockpiles had been assembled. For this reason, he moved north but stopped short of engaging Antonius and Calenus' force in battle despite enjoying numerical superiority.[115] Rather, reassured that Antonius and Calenus were intent upon continuing southwards, Pompeius took up position at Asparagium, a town that stood to the north of the river Genusus and—so it would seem—at the spot where the Via Egnatia in its western extremity divided into a northern branch going to Dyrrachium and a southern branch going to Apollonia.[116] In short, Pompeius assumed a commanding position that allowed him to respond rapidly as Caesar's strategy evolved. As for the Caesarian forces, it seems that the reunion of Caesar with Antonius and Calenus took place to the south of the Genusus.[117] Thus, as of late March or early April, the whole of the expeditionary force had been transferred to the western half of the province of Macedonia, and Caesar was now in a position to manoeuvre for a battle that might prove capable of deciding the issue of the civil war. Nonetheless, in view of inclement weather and the uncertainty of the duration of the coming campaign, he did not press for an engagement at this time. Instead, he sent sizeable detachments to the south and east so as to secure adjacent parts of the province and to assure supplies with the coming of spring. C. Calvisius Sabinus was despatched south to Aetolia with 5 cohorts and some cavalry, L. Cassius Longinus was sent southeast to Thessalia with the newly recruited Legio XXVII and 200 cavalry, and Cn. Domitius Calvinus was sent east into Macedonia proper with the veteran Legio XI and Legio XII supported by 500 cavalry.[118]

Over the following four months, from early April through early July 48 BCE, there was a war of positions fought between Caesar and Pompeius in the vicinity of Dyrrachium. Neither general wished to be seen to relinquish ground, but the circumstances of terrain and season combined to render this period of strategic stalemate a severe trial for both armies. Since Pompeius persistently

115 *Pace* Caes. *B Civ.* 3.30.5–6, where it is claimed that Pompeius tried to effect an ambush.

116 Carter 1993: 167; T.R.E. Holmes, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire. Vol. 3: 50–44 B.C.* (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1923), 443–444.

117 Cf. Carter 1993: 167.

118 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.34.

refused to engage in battle, Caesar undertook to block Pompeius' access to the resources that had been stockpiled in Dyrrachium in the preceding months.[119] By subterfuge and a forced march, Caesar managed to go around Pompeius' camp at Asparagium and to place his army squarely between Pompeius and Dyrrachium before the latter was aware of what Caesar intended.[120] Not dismayed, Pompeius took up position upon a nearby height to the east, Petra, which lay along the shore and was thus linked by sea to Pompeius' stockpiles at Dyrrachium.[121] Initially Pompeius used his superiority in cavalry to acquire supplies from further away and to transport them to the camp overland.[122] Conscious of his own deficiency in the matter of supplies, Caesar did not let Pompeius' control of the local surroundings pass unchallenged. According to time-honoured practice, he proceeded to create a circumvallation about Pompeius' position, with Pompeius responding to Caesar by creating a counter-wall. Whereas Pompeius' counter-wall was approximately 15 km long, that of Caesar reached approximately 17 km in length.[123] As so often in siege warfare, paradoxes were rife in this situation. Pompeius' army was being besieged by a numerically inferior force, and Pompeius' army was better supplied, whereas the morale and fidelity of Caesar's army held good for the better part of four months.[124] The lack of wheat was made good by meat, barley, and a local weed that was used to create loaves of substitute bread.[125] According to a report that is *ben trovato* but quite plausible, Pompeius upon seeing these loaves exclaimed that he was fighting beasts, not men.[126] Be that as it may, privation was long endured, with the Caesarians experiencing problems with food and the Pompeians experiencing a lack of drinking-water as well as fodder for their mounts and pack-animals.[127] In the end, the impasse was broken by a change

119 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.41, 44.1.

120 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.41.

121 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.42.

122 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.43.3.

123 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.44.3.

124 Cf. Plut. *Caes*. 39.1; *Pomp*. 65.4.

125 *chara*: Caes. *B Civ*. 3.48.1. For discusion of the sources (this note and the next) for this episode and identification of the root in question, see Carsana 2007: 194–195; P. Fournier, "La *chara* de César," *Bulletin de la Société botanique de France* 97 (1950) 17–18.

126 Plin. *HN* 19.144; Plut. *Caes*. 39.2–3; Suet. *Iul*. 68.2; App. *B Civ*. 2.61.252; Polyaen. 8.23.24; cf. Lucan. 6.106–117. It is worth observing that the sequence of events (in part. the making of bread from wild roots and the *bravura* of Scaeva) is reversed in Appian's version *vis-à-vis* that in Caesar's. Unfortunately, it is also clear that both texts have suffered perturbation and exhibit irreparable *lacunae* (e.g. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.50.2, 54.2; App. *B Civ*. 2.60.250).

127 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.49.

of sides by a pair of Gallic chieftains and their cavalry contingent. Passing over to Pompeius so as to avoid the prospect of punishment for malversation, they indicated a particularly weak point in Caesar's defences.[128] The ensuing nocturnal made upon the southern end of the Caesarian circumvallation resulted in heavy Caesarian casualties (960 dead amongst the rank-and-file) and allowed Pompeius to break free of the humiliating siege that Caesar had imposed.[129] The fighting was characterized both by memorable instances of self-sacrifice—as in the episode of the terribly wounded Scaeva who nonetheless managed to kill many another enemy and thereby sway his men to defend their redoubt successfully—and by Pompeius' signal failure as a general to press home the advantage that he had unexpectedly achieved. As Caesar is said to have claimed, had his enemies been commanded by a general they would have finished him off that day.[130] The defeat of Caesar's men meant the effective end of the siege. The stalemate of the past four months was now finished.

While Caesar and Pompeius were intent upon a war of positions near Dyrrachium, collaborators had been procuring resources—men for Pompeius and grain for Caesar—in other parts of the Aegean world. Of these collaborators the most significant was Metellus Scipio.[131] Appointed governor of Syria by the Senate in the session of early January 49 BCE, this current father-in-law and collaborator of Pompeius Magnus had assumed command of the two legions then in Syria and been acclaimed *imperator* by his troops after a brief, rousing campaign upon the slopes of Mt. Amanus. After having passed the worst of the winter in the cities along the Ionian coast of the province of Asia, he had brought his army overland in a march from Ephesus and Pergamum up

128 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.59–61.

129 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.62–71. Overall, for this war of positions near Dyrrachium and the victory achieved by Pompeius, see also Vell. 2.51.3; Plut. *Caes.* 39.1–8; *Pomp.* 65–66; *Cic.* 38; *Cat. min.* 54; Suet. *Iul.* 35, 36; Flor. 2.13.38–40; App. *B Civ.* 2.60–63; Frontin. *Strat.* 3.17.4; Polyaen. 8.23.12–13; Cass. Dio 41.49–50; Liv. *Per.* 111; Eutr. 6.20.

130 Plut. *Caes.* 39.8; *Pomp.* 65.5; Suet. *Iul.* 36; App. *B Civ.* 2.62.260. For the self-sacrifice and dedication displayed by Scaeva, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.53.4–5; Val. Max. 3.2.23A; Plut. *Caes.* 16.3–4; Suet. *Iul.* 68.3–4; Flor. 2.13.40; App. *B Civ.* 2.60.247–249; cf. Lucan. 6.140–262. For the subsequent career of Q. Cassius Scaeva, see the convincing reconstruction offered by Carsana 2007: 192–193. He is presumably to be identified with the homonymous *primus pilus* of the Legio XII. who is named on one of the sling-shot missiles from Perusia in 40 BCE: *CIL* 11.6721.28. The existence of an *ala Scaevae* is subsequently attested by a funeral inscription at Minturnum: *CIL* 10.6011; J. Spaul, *ALA* 2 (1994) 20–21; Carsana 2007: 193.

131 For what follows, see esp. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.31–33; J. Linderski, "Q. Scipio Imperator," 145–186, in: J. Linderski (ed.), *Imperium sine fine. T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic*, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1996).

to the Dardanelles and thence by the Via Egnatia to eastern Macedonia and Thessalonica. Taking at least 3 and more likely 4–5 months, this march began perhaps in April, or better March or even February by the civil calendar. Be that as it may, Scipio and his army had reached the river Haliacmon by late June or early July. Pompeius was to treat Scipio as an equal, and the route taken is equally suggestive. Scipio's army may have included not only the 2 legions that he was bringing from Syria, but also one or more of the 2 legions from Asia, the 1 legion from Cilicia, and the 1 legion from Macedonia and Crete.[132] Initially moving south into Thessalia in pursuit of the force of L. Cassius Longinus, Scipio subsequently moved north again in the hope of engaging the force of Cn. Domitius Calvinus in circumstances even more favourable. Skirmishes ensued, but no regular engagement came to pass. Rather, Scipio followed Calvinus as the latter retreated north upon the Via Egnatia with a view to rejoining Caesar at Dyrrachium.[133] Pompeius, in the meantime, was descending south upon the Via Egnatia with a view to engaging the now defeated Caesar in Thessalia or southern Greece. Idle tongues have contributed to more than one twist in military annals. The Gauls in the advance party of Pompeius informed their former comrades serving under Calvinus of what had transpired at Dyrrachium, and Domitius escaped from encirclement with only hours to spare. For his part, Scipio took up position at Larisa, so as to dominate Thessalia in anticipation of Caesar's nigh inevitable arrival.[134]

In the wake of Pompeius' successful breakout in early July, Caesar's situation at Dyrrachium was manifestly untenable. Indeed, with troops both weakened by the hardships of siege warfare and demoralized by their severe defeat, Caesar's immediate future looked bleak. To remain immobile was to court certain destruction. Hence, without the usual fanfare and under the cover of night, Caesar evacuated his positions and began a series of forced marches meant to put as much distance as possible between himself and the victorious Pompeius Magnus.[135] An engagement at this juncture was to be avoided at all costs. Caesar quickly moved south and then eastwards across the Pindus mountains. Passage from the valley of the Apsus river to that of the Peneus

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132 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.4.1.

133 Thus Caes. *B Civ*. 3.36–38, 78–79, but this affirmation is quite problematic as can be seen from the fact that Scipio and Pompeius did not immediately re-unite.

134 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.80.4.

135 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.75.1–2. Overall, for the transferral of the conflict from Epirus to Thessalia, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.73–81; Vell. 2.51.1–2; Val. Max. 1.6.12; Plut. *Caes*. 39.9–42.1; *Pomp*. 67; *Cat. min*. 55; Suet. *Iul*. 68.3; Flor. 2.13.41–43; App. *B Civ*. 2.63–67; Polyaen. 8.23.26; Cass. Dio 41.51–52; Liv. *Per*. 111; Eutr. 6.20.

took some two to three weeks, and it was only in the latter half of July that Caesar at last arrived on the plains of Thessalia.[136] The population of Thessalia was put into a proper frame of mind by the sack of Gomphi, which was the first community of note that Caesar and his men encountered upon emerging from the pass that led across the Pindus to Epirus.[137] The next community that Caesar approached, Metropolis, showed itself willing to aid Caesar even in his moment of difficulty.[138] Thus, in late July and early August, Caesar's army benefited from the recent grain harvest and recovered their strength while preparing for the eventual confrontation with the forces of Pompeius and Metellus Scipio.[139]

Taken by surprise and finding it unfeasible to follow Caesar in his swift retreat, Pompeius left some troops and the fleet in the charge of Cato the Younger, so as to hinder Caesar in the unlikely event that he should attempt to return across the Adriatic to Italia.[140] As has been noted in the description of the movements of Cn. Domitius Calvinus, Pompeius himself took the majority of his forces east and south along the Via Egnatia towards Macedonia proper and the Aegean sea. Apparently calculating that Caesar would make for Thessalia, on account of the region's ability to feed his army, Pompeius passed through Heraclia and then dropped south towards Larisa so as to link up with Metellus Scipio.[141] As of late July or the very beginning of August, they had effected a union of their armies and were now ready to continue the campaign against Caesar within the setting of Thessalia.[142]

The knowledge that Caesar was moving south and east through Thessalia—from his initial entry at Aeginium to Gomphi to Metropolis—led Pompeius Magnus and Metellus Scipio to take their joint force south from Larisa in the direction of Pharsalus.[143] Immediately to the north of the river Enipeus, they

136 For the route and chronology, see Carter 1993: 206.

137 Caes. *B Civ. C* 3.80; Plut. *Caes.* 41.7–8; App. *B Civ.* 2.64.267–269.

138 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.81.

139 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.81.3, 84.1.

140 Plut. *Cat. min.* 55.1–3; *Pomp.* 67.3; Cass. Dio 42.10.1; Cic. *Div.* 1.68; 2.114.

141 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.79.

142 Cf. KHM 1959[12]: 374.

143 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.85, cf. *B Alex.* 48.1 (Palaepharsalus). No toponym for the area of battle is furnished by Caesar. However, the combination of his precise information regarding the flight of the defeated Pompeians can be combined with the indications given by other authors so as to achieve a relatively satisfactory reconstruction, viz. that offered by F.L. Lucas, "The Battlefield of Pharsalus," *Annual of the British School of Athens* 24 (1919–1921) 34–53. While correct as regards the left-bank reconstruction of this battle,

encamped near one of the roads leading to Larisa and on the slope of one of the hills overlooking the plain of Pharsalus. Caesar established his camp at a distance in this same plain.[144] Several days passed inconclusively with Caesar drawing his forces up in battle formation and inviting Pompeius to engage in battle.[145] However, at last ceding to pressure from subordinates and peers, Pompeius allowed himself to be drawn down onto terrain that afforded Caesar a level and evenly balanced field of battle. Operating under the illusion that this was the same army that he had defeated merely a month before, Pompeius accepted Caesar's challenge.[146] The date was 9 August 48 BCE.[147]

According to Caesar's account, the battle-line of Pompeius Magnus and Metellus Scipio consisted of 110 cohorts making up a total of 45,000 infantry.[148] Flanking and supporting these were 2,000 veterans who had re-enlisted, 7,000 cavalry, 3,000 archers, and 1,200 slingers.[149] An additional 7 cohorts guarded the camp.[150] On the left wing were the two Caesarian legions that had been

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other, more recent reconstructions (C.B.R. Pelling, "Pharsalus," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 22 (1973) 249–259; J.D. Morgan, "Palaepharsalus—The Battle and the Town," *American Journal of Archaeology* 87 (1983) 23–54) seem to situate the engagement too far to the east, in view of Caesar's description of the subsequent flight of the defeated.

As regards the name of this battle, the earlier and better sources (apparently including Livy) designate it after the Palaepharsalus: *B Alex.* 48.1; Strab. 17.1.11 C796; Frontin. *Strat.* 2.3.22; Eutr. 6.20.4; Oros. 6.15.27. Those authors less attached to historical detail offer instead the name of the larger and better known Pharsalus: Lucan. 6.313; 7.61, 175, 204, 407; Plut. *Caes.* 52.1; *Pomp.* 68.1; *Cat. min.* 55.4, 56.7; *Brut.* 6.1; *Cic.* 39.1; *Ant.* 8.3; 62.4; Suet. *Iul.* 35.1; App. *B Civ.* 2.313. The name of Palaepharsalus was metrically unwieldy (with Lucan preferring *Pharsalia* [sc. *pugna*]), and it looks as though this may have determined the eventual success of the banalisation.

144 For the situation of Caesar's camp, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.81.1, 84.1. The narrative is none too clear as to the chronological relationship between the creation of the opposing camps of Pompeius (with Metellus Scipio) and Caesar. In view of the lack of any toponym, it might be wondered whether the text is lacunose here as well.

145 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.84.2.

146 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.86–87.

147 *Inscr. Ital.* 13.2.190–191 (*Fast. Amit.*), 208 (*Fast. Ant. Min.*); cf. 13.2.180–181 (*Fast. Allif.*, heavily restored).

148 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.88.4–5. Overall, for the forces of Pompeius and Scipio at Pharsalus, see: Caes. *B Civ.* 3.88; Plut. *Caes.* 42.3–4; *Pomp.* 69; Flor. 2.13.44, 47; App. *B Civ.* 2.70–71; Cass. Dio 41.55.2–4, 61.1; Eutr. 6.20; Oros. 6.15.23.

149 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4. For the Easterners who made up much of these auxiliary forces of Pompeius, see: Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4; Flor. 2.13.5, 44; App. *B Civ.* 2.49, 70–71; Cass. Dio 41.55.2–4; Oros. 6.15.18.

150 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.88.5.

surrendered by Caesar to Pompeius in accordance with a senatorial decree late in 50 BCE, Legio I and Legio III; these seem to have been commanded by Lentulus Crus, but it is to be added that was this point in the line Pompeius himself exercised overall command of the battle line.[151] The middle of the line was held by Metellus Scipio with the two legions that he had brought from Syria.[152] The right wing, which lay along the river Enipeus, was held by the Legio Gemella from Cilicia and those cohorts that had been salvaged from the previous year's defeat in Spain; this section seems to have been under the command of Afranius.[153] The remaining fifty cohorts (the equivalent of 5 legions) were distributed throughout the whole of the line. On the other hand, the extraordinary forces of 7,000 cavalry, 2,000 veterans, 3,000 archers, and 1,200 slingers were stationed on the left wing. It was from that quarter that Pompeius expected to launch an offensive that would turn Caesar's right wing and throw his army into confusion and flight.[154]

Dramatically outnumbered, Caesar himself disposed of 80 cohorts that were under-strength and made for a total of only 22,000 infantry.[155] Flanking and supporting these were 1,000 cavalry.[156] An additional 7 cohorts were entrusted with guarding the Caesarian camp.[157] The left wing along the river Enipeus was entrusted to M. Antonius, who had repeatedly shown a flare for command and acted as Caesar's *alter ego* in the last twenty-one months. Here were stationed the Legio VIII and the Legio IX, which veteran units were so under-strength that together they barely amounted to the equivalent of a single legion.[158] The middle of the battle line was entrusted to Cn. Domitius Calvinus, who had but recently been sparring with Metellus Scipio. As in the case of Metellus Scipio, the appointment might be viewed as relatively safe, albeit uninspired, and politically advantageous in view of the fact that he was a *consularis*. Presumably

151 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.88.2.

152 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.88.3.

153 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.88.3.

154 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.86.3, 88.6.

155 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89.2. Overall, for the forces of Caesar at Pharsalus, see: Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89; Plut. *Caes*. 42.3–4; *Pomp*. 69; Flor. 2.13.44; App. *B Civ*. 2.70; Cass. Dio 41.55.2,4; Eutr. 6.20; Oros. 6.15.24.

156 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.84.4: *ut equitum mille etiam apertioribus locis VII milium Pompeianorum impetum … sustinere auderent*.

157 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89.2, where the transmitted reading of *II* must be emended to *VII*. This is merely yet another instance of the corruption of the text through minim confusion.

158 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89.3. For the figure of Antonius, see *DNP* 1.810–813 s.v. "Antonius [I 9]" (W. Will).

he was still commanding the Legio XI and Legio XII.[159] The critical right wing, which was where the danger of outflanking lay, was held by the Legio X and was commanded by P. Cornelius Sulla, nephew of the dictator L. Sulla and an aspiring *consularis*. He, too, had shown himself a *legatus* who might be trusted to perform adequately but not to the point of usurping the privileges of his commander.[160] Expecting the battle to be won or lost by how Pompeius' outflanking manoeuvre was countered, Caesar himself took up position on the right wing. The Legio X constituted the essence of the right wing, but it was flanked by the force of 1,000 cavalry reinforced by an improvised fourth line that consisted of cohorts pulled out of the other three lines so as to offer sufficient resistance to the mass of Pompeian cavalry.[161]

Now, at daybreak, battle was joined on the plain of Pharsalus.[162] What happened over the course of the next three or four hours was to determine the outcome of the campaign of 48 BCE. Addressing his soldiers in characteristically laconic fashion, Caesar yet again united his honour with their liberty and urged them to win this battle for their general and the Republic.[163] Saluting Caesar, the former centurion Crastinus, accompanied by 120 handpicked men, then led the charge.[164] The whole army followed in this initial rush. But, perceiving that Pompeius' army was not doing likewise, they slowed their pace

159 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89.3. For the figure of Domitius Calvinus, see *DNP* 3.754 s.v. "Domitius [I 10]" (K.-L. Elvers).

160 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89.3. For the figure of P. Cornelius Sulla, see *DNP* 3.185–186 s.v. "Cornelius [I 89]" (K.-L. Elvers); R. Syme, *Augustan Aristocracy*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1986), 265 n. 73 (brother-in-law of Cn. Pompeius Magnus). In this context, given the murky past of P. Sulla as a *consul designatus* convicted of electoral fraud and an alleged partisan of Catilina, of especial interest is the passage in which Caesar expatiates on the duties of a *legatus* and writes in his praise: Caes. *B Civ*. 3.51.3–5. Clearly Caesar is responding first and foremost to the multiple and deep fractures within the Caesarian camp (*plerique existimant*) as the civil war progressed. Arguably, however, this passage was also meant to offer him assistance in election to office and the recovery of honour.

161 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89.4.

162 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.85.3 (for decision to break camp); cf. 3.95.2 (for the time at which the battle ended). In what follows, the first-hand account of Caesar will be followed except when in manifest need of corretion or supplement. Overall, however, for the battle of Pharsalus, see the following literary sources: Caes. *B Civ*. 3.82–99; Cic. *Lig*. 19; *Deiot*. 33–34; Vell. 2.52; Plut. *Caes*. 44–45; *Pomp*. 69–71; *Cic*. 39; *Ant*. 8; Suet. *Iul*. 35; Flor. 2.13.46–51; App. *B Civ*. 2.72–81; Frontin. Strat. 4.7.32; Polyaen. 8.23.14,25; Cass. Dio 41.60–61.1; Liv. *Per*. 111; Eutr. 6.21; Oros. 6.15.26; cf. Lucan. 6.314–7.872.

163 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.90.

164 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.91.

and refrained from the mistake of casting their javelins prematurely and to no effect.[165] When the battle lines at last engaged, after the initial volley of javelins had been cast, the frontal assault revealed itself a stalemate. All along the line the legionaries held their ground. Experience favoured Caesar's veterans, whereas their numbers and the *élan* of a recent victory at Dyrrachium favoured Pompeius' more recent recruits. It was in order to unblock this situation that Pompeius ordered his cavalry to outflank Caesar's right wing and to use their advantage in numbers to drive his men in route.[166] Seeing what was coming, with his own cavalry having to a certain degree halted the enemy cavalry's advance, Caesar at this juncture deployed his fourth line of infantry on the extreme right.[167] The attackers became the attacked, and Caesar's unorthodox formation of legionaries put to flight the Pompeian cavalry. As they did so, they outflanked Pompeius' left wing and began to attack from the rear. Pompeius himself fled to his camp for safety and a respite, and his battle-line began to crumble slowly but surely.[168] As of mid-day, the army of Pompeius Magnus had been routed, and the field of battle belonged to Caesar.[169]

Notwithstanding the mid-day heat and their exhaustion, Caesar urged his men to seize the advantage of the moment and to storm the enemy camp.[170] The fleeing soldiers of Pompeius were in no condition to offer valid resistance. Moreover, the legionary cohorts and auxiliary forces that had been entrusted with the camp's defence proved unequal to the ardour displayed by Caesar's victorious troops. Therefore, Pompeius, who had withdrawn to the camp upon perceiving that the battle was lost, now abandoned the camp as well, fleeing precipitately towards Larisa and escaping by sea.[171] As the camp fell to Caesar's men, Pompeius' soldiers now made their way to the heights overlooking the camp.[172] Again urging his men to follow up their momentary advantage, Caesar persuaded his soldiers to forego looting the enemy camp and instead to focus upon surrounding and capturing the defeated enemy.[173] Deploying his soldiers in such a manner as to hinder the defeated Pompeian legionaries' having access to water or being able to withdraw towards Larisa, Caesar managed to compel

165 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.92–93.
166 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.93.2–4.
167 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.93.5–8.
168 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.94.2–6.
169 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.95.2.
170 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.95.
171 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.95–96.
172 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.95.6.
173 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.96–97.

their surrender by dawn of the following morning.[174] More than half of the army that Pompeius had fielded at Pharsalus had fallen into the hands of Caesar; victory lay with Caesar and was seemingly complete.

The casualty numbers are staggering, even if those reported by Caesar were based upon a preliminary survey of the battlefield and are not altogether accurate. At the time it appeared that there were roughly 15,000 enemy dead and more than 24,000 taken captive.[175] Equally significant, from a military perspective, Caesar's men reckoned 180 military standards and nine legionary eagles amongst the spoils of war.[176] In short, the army of Pompeius and Metellus Scipio had ceased to exist as a fighting force. Small groups of dozens or a couple hundred men may have melted away into the countryside, but the army had ceased to exist. Even if credit be given to the Caesarian *legatus* Asinius Pollio's rectification of Caesar—to the effect that only 6,000 enemy soldiers were killed—the battle indubitably marked a watershed.[177] The campaign in the province of Macedonia was at an end, and Caesar had emerged as the victor despite the reverses previously suffered at Dyrrachium. On a par with the victory achieved over Afranius and Petreius in Hispania Citerior a year before, this victory, too, was to be added to the list of festivals to be celebrated under the Principate.[178]

Caesarian losses were dramatically fewer, but not for that reason any less perceived. More or less 200 legionaries and 30 centurions lost their lives.[179] The former *primipilus* Crastinus was found dead, with a sword thrust through his mouth. Caesar honoured his exemplary self-sacrifice with military decorations and an individual tomb beside the mass grave in which his companions were buried.[180]

Notwithstanding the loss of human life on the Pompeian side, Pharsalus was not the hecatomb of the nobles that Philippi was to be. Killed by his own cavalry

174 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.98.1.

175 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.4.

176 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.4.

177 For the critique expressed by Asinius Pollio, see Plut. *Caes.* 46.3; Suet. *Iul.* 56.4; App. *B Civ.* 2.82.345–346; *FRH* 56 F4.

178 Cf. Fraschetti 2005^2: 15.

179 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.1.

180 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.2–3; Carter 1993: 218. The text must be emended with the assistance of a later source that seems not have used Caesar directly: App. *B Civ.* 2.82.348. Intriguingly, yet again, Plutarch can be seen to draw upon a source quite different from that followed by Appian, for the death of Crastinus is related together with the report of his words to Caesar at the opening of the battle: Plut. *Caes.* 44.9–12.

in the retreat, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was the most noteworthy of those to perish immediately, and no further names can be adduced.[181] Some two months would pass before Pompeius Magnus and Lentulus Crus were killed by their prospective hosts in Egypt, and Metellus and Afranius would survive until their defeat in Africa in 46 BCE.[182] Perhaps the most indomitable of those to fight against Caesar at Pharsalus, Labienus indeed would not meet his end until disaster in Spain 45 BCE.[183] But these were all enemies tried and true. For them life by Caesar's permission would not have been worth living. For others, the issue was less dramatic, or so M. Iunius Brutus and many of his peers believed at the time.[184] Caesar's call for clemency with the nobility served a purpose, but would eventually cost him his life and was not to be repeated—but for the occasional exception—at Philippi.[185]

Once the problem of the enemy's army had been resolved, Caesar was free to commence his pursuit of Pompeius. Pompeius had fled precipitately north towards Larisa and then from there to the Thermaic Gulf. Embarking upon a grain-transport that happened to be present, Pompeius briefly sojourned at Amphipolis, where he issued an edict ordering all of the men of military age in the province of Macedonia to assemble for service. Whether intending to offer resistance or merely going through the motions of doing so, Pompeius lifted anchor and sailed away at report of Caesar's imminent arrival.[186] Rapidly covering ground with his cavalry, Caesar had made for Thessalonica and was descending upon Amphipolis in the hope of capturing Pompeius.[187] Pompeius sailed to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos, where he gathered family and friends, and then set sail for Cilicia in southeastern Asia Minor. During a sojourn on Cyprus, he learned that Antioch-on-the-Orontes and other com-

181 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.5. For ideas of widespread loss of life by the nobiles, see Vell. 2.52.3; Oros. 6.15.25.

182 For Pompeius Magnus and Lentulus Crus, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.104.3. As for Metellus Scipio and Afranius, see Liv. *Per.* 114.

183 *B Hisp.* 31.9. For Labienus' adventurous escape from the disaster at Pharsalus, see Frontin. *Strat.* 2.7.13.

184 For Caesar's exercise of clemency at Pharsalus, see Suet. *Iul.* 75.2 (*acie Pharsalica proclamavit, ut civibus parceretur, deincepsque nemini non suorum quem vellet unum partis adversae servare concessit*). See also Vell. 2.52.4–6; Plut. *Caes.* 46.4; *Brut.* 5–6; Flor. 2.13.50–51; Polyaen. 8.23.29–31.

185 In this, as in so many things, to show himself the true heir of Caesar in the short-term was M. Antonius rather than Caesar the Younger. Thoughts turn to the aftermath of the battle of Philippi.

186 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.102.2–4.

187 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.102.1.

munities in Syria were opposed to his attempting to make a landing. Therefore, having acquired new resources in terms of money and men, he sailed south along the eastern Mediterranean coast, making his way to Ptolemaic Egypt in the expectation of finding hospitality there.[188] He arrived to find a civil war in progress between Ptolemy XIII and Cleopatra VII, the children of Ptolemy XII Auletes. Setting anchor at Pelusium, he sought and was accorded an audience with the youthful Ptolemy XIII. The monarch's advisors, aware of the changed situation of Pompeius, decided that he was too dangerous to keep as a guest, but impossible to turn away. Therefore, Pompeius must die. Tricked into leaving his warship for an Egyptian boat that was to take him to shore, Pompeius was cut down by one of his former officers before making landfall. As fate would have it, the date was 28 September, one day before Pompeius' birthday and the anniversary of his third and last triumph.[189] The ship on which Pompeius' wife Cornelia and son Sextus were was able to escape. However, Lentulus Crus also fell into the hands of the counsellors of Ptolemy XIII and was put to death.[190] In the meantime, having failed to capture Pompeius at Amphipolis, Caesar continued his pursuit overland, moving from Amphipolis eastwards to the Dardanelles and then passing over to Asia, where he descended along the Ionian coastline. Learning that Pompeius had been sighted at Cyprus, Caesar embarked an expeditionary force of 3,200 legionaries and 800 cavalry, setting out across the sea for Egypt.[191] Arriving in Alexandria on 2 October, Caesar learned of the recent death of Pompeius.[192] In theory, that should have been the end of the civil war: the principal enemy army had been routed and its commander was now dead.

188 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.102.4–103.1.

189 For rhetorical elaboration upon the date, see Vell. 2.53. Overall, for the flight of Pompeius from Pharsalus to Pelusium, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.94.5–6, 96.3–4, 102–104; Strab. 17.1.11 C796; Vell. 2.53; Val. Max. 1.5.6, 8.9; 4.5.5; 5.1.10; Plut. *Caes*. 45.7–9; *Pomp*. 72–79; *Cat. min*. 56; *Brut*. 6; Suet. *Iul*. 35; Flor. 2.13.51–52; App. *B Civ*. 2.81, 83–86; Cass. Dio 42.1–5; Eutr. 6.21; Oros. 6.15.28.

190 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.103–104.

191 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.106. Overall, for Caesar's pursuit of Pompeius from Pharsalus to Alexandria, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.98, 102.1, 105.1, 106–112; Strab. 14.2.15 C656; Vell. 2.54.1; Plut. *Caes*. 48.1–2; *Pomp*. 80; *Cic*. 39; *Ant*. 8; Suet. *Iul*. 35; Flor. 2.13.53–60; App. *B Civ*. 2.88.368–90.377; 5.4.19; Frontin. *Strat*. 1.1.5; Cass. Dio 42.6–9; Eutr. 6.21–22; Oros. 6.15.29. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, it was during this time that Caesar will have learned of the omens associated with Pharsalus that he reports as occurring in the cities of the East: Caes. *B Civ*. 3.105. For other, more complete collections, see: Val. Max. 1.6.12; Plut. *Caes*. 42.1, 43.3–6, 47; Plut. *Pomp*. 68; Flor. 2.13.45; App. *B Civ*. 2.68; Cass. Dio 41.61.2–5.

192 For the date, see Liv. *Per*. 112; cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.106.4.

Reality, however, proved more refractory. For one thing, Caesar became entangled in the civil war being fought between the contenders for the Ptolemaic throne. Prestige and an urgent need of money necessitated involvement in what proved to be a protracted and complicated war.[193] By the time that Caesar had put matters in order in Egypt, there were new problems to be resolved. Cn. Domitius Calvinus had been defeated in open battle by the Pontic monarch Pharnaces, and Cato the Younger and Metellus Scipio had managed to regroup and augment their forces in relative peace in Africa. Final victory proved elusive. Neither the exemplary and resounding defeat of Pharnaces at Zela in 47 BCE nor the destruction of the forces of Metellus Scipio and Cato at Thapsus in 46 BCE was sufficient to restore peace throughout the whole of the Roman world.[194] When his *legati* proved unequal to the task, Caesar found himself forced to take to the field again in Spain in 45 BCE.[195] Even then the defeat of forces led by Labienus and Pompeius' sons did not suffice. Indeed, Caesar himself was assassinated soon after returning to Rome, and civil war was alternatively to blaze forth and endure until Caesar the Younger's destruction of the forces of M. Antonius and Cleopatra VII in 30 BCE.[196] Only with the triple triumph of 29 BCE, and the political settlement implemented in the following two years might it conceivably be said to be at an end.[197]

193 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.107–112; *B Alex.* 1–33.

194 *B Alex.* 34–41, 69–77; *B Afr. passim.*

195 *B Hisp* 2; Plut. *Caes.* 56.1.

196 For the subsequent story, readers are referred to: J. Osgood, *Caesar's Legacy. Civil War and the Emergence of the Roman Empire.* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2006); C.H. Lange, *Res Publica Constituta. Actium, Apollo and the Accomplishment of the Triumviral Assignment.* (Impact of Empire, 10), (Brill: Leiden 2009); K. Welch, *Magnus Pius. Sextus Pompeius and the transformation of the Roman Republic*, (Classical Press of Wales: Swansea 2012).

197 See now J.W. Rich, "Making the Emergency Permanent: *auctoritas*, *potestas* and the Evolution of the Principate of Augustus," 37–121, in: Y. Rivière (ed.), *Des réformes augustéennes*, (École française de Rome: Roma 2012); G. Rowe, "Reconsidering the *Auctoritas* of Augustus," *Journal of Roman Studies* 103 (2013) 1–15.

CHAPTER 3

Italia

Introduction

In taking the measure of an author, attention must be given to verifying whether that author is credible. This task assumes especial significance when that author's work is to be used for the purposes of historical analysis. In the case of the renegade proconsul C. Caesar (100–44 BCE), there can be no doubt that he wrote his narrative from a partisan perspective. The *Bellum Civile*, or *Civil War* as it will henceforth be called, was composed at a short remove from 49–48 BCE, and Caesar was himself a protagonist in the events that he describes. Despite the various rhetorical features that Caesar has adopted so as to instill confidence in his credibility as an author, this narrative patently rests upon repeated misrepresentation of what transpired. Manipulating the record in order to justify his actions, Caesar has not left to posterity an account that is neutral or candid. This is something that was remarked by contemporaries, amongst whom C. Asinius Pollio looms large. However, too often in the past people have been content to cite Pollio's critique while accepting Caesar's account as it stands. Not so Pollio himself, who felt that the record should be set forth *sine ira et studio* and composed a detailed acccount of the period that claimed superiority in terms of historical truth and literary artistry.

In the chapter that follows, attention will be focused upon a select number of key moments and elements in Caesar's account of his invasion of Italia in early 49 BCE. Their critical examination reveals grave and frequent misrepresentation of the nature and course of events. This should occasion no surprise, for Caesar is avowedly partisan in his interpretation of history and was one of the protagonists of the Roman civil war in 49–48 BCE. However, the fact that for Caesar historical truth is subordinate to other, political ends does not altogether vitiate his worth as a source. Alternatively constrained to explain away embarrassing facts or providing representations that are plausible, he furnishes the historian of society and economic affairs with ample material allowing for insight into the transformation that led from Republic to monarchy.

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1 Crossing the Rubicon

Motum ex Metello consule civicum ... The horrors of the civil wars of the 40s BCE had their origins in the fatal compact that united the political fortunes of Cn. Pompeius, M. Crassus, and C. Caesar late in 60 BCE, or thus C. Asinius Pollio according to the report of Horace.[1] But this analysis of the leading figures and their motivations did not prevent him from commencing his narrative with the events of 49 BCE.[2] Pollio would seem to have been the source of information on Caesar's invasion of Italia for most of those narratives that survive.[3] Indeed, the identification of Pollio as a source proceeds from the fact that he is mentioned as having been present at the crossing of the Rubicon. Writing upon a Thucydidean model, Pollio probably furnished readers with an *arkhaiologia* that briefly reviewed the history of the so-called "First Triumvirate". Hence, it is quite likely that he opened the *Historiae* with Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon rather than the establishment of the "First Triumvirate" in 60/59 BCE. This dramatic choice is in character for Pollio, who had previously been the author of theatrical productions, and consonant with the bilingual culture of the late Republic and its penchant for Greek drama within a Roman guise.

The *Historiae* of Pollio have not survived, despite their exerting a noticeable influence upon both contemporary authors and later imitators. Livy's own account of the civil war years of the 40s was perceptibly influenced by Pollio's work, and Tacitus would appear to have drawn inspiration from Pollio in the

1 Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.1; R.G.M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book II*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1978), 7–10. On the figure and literary production of Pollio, see L. Morgan, "The Autopsy of C. Asinius Pollio," *Journal of Roman Studies* 90 (2000) 51–69; G. Zecchini, "Asinio Pollione: dall'attività politica alla riflessione storiografica," *ANRW* 2.30.2 (1982) 1265–1296; J.P. Néraudau, "Asinius Pollion et la poésie," *ANRW* 2.30.3 (1983) 1732–1750. For additional bibliography, see the extensive list provided at *FRH* 1.430 (s.v. "No. 56: C. Asinius Pollio"). Of especial note, despite its being vitiated by premises about Appian's use of Pollio that are no longer tenable, is the work of E. Kornemann, "Die historische Schriftstellerei des C. Asinius Pollio," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie und Pädagogik* Suppl. 22 (1896) 555–692. For the date and nature of the so-called "First Triumvirate", see G.R. Stanton and B.A. Marshall, "The Coalition between Pompeius and Crassus, 60–59 B.C.," *Historia* 24 (1975) 205–219.

2 See R.W. Westall, "The *Historiae* of C. Asinius Pollio," (forthcoming); *pace* R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1939), 8.

3 Viz. Plut. *Caes.* 32.4–8; Pomp. 60.4; *Apophth. C. Caes.* 6–7; Suet. *Iul.* 31–32; App. *B Civ.* 2.35.138–141; Lucan. 1.183–232. Matters are not unnaturally complicated by the fact of contamination of Pollio's account with that of Livy (cf. J.L. Moles, "Virgil, Pompey and the *Histories* of Asinius Pollio," *CW* 76 (1983) 287–288, for another instance) and at least one *fabula praetexta* (T.P. Wiseman, "Crossing the Rubicon, and other dramas," *SCI* 15 (1996) 152–158).

unusual decision to commence his own *Historiae* with the opening of 69 CE.[4] Albeit implicitly, Plutarch clearly relies upon Pollio when narrating Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon (Plut. *Caes*. 32.4–8):

> Αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν διῆγεν ἐν φανερῶι μονομάχοις ἐφεστὼς γυμναζομένοις καὶ θεώμενος· μικρὸν δὲ πρὸ ἑσπέρας θεραπεύσας τὸ σῶμα καὶ παρελθὼν εἰς τὸν ἀνδρῶνα καὶ συγγενόμενος βραχέα τοῖς παρακεκλημένοις ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον, ἤδη συσκοτάζοντος ἐξανέστη, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους φιλοφρονηθεὶς καὶ κελεύσας περιμένειν αὐτὸν ὡς ἐπανελευσόμενον, ὀλίγοις δὲ τῶν φίλων προείρητο μὴ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντας, ἄλλον δὲ ἄλληι διώκειν. Αὐτὸς δὲ τῶν μισθίων ζευγῶν ἐπιβὰς ἑνὸς ἤλαυνεν ἑτέραν τινὰ πρῶτον ὁδόν, εἶτα πρὸς τὸ Ἀρίμινον ἐπιστρέψας, ὡς ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸν διορίζοντα τὴν ἐντὸς Ἄλπεων Γαλατίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης Ἰταλίας ποταμόν—Ῥουβίκων καλεῖται—καὶ λογισμὸς αὐτὸν εἰσήιει μᾶλλον ἐγγίζοντα τῶι δεινῶι καὶ περιφερόμενον τῶι μεγέθει τῶν τολμωμένων, ἔσχετο δρόμου· καὶ τὴν πορείαν ἐπιστήσας πολλὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῶι διήνεγκε σιγῆι τὴν γνώμην ἐπ' ἀμφότερα μεταλαμβάνων, καὶ τροπὰς ἔσχεν αὐτῶι τότε τὸ βούλευμα πλείστας· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν φίλων τοῖς παροῦσιν, ὧν ἦν καὶ Πολλίων Ἀσίννιος, συνδιηπόρησεν, ἀναλογιζόμενος ἡλίκων κακῶν ἄρξει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ διάβασις, ὅσον τε λόγον αὐτῆς τοῖς αὖθις ἀπολείψουσι. Τέλος δὲ μετὰ θυμοῦ τινος ὥσπερ ἀφεὶς ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς εἰς τύχας ἐμβαίνουσιν ἀπόρους καὶ τόλμας προοίμιον ὑπειπών, Ἀνερρίφθω κύβος, ὥρμησε πρὸς τὴν διάβασιν. καὶ δρόμωι τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χρώμενος εἰσέπεσε πρὸ ἡμέρας εἰς τὸ Ἀρίμινον καὶ κατέσχε.

> He himself passed the day openly present and watching as gladiators practiced. Shortly before evening, he bathed, presented himself in the dining-room, and met briefly with his dinner-guests. It was already growing dark when he stood up and excused himself, asking his guests to wait for him to come back, except for a few friends whom he had told to follow him, not all by the same route, but one by one path and another by another. He himself mounted a hired cart and initially drove along one road, but then turned upon another leading to Ariminum. When he came to the river that separates Gallia Cisalpina from the rest of Italia—it is called Rubicon—and thoughts began to come to him as he drew near to the dreadful act and was agitated by the immensity of what he was

4 For the nature of this choice, see C. Damon, *Tacitus, Histories: Book 1*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2003), 78; cf. R. Syme, "Imperator Caesar: A Study in Nomenclature," *Historia* 7 (1958) 172–188, in part. 145.

> undertaking, he left off driving. Coming to a halt, he quietly meditated on many things as he reflected on the positive and negative arguments and his resolution wavered considerably. He also shared many of his doubts with those of his friends present, one of whom was Pollio Asinius, and he reflected that crossing that river would be the start of great evils for all of humanity, and that the fame of that act with posterity would be immense. At last, as if prey to some passion, he quit thinking of the future and he uttered the following phrase, which is commonly said by those who are about to embark upon perilous enterprises of doubtful outcome: “Let the die fly high”. Then he rushed to make the crossing. Now making haste for the remainder of the journey, he fell upon Ariminum before daybreak and occupied it.

Unlike his practice elsewhere, Plutarch does not inform us that Pollio was the source of the information that he is relating.[5] Nevertheless, the detail that Pollio figured amongst those who accompanied Caesar as he launched the invasion of Italia allows us to be sure that Pollio was in fact the ultimate source of this information, even if Livy served as an intermediate source.[6] Consequently, despite the indubitable reworking that occurred as the source was translated from Latin into Greek, this text allows us to glimpse the nature of the original version. Pollio emerges as an eyewitness to history who was capable of critical insight despite his being a dedicated partisan of the Caesarian cause in the 40s.

Two items are of especial interest from a historiographical perspective. First, there is Pollio’s decision to attribute to Caesar direct speech (*oratio recta*) together with reported speech (*oratio obliqua*) at the moment in which he chose to cross the Rubicon. Secondly, there is the focus upon the individual’s heroic choice. Both the dramatic nature of the moment and the means whereby that nature is underlined are striking.

From the testimony of Plutarch and Appian, it would appear that Pollio did not attribute to Caesar a speech in *oratio recta* of any significant length. Rather,

5 Cf. Plut. *Caes*. 46.1–3, 52.7–8. For brief but incisive discussion, see C.B.R. Pelling, “Plutarch’s method of work in the Roman lives,” *JHS* 99 (1979) 74–96, in part. 84–85; cf. C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Caesar*, (Clarendon Ancient History Series), (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2011), 44–47 and 312–315, esp. 314 (“The naming here [of Pollio] almost serves as a source citation”).

6 In view of the tendency for hypotheses to become accepted as fact, this possibility cannot be sufficiently stressed. The loss of the accounts of both Livy and Pollio in this instance renders a verdict of *non liquet* the better choice for the present.

he would seem to have employed *oratio obliqua* followed by a memorable quotation: "Let the dice fly high". In so doing, Pollio ran counter to the tradition informing subsequent works such as that of Cassius Dio, but remained faithful to the Thucydidean tradition. Proverbial by this time, the phrase in question derived from Menander.[7] Since Caesar is known to have highly valued the elegant simplicity of Menander's language, he will have been aware that he was citing Menander.[8] Warfare was often likened to a game of dice, for anything might happen once the dogs of war had been unleashed.[9] Quotation of Caesar citing Menander at this critical moment serves to underline the dramatic nature of the choice made by Caesar for civil war. Once he had openly flouted the authority of the Senate and broken the law, there was no turning back.

Classical historiography tends to focus upon the moral responsibility of the individual, despite the acknowledgement that there are higher powers, and Pollio's depiction of Caesar's crossing the Rubicon is no exception. There always exists a choice. The Rubicon clearly constituted the boundary between Gallia Cisalpina and Italia, and Caesar's crossing that boundary constituted an

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7 Athen. *Deipn.* 13, 559C; A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer*, (B.G. Teubner: Leipzig 1890), 12–13 s.v. "*alea*". Cf. Pelling 2011: 317.

8 M. Gelzer, *Caesar. Der Politiker und Staatsmann.* Introduction and updated bibliography by E. Baltrusch. (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2008), 163–164. Of course, the act of citation may be an invention on the part of Pollio.

9 In view of Caesar's high regard for his *Fortuna*, the metaphor is particularly apt. Aside from the discussion and literature cited by Gelzer (previous note), see C. Brutscher, *Analysen zu Suetons Divus Julius und der Parallelüberlieferung*, (Noctes Romanae, 8), (Paul Haupt: Bern 1958), 75–83. It may be worth adding a reference to an event from later in this same decade. For the massive confusion that is characteristic of battle, to such a degree that the legate Sulpicius Galba by chance ended well behind the enemy line in the battle of Forum Gallorum in 43 BCE (Cic. *Fam.* 10.30), see A.K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War, 100 BC–AD 200*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1996), 159, 244. Not unnaturally, in view of such confusion, warfare was likened to a throw of the die (cf. Plut. *Ant.* 33.4; J. Uden, *The Invisible Satirist. Juvenal and Second-Century Rome*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015), 15–16), and games of chance seem to have been popular with soldiers (e.g. *Evang. Matt.* 27.35; *Evang. Luc.* 23.34; *Evang. Ioh.* 19.24; cf. J. Schwarz, "Gambling in Ancient Jewish Society and in the Graeco-Roman World," 145–168, in: M. Goodman (ed.), *Jews in a Graeco-Roman World*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1998)). During the *bellum Siculum* of the mid-30s BCE, the younger Caesar's recklessness with the lives of his soldiers was pointedly compared to his nonchalance in gambling (cf. Suet. *Aug.* 70.2; D. Wardle, *Suetonius: Life of Augustus / Vita Divi Augusti.* Translated with Introduction and Historical Commentary, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014), 447).

illegal act.[10] Caesar is portrayed as having reflected that dire events for "the whole of humanity" would follow, but that immortal glory would also be his. Notwithstanding the crime and its consequences, many thought Caesar justified in what he did. Neither Pollio nor his contemporaries will have ignored the fact that Caesar had definitively put an end to the Gallic threat. The likelihood that he would not celebrate a triumph for this achievement and the possibility that he might even be put on trial were not to be endured. Pollio did not seek to hide the fact that Caesar had committed an illegal action by his invasion of Italia, but rather accepted this illegality as a choice necessary for the maintenance of a greater common good: *libertas*.

The narrative strategy adopted by Caesar in his own account of this initial stage of the invasion of Italia is altogether different. Which does not mean that *libertas* as a common good is any less important within Caesar's justification of his actions; *libertas* was to serve as a *Leitmotif* for the followers and heirs of Caesar through the coming decades.[11] However, as an experienced advocate for the prosecution, he was well aware that omission was by far the best strategy in his defense.[12] Hence, he does not mention the river Rubicon, thereby avoiding any explicit confession that he had acted contrary to the *lex Cornelia de maiestate*. Equally significantly, he re-orders events so that an address to his troops (*contio*) precedes and justifies his march upon Ariminum. Consequently, readers are presented with the choice between *libertas* and domination of the Roman state by a cabal (*dominatio factionis*) rather than with the choice between civil war or peace. Referring to himself in the third-person singular and using indirect speech for his address to the soldiers, Caesar fashions a style that is seemingly dispassionate and neutral, thereby giving a sense of inevitability to his narrative.

10 For identification of the Rubicon, see P. Aebischer, "Considérations sur le cours du Rubicon," *MH* 1 (1944) 258–269.

11 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.22.5 (*ut se et populum Romanum factione paucorum oppressum in libertatem vindicaret*); Aug. *RG* 1.1 (*rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi*). As regards the significance of *libertas* for Pollio, see Morgan 2000: 51–69, esp. 66–68; A.B. Bosworth, "Asinius Pollio and Augustus," *Historia* 21 (1972) 441–473, esp. 441–452, for the "freedom of expression" evident in the biography of Pollio as a senior statesman. As Bosworth compellingly observes, however, such a liberty in no way necessitates the modern vision of Pollio as a proponent of opposition to the Principate. On the contrary, the evidence for amicable relations between Augustus and Pollio to the very end is a sign of the latter's willing co-optation, and that means that there was a qualitative difference between the "freedom of expression" of Pollio and that of the less fortunate "Rabienus".

12 For Caesar's experiences as an advocate, see discussion in Chapter 6 (Asia).

Situated at Ravenna, where he was awaiting the Senate's response to his "extremely mild requests" (*lenissima postulata*), Caesar decided to move once the Senate had passed an emergency decree calling upon all magistrates and pro-magistrates to take whatever action required for the well-being of the Roman state.[13] This decree was passed on 7 January 49 BCE.[14] Its passage was secured only through the threat of physical violence to those tribunes of the *plebs*, M. Antonius and Q. Cassius, who had sought to interpose their tribunician veto. That threat gave them the excuse for fleeing from Rome to Caesar and allowed Caesar to claim that he was acting in defense of the rights of the tribunes of the *plebs*. Transposing to Ravenna the speech that he presumably delivered at Ariminum, Caesar depicts himself as addressing his legionaries as Roman citizens (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.7.1–8):[15]

> Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar apud milites contionatur. Omnium temporum iniurias inimicorum in se commemorat; a quibus deductum ac depravatum Pompeium queritur invidia atque obtrectatione laudis suae, cuius ipse honori et dignitati semper faverit adiutorque fuerit. Novum in rem publicam introductum exemplum queritur, ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur quae superioribus annis armis esset restituta. Sullam nudata omnibus rebus tribunicia potestate tamen intercessionem liberam reliquisse; Pompeium, qui amissa restituisse videatur bona, etiam quae ante habuerint ademisse. Quotienscumque sit decretum darent operam magistratus ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet, qua voce et quo senatus consulto populus Romanus ad arma sit vocatus, factum in perniciosis legibus, in vi tribunicia, in secessione populi, templis locisque editioribus occupatis; atque haec superioris aetatis exempla expiata Saturnini atque Gracchorum casibus docet; quarum rerum illo

13 For Caesar at Ravenna, see Caes. *B Civ.* 1.5.5. As regards his *lenissima postulata*, see K. Raaflaub, *Dignitatis Contentio. Studien zur Motivation und politischen Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius*, (Vestigia, 20), (C.H. Beck: München 1974), 63, 68. It is to be remarked not only that Caesar is thus describing his own requests, but that he is not overly fond of employing adjectives in the superlative form: L. Canali, *Personalità e stile di Cesare*, (Edizioni dell'Ateneo: Roma 1964), 181–194.

14 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.5.4. It is perhaps worth stressing, contrary to Caesar's own editorial comment, that the fact that the Senate employed five business days in order to discuss a response to Caesar's latest letter (1 January 49) is a sign that even on the brink of civil war there were many who hesitated to take the plunge. Cf. A.W. Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence. A Historian's Companion*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008), 282.

15 J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Books 1–2*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1991), 163.

tempore nihil factum, ne cogitatum quidem [nulla lex promulgata, non cum populo agi coeptum, nulla secessio facta]. Hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant. Conclamant legionis XIII., quae aderat, milites—hanc enim initio tumultus evocaverat, reliquae nondum convenerant—sese paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere.

Upon learning these things, Caesar publicly addressed his soldiers. He reminded them of the injustices that his enemies had done to him over the years. He complained that they had misled and corrupted Pompeius through jealousy and disparagement of his own praise. Yet, he had always favoured this man's honour and standing and been of assistance. He complained that a new example had been introduced into the state, so that the tribunician veto might be censured and suppressed by arms whereas it had been restored by arms in preceding years. (He complained that) Sulla left the tribunician veto untrammelled despite having despoiled it of all else. Pompeius, who seemed to have restored those rights that had been lost, had even removed that which the (tribunes) had previously had. Whenever it had been decreed that the magistrates should see to it that the state not suffer harm, by which expression and by which decree of the Senate the Roman people had been called to arms, it was done in the case of harmful laws, tribunician use of force, secession by the People, and occupation of the temple and high places (of the city). He showed that these instances of an earlier age had been expiated by the fates of Saturninus and the Gracchi. None of those things had now occurred. Indeed they had not even been imagined. [No law had been promulgated, there had been no popular agitation, and there had been no secession.] He called upon them to defend from his enemies the standing and honour of the general under whose leadership they had most felicitously managed the state for nine years and fought countless successful battles and pacified the whole of Gallia and Germania. The soldiers of the XIII legion, which was present—for he had called out this legion at the beginning of the disturbance (*tumultus*), and the others had not yet assembled—that they were ready to avenge the injustices done to their general and the tribunes of the *plebs*.

There is nothing here of the individual *Angst* that Pollio depicts Caesar as having experienced prior to crossing the Rubicon, nor is there the least hint

of illegality on the part of Caesar.[16] On the contrary, his political enemies are represented as having acted against the ancestral constitution by their treatment of the tribunes of the *plebs* and through their recourse to violence rather than due process of law. Caesar's cause is identified with that of the tribunes of the *plebs*, and his soldiers assert their readiness to protect both the tribunes of the *plebs* and their general.

Eschewing the individual and the heroic for the constitutional and corporate, Caesar portrays himself as engaged in discussing civic values with fellow-citizens, rather than as a general commanding his soldiers. The very choice of verb used to describe his speech (*contionor*) is exquisitely redolent of civic discourse.[17] The proconsul of Gallia, like a magistrate or candidate for a magistracy, addresses an assembly of citizens and submits to their consideration his reasons for action. The *comitia centuriata* were an assembly both for elections and for war.[18] It is this dual identity that informs Caesar's presenting his case to his soldiers so that, as citizens, they might proclaim their willingness to defend him. The harangue is almost exclusively civic in nature. Caesar rehearses the history of the tribunate of the *plebs* in recent decades. The historical *exempla* afforded by L. Appuleius Saturninus and the Ti. Gracchus and C. Gracchus con-

16 Caesar is singularly devoid of emotions in his *commentarii*. Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.80.5 with App. *B Civ*. 2.64.267, as regards the decision to attack Gomphi in 48 BCE. Appian openly writes of Caesar's being moved by anger, whereas *iracundia* and similar sentiments are attributed by Caesar only to his enemies (e.g. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.8.3, 16.3). Caesar's stance is to be explained in terms of political *and* philosophical choice.

17 F.G.B. Millar, *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic*, (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1998), 207.

18 L.R. Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar*, (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1966); cf. C. Nicolet, *The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome*, tr. P.S. Falla, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1980), 207–315 (= Ch. VII: Comitia: The citizen and politics), esp. 217–224. While consuls and other magistrates interacted with the assembled Roman people within the context of *comitia tributa* as well as *comitia centuriata*, the military context and the gravity of the topic being treated—no less than the life or death of Caesar in the ultimate analysis—together suggest that Caesar's Roman audience would have intuitively assimilated the assembled legionaries to the *comitia centuriata* or Roman people under arms. See also A. Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1999), 55–61; C. Nicolet, *Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen. Tome 1: Les structures de l'Italie romaine* (Presses Universitaires Françaises: Paris 1979) 341–344, remarking the use of the *comitia centuriata* for, amongst other things, declarations of war and the recall of Cicero from exile in 57 BCE, items which are not altogether irrelevant to the present context. For further bibliography, of a general nature, see Nicolet 1980: 414 n. 12.

cern the exaggerated assertion of the rights of the Roman people and actions that occurred within the city of Rome itself.[19] Seeking to demonstrate the inappropriate nature of the *senatus consultum ultimum* aimed against himself, Caesar stresses the difference between the present and the past situation within the city of Rome. With a breathtakingly daring turn of phrase, he also redefines as *tumultus* the behaviour of his opponents in Rome.[20]

The narrative framework for Caesar's address to his soldiers is furnished by the tribunes of the *plebs* fleeing from Rome to Ariminum. It is the report of their flight (*quibus rebus cognitis*) that affords the occasion for his addressing his men at Ravenna. Immediately after this speech follows Caesar's march upon Ariminum, where the physical presence of the tribunes provides corroboration of what he had said.[21] Mistreatment of the sacrosanct tribunes of the *plebs*, whose only fault was that they had sought to prevent discussion of Caesar's replacement as governor, foreshadows the fate in store for Caesar himself if he meekly followed the dictates of the Senate. Effectively surrogates for Caesar, the tribunes of the *plebs* M. Antonius and Q. Cassius provided the renegade proconsul with legal justification for his march upon Rome.[22]

19 It is to be remarked that the language at Caes. *B Civ.* 1.7.5 is particularly forceful, with reference to *perniciosae leges* and *vis tribunicia* that might seem paradoxical to those steeped in the modern vision of Caesar as a *popularis*. Nevertheless, violence is justified by the success that it enjoys and the individuals cited were united in failure (cf. Suet. *Iul.* 20.1, for the use of *vis* against consular opposition to a law). Moreover, Caesar has here adopted the language of the *optimates* (e.g. Cic. *Fam.* 1.5b.1, condemning the speech of the tribune of the *plebs* C. Porcius Cato in 56 BCE) in order to call them out in this instance.

For biographies of these individuals, still fundamental remain: D. Stockton, *The Gracchi*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1979); *RE* 2.2 (1923) 1409–1426 s.v. "Sempronius Nr. 54" (F. Münzer); *RE* 2.2 (1923) 1375–1400 s.v. "Sempronius Nr. 47" (F. Münzer); *RE* 2.1 (1895) 261–269 s.v. "Appuleius Nr. 29" (E. Klebs).

20 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.7.8: *hanc* [i.e. *legionem XIII.*] *enim initio tumultus evocaverat*. Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.3.3: *completur urbs et ipsum comitium tribunis, centurionibus, evocatis*. In response to those who persist in favouring a late date for the composition and publication of Caesar's *Bellum Civile*, it is worth remarking that Caesar is hardly likely to have written these complaints after he himself had installed M. Lepidus upon the Tiber island with a legion.

21 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.8.1: *cognita militum voluntate Ariminum cum ea legione proficiscitur ibique tribunos plebis qui ad eum confugerant convenit.*

22 Cf. Cic. *Phil.* 2.55; Plut. *Ant.* 6.1. For the unflattering, trivialising comparison of the *consul* M. Antonius to the notorious Helen of Troy, see R. Pitcher, "The Second *Philippic* as a Source for Aristocratic Values," pp. 131–139, in: T. Stevenson and M. Wilson (eds.), *Cicero's Philippics. History, Rhetoric and Ideology*. (Polygraphia Ltd: Auckland 2008), esp. 136–137; cf. R. Evans, "Phantoms in the Philippics," pp. 62–81, (in that same collection), esp. 62, 66;

Libertas as embodied by the tribunes of the *plebs*, however, was merely a pretext. The issue at stake was when Caesar might be removed from his province and divested of his soldiers. From the protracted and acrimonious dispute over the years 51–49 BCE, it emerges that there was ample room for debate. The constitution of the Roman Republic was a heterogeneous collection of laws and usage sanctioned by time that afforded a bewildering variety of responses.

There were those who thought like M. Claudius Marcellus (*cos.* 51) that Caesar might justifiably be recalled from service in 51, in the wake of his victory over Vercingetorix.[23] The conquest of Gallia Transalpina was seemingly at an end. In celebration of Caesar's victory at Alesia, in fact, the Senate had proclaimed a *supplicatio* for a virtually unparalleled period of twenty days.[24] Despite the elimination of the Gallic peril, however, certain of the tribunes of the *plebs* and Marcellus' colleague in the consulate, Serv. Sulpicius Galba, successfully thwarted this attempt to remove Caesar from power.

There were those, more numerous, who agreed with C. Claudius Marcellus (*cos.* 50) that Caesar's second five-year term as governor of Gallia Transalpina, Gallia Cisalpina, and Illyricum came to an end in early 50 BCE. Even the meagre chronicle provided by A. Hirtius for Caesar's military operations in Gallia in that year reveals that there was no longer any strategic rationale for the pro-

L. Sussman, "Antony the *Meretrix Audax*," *Eranos* 96 (1998) 114–128. It is worth remarking that, in order to undermine his political opponents, Cicero deploys exemplary names in unflattering comparisons (e.g. "Spartacus": Cic. *Phil.* 4.15; 13.22; cf. Z. Yavetz, "Cicero: A Man of Letters in Politics," 173–180, in: G. Clark and T. Rajak (eds.), *Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World. Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2002), here 174, for a similar observation regarding Cicero's treatment of the person of Pompeius in private correspondence), which is not a rhetorical strategy to be found in the highly politicized *commentarii* of Caesar.

23 Cass. Dio 40.59.1–3. As so frequently, Pompeius played an ambiguous role.

24 Caes. *B Gall.* 7.90.8. For the phenomenon of *supplicationes* in the late Republic, readers are referred to the fundamental work of L. Halkin, *La supplication d'action de grâces chez les Romains*, (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, 128), (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1953). It should be added, however, that there was clearly an inflation of honours at work in the 60s and 50s BCE. Whereas a ten-day *supplicatio* had twice been decreed for Pompeius in 63 BCE, for putting an end to the Mithridatic war and for allegedly having brought all hostilities on land and sea to an end (Cic. *Prov. cons.* 27; F.H. Hahn, "Pompey's *supplicatio duplicata*," *Phoenix* 54 (2000) 244–254), a fifteen-day *supplicatio* was decreed for Caesar in 56 BCE (Cic. *Prov. cons.* 26), and a twenty-*supplicatio* was decreed for him in 55 BCE (Caes. *B Gall.* 4.38.5). The last-mentioned year, it will be recalled, was that in which the consulate was performed once again jointly by M. Licinius Crassus and Cn. Pompeius Magnus.

consul's continuing in service. Since Caesar's second term as governor had been authorized by a law of 55 BCE, the time seemed appropriate. However, again the other colleague in the consulate and a talented tribune of the *plebs*, L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Scribonius Curio respectively, managed to hinder the Senate's voting on a proposal to remove Caesar from power.

But still more numerous were those who agreed with L. Cornelius Lentulus (*cos.* 49) in thinking that the situation had become intolerable as of early 49 BCE. Despite financial difficulties and long-standing friendship with Caesar's *praefectus fabrum* Cornelius Balbus, Lentulus refused to be swayed from his chosen course of action.[25] With the encouragement of C. Claudius Marcellus (*cos.* 49, not to be confused with his homonymous cousin and predecessor), he overrode the objections of the tribunes of the *plebs* M. Antonius and Q. Cassius and allocated Caesar's province to two or three senators in accordance with the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* of 52 BCE. It is recorded that Gallia Cisalpina fell to Considius Nonianus and Gallia Transalpina to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus.[26]

Caesar himself had a position that evolved over the years, although always tending towards a maximalist interpretation of the law in favour of himself. As a result of a senatorial decree and the *lex Vatinia* passed during his first consulate in 59 BCE, he had eventually received the regions of Illyricum, Gallia Cisalpina, and Gallia Transalpina as his province for a five-year period.[27] With the joint approval of Cn. Pompeius and M. Crassus, this province was renewed for another five years through another law in 55 BCE.[28] Yet another law passed in mid-52 guaranteed him the right to be a candidate for the consulate without having to be physically present in Rome (*ratio absentis*).[29] It would appear

25 For the figure of Balbus, see K. Welch, "The Office of *Praefectus Fabrum* in the Late Republic," *Chiron* 25 (1995) 131–145, in part. 135–136. He subsequently reappears in this guise during the Macedonian campaign: Vell. 2.51.3. Readers should beware of the confusion of uncle with nephew to be found in Velleius. See also Cic. *Fam.* 10.32(415).3; A.J. Woodman, *Velleius Paterculus: The Caesarian and Augustan narrative, 2.41–93*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1983), 92.

26 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.6.5 (L. Domitius Ahenobarbus); Cic. *Fam.* 16.12.3 (Considius Nonianus). It is regularly asserted that Illyricum was yet united with Gallia Cisalpina, but recent history (T.C. Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*. 2 vols. (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2000), 424–425) and assignment to Vatinius in 48–47 (*MRR* 2.281, 290) together suggest separate administration, possibly by Voconius (Cic. *Att.* 8.15.3).

27 G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani. Elenco cronologico con una introduzione sull'attività legislativa dei comizi romani*, (Società Editrice Libraria: Milano 1912), 392.

28 Rotondi 1912: 404–405.

29 Rotondi 1912: 412. Most recently and forcefully, see R. Morstein-Marx, "Caesar's Alleged Fear of Prosecution and His *Ratio Absentis* in the Approach to Civil War," *Historia* 56 (2007)

that Caesar was initially interested in being a candidate for the consulate of 50 BCE. For whatever reason, he delayed, neither seeking office in mid-51 nor in mid-50. By early 49 BCE, he appears to have arrived at a position whereby he claimed that the *ratio absentis* attributed to him in 52 implicitly allowed him to retain his province until he had been a candidate.[30] Also revelatory is his subsequent assertion that, in becoming consul in 48, he had respected the legal requirement of an interval of ten years between the holding of this office.[31] Unwilling to part with his army as long as Pompeius remained near Rome and there were armed forces that might be used against himself, Caesar sought a situation in which he might assume office without the risk of being arraigned for past actions.

Focussing upon the unjust treatment accorded to the tribunes of the *plebs* and the glorious achievements of his own soldiers, Caesar avoids entering into these legal technicalities. The speech is a masterpiece of dissimulation, squarely placing the onus for civil war upon his enemies within the Senate.

But there is an element to this dissimulation that has infrequently and not fully been appreciated, perhaps as a consequence of the loss of the very opening of the *Civil War*. Had the opening survived intact, modern readers would be more aware of a trait that recurs at the opening of Book Three, wherein Caesar provides a detailed listing of his enemies' forces but fails to do the same as regards his own.[32] As a rule, only traces and hints are offered as to the effective nature of the military forces deployed by Caesar. A decent and necessary silence enfolds the strategic decisions that he made so as to win the Italian campaign.

In writing of the men of the Legio XIII, Caesar claims that he had summoned them at the beginning of the *tumultus*.[33] That statement is only partially true, for they were present in Ravenna and immediately available for action. Similarly, the other legions that were to accompany Caesar in his invasion of Italia were already present or being levied in Gallia Cisalpina, albeit at a further distance so as to avoid clear reports in Rome that might result in levies being

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159–178; L. Gagliardi, *Cesare, Pompeo e la lotta per le magistrature, anni 52–50 a.C.* (Giuffrè: Milano 2011), 53–56.

30 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.9.2: *doluisse se quod populi Romani beneficium sibi per contumeliam ab inimicis extorqueretur ereptoque semestri imperio in urbem retraheretur, cuius absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus iussisset.*

31 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.1.1: *dictatore habente comitia Caesare consules creantur ⟨C.⟩ Caesar et P. Servilius; is enim erat annus quo per leges ei consulem fieri liceret.*

32 Cf. J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Book 3*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1993), 144.

33 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.7.8 (cited above).

held prior to his taking action, were that needed. By the time that Caesar left Corfinium to besiege Brundisium in late February 49 BCE, he was accompanied by six legions and a substantial cavalry force from the king of Noricum.[34] The rapidity with which Caesar was able to deploy these forces deep within the Italian peninsula reveals a fundamental contradiction between Caesar's actions and his claims to have reacted only in response to the *senatus consultum ultimum* of 7 January 49 BCE.[35]

The style and mood of Caesar's narrative of his invasion of Italia on 11 January 49 BCE are sober, indeed laconic in view of the significance of the events that were to follow. Caesar eschews the dramatic and individual in order to focus upon a constitutional issue that would be of interest to all Roman citizens. Deftly linking his own success as a general to this issue and silently re-ordering events and omitting strategic considerations of no little consequence, Caesar fashions a tendentious narrative that commands assent by its seeming adherence to the truth. Pollio, by contrast, appears to have offered a narrative that was closer to the truth of the course of events despite its being far more dramatic and artistically wrought. Neither account may be accepted as it stands, but that of Pollio is decidedly more trustworthy.

2 Opening the *Sanctius Aerarium*

Warfare could not be conducted without men and financial means. That structural truth recurs frequently in Roman history. Which is not to say that it might be conveniently forgotten upon occasion. In an interview that occurred before Pompeius left Rome on 17 January 49 BCE, Cicero had informed the erstwhile general that he would not undertake the defense of Capua without soldiers and money.[36] The fact that the orator felt the need to remind a general who had

34 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.25.1.

35 For a more detailed discussion, see H.-M. Ottmer, *Die Rubikon-Legende. Untersuchungen zu Caesars und Pompeius' Strategie vor und nach Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges*, (Boldt: Boppard am Rhein 1979). As has been remarked by K.M. Girardet, "*Imperia* und *provinciae* des Pompeius 82 bis 48 v.Chr.," *Chiron* 31 (2001) 153–209, here 202 n. 203, this important work has been unjustly neglected. Demonstration that Caesar already had his forces disposed for conflict prior to its inception is of capital importance.

36 Cic. *Att*. 8.3.5: *dixi ipsi me nihil suscepturum sine praesidio et sine pecunia*. For analysis of the evidence for Cicero's refusal, see D.R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's letters to Atticus*. 7 vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1965–1970), here 4.438–440. For an explicit statement of the date: Cic. *Att*. 9.10.2. As regards the conjoining of soldiers and money, see

celebrated three triumphs of this fundamental truth is testimony to the confusion and seemingly disingenuous nature of the tardy defense set in place to oppose Caesar's advance southwards through Italia.[37] Since Campania was one of the most populous regions of ancient Italia, levies might have been expected to provide sufficient men for mounting the region's defense. But Cicero's language suggests that the orator perhaps had in mind the veteran legions that were accompanying Pompeius as he made his way to Apulia. Surely, Cicero's recent experience in Cilicia would have indicated the utility of veterans. Moreover, the context of his statement suggests that he seems to have thought that Pompeius should be the one to provide him with the money with which to pay these soldiers. If so, then that money would have come from the *aerarium*, or state treasury, of Rome.

Established at an uncertain moment in the early history of the Republic, the *aerarium* seems to have always been maintained within the safety of the temple of Saturn standing upon the lower slopes of the Capitoline hill and at the northeastern end of the Forum Romanum. The name of this public institution was explained by its having come into being prior to the use of silver and gold coinage, at a moment when bronze in the form of bars alone served as the means of exchange.[38] At some point, the administration of the state treasury was assigned to the *quaestores urbani*.[39] Their role was effectively limited to that of keeping an account of proceeds from taxes and expenditures as determined by the Senate.[40] The money kept within the *aerarium* derived not only from taxes such as the 5% value tax levied upon liberated slaves, but also from the spoils of war. Precisely where in the temple this money was

App. *B Civ*. 4.99.416 ("sinews of war"); Cass. Dio 42.49.4–5. Echoing the language of their sources, these historians give voice to an expression that was a commonplace of political discourse in the late Republic. Examples include: Cic. *Pis*. 12.28; Caes. *B Civ*. 1.4.2.

37 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.3.1–2, which with its focus on soldiers and money illustrates once again (were that necessary) that Pompeius was not ignorant of the difficult nature of the task assigned to Cicero. On the other hand, it is worth observing that the failure to provide Cicero with money seems to coincide with the failure to include him fully in Pompeius' plans for the future. Pompeius seems not to have had a high opinion of Cicero's resolve and ability to stay the course in offering opposition to Caesar. In view of Atticus' reiterated advice to Cicero (Cic. *Att*. 9.10.5–8) and the fact that Tullia was pregnant with child, Pompeius' diffidence appears well founded even though Cicero did eventually join Caesar's opponents in Macedonia.

38 Varro, *Ling. Lat*. 5.183.

39 T. Mommsen, *Römische Staatsrecht*, 3 vols. in 5. (S. Herzel: Leipzig 1887[3]–1888[3]), 2.1.132–133, 544–545; 3.2.1130–1135.

40 Cf. Plut. *Cat. min*. 18.

maintained is uncertain. However, part of this money was denominated the *sanctius aerarium* and earmarked for expenditure only in the case of the gravest of perils: another attack upon Rome by the Gauls.

Caesar himself emphasizes the concern for soldiers and money that motivated his opponents' actions throughout the whole of Italia as they prepared to offer resistance. His account of events at Rome culminating with passage of the *Senatus consultum ultimum* terminates with a brief list of the actions that followed. At the very end of that list the narrative focus shifts from the city of Rome to the whole of the Italian peninsula (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.6.8):

> Tota Italia dilectus habentur, arma imperantur, pecuniae a municipiis exiguntur, e fanis tolluntur, omnia divina humanaque iura permiscentur.

> In all of Italia levies were held, weapons were requisitioned, and money was exacted from the Italian towns and removed from the temples. All divine and human laws were thrown into confusion.

There can be little doubt that the course of events did in fact occur in this sequence, and the narrative logic is impeccable. On the one hand, the extension of the Roman citizenship to the whole of Italia some four decades earlier meant that levies would naturally occur throughout the peninsula in case of an emergency such as that presently obtaining. On the other, the *coloniae* and *municipia* had their own *aeraria* in imitation of Rome and might be expected to contribute funds to the prosecution of a war ostensibly in defense of Rome.[41] As with the *aerarium* at Rome, these local treasuries were maintained in sanctuaries, with a view to their being kept safe by the penalties attaching to sacrilege.[42] The allegation of undue appropriation advanced by Caesar in this instance is merely an example of the rhetoric of civil war, damning one's rivals for what was routinely done by oneself.

It is worth remarking, however, that the interpretation that Caesar gives to the financial preparations for war undertaken by his opponents is extremely tendentious. The verbs *exiguntur* and *tolluntur* both carry the implication of the illegitimate exercise of power, which is strengthened in this instance by the claim that all human and divine laws were thrown into confusion.[43] This

41 *TLL* 1.1058–1059; cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.23.4.

42 For the significance of religion in the late Republic, which it may not be inopportune to highlight at this juncture, see now F. Santangelo, *Divination, Prediction and the End of the Roman Republic*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2013).

43 Divine affairs, it will be recalled, were ever the first concern of the Senate upon assembly,

whole denunciation rests upon Caesar's implicit denial of the constitutional validity of decisions and actions that might be detrimental to his own personal position; there has occurred a complete identification of the person of Caesar with the Roman state.

As indicated by its etymology and contemporary usage, the verb *exiguntur* contains within itself the idea of compulsion.[44] Frequently, for example in Caesar's descriptions of the financial exactions effected by Pompeius and Metellus Scipio in the East in 49–48 BCE, this verb appears in conjunction with the verb *imperare* in contexts in which the power of the Roman state is manifestly being abused.[45] In the specific case of the Italian *municipia*, further evidence in support of this tendentious intent on Caesar's part is provided by Caesar's own narrative of his invasion of Italia. Repeatedly the governing bodies of these communities are represented as having informed Caesar's opponents that they would not close their gates to the conqueror of Gaul. The decurions of Auximum, for instance, informed Pompeius' agent P. Attius Varus that "neither they nor their fellow-citizens (*municipes*) would allow the victorious general C. Caesar, who by his great deeds deserved to be well treated by the state, to be shut out from their community and walls".[46] Subsequently, even Cingulum, which had in recent years received material benefactions from Labienus, sent envoys to Caesar, promising that "they would very gladly do whatever he commanded".[47] The contrast between Caesar and his enemies could not be clearer.

The verb *tolluntur* likewise is far from neutral in sense within the present context. Indeed, on any occasion in which it occurs in conjunction with the removal of something from a sanctuary, the word clearly has the connotation of "theft". Thus, amidst the other crimes committed during his time as governor in Sicilia, C. Verres stole images of the gods from the temples.[48] Similarly,

as is indicated by the contemporary Varro in his handbook on senatorial procedure for Pompeius Magnus: Gell. *NA* 14.7; R.J.A. Talbert, *The Senate of Imperial Rome*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1984), 223; *RE* Suppl. 6 (1935) 1172–1277 s.v. "Terentius Nr. 84" (H. Dahlmann), here 1249–1250. Cf. the *Ephemeris navalis ad Pompeium*: coll. 1252–1253.

44 *L&S* 686 s.v. "exigo".

45 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.3.2 (*magnam imperatam ... pecuniam*), 32.1 (*imperatae pecuniae*).

46 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.13.1: *neque se neque reliquos municipes pati posse C. Caesarem imperatorem, bene de re publica meritum, tantis rebus gestis oppido moenibusque prohiberi.*

47 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.15.2: *ad eum legati veniunt quaeque imperaverit se cupidissime facturos pollicentur.*

48 Cic. *Div. Caec.* 1.3: *sese iam ne deos quidem in suis urbibus ad quos confugerent habere, quod eorum simulacra sanctissima C. Verres ex delubris religiosissimis sustulisset.* Examples drawn from Cicero's speeches against Verres might be multiplied *ad nauseam*.

Caesar's *bête-noire* T. Ampius is accused of having "sought to remove the money from the temple of Artemis at Ephesus" in mid-48.[49] In view of the religious prohibitions attached, the removal of money that had been placed within a temple or sanctuary for safe-keeping could only be legitimately achieved under certain, well-defined circumstances. As a result, it was relatively easy for Caesar to twist the truth and to portray his enemies as engaged in acts of sacrilege.

However, in Rome, where Caesar passed in muted triumph after failing to entrap the consuls and Pompeius Magnus at Brundisium, the situation was decidedly more delicate. For one thing, Caesar's enemies had in fact respected religious scruples when taking money from the *aerarium* in early January 49. For another, Caesar's declared respect for the sacrosanctity of the persons of the tribunes of the *plebs* was shown to be false posturing when one of the tribunes of the *plebs* for that year, L. Metellus, contested Caesar's opening the *aerarium* so as to acquire more funds for his prosecution of the civil war.[50] For these reasons it was imperative that Caesar rewrite the historical record, using the rhetorical instruments of invention and chronological transposition to create an exculpatory narrative. Thereby, he managed to obfuscate what actually occurred and effectively cast the blame for his pillaging the treasury of Rome upon his opponents. Success is to be had by those prepared to falsify matters flagrantly.

Caesar brazenly claims that the consul L. Lentulus had fled precipitously from Rome after having caused the *sanctius aerarium* to be opened. This narrative is dramatically vivid and perhaps convinces by virtue of the aspects of terror and utter disorganization that it manages to capture. However, it is incoherent with what Caesar reports elsewhere and altogether unintelligible except as a partisan attempt to misrepresent the historical record. Describing the actions taken by the consuls subsequent to Pompeius' departure from Rome to organize the defense of Italia, Caesar asserts (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.14.1–2):

> Quibus rebus Romam nuntiatis tantus repente terror invasit ut, cum Lentulus consul ad aperiendum aerarium venisset ad pecuniamque Pompeio ex senatus consulto proferendam, protinus aperto sanctiore aerario ex urbe profugeret. Caesar enim adventare iam iamque et adesse eius

49 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.105.1: *T. Ampium conatum esse pecunias tollere Epheso ex fano Dianae.*

50 For a detailed and thorough review of the evidence of the ancient evidence and a census of modern interpretations, see L. de Libero, "Der Raub des Staatsschatzes durch Caesar," *Klio* 80 (1998) 111–133. As to the identity of this intrepid tribune of the *plebs*, see *RE* 3.1 (1897) 1205 s.v. "Caecilius Nr. 75" (F. Münzer).

> equites falso nuntiabantur. Hunc Marcellus collega et plerique magistratus consecuti sunt.
>
> When these things were reported at Rome, the fear caused was so great that, when the consul Lentulus came to open the treasury and to withdraw money for Pompeius in accordance with the Senate's decree, he fled precipitately from the city immediately after having opened the "more sacred" treasury (*sanctius aerarium*). There were false reports that Caesar was already arriving and that his cavalry were already present. He was followed by his colleague Marcellus and numerous magistrates.

Whatever the defects of his mental processes, Lentulus can hardly have been so incompetent as to leave the state treasury open and untouched when abandoning Rome upon report of Caesar's imminent arrival with his Gallic cavalry. Indeed, other contemporaries and the later historiographical tradition are agreed that it was Caesar who employed force and a threat of violence against the tribune of the *plebs* L. Metellus in order to open and take possession of the contents of the *aerarium* in late March or early April 49 BCE.[51] The testimony of Caesar is not to be trusted.

When writing of the decisions and actions taken in the days immediately following the passing of the *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU), Caesar reports that the Senate decreed that "money from the *aerarium* be given to Pompeius".[52] This decision must have been taken at some point in the week of 8–15 January 49, for the calendar prohibited meetings of the Senate thereafter until February.[53] In all likelihood, that money had been subtracted from the *aerarium* and consigned to Pompeius by the morning of 16 January at the latest, for Pompeius himself left Rome on the day prior to the consuls' decision to abandon the city.[54] When Pompeius left Rome, there was no sign that the consuls would shortly be joining him in a movement that would turn into a retreat to Apulia. Therefore, in the unsettled conditions of the moment, it is more than likely that Pompeius had with him as he travelled the money that he was to use in raising and paying for legions to field against Caesar.[55]

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51 Cic. *Att.* 10.4.8; Plut. *Caes.* 35.6–11; App. *B Civ.* 2.41.164; Cass. Dio 41.17.2.

52 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.6.3: *pecunia uti ex aerario Pompeio detur.*

53 Cic. *Q.fr.* 2.2.3; Carter 1991: 160; A.K. Michels, *The calendar of the Roman Republic*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1967), 42–45.

54 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.3.

55 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.23.4, for Ahenobarbus. There are strong reasons, however, to doubt the veracity of Caesar's claim that this money had been given to Ahenobarbus by Pompeius,

By portraying Lentulus' move to procure funds for Pompeius as occurring immediately prior to flight from Rome, Caesar has created a narrative that serves to explain how he himself came into possession of the remaining money within the state treasury. Of that moment of taking possession, there is not a single word in the *Civil War*. As is his custom, Caesar observes a decent silence when dealing with the acquisition of money with which to pay his own troops.[56] Only obliquely does Caesar refer to his confiscation of what remained within the *aerarium*, mentioning that he had encountered problems from the tribune of the *plebs* L. Caecilius Metellus (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.33.3–4):

> Sic triduum disputationibus excusationibusque extrahitur. Subicitur etiam L. Metellus tribunus plebis ab inimicis Caesaris, qui hanc rem distrahat reliquasque res quascumque agere instituerit impediat. Cuius cognito consilio Caesar frustra diebus aliquot consumptis, ne reliquum tempus dimittat, infectis eis quae agere destinaverat ab urbe proficiscitur atque in ulteriorem Galliam pervenit.

> In this way three days were drawn out in debates and excuses. In fact, the tribune of the *plebs* L. Metellus had been suborned by Caesar's enemies to prolong the matter and to block anything else that he undertook to do. Caesar learned of this man's plan after some days had been spent in vain. So as not to lose further time, he left unaccomplished those things that he had planned to do and set forth from the city and arrived in Gallia ulterior.

Focussing explicitly only upon a non-conclusive series of meetings of the Senate,[57] Caesar does not clearly state what are the various other things (*reli-*

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for Ahenobarbus himself had been present in Rome prior to departing to raise more soldiers in Paelignian territory for the defense of Italia: App. *B Civ.* 2.32.129, 38.149.

56 The sole exception is the confiscation of the treasury of Massilia: Caes. *B Civ.* 2.22.5. As has been demonstrated by M. McDonnell, "Borrowing to Bribe Soldiers: Caesar's *De Bello Civili* 1.39," *Historia* 118 (1990) 55–66, the apparent exception of Caes. *B Civ.* 1.39.3–4 in fact concerns one of the *legati* of Cn. Pompeius Magnus in Hispania.

57 These meetings may well have occurred within the context of the temple of Saturn, after the traditional convocation within the temple of Iupiter Optimus Maximus on 1 January 49 BCE. The sources do not specify in which temple the Senate met, but it seems unlikely that the Curia had yet been fully restored by Faustus Sulla. *LTUR* 1.331–332 s.v. "Curia Hostilia" (F. Coarelli), cf. 1.332–334 s.v. "Curia Iulia" (E. Tortorici); L. Richardson, jr. *A New Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore 1992), 102–104 ss.vv. "Curia Hostilia", "Curia Iulia". The fact that Sulla had restored the Curia

quasque res quascumque) that Metellus hindered. It is particularly significant that Caesar neither asserts nor denies that he himself took money from the *aerarium*, leaving his readers to choose between two less damning versions: either Caesar took money from a structure that had been left open or he did not touch the money at all. That Caesar actually used force to enter the *aerarium* is excluded *a priori* from his narrative. Naturally, Caesar's laconic style lends an air of credibility to a narrative that is logically without foundation.

For any attempt to perceive what actually took place, recourse must be had to Cicero's correspondence and the subsequent historiographical tradition. The letters exchanged by Cicero and his contemporaries provide an account that is both logically consistent and plausible. The subsequent historiographical tradition provides a fuller version of this account, the credibility of which is not undermined by the fact that different statistics for the contents of the *aerarium* are furnished. Rather, that difference indicates that the version hostile to Caesar was transmitted by independent witnesses, and is itself an argument in favour the historicity of this version.

From the surviving letters exchanged between Cicero and Atticus on the one hand and C. Scribonius Curio and Cicero on the other, it emerges that the consuls had left the *aerarium* locked upon their departure from Rome and that Caesar had ignored the strenuous objections of L. Metellus and broken into the *aerarium* in order to take the money and precious items stored therein.[58] The subsequent historiographical tradition, or its echoes in historical epic, depicts the renegade general as having threatened the obdurate tribune of the *plebs* with death if he persisted in resisting the forcible opening of the *aerarium*. Colorful details are furnished that would have appealed to an ancient audience and include items such as the breaking of the bolt that held fast the closed doors of the *aerarium*. On a more mundane level, the sources differ as to the exact amount that Caesar seized, but are in substantial agreement that he found considerable sums of gold, silver, and *laserpicium* (silphium).[59] Caesar

Hostilia in 80 BCE (Plin. *HN* 34.26) helps to explain, in part, the intervention of his son Faustus in the wake of the fire of 52 BCE (Cic. *Fin*. 5.2; cf. Cass. Dio 44.5.2; 45.17.8). So, too, in all likelihood, does the fact that the sole consul at the crucial moment of 52 BCE was none other than Faustus' father-in-law Pompeius Magnus.

58 Cic. *Att*. 7.12.2; 10.4.8; 10.8.6.

59 Plin. *HN* 33.56 and 19.40; Oros. 6.15.5. *OLD* 1004 s.v. "laserpicium": 1. asafoetida (product); 2. silphium (plant); *RE* 2.3.1 (1927) 103–114 s.v. "Silphion" (A. Steier); cf. J. André (ed.), *Pline l'ancien. Histoire naturelle. Livre XIX*. ("Les Belles Lettres": Paris 1964), 112 (annotation ad loc.); J. André, *Les noms de plantes dans la Rome antique*, (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1985), 139. Indicative of this product's significance is the testimony that there were 1500

is plausibly claimed to have removed all of the money that he found within the *aerarium*,[60] and this was likely also the case with the bullion and just possibly the *laserpicium*. Even if this hostile tradition did not survive, Caesar's nonsensical claim that his enemies had left the doors of the *aerarium* open would in and of itself constitute eloquent proof that he did break into that structure. Consequently, having shown his defense of tribunician sacrosanctity to be a sham, Caesar can hardly have left the pillaging of the treasury only half-done.

Which raises the question of why Caesar's especial and striking emphasis upon the *sanctius aerarium*. Divergent answers have been provided in the past, and no discernible *communis opinio* exists at present. However, linguistic usage and historical context suggest answers that are clear, albeit hardly creditable to Caesar.

In his first reference to Lentulus' withdrawal of money for Pompeius, Caesar generically writes of the *aerarium*.[61] In so doing, he resembles other authors when they write of Caesar's own withdrawal of money from the state treasury.[62] On the other hand, Caesar's claim that the consuls left the *sanctius aerarium* open at the moment of their flight from Rome only makes sense if that is the structure from which he took money. Whatever the precise spatial relationship between the *aerarium* and the *sanctius aerarium*, it would seem that both

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lbs. of it in the Treasury of Rome in early 49 BCE: Plin. *HN* 19.38. Likewise telling is the anecdote (Macr. *Sat*. 2.4.12) that Augustus in jest was wont to call *laser Arretinum* Maecenas, who came from Arretium. In all likelihood, to conclude this brief review, it was one of the principal reasons for the Roman decision to annex Cyrenaica as a province, for silphium was depicted upon coins and Pliny tells the story of 30 pounds of *laserpicium* brought to Rome from Cyrene in the consulate of C. Valerius and M. Herennius (93 BCE).

60 Cass. Dio 41.17.2.

61 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.6.3.

62 Cic. *Att*. 10.4.8 (*de aerario*); Plut. *Caes*. 35.6–10 (ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων); *Pomp*. 62.1–2 (ἐκ τοῦ ταμιείου); *Apophth. Caes*. 8 (τοῦ ταμιείου); App. *B Civ*. 2.41.164 (τῶν δημοσίων ταμιείων); Cass. Dio 41.17.2 (τοὺς θησαυρούς); Lucan. 3.112–168 (*templa Saturnia*); Plin. *HN* 33.56 (*ex aerario*); Flor. 2.13.21 (*aerarium quoque sanctum*); Oros. 6.15.5 (*ex aerario*); cf. Cic. *Att*. 7.12.2, prognosticating correctly that the closure of the Treasury (*aerarium clausum*) would not serve as an impediment to Caesar. The plurals to be found in the Greek authors might as readily represent rhetorical plurals as any pedantic attempt to refer to both the *aerarium* and the *sanctius aerarium*. On the other hand, Appian adds the intriguing *pièce justificatif*, whereby Caesar's seizure of the money in the *sanctius aerarium* is justified by his conquest of the Gauls. That can hardly derive from an author of Caesarian sympathies.

were situated within the podium of the Temple of Saturn.[63] Since it is independently attested that Pompeius subsequently ordered the consuls L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus to remove money from the *sanctius aerarium* and that they were unable to return to Rome to do so, the natural inference is that there was no longer any money left in the *aerarium* by the time of Caesar's arrival in early April 49 BCE.[64] In other words, Caesar's use of the linguistically precise *sanctius aerarium* is true to what occurred, even if his claim about the consuls' having left it open in their haste to abandon the city is palpably fraudulent.

The employment of *sanctius aerarium* in place of the more comprehensive *aerarium* is striking and has not received the attention that it deserves. Caesar is an author who is exceptionally careful in his use of language. It is not irrelevant that the *sanctius aerarium* contained that money and precious minerals earmarked for use in the case of a dire emergency. Specifically, tradition required that this money lie untouched except in the case of a renewal of the Gallic peril. It would appear that the consuls' decision not to seize the contents of the *sanctius aerarium* was due to the religious prohibition attaching to the use of this money for any other purpose than that of protecting Rome against a new attack by the Gauls. Caesar, on the other hand, more than once revealed himself particularly inventive when it was a matter of circumventing religious prohibitions or unpropitious omens.[65] As is indicated by the speech that Caesar portrays himself as having delivered to his soldiers in invading Italia, he claimed to have conquered the whole of Gallia and Germania and therefore might have argued that the prohibition no longer applied.[66] Turning the tables upon his enemies, Caesar dexterously made a virtue of necessity and emphasized that he had taken those funds that were still present within the *aerarium*.

63 Cf. M. Corbier, *L'*aerarium Saturni *et l'*aerarium militare. *Administration et prosopographie sénatoriale*, (Collection de l' École française de Rome, 24), (École française de Rome: Roma 1974), 631–632; F. Coarelli, "Saturnus, aedes," *LTUR* 4 (1999) 234–236, in part. 234–235.

64 Cic. *Att.* 7.21.2: *VII Id. Febr. Capuam C. Cassius tribunus pl. venit, attulit mandata ad consules ut Romam venirent, pecuniam de sanctiore aerario aufferrent, statim exirent.* Naturally, Cicero asked Atticus for his opinion of this startling order. It is worth remarking that Pompeius' letter was consigned to the consuls on 7 February, some three weeks after they had fled from Rome.

65 Suet. *Iul.* 59. Indeed, Caesar attended the Senate's meeting on the Ides of March in 44 BCE, despite having allegedly received abundant supernatural signs to the contrary. See R.W. Westall, "Simon of Cyrene, a Roman citizen?," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 59 (2010) 489–500, here 489 n. 1; R.W. Westall, "The Omens for the Assassination of Julius Caesar," (forthcoming).

66 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.7.7.

Sophistry of this sort, however, did not endear the triumphant general to the masses in Rome. They had expected financial gain and material benefit from the Gallic victories of Caesar. The Gauls were celebrated for their treasure hoards of gold and silver, and Caesar had cultivated a reputation for economic liberality during his time in Gallia. From legionaries to senators of consular rank, more than one Roman betook himself to Caesar in the distant north in order "to be showered in gold" (*inaurari*).[67] When Caesar returned to Rome, however, he came to take and not to give. Relying upon the report of the youthful, but shrewd, C. Curio, Cicero described the situation to Atticus as follows (Cic. *Att.* 10.4.8):

> Et plane iracundia elatum voluisse Caesarem occidi Metellum tribunum pl., quod si esset factum, caedem magnam futuram fuisse. Permultos hortatores esse caedis, ipsum autem non voluntate aut natura non esse crudelem, sed quod ⟨putaret⟩ popularem esse clementiam. Quod si populi studium amisisset, crudelem fore; eumque perturbatum quod intellegeret se apud ipsam plebem offendisse de aerario. Itaque ei cum certissimum fuisset ante quam profisceretur contionem habere, ausum non esse vehementerque animo perturbato profectum.
>
> Moreover, visibly carried away with rage, Caesar had wanted to have the tribune of the *plebs* Metellus killed. If that had occurred, there would have been tremendous slaughter. There were a great many people clamouring for slaughter. It was not by desire or by nature that (Caesar) himself was not cruel, but because he ⟨reckoned⟩ that clemency is favoured by the people. If he lost the people's favour, he would be cruel. He was troubled because he perceived that he had alienated the masses in the matter of the treasury. So even though he had been absolutely determined to hold a public meeting before departing, he did not dare to do so and he departed extremely preoccupied.

67 Cic. *Fam.* 7.13.1 (for this word used to describe C. Trebatius); cf. 7.5.2; 7.16.3; T.P. Wiseman, "The ambitions of Quintus Cicero," *Journal of Roman Studies* 56 (1966) 108–115, here 108. It is worth underscoring the fact that Q. Cicero discovered that—contrary to the initial expectations that he and his brother had entertained—one campaigning season with Caesar in Gaul had not sufficed for the financial gains reckoned necessary in order to repay his existing debts and be able to stand for the consulate. Therefore, despite having departed for Gaul in January or Febraruy 54 BCE, Q. Cicero did not return to Rome in August of that same year as previously planned.

Writing again to Atticus at a remove of nearly a month, Cicero expressed his judgement of this episode in pointed antitheses (Cic. *Att.* 10.8.6):

> Nullo enim modo posse video stare istum diutius quin ipse per se etiam languentibus nobis concidat, quippe qui florentis⟨simus⟩ ac novus sex, septem diebus ipsi illi egenti ac perditae multitudini in odium acerbissimum venerit, qui duarum rerum simulationem tam cito amiserit, mansuetudinis in Metello, divitiarum in aerario.
>
> I do not see how he can possibly survive for long without bringing himself to ruin, even though we have been ineffectual. In fact, although extremely strong and fresh, he has in six or seven days incurred the wrath of the destitute and desperate mob. In so brief a time he has lost the pretence of two things: that of leniency in the case of Metellus and that of wealth in the case of the treasury.

The masses in Rome drew the necessary conclusion from Caesar's behaviour, perceiving that his conquest of Gallia had not rendered him spectacularly wealthy, contrary to popular report. Although uncharitable, this interpretation finds corroboration in Pompeius' own estimate of Caesar's financial well-being on the eve of civil war and in the fact that Caesar did not mint gold coins until the latter half of 48 or 47 BCE.[68] Pompeius was in a position to know the nature and extent of Caesar's wealth. Having laid hands upon the gold reserves of the Roman state, on the other hand, Caesar not only avoided bankruptcy for the present, but was also in a position to issue gold coins that mark the beginning of a regular series at Rome.[69] In short, a long-term change in monetary policy would seem to be due to Caesar's conquest of the Roman state, not to his completion of the Roman conquest of Gallia.

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68 Suet. *Iul.* 30.2, 54.2; cf. C. Scantamburlo, *Svetonio, Vita di Cesare. Introduzione, traduzione e commento*, (Commenti a testi latini e greci per l'insegnamento universitario, 1), (Plus—Pisa University Press: Pisa 2011), 204. For the first gold series minted by Caesar, see M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1974), 467 no. 452.1 (July 48–47 BCE). For the financial situation of Caesar on the eve of civil war, perhaps the best discussion to date is the detailed and relatively comprehensive discussion at I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*, (Collection Latomus, 142), (Bruxelles 1975), 350. This is a subject to which we shall return in the final chapter of the present work.

69 For the production of 46 BCE, see B. Woytek, *Arma et Nummi. Forschungen zur römischen Finanzgeschichte und Münzprägung der Jahre 49 bis 42 v.Chr.* (Österreichische Akademie

3 The Sources of Soldiers

In seeking to put an end to the civil war as quickly as possible, both Caesar and his enemies gave particular attention to the levying of soldiers for the creation of new legions to put into the field. Caesar repeatedly points out that his enemies were conducting levies throughout the whole of Italia.[70] When forced to flee abroad, they continued to recruit new legions as well to fill out those that they had rescued from the Italian debacle. Caesar himself did no less. Already raising levies in Gallia Cisalpina prior to crossing the Rubicon, he subsequently ordered soldiers to be conscripted in all those areas that fell under his control. Consquently, by the time of the battle of Pharsalus, there were some forty-five to forty-seven legions in the field, coming to a theoretical total of nearly 250,000 Romans under arms. This order of mobilization was abnormal and virtually unprecedented. Not even at the height of the Second Punic War had there been so many Romans serving in the army at a given moment. However, it was a natural consequence of socio-economic and political factors at work since that epoch.[71]

Caesar's representation of the phenomenon, however, is not without its darker aspects. His account cannot be regarded as a limpid, straightforward depiction of historical reality. There are various ways in which he selectively chooses to relate things and thereby provides a narrative that justifies his decision to invade Italia rather than to subject himself to the dilatory negotiations promised by his opponents.

First and foremost, there is the little appreciated fact that Caesar had manifestly already been engaged in levying new legions prior to the passage of the *senatus consultum ultimum* and his crossing of the Rubicon. For obvious reasons, Caesar is not particularly at pains to inform readers, but it emerges from the account of his march upon Corfinium and consequent siege of that city.

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der Wissenschaften: Wien 2003), 268; M.H. Crawford, *Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic. Italy and the Mediterranean economy.* (Methuen: London 1985), 243. It was a foregone conclusion that these would carry motifs and legends that highlighted Caesar's military successes.

70 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.6.8, 9.4, 24.2; cf. specific places mentioned (1.12.3, 14.4 [2×], 15.7, 30.4).

71 P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1971), 417–422, with Table x. By Brunt's estimate, there could have been as many as 240,000 men under arms at the height of the conflict. That would include 20–40,000 marines serving in the fleet and 120,000 allied infantry as well as 80,000 legionaries (e.g. 212–211 BCE). It should be added that the figure given in the text above for 49–48 BCE focusses only upon legionaries and therefore omits cavalry as well as auxiliary and naval forces.

For the new levies to have reached Caesar at Corfinium in time to contibute to that city's capitulation, they must have been raised and set in motion prior to Caesar's invasion of Italia.[72] In other words, through his officers Caesar was already engaged in recruiting soldiers for new units some two to three months *in advance* of his crossing of the Rubicon, at the very least. This conclusion admittedly stands at variance with Caesar's claim to have made military dispositions only *after* receiving news of the *senatus consultum ultimum*. However, as we have had occasion to see, the general was not overly attached to the truth when a partisan narrative might better serve his purposes, and the new levies' attested arrival at Corfinium must be deemed more credible than the explicit chronology offered by Caesar for his actions. In the end, Caesar could hardly be expected to have openly admitted that the whole of his action was without legal foundation.

Similarly, Caesar subtly defuses the nightmarish vision of himself at the head of Gallic hordes, which must have been circulated by his enemies. That such a vision was circulating can be safely assumed despite the paucity of contemporary evidence. Suggestive are items such as Cicero's reference to the Gauls when speaking of abandonment of the defense of Rome and his comparison of Caesar with Hannibal.[73] So, too, are things such as the specious claim subsequently made that Caesar led the Gauls in triumph and then into the very Senate-house.[74] The rhetorical culture of the period encouraged such visions, as is demonstrated by the set-piece in which Cicero elegantly poses the question of whether he was to bring ruin upon Italia by leading the Getae, Armenians, and Colchians in an invasion meant to reclaim the peninsula from Caesar.[75] Caesar deftly eliminates the problem by suppressing virtually any reference to his Gallic and Germanic cavalry.[76] True, he does allude to them obliquely when he claims that it was the report of the arrival of Caesar together with his cavalry that led the consuls to abandon Rome in haste.[77] However, the absence of a defining ethnic adjective and Caesar's frequent use of *nostri* to refer to his Roman soldiers together have the effect of lessening any sense

72 Ottmer 1979: 27–38.

73 Cic. *Att.* 7.11.1, 3.

74 Suet. *Iul.* 80.2.

75 Cic. *Att.* 9.10.3.

76 Indeed, the adjective is employed only at Caes. *B Civ.* 1.51; 2.40; 3.4, 22. To be sure, Caesar does record the arrival at his camp before Corfinium of some 300 cavalry sent by the king of Noricum: Caes. *B Civ.* 1.18.5. It will be remarked in passing, however, that Caesar also very carefully avoided a nocturnal taking of the city.

77 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.1.

of the threat posed by the barbarian "other".[78] Paradoxically, these horsemen later appear during the campaign in Epirus. When described in detail on that occasion, however, the Allobrogic princes Egus and Roucillus and their retinue appear in the guise of ingrates and traitors who had passed over from Caesar to Pompeius.[79] While C. Matius played upon Roman fear of the Gauls early in 49 in an attempt to convince the wavering or unconvinced that opposition to Caesar would be futile,[80] Caesar took great care to distance himself from the Gauls and Germans when composing the narrative with which he was to justify his actions.[81]

By contrast, Caesar does portray his enemies as having relied upon barbarians and socially undesirable elements in order to constitute armies with which to fight him. This is a constant theme from the very outset, when he describes the actions taken that resulted in the passing of the *senatus consultum ultimum*. Subsequently, he attributes to L. Lentulus the intention and to Pompeius Magnus and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus realization of the use of social outcasts and undesirables to create an armed force for prosecuting the civil war.

The scene in which Pompeius speaks in favour of the Senate's ordering Caesar to step down from his provincial command is ominous, despite being crowded with Romans. The city and those spaces associated with the conduct of political life are depicted as having been filled with soldiers, both former and present. Not indifferent is the dramatic date, apparently 1 January 49 BCE. The text as most plausibly restored reads (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.3.2–3):

> Multi undique ex veteribus Pompei exercitibus spe praemiorum atque ordinum evocantur, multi ex duabus legionibus quae sunt traditae a Caesare arcessuntur. Completur urbs, clivus, comitium tribunis, centurionibus, evocatis.

78 M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César*, (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1966²), 208–214; cf. L. Grillo, *The Art of Caesar's* Bellum Civile. *Literature, Ideology, and Community*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2012), 83, on Petreius' re-affirmation of the antithesis *nostri—sui* despite Caesar's linguistic inclusiveness.

79 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.59–61; B. Kavanagh, "The citizenship and *nomen* of Roucillus and Egus," *AHB* 15 (2001) 163–171. It should be emphasized that this is the only instance in which Caesar records having been abandoned by his soldiers.

80 Cic. *Att*. 9.13.4.

81 For a detailed review of this narrative strategy as regards the campaign of 48 BCE, see A.F. Rossi, "The Camp of Pompey: Strategy of Representation in Caesar's *Bellum Ciuile*," *Classical Journal* 95 (2000) 239–256, esp. 239–240.

> Many men from the former armies of Pompeius were called out from all parts by the hope of rewards and advancement. Many were summoned from the two legions which had been handed over by Caesar. The city, the approach to the Capitol, and the place of assembly were filled with tribunes, centurions, and recalled veterans.

Readers can hardly have failed to remark the similarity to the situation that obtained when Pompeius was made sole consul for the sake of restoring order to the city in 52 BCE. Yet more insidiously, these soldiers either belonged to the two legions that had been wrongfully re-routed from their supposed mission to the East or were veterans who had served formerly under Pompeius and were now in search of financial gain and social advancement. Manifestly Caesar's enemies were acting in bad faith. Equally grave, however, is the implicit suggestion that these soldiers were like the Sullan veterans of the previous generation.[82] It is a suggestion that contemporary readers would have found both plausible and damning. Soldiers willing to profit financially from civil war and the ruin of their country are a dangerous force that only the most irresponsible and desperate would be willing to deploy.

Abandoning Rome to pursue the struggle elsewhere, Caesar's enemies display a similar lack of interest in the well-being of the Roman state, or thus Caesar. Emblematic is the behaviour wrongly attributed to L. Lentulus (*cos.* 49 BCE). Forgetful of the fact that he was one of the two highest magistrates of the imperial Republic, Lentulus flees precipitously from Rome upon receiving the erroneous information that Caesar and his cavalry were about to arrive.[83] Levies within the environs of Rome and Latium are abandoned at the prospect

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82 To savour the full paradox of this passage (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.3.2), it is vital that the modern reader recollect that only for triumphs and in time of civil war (or extreme emergency tantamount to civil war) were soldiers deployed within the city of Rome. Aside from the *tumultus* of 52 BCE, the last time that soldiers had been deployed in Rome in a non-triumphal context had been the conclusion of civil war by Sulla in the late 80s BCE. Of relevance, also, is the following passage regarding the Sullan veterans in similar circumstances: Sall. *Cat*. 16.4, *quod plerique Sullani milites, largius suo usi, rapinarum et victoriae veteris memores, civile bellum exoptabant*. For citizens to be visible as soldiers or veterans was itself a sign of grave unrest. Overall, the paragraph in which this sentence occurs provides a most suggestive juxtaposition of Sullan veterans in Rome eager for the prospect of civil war and Pompeius abroad fighting wars with his soldiers at the ends of the earth. The Caesarian historian's keen eye for paradox may be discerned here, as elsewhere.

83 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.14.1–2; see the previous section for this text and its discussion.

of Caesar's imminent arrival. Subsequently halting at last at Capua, where Pompeius' veterans had been settled as colonists thanks to the *lex Iulia de agro Campano* of 59 BCE, they resumed the levy.[84] Lentulus, however, is said to have sought to go even further (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.14.4–5):

> Gladiatoresque, quos ibi Caesar in ludo habebat, ad forum productos Lentulus libertatis ⟨spe⟩ confirmat atque his equos attribuit et se sequi iussit; quos postea monitus ab suis, quod ea res omnium iudicio reprehendebatur, circum familiares conventus Campaniae custodiae causa distribuit.
>
> The gladiators whom Caesar had there in a school were led forth to the market-place by Lentulus. He offered them their freedom and gave them horses and ordered them to follow him. Afterwards, upon the advice of his circle, since that act was universally condemned, he distributed them among the slave-gangs of Campania for supervision.

It was standard rhetorical practice to denigrate opponents for their intentions when actions were lacking. Indeed, that was far more practicable, for clear proof was not required and the accusation might be expected to remain despite all evidence to the contrary. In this instance, the intention that Caesar attributes to L. Lentulus seems meant to evoke the circumstances that resulted in the slave revolt led by Spartacus in the late 70s BCE.[85] At that time the unusual concentration and careless surveillance of gladiators by a like-named member of the Campanian elite—a certain Lentulus Batiatus—had led to a successful break-out by the gladiators.[86] Pompeius Magnus had vied with

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84 Rotondi 1912: 387–388 (*lex Iulia de agro Campano*); P. Paniteschek, "Die Agrargesetze des Jahres 59 und die Veteranen," *Tyche* 2 (1987) 141–153. A caveat seems in order, for moderns as well as ancients sometimes fail to distinguish between this *lex Iulia de agro Campano* and the prior *lex Iulia agraria* of that same year, but of a more general nature and apparently applicable to the whole of Italia. For the *lex Iulia agraria*, see M.H. Crawford, "The Lex Iulia Agraria," *Athenaeum* 77 (1989) 179–190; M.H. Crawford (ed.), *Roman Statutes*, 2 vols. (BICS, Suppl. 64), (Institute of Classical Studies: London 1996), 2.763–767 no. 54.

85 Cf. Cic. *Phil*. 4.15; 13.22, for M. Antonius depicted in a similar light subsequently. As emerges from Cic. *Phil*. 3.21, Antonius himself had dared to call Octavian a "Spartacus" in his own edicts of 44 BCE. While it is hard to credit Caesar with the genesis of this abusive application of the revolutionary's name, Antonius surely was emulating Caesar in his attack upon the dead dictator's great-nephew and adoptive son.

86 For Lentulus Batiatus, see *RE* IV 1 (1900) 1377 s.v. "Cornelius Nr. 209" (F. Münzer). For

M. Crassus in quashing that rebellion.[87] By an irony of history that would not have been lost upon Caesar's audience, Pompeius is now associated with those who are so desperate as to incur the same risk of the destruction of the Roman state.

The irony is particularly heavy, for it emerges from the contemporary evidence of Cicero that Pompeius himself had been responsible for resolving the potential problem posed by Caesar's gladiators prior to the consuls' arrival. Writing to Atticus on 25 January 49 BCE, Cicero specifically remarks (Cic. *Att.* 7.14.2):

> Gladiatores Caesaris qui Capuae sunt, de quibus ante ad te falsum ex Torquati litteris scripseram, sane commode Pompeius distribuit binos singulis patribus familiarum. Scutorum in ludo ⟨mille⟩ fuerunt; eruptionem facturi fuisse dicebantur. Sane multum in eo rei publicae provisum est.
>
> Caesar's gladiators who are at Capua, regarding whom I had sent you a false report based on Torquatus' letter, have quite sensibly been distributed by Pompeius, two to each head of a household. There were ⟨1,000⟩ shields in the school, and they were said to be planning a breakout. In that business, forethought for the interests of the state have been taken quite well.

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the milieu of Roman Campania, see M. Frederiksen, *Campania*, edited with additions by Nicholas Purcell, (British School at Rome: Roma 1984); J. D'Arms, *Romans on the Bay of Naples and other essays on Roman Campania*, ed. F. Zevi, (Edipuglia: Bari 2003²), 49–78. As for the gladiatorial schools of that region, see K.E. Welch, *The Roman Amphitheatre. From its Origins to the Colosseum*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2007), 91.

87 For an incisive introduction that situates within the context of slave revolts in general the slave revolt associated with the figure of Spartacus, see P. Hunt, *Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery* (Wiley Blackwell: Malden, Mass. 2017), 155–172. For a useful anthology with a more extended review of that episode, see K. Brodersen, *Ich bin Spartacus. Aufstand der Sklaven gegen Rom. Geschichte erzählt*, (Primus Verlag: Darmstadt 2010). For further treatment at length, see B. Strauss, *The Spartacus War*, (Simon & Schuster: New York 2009); B.D. Shaw, *Spartacus and the Slave Wars. A Brief History with Documents*, (Palgrove Macmillan: Boston—New York 2001); K. Bradley, *Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World, 140 B.C.–70 B.C.*, (Indiana University Press: Indianapolis and Bloomington, 1989), 83–101; J.-P. Brisson, *Spartacus*, (CNRS: Paris 2011). The ancient sources are also conveniently assembled in one place and available in translation: Z. Yavetz, *Slaves and Slavery in Ancient Rome*, (Transaction Books: New Brunswick 1988), 83–111.

Since the consuls met with Pompeius at Teanum Sidicinum on 23 January and Cicero was writing from Cales on 25 January, there is insufficient time for the version related by Caesar.[88] Whatever the erroneous information that Cicero had previously culled from a letter of Torquatus and shared with Atticus, there is no mention whatsoever of Lentulus and Pompeius emerges from the episode as having acted in an altogether sensible and appropriate manner. That view of things was confirmed by a subsequent letter of Cicero to Caesar precisely dedicated to the subject of Caesar's gladiators (Cic. *Att.* 8.2.1):

> Ego ad Caesarem unas Capua litteras dedi, quibus ad ea rescripsi quae mecum ille de gladiatoribus suis egerat, brevis sed benevolentiam significantis, non modo sine contumelia sed etiam cum maxima laude Pompei; id enim illa sententia postulabat qua illum ad concordiam hortabar.
>
> I sent one letter to Caesar from Capua. In it I replied to what he had said to me about his gladiators. It was short but displayed good-will, not only avoiding abuse but in fact highly praising Pompeius. That was called for by my argument, in which I urged him to a settlement.

Gladiators were both a potential source of experienced manpower and a threat within the context of civil war: Pompeius might well have armed them and promised them their freedom for loyal service or seen to their suppression.[89] As emerges from Cicero's correspondence, he did neither, contenting himself with the simple dispersal of the group so as to reduce the risk of an uprising. This is not the action of someone altogether desperate.

Throughout the whole of Caesar's *Civil War*, by contrast, Pompeius emerges far less favourably. This was only to be expected, for it was Pompeius' treachery—in the eyes of Caesar—that had rendered civil war inevitable. Consequently, while taking care not to attack Pompeius directly lest he alienate readers, Caesar undermines the credibility of Pompeius by representing him as associated with the "other", be they foreigners, social outcasts, or simply Romans who put their personal interests ahead of the good of the Roman state. Where Lentulus is said merely to have had malign intentions, Pompeius is depicted as putting them into effect.

88 Cf. *The Letters of Cicero to Atticus*, ed. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, vol. 4 (1968), p. 309.

89 That is precisely what happened in the sequel, thanks to the intervention of Caesar's youthful, headstrong cousin. Cf. Suet. *Iul.* 75.3, where it is reported that L. Caesar *filius* did in fact butcher the slaves, freedmen, and wild animals of Caesar.

Passing eastwards from Campania over to Apulia, Pompeius rapidly made his way from Capua to Luceria. Prior to the outbreak of civil war, the units that had been surrendered by Caesar for eventual service in a campaign against the Parthians in the East had gone into winter quarters near the Apulian communities of Larinum, Luceria, and Teanum Apulum.[90] Moving through Apulia by means of the transhumance routes, he not only called the legionary forces out of winter camp and ordered newly conscripted forces to join him as he passed through Canusium and on to Brundisium, but also raised an impromptu cavalry force (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.24.2):

> Servos, pastores armat atque eis equos attribuit; ex his circiter ⟨D⟩CCC equites conficit.
>
> He armed his slaves and herdsmen and assigned horses to them. From these he created nearly 800 cavalry.

That is all. Laconic in style and preferring to continue with the mass of detail illustrating the precipitate flight of his enemies, Caesar does not halt to emphasize what would have been manifest to his readers. As he incidentally remarks elsewhere, in a moment of pleonasm when describing the stout resistance that his own supporters offered to Caesar's enemies, the arming of slaves was a last resort.[91] Through deployment of the telling detail, Caesar advances the argument that it is his enemy who is truly acting for the destruction of the Roman state.

The report cannot be utter invention, for it reappears in somewhat different form when Caesar lists his enemies' forces available for the Balkan campaign of 48 BCE. Repetition within a different context affords a guarantee of fundamental veracity. But this first appearance of the claim is not without problems. For one thing, it is not altogether clear whether a distinction is to be observed between "slaves" and "shepherds" or whether Caesar wishes simply to use the latter as a predicative and to speak of "slaves acting as shepherds". For another, there is the question of number. As transmitted the text gives the

90 Cic. *Att.* 7.12.2; cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.3, where the subdolous assertion is made that Pompeius was responsible for their being sent there. While Pompeius may have counselled the choice of their winter quarters, he can hardly have been the person who made the final disposition. It lay beyond his constitutional competence at the time.

91 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.9.3: *ad extremum auxilium descenderunt servosque omnes puberes liberaverunt.* The translation "last resort" is owed to Carter 1993: 33 ad loc.; cf. Carter 1991: 178.

figure "CCC equites", but the later reference to this cavalry group attests the figure of "DCCC".[92]

Furnishing an extensive catalogue of the forces put into the field against him in 48 BCE, Caesar thereby imparts to readers both a sense of the immensity of the task that faced him and a clear vision of his enemies as relying upon foreign powers in order to dominate the state. In the motley assembly of 7,000 cavalry, there figures that force contributed by Pompeius himself (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4.4):

> DCCC ex servis suis pastorumque suorum ⟨numero⟩ coegerat.
>
> He had assembled 800 cavalry from his own slaves and herdsmen.

Cavalry was a subsidiary arm within the Roman military, and Caesar finds no other occasion to make a specific reference to this force that Pompeius had salvaged from the wreck of Italia in the first months of 49 BCE. Observation of the social composition and number of this cavalry force served Caesar's strategy as an author, but these things exerted no discernible impact upon the course of military operations.[93] The illegality of his enemies' actions and the threat they ostensibly posed to the survival of Rome are demonstrated by the size and composition of the military force against which Caesar fought as consul for the second time in 48 BCE.

Comparison of the two passages affords enlightenment. The *variatio* of the second passage makes it clear that the two categories of slaves and shepherds are notionally distinct for Caesar. Consequently, while it was not unusual to find that shepherds were frequently slaves at this epoch,[94] Caesar is distin-

92 There is no sign of any problem whatsoever with the text in the latest, most thorough edition and study dedicated to the textual transmission of this work: C. Damon, *Studies on the text of Caesar's Bellum civile*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015); C. Damon, (ed.), *C. Iulii Caesaris commentariorum libri III de bello civili, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 2015), 16 (1.24.2), 89 (3.4.4).

93 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.88–89, with a listing of Roman forces only. For a more comprehensive and inclusive vision, which arguably goes back to the historical work of Strabo of Amaseia and can be discerned in some of the accounts of Greek imperial historians, see App. *B Civ.* 2.70.292–71.296 (even listing, perhaps with a trace of chauvinism, the Egyptian contribution to the Roman fleet); Cass. Dio 41.55.2–4, cf. 41.62.3–63.5 (Caesar granting pardon in return for monetary reparations).

94 Cf. Suet. *Iul.* 42.1; Z. Yavetz, *Julius Caesar and his Public Image*, (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life), (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY 1983), 152–154; Brunt 1971: 374. Caesar's decision to require that at least 1/3 of the *pastores* in Italia be free in status implies that conceivably all—or virtually all—shepherds were slaves. A fundamental structural cause

guishing between two different types of dependents of Pompeius Magnus and the asyndeton of the first passage is to be recognized for that generic feature of *commentarii* that it is.[95] As regards the difference in number, it might be thought that perhaps Pompeius had enrolled cavalry from his dependents in the Balkans as well as southern Italia. That, however, seems most doubtful. Unlike his contemporaries Atticus and Varro, Pompeius is not attested as having possessions within Epirus or Macedonia, and the number of unknowns ought not to be increased.[96] Far easier and more plausible is an error in textual transmission, with the figure of "DCCC" having been negligently reduced to "CCC".

Inadvertently Caesar sheds light upon the vast landholdings and agricultural interests of Pompeius Magnus, who was arguably the wealthiest Roman of his generation.[97] Caesar's goal was that of depicting Pompeius as engaged in the sort of behaviour that had made possible the slave rebellion led by Spartacus a quarter of a century previously.[98] In view of a contemporary painting in a house at Pompeii that depicts Spartacus astride a horse while engaged in combat, Caesar's explicit charge that Pompeius created a cavalry force by giving weapons and mounts to slaves and shepherds would have possessed unescapable historical resonance.[99] Portraying himself as constant in his concern for the welfare of the Roman state, Caesar cites the arming of slaves and shepherds in composing a narrative aimed at illustrating how factional inter-

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for this situation likely lies in the fact that slaves were preferable as agricultural workers because they were not subject to conscription (J.S. Jeffers, *The Greco-Roman World of the New Testament Era. Exploring the Background of Early Christianity*, (InterVarsity Press: Downers Grove 1999), 21).

95 Cf. E. Fraenkel, "Eine Form römischer Kriegsbulletins," *Eranos* 54 (1956) 189–194 = *idem*, *Kleine Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* (Edizioni di storia e letteratura: Roma 1964) 2.69–73.

96 For the properties of M. Varro, see Shatzman 1975: 400–401. For those of Atticus, see N. Horsfall, "Atticus brings home the bacon," *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 14.4 (1989) 60–62.

97 D'Arms 2003^2: 49; cf. 184, citing Plut. *Pomp.* 40; Ios. *Bell. Iud.* 1.155; Sen. *Tranq.* 8.6.

98 Cf. A. Deman, "Bergers transhumants et mouvements de résistance en Italie depuis les Gracques jusqu'à César," 209–225, in: T. Yuge and M. Doi (eds.), *Forms of Control and Subordination in Antiquity*, (E.J. Brill: Leiden 1988), 212, where it is appropriately observed that the Spartacus war was "la guerre des gladiateurs ET des bergers". The same combination in the same chronological order—Capua and Apulia—certainly seems to corroborate the interpetation presented here. It should be added that the same thought informed many a worried politician in Rome at the time of the Catilinarian conspiracy: Sall. *Cat.* 30.2, *Capuae atque in Apulia bellum servile moveri*.

99 For the painting, see images for the following house: Pompeii I-7-7; R.W. Westall, "The Rebel, the General, and a Painting," (forthcoming).

ests menace the foundations of civil society.[100] But the information that he provides also reveals the extensive economic interests of Pompeius in south-eastern Italia.[101] The ability to create 800 cavalrymen from one's dependents implies both vast numbers of livestock and extensive land use, arguably upwards of 80,000 animals and 720,000 *iugera* in Apulia alone.[102] In view of the Tavoliere with its centre at Luceria (near the modern Foggia), this makes perfect sense.[103] It is hardly a coincidence that social unrest amongst the thou-

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100 Cf. Cic. *Tog. cand.*, cited by Asconius, *In orationem in toga candida*, 87.26–29 Clark: *Alter* (i.e. C. Antonius Hybrida) *pecore omni vendito et saltibus prope addictis pastores retinet, ex quibus ait se cum velit subito fugitivorum bellum excitaturum*. As is remarked by Deman 1988: 215, this piece of electoral propaganda was pronounced by Cicero so as to damage one of his opponents in the consular elections of 64 BCE.

101 Cf. H. Schneider, *Wirtschaft und Politik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der spätern römischen Republik*, (Erlangen Studien, 3), (Palm & Enke: Erlangen 1974), 17; Shatzman 1975: 389–393. When the occasional attempt is made to deploy the testimony of Caesar as regards Pompeius' agricultural labourers, focus has to date been exclusively upon the landholdings attested in Lucania (Cic. *Phil.* 13.12).

102 Extrapolation is based upon the ratios stipulated by Varro and inherent in the testimony of Cato: Cat. *agr.* 10.1; Varr. *rust.* 2.2.20; 2.10.11. For the value of the numbers transmitted in the documents, see cf. W. Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," *CQ* 46 (1996) 222–238; cf. R.W. Westall, "The Forum Iulium as Representation of *Imperator* Caesar", *Römische Mitteilungen* 103 (1996) 83–118, in part. 85, citing previous German scholarship.

103 For Apulia and in particular the Tavoliere, with its surface area of nearly 3000 km^2, see *Guida d'Italia del Touring Club Italiano. Puglia.* (Touring Editore: Milano 1978^4), 14–15; *Enciclopedia Italiana* 33 (1950) 345 s.v. "Tavoliere"; J.M. Frayn, *Sheep-rearing and the wool trade in Italy during the Roman period*, (ARCA, 15), (Francis Cairns: Liverpool 1984), 22–23. For the estimate that a sheep needs about 938 m^2 of poor grazing land (Frayn 1984: 60), see also J.R. Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World*, (Duckworth: London 1991), 313, whose caution that this is an underestimate seems appropriate. In any case, notwithstanding the size of Pompeius' flocks, they would have necessitated the use of only 1/45th (or rather 1/90th because present for only six months) of the region's resources. In closing, it should be added that (*per* Sallares 1991: 313), a total of 80,000 sheep would have produced clothing only for approximately 21,600 people.

If it is somewhat more generously reckoned that a sheep requires 1,000 m^2 for grazing, then the implied figure of 80,000 sheep belonging to Pompeius would require 80 km^2 or just 2% of the Tavoliere upon an annual basis. Since the sheep were kept there for only six months out of the year, this comes to 1%. That may not seem particularly striking, until it is recalled that Pompeius was merely one person out of the estimated 5–6 million inhabitants of the Italian peninsula at the time (P.A. Brunt, *Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic*, (W.W. Norton & Company: New York 1971), 18, for the global figure, which is based upon the work of Brunt 1971A, esp. 121–130). The imbalance in distribution of wealth

sands of shepherds living and working in Apulia for half of the year was a recurrent problem of the last two centuries of the Republic.[104]

Caesar likewise observes a similar use made of dependents by L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, when relating how the latter made his way from Etruria to Massalia in order to enter upon the government of Gallia Transalpina, or at the very least to cause Caesar no small difficulty at a moment when Caesar was anxious to be in Hispania campaigning against the *legati* of Pompeius.[105] Having been deprived of his levies at Corfinium, the indomitable successor to Caesar armed the agricultural labour readily available to him (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.34. 2):

> Profectum item Domitium ad occupandam Massiliam navibus actuariis VII, quas Igili et in Cosano a privatis coactas servis, libertis, colonis suis compleverat.

> Domitius had likewise departed, so as to occupy Massilia with seven swift ships that he had seized from private owners at Igilium and in the territory of Cosa and had filled with his own slaves, freedmen, and tenants.

These dependents recur within the narrative of naval warfare before the walls of Massalia, for they were the only military force that Domitius himself was able to contribute to the resistance that that city inopportunely chose to offer to Caesar. As in the case of the cavalry force constituted by Pompeius from his own slaves and shepherds, it is more than likely that the social extraction of Domitius' impromptu military force is not due to Caesar's invention and the liberties of political invective, but rather an all too accurate reflec-

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emerges from that fact, for it is then realized that 0.000017% of the population disposes of 1% of a vital resource.

104 Also constituting evidence for Apulia as a centre for the wool industry in the late Republic are the scattered notices of shepherds' revolts (*motus*) during the second and first centuries BCE. For example, in 185 BCE, the praetor L. Postumius is reported as having "convicted some 7,000 men" after conducting an inquiry into a "conspiracy" of shepherds that had resulted in a serious slave revolt in Apulia in that year (Liv. 39.29.8; cf. 39.41.6–7 [184 BCE]). In similar fashion, there is mention of a servile revolt (*motus*) in Apulia as well as elsewhere in 62 BCE (Sall. *Cat*. 30.2, 42.1; cf. Suet. *Aug*. 3.1, 7.1, with Wardle 2014: 89, 101–102).

105 For Domitius' appointment to succeed Caesar as governor in Gallia Transalpina, see Caes. *B Civ*. 1.6.5; Cic. *Att*. 8.12B–D (prescripts); *Fam*. 16.12.3; Lucan. 7.607; Suet. *Iul*. 34.1; *Ner*. 2.2; App. *B Civ*. 2.32, 38, 82; cf. *RE* V.1 (1903) 1334–1343 s.v. "Domitius Nr. 27" (Münzer), here col. 1337; *MRR* 2.261–262. Last but not least, see Cic. *Fam*. 8.15.2, for a minor incident that occurred amongst the Intimilii.

tion of historical reality and the socio-economic forces at work.[106] Comparison with the numbers of slaves attested for the freedman Caecilius Isidorus is revealing.[107] A somewhat younger contemporary who seems to have had landholdings on a scale comparable to those of Domitius, Isidorus is attested as possessing 4,116 slaves, 3,600 pairs of oxen, and 257,000 sheep (or similar) at the time of his death. Manifestly, Isidorus relied upon free as well as servile labour in pursuing his agricultural interests, and the people in his service would have been able to constitute a small army. Indeed, it is hard not to see significance in the fact that Pliny the Elder's citation of the *testamentum* of Caecilius Isidorus follows his citation of the *bon mot* of M. Licinius Crassus that no one could consider himelf wealthy unless able to put a legion into the field.[108]

A clear measure of the lengths to which Domitius was prepared to go, this military force ran counter to the traditions of the Republic. None of the categories specified by Caesar—slaves, freedmen, and *coloni*—would have been found acceptable within a Roman army in normal conditions. While they might fight and die as valiantly as free men of honourable status, perpetuation of the social hierarchy required that they not be permitted the chance to display this democracy of talent and character.[109] Hence, when Caesar subsequently remarks upon the bravery of the shepherds of Domitius and the high incidence of casualties that they suffered, his remarks are far from neutral.[110] At the same

106 For the normally servile condition of shepherds, see K.R. Bradley, *Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World, 140 B.C.–70 B.C.* (Indiana University Press: Indianapolis 1989), 94–95; cf. K.R. Bradley, *Slavery and society at Rome*, (Key Themes in Ancient History), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1994), 71, 73–74, 86–87. See also, more generally, L. Aigner Foresti, "Gli Etruschi e la politica di Cesare," 11–33, in: G. Urso (ed.), *L'ultimo Cesare. Scritti riforme progetti poteri congiure. Atti del convegno internazionale, Cividale del Friuli, 16–18 settembre 1999*, («L'Erma» di Bretschneider: Roma 2000), esp. 11–18, for the relations of Caesar with the political elite of the Etruscan cities in the early years of civil war in the 40s BCE.

107 Plin. *HN* 33.135; P.A. Brunt, "Two great Roman landowners," *Latomus* 34 (1975) 619–635, here 624–629.

108 Plin. *HN* 33.134; see discussion below at p. xxx (92).

109 Thus, despite the precarious nature of his situation in 46 BCE, Metellus Scipio showed himself reluctant to honour a former slave for bravery displayed in combat: Val. Max. 8.14.5; M. McDonnell, *Roman Manliness. Virtus and the Roman Republic*, (Cambridge Univesity Press: Cambridge 2006), 160. It is to be suspected that this attitude was widespread; cf. S.M. Treggiari, *Roman freedmen during the late Republic*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1969), 67–68.

110 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.56.3, 57.4, 58.4.

time that he praises the accomplishments of his own soldiers, there emerges the desperation of his opponent.

Tenant-farmers (*coloni*) were bound to the land as a result of the debts that they had incurred. Roman law dealt none too kindly with debtors. Nor was society forgiving with those whose affairs reached the point where the law was allowed to intervene.[111] Freedmen (*libertini*) and slaves (*servi*) were likewise socially despised, despite the useful, indispensable services that they might perform.[112] Only someone entirely devoid of a sense of the Roman state, or desperate, would depend upon people from these social categories in order to achieve victory in civil war.[113]

Nowhere does Caesar specify the numbers involved in the case of Domitius' *coloni* and shepherds. Nonetheless, the report that they were transported from Igilium to Massalia in seven swift ships (*actuariae*) does provide an indication of sorts as regards the dimension of this military force. If a parallel with the *pontones* employed to transport Caesar's soldiers across the Adriatic in the winter of 49–48 BCE be permitted,[114] then it would seem that perhaps as many as some 1500 *coloni* and shepherds accompanied Domitius on the journey to Massalia. Even if only half of that figure, the number is suggestive and gives weight to the *dictum* of M. Crassus that an individual was not wealthy unless he could afford to field an army from his own resources.[115] In the case of Domitius,

111 P.W. de Neeve, *Colonus. Private farm-tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic and the Early Principate*, (J.C. Gieben: Amsterdam 1984), 175–187; J.E. Skydsgaard, "Non-slave labour in rural Italy during the late Republic," 65–72, in: P. Garnsey (ed.), *Non-Slave Labour in the Graeco-Roman World*, (The Cambridge Philological Society: Cambridge 1980). For Roman views of debt, still useful is the incisive synthesis provided by M.W. Frederiksen, "Caesar, Cicero and the Problem of Debt," *JRS* 56 (1966) 128–141, here 128–130.

112 Treggiari 1969: 225–226. Compare the implications of Augustus' one-sided and tendentious representation regarding the use of slaves by Sextus Pompeius: *RGDA* 25.1; A.E. Cooley, *Res gestae divi Augusti. Text, translation and commentary*. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2009), 214–215.

113 For the desperation involved, worthy of note is the explicit, evocative language employed by Caesar to describe his supporters' resistance at Salonae when subjected to attack by superior forces: Caes. *B Civ*. 3.9.3, *ad extremum auxilium descenderunt servosque omnes puberes liberaverunt*. Military service, as has been remarked in a wide-ranging and detailed survey of servile labour, was the only occupation in Roman society closed to slaves: Bradley 1994: 64.

114 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.28.3.

115 Cic. *Parad*. 6.45; *Off*. 1.8.25; Plin. *HN* 33.135; Plut. *Crass*. 2.9; Cass. Dio 40.27.3. For discussion, see D. Whitehead, "The measure of a millionaire: what Crassus really said," *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 11.5 (1986) 71–74; Westall 1996: 85 n. 15.

who has been estimated to have possessed 1/250th of the arable surface of the Italian peninsula, the figure need not occasion surprise.[116] For Caesar and his readers, the thing worthy of note was not the extent of the wealth of Domitius, but rather the poor use that he made of it.

Aware of the fact that it was incumbent upon him to discredit the opposition, Caesar time and time again highlights, where possible, the lacklustre elements within the military forces that his enemies raised to fight the civil war of 49–48 BCE. Initially handicapped by the possibility that his own forces would be equated with the Gauls and Germans that they had been fighting for the past decade, he swiftly seized upon any and every potential mistake made by his enemies. Hence, the facile and absurd denigration of the consul L. Lentulus for the unrealized intention of arming the gladiators that Caesar was maintaining at Capua. Likewise, he draws attention to the reliance of Cn. Pompeius Magnus and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus upon a variety of agricultural labourers—slaves, shepherds, and *coloni*—to constitute military forces amidst the chaos obtaining in Italia in the early months of 49 BCE. There need be little doubt that Caesar himself was engaged in similar activities, but his representation of the period's history is openly partisan and one-sided and politics is the art of castigating others for faults that are commonly shared.

Conclusion

Caesar's candour has been found wanting, and the issues involved are not minor. Time and time again Caesar shows himself willing to manipulate the historical record.[117] His visible objective is that of misleading readers into thinking that he was the aggrieved party and his position the one that was sanctioned by law and ancestral custom. The means of manipulation are multiple and insidious. Chronological transposition gives the appearance of Caesar's having called his soldiers out of their winter camps and from across the Alps only in the wake of the passage of the *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU). Omission conveniently leaves in oblivion the illegal trespass of the Rubicon, which rivulet separated Italia from Gallia Cisalpina. Omission in conjunction with invention, on the other hand, creates the impression that it was Caesar's avowed enemy, the consul L. Lentulus, and not Caesar himself who opened the *aerar-*

116 Brunt 1975: 619–635.

117 Rambaud 1966[2]: *passim*, esp. 134–140 and 138 for a masterly summary of what Rambaud terms "omission".

ium. Naturally, in the sequel, Caesar's removal of bullion and money from the *aerarium* is itself not represented. The proconsul who claimed to be defending the rights of the tribunes of the *plebs* could hardly be expected to depict himself as having threatened one of their number with physical violence unless he stood aside and allowed Caesar to pillage the state treasury. On the other hand, the rhetoric of invective permitted liberties as regards accounts of the intentions and actions of one's political opponents. Moreover, associating them with the "other" was a time-honoured form of denigration.[118] Hence, it was a relatively effortless step to move from manipulation to making the demonstrably false claim that L. Lentulus had intened to make soldiers of Caesar's gladiators housed near Capua. More faithful to the historical record, but no less partisan and ultimately inconsequential, are Caesar's reports that Pompeius and Ahenobarbus armed their own slaves, shepherds, and *coloni* in order to constitute military forces amid the chaos obtaining in Italia early in 49 BCE.

Nonetheless, despite Caesar's failings as a narrator of history, his account does provide unique and invaluable testimony of use to the socio-economic historian of the late Republic. From the importance that Caesar attaches to the *sanctius aerarium*, the connection between his own depredation of that institution and the long-lasting change in economic policy evinced by the minting of gold coins becomes more comprehensible. From his allegations against Lentulus, Pompeius, and Ahenobarbus, there emerges more clearly the widespread fear of insurrection that provided a basis for social cohesion between citizens of varying economic status. From these same allegations, however, there also emerges with startling clarity the vast gulf that separated the wealthy from the poor in the late Republic. The promise made by Ahenobarbus at Corfinium was predicated upon possession of landholdings amounting to 1/250th of the arable land within the Italian peninsula. Whether or not this statistic is objectively accurate, such a concentration of power was plausible to contemporaries and affords a clear vision of the disparity in the distribution of wealth, thereby explaining in part both the outbreak of civil war in the 40s BCE and the revolution that followed.

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118 Cf. H. Bellen, *Metus Gallicus, Metus Punicus. Zum Furchtmotiv in der römischen Republik*. Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur: Mainz 1985; A.M. Eckstein, "Review of Bellen 1985," *Classical Journal* 82 (1987) 335–338. While Eckstein is indubitably correct that this exemplary investigation offers a powerful corrective to revisionist historians of Roman imperialism as regards the reality of the causes for Roman fear of their neighbours, it is equally manifest that this fear of the "other" was deployed in Roman politics in order to assimilate Roman opponents to the "other" as a prelude to their destruction. Traitors can never expect due legal process.

TABLE 1 *List of the properties of Cn. Pompeius Magnus*

No.	Typology	Location	Evidence	Date
1	house	Carinae	Cic. *Har. Resp.* 49; *Phil.* 2.68; Vell. 2.77.1; Plut. *Pomp.* 40.5; Suet. *Gramm.* 15.1; Dio 48.38.2; Vir. Ill. 84.3; Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.361	70 BCE
2	house	Campus Martius	Plut. *Pomp.* 40.5	55 BCE
3	buildings, gardens	Campus Martius	Cic. *Mil.* 54; *Phil.* 2.109; Vell. 2.60.3; Ascon. 50; Plut. *Pomp.* 40.5; 44.3; *Cat. min.* 30.5; App. *B Civ.* 3.14; cf. *CIL* 6.6299 (= *ILS* 7442c)	55 BCE
4	estate	Alba (near Aricia)	Cic. *Att.* 4.11.1; 7.5.3; *Pis.* 77; *Rab. Post.* 6; *Mil.* 54; *Phil.* 13.11; Plut. *Pomp.* 53.4; 80.5; *Cic.* 31.2	59 BCE
5	estate	Formiae	Cic. *Att.* 7.8.4; 15.13.5; *Phil.* 13.11	
6	estate	Tusculum	Cic. *Phil.* 13.11	43 BCE
7	estate	Falernum	Cic. *Phil.* 13.11; Serv. *ad Eclog.* 9.36	43 BCE
8	estate	Alsium	Cic. *Mil.* 54	52 BCE
9	estate	Cumae	Cic. *Att.* 4.10.2	55 BCE
10	house	Neapolis	Cic. *Att.* 4.9.1; *Tusc.* 1.86	55 BCE
11	estate	Baiae	Sen. *Ep.* 51.11 (cf. D'Arms 1970: 192–193, for idea maybe identical w/ Cumae)	*non liquet*
12	estates	Lucania	Cic. *Phil.* 13.12	43 BCE
13	estates	near Tarentum	Cic. *Att.* 5.5.2; 6.1	
14	estates	Picenum	Plut. *Pomp.* 6.1; Vell. 2.29.1; cf. *ILS* 877 (= *ILLRP* 382)	83 BCE
15	estate(s)	Apulia (environs of Luceria and Canusium)	⟨Caes. *B Civ.* 1.24; 3.4.4⟩	49 BCE

Cf. Shatzman 1975: 389–390; Schneider 1974: 17.
NB: The symbols ⟨⟩ indicate that the evidence is indirect. As for the category of "date", that is to indicate the historical moment in which the property first appears in the evidence.

CHAPTER 4

Hispania

1 *Laudes Hispaniae*

ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἂν Ἀμαλθίης
βουλοίμην κέρας οὔτ᾽ ἔτεα
πεντήκοντά τε κἀκατὸν
Ταρτησσοῦ βασιλεῦσαι.

ANACR. fr. 361 PAGE

Thus does Anacreon express himself in a priamel that once belonged to a poem in all likelihood dealing with the poet's choice between wealth and love. In a vein characteristic of lyric, Archaic and subsequently, desire for a youth outweighs cold, pragmatic considerations of possible material gain.[1] The horn of Amalthea, a Cretan nymph, was the proverbial "horn of plenty", endowed with the capacity of producing an endless supply of food and drink.[2] Similarly, located in the southwestern Iberian peninsula and just beyond the pillars of Hercules, the community of Tartessus was fabled for its wealth and for that reason an object of interest to enterprising traders from Phocaea and the other cities of Ionia.[3] The nexus between material wealth and extraordinary longevity was perhaps inevitable. Of what use is wealth if its enjoyment be fleeting? To rule over Tartessus for 150 years, the sum of three generations, would be the summit of happiness for most mortals, but not for a lyric poet nor the lover.

Worthy of note is not only the fact that rule over Tartessus is associated with the enjoyment of immense wealth for an inordinate period of time, but also the fact that Anacreon's reference is allusive. The poet had no need to explain to his audience where Tartessus lay and by whom it was ruled for so long a period. Composing his poem at some point in the years 545–523 BCE, during his stay at the court of Polycrates, Anacreon could assume that his audience would

1 G. Guidorizzi (ed.), *Lirici greci. Saffo, Alceo, Anacreonte, Ibico*, (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore: Milano 1993), 151, citing Sappho, fr. 361 Voigt, for comparison.

2 Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.7.5.

3 D. Asheri (ed.), *Erodoto, Le storie. Libro I: La Lidia e la Persia*, (Fondazione Lorenzo Valla: Milano 1988), 358.

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understand his allusion to Arganthonius, the semi-legendary ruler of Tartessus in mid-sixth century.[4]

This acquaintance is comprehensible, in light of what survived to be reported by Herodotus in his narrative of Phocaean trading ventures and colonization in the period prior to the Persian conquest in the mid-540s BCE. Despite the relatively limited range of the vessels that they used at the time, the Phocaeans developed a maritime trading network that reached from Anatolia to the outermost recesses of the Iberian peninsula.[5] Through trading, and piracy it may safely be presumed, they achieved immense wealth in a remarkably brief span of time. Manifestly in rivalry with the Phoenicians, they provided a model for emulation by other Hellenes. They also circulated improbable stories regarding the nature of their success.[6] Engaged in establishing colonies and winning enemies amongst the Etruscans and Phoenicians *inter alios*, they claimed to have established relations with Arganthonius that were so cordial that he invited them to re-settle *en masse* in his country. Failing to achieve that wish, he then, it is alleged, unstintingly provided them with the wealth that permitted them to fortify Phocaea against impending Persian attack.[7] The re-modelling of the historical Arganthonius to Hellenic models and desires is palpable: he is described as a tyrant and said to have favoured the Phocaeans in what can only have been invasive economic activity. The fact that Arganthonius is claimed to have ruled for 80 years and to have lived for 120 years likewise renders him more a figure of legend than reliable history.[8] Nonetheless, he loomed large in the Archaic imagination.

4 For the date of composition, see C.M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry. From Alcman to Simonides* (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1961²) 291–292, aptly remarking the interest of Kolaios of Samos in Tartessus: Hdt. 4.152.2. From Anacreon's being mentioned together with Polycrates of Samos, it would appear that his acme fell in the 530s BCE: *Sud.* A 1916 (1.171–172 Adler); Euseb. *Chron.* Olymp. 61.1 (p. 104 Helm; 2.98–99 Schöne); Aristox. fr. 12 Wehrli; Aelian. *VH* 9.4; Apul. *Flor.* 15.54. The date of composition depends upon the assumption that this poem is one of the set dedicated to the Thracian youth of whom Anacreon was enamoured (Smerdies: frr. 346 scholiast, 366, 471; Max. Tyr. *Orat.* 18.9; 37.5; Pap. ed. Schubart, *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Leipzig, Phil.-Hist. Kl.* [Berlin 1950] n. 38, pp. 72 ff., F col. ii 59 ff.; *Anth. Pal.* 7.27.6) and his rival in love for this youth was none other than Polycrates of Samos. Cicero mentions Anacreon's poetry, only to dismiss it: Cic. *Tusc.* 4.71.

5 Hdt. 1.163.

6 Cf. R.W. Westall, "Archaic Greek Religion and the Colonisation of Massalia: The Cult of Artemis of Ephesos," *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni* 75.1 (2009) 27–54, for the foundation of Massalia.

7 Hdt. 1.163.

8 Hdt. 1.163; Cic. *Sen.* 69; Phleg. Trall. *Macr.* 4 p. 90 Keller (= 37.98, Jacoby, *FHG* 257); Lucian.

On the other hand, Arganthonius' reappearance centuries later in the literature of the late Republic is cause for surprise. Herodotus indubitably had his readers in that age, amongst whom Cicero and in all likelihood Pollio. However, there is the anachronistic detail that he was a Gaditane, which, together with an altogether different narrative context, adds to the historical meaning vested in this figure. As emerges from the testimony of Valerius Maximus, Pollio made unambiguous reference to Arganthonius in the *Historiae* when writing of Caesar's Spanish campaign of mid-49 BCE (Val. Max. 8.13 ext. 4):[9]

> Arganthonius autem Gaditanus tam diu regnavit quam diu etiam ad satietatem vixisse abunde foret: octoginta enim annis patriam suam rexit, cum ad imperium quadraginta annos natus accessisset. Cuius rei certi sunt auctores. Asinius etiam Pollio, non minima pars Romani stili, in tertio historiarum suarum libro centum illum et triginta annos explesse commemorat, et ipse nervosae vivacitatis haud parvum exemplum.

> Arganthonius of Gades ruled for so long that it would easily cause surfeit to have lived that long. For eighty years he governed his homeland, even though he had come to power at the age of forty. There are reliable authorities for the matter. In fact, Asinius Pollio, not the least part of Roman literature, records in the third book of his histories that that man lived for one hundred thirty years. He himself was no mean example of vigorous attachment to life.

Tartessus of the Archaic period is assimilated to Gades of the late Republic, and this piece of mythological history or legend is evoked within a narrative dedicated to Caesar's taking control of Hispania Ulterior.[10] Although accompanying C. Curio in north Africa at the time, Pollio later had occasion to gain local

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Macrob. 9; Dionys. *Perieg.* 332 schol. (*Geogr. Gr. Min.* 345). With telling imprecision, whereby Herodotus' testimony is mentioned together with and subsumed by that of Anacreon, it would seem that there was a revival of interest in the works of Anacreon under the reigns of Hadrian and his successors. Cf. Plin. *HN* 7.154, 156.

9 For this text of Pollio, see *FRH* 56 F1 Pollio (= Peter F1 = Val. Max. 8.13 ext. 4). See also the considerations of R. Westall, "Triumph and Closure: Between History and Literature", *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici* suppl. 45 (2014) 25–46.

10 *HRR* 2.67 note to frag. 1: *mentionem eius fecisse uidetur As(inius) in oppugnatione Gadium (a. 49. 705)*. Most scholars (e.g. Kornemann 1896: 661–662; *FRH* 3.521 [Drummond]), but in so doing fail to observe the rigour of Occam's razor.

knowledge of Gades when governor of Hispania Ulterior in 44–43 BCE.[11] More significantly, in terms of historical context and contemporary events, Caesar is reported as having levied money and accorded the status of *municipium* to Gades during his sojourn in Hispania Ulterior in mid-49 BCE.[12] Far from being some idle ethnographical notice meant as a display of futile erudition, the reference to Arganthonius in Pollio's *Historiae* reinforced the topical motif of the region's wealth.

Naturally, there is no trace of Arganthonius nor Caesar's levying of money in the account that Caesar himself left to posterity in the *Civil War*. Whatever his intellectual aptitudes, Caesar did not destroy the marvellous simplicity of his *commentarii* with references to persons or events of legend and myth.[13] Moreover, as we have already had occasion to remark, he was meticulous in avoiding any representation of himself as engaged in the act of levying money in order to finance his wars. Hence, in relating the commencement of the Spanish campaign, the lacunose description of money being borrowed from tribunes of the soldiers and centurions must concern L. Afranius, and not Caesar himself.[14] In the case of Gades, Caesar claims that Pompeius' legate M. Varro had transferred the wealth to be found in the extra-mural sanctuary of Hercules into a private residence within the city.[15] History writ-

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11 *MRR* 2.327, 343.

12 Cass. Dio 41.24.1–2.

13 While there is surprisingly little free of the taint of panegyric as regards Caesar's intellectual capacity, the fact that he engaged in a calendrical reform that proved difficult for successors to maintain in good order is suggestive.

14 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.39.3–4; M. McDonnell, "Borrowing to Bribe Soldiers: Caesar's *De Bello Civili* 1.39," *Historia* 118 (1990) 55–66.

15 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.18.2, 21.3. For a concise survey of the situation and history of Gades, see *DNP* 4 (1998) 730–732 s.v. "Gades" (P. Barceló and H.G. Niemeyer). As regards the legendary "pillars of Hercules" and the celebrated extra-mural sanctuary dedicated to Melqart/Hercules, which lay 18 km to the southeast but was invariably associated with the city of Gades, see H. Walter, "Zum Ursprung und Nachleben der Sage von den Säulen des Herakles," 14–26, in: R. Stupperich (ed.), *Lebendige Antike. Koll. W. Schiering*, (Palatium Verlag im J & J Verlag: Mannheim 1995); H.G. Niemeyer, "Zum Thymiaterion vom Cerro del Peñón," *Madrider Mitt*. 11 (1970) 96–101. The sanctuary was an invariable site of pilgrimage in the Graeco-Roman world and therefore a repository of immense wealth. For instance, Hannibal visited it prior to launching his expedition against Italy in 218 BCE (Liv. 21.21; cf. Strab. 3.5.7, 9), Caesar visited it during his time as quaestor to the governor of Hispania Ulterior in 69–68 BCE (Suet. *Iul*. 7.1; Cass. Dio 37.52.2; cf. Plut. *Caes*. 11.5–6; C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Caesar*, (Clarendon Ancient History Series), (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2011), 183–184; cf. K. Welch and H. Mitchell, "Revisiting the Roman Alexander," *Antichthon* 47

ten by the protagonists is a rhetorical exercise in shaping a partisan vision of the past that can convince contemporaries, and Caesar shows himself once more adept to the task. By Caesar's own account, he came to give, not to take.

The case of Gades involves not only the credibility of Caesar as an eyewitness to history, but also the complex rules regarding the confiscation of money and other forms of wealth. It is to be observed that the desecration of the temple of Hercules is attributed to M. Varro, or rather to agents acting on his behalf. It might be thought that the location in which those deposits were situated at the time of Caesar's presence in Gades would be immaterial. However, as emerges from evidence for the Roman conquest of Ptolemaic Egypt by Caesar's adoptive son and heir nearly two decades later, pollution (*miasma*) did not attend the seizure of wealth that had been moved by someone else from a sanctuary to a private residence.[16] According to this *mentalité*, it was Varro who had incurred pollution when he, not surprisingly, decided to place the wealth of the sanctuary of Hercules within the safety of the city-walls of Gades and thereby remove it from the grasp of Caesar. Once Varro had surrendered, and that surrender included a rendering of financial accounts to Caesar, Caesar would have been at liberty to dispose of the spoils of victory as he saw fit.[17] Despite his unambiguous claim to have restored the wealth removed from the sanctuary of Hercules, it is hard to believe that he did not divert it to help pay for the legions to be cashiered as well as those to be used in garrisoning the Spanish provinces.[18]

Whatever the precise nature of Caesar's financial arrangements in the wake of his campaign in Hispania in 49 BCE, there can exist no doubt as to the substantial mineral wealth of the region. This was something that had early impressed Phoenician and Hellenic explorers. The theme of the region's precious metals, moreover, continually recurs throughout the whole of the history of Carthaginian and Roman occupation.

(2013) 80–100, here 94 n. 43), and Apollonius of Tyana visited it during a tour of the western Mediterranean (Philostr. *V Apollon.* 5.5.1–2, 7.1).

16 Cass. Dio 51.17.6.

17 For Varro's surrender, see Caes. *B Civ.* 2.20.8, as though entrusting the province to his duly appointed successor. Cf. Cic. *Att.* 6.7.2; A.J. Marshall, "Governors on the move," *Phoenix* 20 (1966) 231–246, esp. 242; "The *Lex Pompeia de provinciis* (52 B.C.) and Cicero's *imperium* in 51–50 B.C. Constitutional aspects," *ANRW* 1.1.887–921; "Symbols and showmanship in Roman public life. The fasces," *Phoenix* 38 (1984) 120–141.

18 For the numbers involved, see P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1971), 473, 475.

In the wake of their loss of Sardinia and Sicilia, the Carthaginians had sought to create new imperial possessions in the Iberian peninsula, a region that had been under-exploited previously on account of its being further afield. This led to the creation of mines at Carthago Nova and elsewhere under the Barcids. Allegedly finding the locals employing silver for such quotidian objects as feeding-troughs and wine-jars, Hamilcar Barca and his sons systematized the extraction of precious metals from the region's soil.[19] The wealth of these mines is epitomized by the fact that they continued to produce substantial amounts on into the late Republic and early Principate.[20] As Posidonius shrewdly remarked in the mid-70s BCE, they provided "an inexhaustible treasury for empire".[21] Failure to safeguard and adequately develop this resource, it might be opined, ultimately lay behind the failure of Carthage in the perennial struggle with Rome.

The Romans did not fail to appreciate the significance of these mines, and creation of the two provinces Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior is to be attributed to this elementary fact of the region's mineral wealth.[22] Observers from the other end of the Mediterranean, in the distant East, remarked the financial motivation for this extension of Empire (*1Macc.* 8.3–4):

> καὶ διηγήσαντο αὐτῶι … καὶ ὅσα ἐποίησαν ἐν χώραι Σπανίας τοῦ κατακρατῆσαι τῶν μετάλλων τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ τοῦ χρυσίου τοῦ ἐκεῖ. καὶ κατεκράτησαν τοῦ τόπου παντὸς τῆι βουλῆι αὐτῶν καὶ τῆι μακροθυμίαι—καὶ ὁ τόπος ἦν μακρὰν ἀπέχων ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν σφόδρα—καὶ τῶν βασιλέων τῶν ἐπελθόντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ ἄκρου τῆς γῆς, ἕως συνέτριψαν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπάταξαν ἐν αὐτοῖς πληγὴν μεγάλην, καὶ οἱ ἐπίλοιποι διδόασιν αὐτοῖς φόρον κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτόν.

> They narrated to him … all that (the Romans) had done in the country of Spain so as to take control of the silver and gold mines located there.

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19 Strab. 3.2.14 C151; Nepos, *Hamil.* 4.1. Cf. C. Domergue, *Les mines de la péninsule ibérique dans l'antiquité romaine*, (CEFR, 127), (École française de Rome: Roma 1990), 163, 166–167; D.B. Hoyos, *Hannibal's dynasty. Power and politics in the western Mediterranean, 247–183 BC*, (Routledge: London 2003), 58, 71, 225. For the estimate that Carthaginian revenues on the eve of the Second Punic War may have reached the extravagant sum of 6,000 talents per annum, see U. Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager. 3: Vom 218 bis 146 v. Chr.*, (Weidmann: Berlin 1913), 135–137; cf. Hoyos 2003: 225, for scepticism.

20 Diod. 5.38.2.

21 Strab. 3.2.9 C147.

22 That may also help to explain why two provinces, in accordance with the time-honoured principle of dividing power at Rome, so as to avoid possible tyranny.

> By resolution and fortitude, they took control of the whole of the country, even though it was extremely far away from them, and overcame the kings who attacked them from the ends of the earth, crushed them and dealt them a severe blow, while the survivors have been paying them an annual tax.

Despite the tendency for external observers to simplify formulation of the intentions of those whom they describe, the actions of Cato the Elder and his peers confirm this view that the Romans were not insensible to the material wealth offered by the Iberian peninsula.[23] Indeed, it was within a mine in Hispania that M. Crassus took refuge from the chaos at Rome during the mid-80s BCE,[24] and it was at Gades in particular that there was to be found the largest gathering of Roman *equites* outside the Italian peninsula.[25] The "incredible revenues" of the Spanish mines rendered the region the *El Dorado* of Antiquity.[26]

Of course, the Iberian peninsula was also remarkable for its abundance in a variety of things other than precious metals. The population and livestock were plentiful, as were those natural resources upon which they depended for sustenance. As of the late Republic and early Principate, the commodities of grain, wine, and olive oil—not to mention fish-sauce—were produced in Hispania in substantial quantities for exportation abroad.

The populous nature of the Iberian peninsula permitted the Romans not only to fill the ranks of their legions, but also to rely upon the provincial population armed in native fashion. From Caesar's evidence, it would appear that many of those in the legions serving under Pompeius' *legati* actually resided within Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior. In addition, a *legio vernacula* had been recruited from provincials to serve under M. Varro. Moreover, there were *magna auxilia*, as remarked by Cicero.[27] Serving with L. Afranius and M. Petreius in Hispania Citerior in mid-49 BCE were some 30, 40, or 80 auxil-

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23 For example, see the sums of precious metals reported at Liv. 34.46.2; *ESAR* 3.129 (J.J. Van Nostrand, "Roman Spain," in Volume 3 (1937), in: T. Frank, ed. *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 6 vols. (Johns Hopkins: Baltimore 1933–1940)). Cf. Gell. *NA* 2.22.29, citing a letter by Cato: *Set in his regionibus ferrareae, argentifodinae pulcherrimae*.

24 Plut. *Crass*. 4–6. It is to be remarked that Plutarch found this episode within the history composed by Fenestella, who had engaged in personal research in the region. See more precisely Plut. *Crass*. 5.6 = *FRH* 70 Fenestella T3 = Accornero T2 = Peter F16.

25 Strab. 3.5.3.

26 Diod. 5.38.1.

27 Cic. *Fam*. 16.12.4.

iary cohorts.[28] That translates into roughly 13,500 to 36,000 provincial infantry armed in indigenous fashion and attached to the Roman army in Hispania Citerior. There were also some 5,000 provincial cavalry serving with Afranius and Petreius at the time. In Hispania Ulterior, things were not much different. Varro is reported to have raised 30 cavalry cohorts, or some 13,500 men, for the campaign that he never fought.[29] The relative ease with which tens of thousands of men might be called into service and deployed points to a substantial demographic base.

Livestock was equally numerous within the peninsula, abetted by a favourable environment and an active interest in animals of use to the martial arts. Although there was a general tendency to rely upon animals locally raised, the Spanish horses were known abroad for their speed and reputed to be the offspring of one of the winds.[30] Hence, when local supply might fail, as in the case of the Gallic campaign of 52 BCE, it was no hardship to rely upon Spanish stock in order to make good the loss.[31] Indeed, it is to be remarked that the cohort of Illurgavonenses who received Roman citizenship from Pompeius Strabo for services rendered in the course of the Social War was a cavalry unit.[32] The deployment of Spanish cavalry in Italia at a critical moment of this sort is eloquent witness to the martial value of the horses and their riders. The plains of western and southern Hispania afforded ideal conditions for the large-scale breeding of horses that would be swift.

The soils and climate of the Iberian plains also rendered them notably productive for the purposes of cerealiculture, viticulture, and oleiculture. First, of course, came the growth of cereals with the capillary spread and augment of the population. Then, with specialization, there came the production of wine and olive oil, the latter upon a truly spectacular scale directly linked to the life of the imperial capital.

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28 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.39.1. For the corruption of this number, see C. Damon (ed.), *C. Iulii Caesaris commentariorum libri III de bello civili, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 2015), 25 app. crit. ad loc. (citing Baron E.G.H.C. Stoffel, *Histoire de Jules César. Guerre civile*. 3 vols. (Imprimerie nationale: Paris 1887), 1.265 and inviting readers to compare Caes. *B Civ*. 1.83.1); cf. W. Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," *CQ* 46 (1996) 222–238, for the "stylization" of numbers in literary sources.

29 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.18.1.

30 For the conceit that Spanish horses had been sired by a wind deity, see Colum. 6.27.3; Iustin. 44.3; Plin. *HN* 8.166; Sil. Ital. 3.380–381; Solinus 23.7; Varro, *de re rust*. 2.1.19; *ESAR* 3.180. Clearly this was too an item of learning good to overlook. It is worth adding that Spanish asses were renowned for their high quality: Colum. 7.1; cf. Plin. *HN* 8.170.

31 Caes. *B Gall*. 7.55.3; cf. Iustin. 44.2.5.

32 *ILS* 8888 = *CIL* 6.37045 line 2 and col. 4 ll. 2–3.

The literary evidence for cerealiculture in the Spanish provinces is sparse, for attention is as a rule focussed upon warfare occurring there and consequently dearth rather than abundance is what captures the attention. So, for example, it proved necessary to ship grain from Italia to the Spanish territories in the course of the Second Punic War, and the failure of the harvest in Gallia in the mid-70s caused severe problems in the grain supply for Pompeius' army operating in Hispania Citerior.[33] However, in describing the Spanish campaign of mid-49 BCE, Caesar does furnish clear evidence of the successes attained by cerealiculture in Hispania. M. Varro is said to have amassed an immense amount of grain in Hispania Ulterior, so as to despatch it to the relief of Massilia and the army of L. Afranius and M. Petreius in Hispania Citerior.[34] The amount compulsorily gathered is reported as having been 120,000 *modii*.[35] Enough to feed roughly 50,000 people for a month, this sum is easily dwarfed by the storage capacity of the grain-pits, or *putei*, found at just one locale near Corduba.[36] Nevertheless, the figure suffices to demonstrate both a thriving industry of cerealiculture, such as what might have easily been imagined from a knowledge of the terrain, and points to an awareness of this potential on the part of Caesar and his peers. Had the Spanish grain reached Massilia and the Massiliotes maintained their command of the sea, Caesar in all likelihood would not have been free to take the offensive against Pompeius in Macedonia as of late 49 BCE.

The literary evidence for viticulture and olive oil production is virtually nil. Yet, archaeological evidence nicely supplies the defect. Coins produced in substantial quantities in Hispania Ulterior in the late Republic and during the Triumvirate are suggestive with their representations of a cluster of grapes.[37] Whether or not the wine to which allusion was being made was exported for consumption abroad, there was a clear movement to diversify crops, presum-

33 For the situation obtaining in the Second Punic War, see Liv. 23.48.4–5; P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World. Responses to Risk and Crisis*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 188–189, 192. For that of the Sertorian War, see Sall. *Hist.* 2.98.1–2, 9.

34 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.18.1.

35 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.18.5.

36 The estimate is based upon figures provided in a related context (that of the *lex Terentia Cassia* of 73 BCE) by Garnsey 1988: 212. For the *putei*, see E.W. Haley, *Felix Baetica. People and Prosperity in Southern Spain from Caesar to Septimius Severus*, (University of Texas Press: Austin 2003), 23. These *putei*, it is to be remarked, had attracted the attention of Varro during his time in Hispania Ulterior: Varr. *Rust.* 1.57.2.

37 Haley 2003: 26.

ably in an attempt to achieve greater productivity. Subsequently, as of the principate of Augustus, there is evidence in the form of a hill of amphorae at Rome (Monte Testaccio) for the exportation of olive oil from Hispania Ulterior to the imperial capital in substantial amounts upon a regular basis.[38] The operation was performed upon a massive scale, which, together with the lengthy productive cycle of the olive tree, reveals an enterprise of some planning.[39] Again, it may be that a local market preceded the establishment of the enduring tie to Rome, which itself may be a product of increased knowledge of the region as a result of the civil wars.

2 C. Caesar and Hispania

Abandoning Italia, where military success had been followed by repeated, abject failure on the political plane, Caesar turned his attention to the furthest west, where there was operative a sizeable veteran army under the command of the legates of Pompeius Magnus. Again contrary to what might be thought from a naive reading of the *Civil War*, Caesar had set his legions in motion for the invasion of Hispania prior to passage of the *senatus consultum ultimum*.[40] Hence, the relative ease with which victory was achieved against "an army without a general", despite Caesar's being delayed temporarily at Massilia.[41] The campaign against L. Afranius and M. Petreius in Hispania Citerior came to an inglorious end on 2 August 49 BCE, when the evil mood amongst the troops drove Pompeius' legates to parley and then surrender to Caesar.[42] The

38 A relatively recent synthesis is furnished by J. Remesal Rodríguez, "Baetican olive oil and the Roman economy," 183–199, in: S. Keay (ed.), *The Archaeology of Early Roman Baetica*, (JRA suppl., 29), (Journal of Roman Archaeology: Portsmouth 1998). The fundamental publication regarding this archaeological site remains: E. Rodríguez Almeida, *Il Monte Testaccio. Ambiente. Storia. Materiali*, (Edizioni Quasar: Roma 1984).

39 Cf. Haley 2003: 25–26, citing also *BHisp*. 27.1.

40 For crucial light on this subject, see M. Rambaud, "Les marches des Césariens vers l'Espagne au début de la guerre civile," 845–861, in: *L'Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine. Mélanges offerts à Jacques Heurgon*. (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 27), (École française de Rome: Roma 1976).

41 Suet. *Iul*. 34.2: *validissimas Pompei copias, quae sub tribus legatis M. Petreio et L. Afranio et M. Varrone in Hispania erant, invasit, professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce et inde reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu.*

42 *Fasti Amiterni* = *ILS* 8744; cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 2.32.5, where it is claimed that the campaign lasted a mere 40 days. The rhetorical context of that claim, however, does not instil great faith. Nonetheless, the established dates for Caesar's presence in Rome (Cic. *Att*. 9.17.1) and the

campaign against M. Varro was accomplished even more rapidly, with Varro's surrender to Caesar probably having occurred already by the end of that same month.[43] Towards the very close of this episode, Caesar once more provides a speech that sheds light upon the purported motivations of the various actors. Reporting obliquely and in summary fashion what he said in the wake of his victory over Varro, Caesar writes (Caes. *B Civ*. 2.21.1):

> Caesar contione habita Cordubae omnibus generatim gratias agit: civibus Romanis, quod oppidum in sua potestate studuissent habere, Hispanis, quod praesidia expulissent, Gaditanis, quod conatus adversariorum infregissent seseque in libertatem vindicavissent, tribunis militum centurionibusque qui eo praesidi causa venerant, quod eorum consilia sua virtute confirmavissent.

> Caesar held a public meeting in Corduba. and he thanked each of the various groups: the Roman citizens because they had desired that their community be in his power; the Spaniards because they had driven out the garrisons; the people of Gades because they had rendered ineffectual his enemies' preparations and set themselves free; the tribunes of the soldiers and centurions, who had gone there to serve as a garrison, because by their bravery they had given force to the decisions taken by the people of Gades.

Notwithstanding its brevity, this speech is important, for its repetition of the key themes of Caesarian propaganda and its evocation of the social categories that informed political thought and economic behaviour in the late Republic. Speaking at what might be deemed the capital of the province of Hispania Ulterior, Caesar thanked those who had made his victory possible.

The attention given to social categories is remarkable, in that it affords insight into the way in which Caesar and contemporaries viewed the world about them. Caesar displays a care for social and legal detail that is similar to that revealed by the *Lex de Gallia Cisalpina* of the very same year.[44] There is a

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end of the campaign in Hispania Citerior (*Inscr.Ital.* 13.1.318, 328; 2.30–31, 79, 190–191, 208) indicate that the temporal length possesses verisimilitude.

43 Despite the false security given by the chronological table's hyper-precision, see F. Kraner, F. Hofmann, and H. Meusel (eds.), *C. Iulii Caesaris Commentarii de Bello Civili.* Afterword and bibliography by H. Oppermann, (Berlin 1959[12]), 371.

44 Cf. *FIRA* 1 no. 19 col. 2 ll. 2–3, 26, 53, 56, 58. It is hard not to be struck by the legislator's insistent use of the comprehensive, but legally differentiating, formula *in eorum quo*

discernible pecking-order: Romans, provincials, and allies.[45] Unlike the army or a crowd of citizens in Rome, the audience addressed by Caesar was not a homogeneous entity, not even by legal fiction. While such situations occurred often enough in the provinces, it is rather unusual to see this differentiation displayed quite so clearly.

Caesar commences by thanking his fellow-citizens, those Romans at Corduba whose timely intervention had assured him of possession of the foremost city within the province. In response to Caesar's edict calling for an assembly of the leading men of Hispania Ulterior at Corduba upon a given date, or so it seems from Caesar's account, the *conventus* of Corduba had closed its gates against Varro and appropriated to itself care of the city's defenses.[46] The parallel between Caesar's speech of thanks at Corduba and that which he delivered to a similar audience at Tarraco within two weeks' time is a sign of the city's importance, on a par with its subsequent description as *caput provinciae* in 45 BCE.[47] In the course of the regularization of Roman rule over the southwestern Iberian peninsula, an Italian colony had been founded at Corduba in 152 BCE.[48] Those who had been magistrates within the city and Roman *negotiatores* active within the province constituted its *conventus*. These people are the Roman citizens whose prompt action had earned Caesar's public gratitude.[49]

The precise identity of these Roman citizens who constituted the *conventus* of Corduba is hard to isolate. That they were numerous is suggested not only

o(ppido) m(unicipio) c(olonia) p(raefectura) f(oro) u(eico) c(onciliabulo) c(astello) t(erritorio)ue quae sunt.

45 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.57.4: *quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperi uni omnis acceptam relaturos.*

46 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.19.1–3.

47 For the assembly of leading men at Tarraco, see Caes. *B Civ*. 2.21.4–5. A stone carrying inscriptions honouring Cn. Pompeius Magnus and P. Mucius Scaevola is to be associated with this particular episode: G. Alföldy, *Die römischen Inschriften von Tarraco*, 2 vols. (Madrider Forschungen, 10), (W. de Gruyter: Berlin 1975), nos. 1–2. For the designation of Corduba, see *BHisp*. 3.1, which is concerned to explain the rationale informing the strategy of Sex. Pompeius. Notwithstanding the hesitation of R. Knapp, *Roman Córdoba*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1983), 22, 52, the term "capital" seems proper; cf. R. Haensch, *Capita Provinciarum. Statthaltersitze und Provinzialverwaltung in der römischen Kaiserzeit*, (Kölner Forschungen, 7), (Philipp von Zabern: Mainz am Rhein 1997) 180–183.

48 Strab. 3.2.1.

49 Brunt 1971: 215 ("more probably under Augustus"); cf. E. Kornemann, "Conventus," *RE* 4 (1901) coll. 1173–1200, here coll. 1180–1182.

by comparison with the case of Utica in 47–46 BCE, but also by their taking an active role in Corduba's defense in 49 BCE.[50] Yet, despite their probably numbering in the hundreds, the epigraphic and literary record attests only to a desultory dozen. Of these only one is relatively well known. Born at Corduba ca. 50 BCE, or so it is commonly avowed, L. Annaeus Seneca the Elder came of an equestrian family typical of the Romans and Italians who had settled in Hispania Ulterior in order to make their fortune.[51] Even when labelled *Hispanienses* as a consequence of the length of their stay abroad, they thought of themselves as Romans and behaved accordingly. Their culture was conservative and susceptible to ridicule at Rome for the maintenance of characteristics that had disappeared in the imperial capital.[52] On the other hand, as is suggested by cases such as that of C. Gallonius, an *eques Romanus* active in Hispania Ulterior on behalf of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus in mid-49, it is to be suspected that there was a fairly constant stream of Romans moving back and forth between imperial and provincial capital, with their presence in one or the other determined as much by stage of life as by immediate economic goals.[53] Mobility is a key element all too often absent from modern histories of colonial elites.

After the Romans resident in Hispania Ulterior, there come the provincials, those condemned to pay tribute to the Roman state and under the direct dominion of Roman arms. The *Hispani*, or Spaniards, were native to the region. Constituting the vast majority of the populace of the province, they did not

50 In theory there were some 300 Romans active in the *conventus* at Utica: Plut. *Cat. min.* 59. Caution is advised, however, by the fact that this statistic recurs far too frequently to be deemed anything other than a "rhetorical number". The expression "rhetorical number" is borrowed from A. Dreizehnter, *Die rhetorische Zahl. Quellenkritische Untersuchungen anhand der Zahlen 70 und 700*, (C.H. Beck: München 1978), a study dealing with the question of Socrates' age at death. For statistical concerns, see W. Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," *Classical Quarterly* 46 (1996) 222–238; cf. R.W. Westall, "The Forum Iulium as Representation of *Imperator* Caesar", *Römische Mitteilungen* 103 (1996) 83–118, here 85, with an argument that applies with equal force to all of the statistics provided by the ancient sources for the cost of purchase for the land upon which Caesar built the Forum Iulium in the 50s–40s BCE.

51 M.T. Griffin, "The elder Seneca and Spain," *Journal of Roman Studies* 62 (1972) 1–19.

52 Thus Cic. *Arch.* 26, for the defects in language of one or more Corduban poets. Cf. Varro, *Ling.* 5.162, on use of the word *cenaculum*, a trait shared with certain towns in Latium.

53 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.18.2, remarking that Gallonius was present in Gades so as to overlook an inheritance. But for the death of the unnamed testator who had decided to bequeath an estate to Ahenobarbus, Gallonius would not have been present so as to take a hand in Varro's preparations for warfare with Caesar.

enjoy Roman citizenship and its prerogatives.[54] In the present instance, those whom Caesar thanked were the inhabitants of Carmo. His mention of *praesidia* must be an exaggeration making use of the rhetorical plural, for no garrisons were expelled from Italica or Hispalis, even if the allegiance of the units in those communities was transferred from Varro to Caesar.[55] Lying to the northeast of Italica and Hispalis and situated upon a height commanding the valley of the Baetis river as one ascended it towards Corduba, Carmo possessed an extremely secure military position.[56] Whoever occupied this town might easily disrupt communications between Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior, reducing to nought the possession of Corduba. For that reason had Varro despatched three cohorts to occupy its citadel.[57] But the townspeople expelled these cohorts, preferring the rapidly victorious Caesar to the sluggish dilettantism of Varro. Cognizant of his immense debt to them, Caesar publicly thanked them for their part in a Roman civil war. Thus Caesar himself. From the epigraphic evidence, on the other hand, it emerges that the city had acquired the status of *municipium*—whether *civium Romanorum* or *Latinorum* is unknown—at some point prior to the death of Augustus' grandson and heir C. Caesar in 4 CE.[58] In view of the importance of the city's change of allegiance on this occasion and given the fact that there was no subsequent moment at which it played a comparable role, it may not be excessively daring to suggest that

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54 It is to be observed that there was a fundamental difference between *Hispani* and *Hispanienses*. The situation is well illustrated by a comment made regarding L. Cornelius Balbus, a native of Gades who had acquired Roman citizenship as an adult rather by birth. Despite the necessity of emendation, on which see A.J. Woodman, *Velleius Paterculus: The Caesarian and Augustan narrative, 2.41–93*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1983), 93, highly pertinent is Vell. 2.51.3: *non Hispani⟨ensis⟩ natus, sed Hispanus*. The lexica, including *OLD* 799 s.v. "Hispaniensis", fail to remark the fact of emendation.

55 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.20.4–6.

56 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.19.4: *Carmonenses quae est longe firmissima totius provinciae civitas*.

57 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.19.4.

58 *CIL* 2.5120; H. Galsterer, *Untersuchungen zum römischen Städtewesen auf der Iberischen Halbinsel*, (W. de Gruyter: Berlin 1971), xix; R. Wiegels, *Die Tribusinschriften des römischen Hispanien, ein Katalog*, (De Gruyter: Berlin 1985), 26; G. Alföldy, "La sociedad del municipio de Carmo," 381–396, in: A. Caballos Rufino (ed.), *Carmona Romana. Actas del Congreso de Historia de Carmona. Carmona, 29 septiembre–2 octobre 1999*, (Ayuntamiento de Carmona: Carmona 2001), 382. For a survey of the community's geographical situation and archaeological monuments, see A. Tovar, *Iberische Landeskunde. Teil 2: Die Völker und die Städte des antiken Hispanien*. 2 vols. (Koerner: Baden-Baden 1974–1976), 155–157; R. Collins, *Spain. An Oxford archaeological guide*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1998), 100–103.

Caesar has omitted to include in his narrative the detail that he at this time granted the status of *municipium* to Carmo as a reward for the community's support.

Next follow the Gaditanes, whose community historically enjoyed the enviable status of *civitas foederata* as a consequence of their opportune change of allegiance late in the Second Punic war.[59] Assimilating them to those Romans who were willing to take up arms on his behalf, Caesar expressed gratitude for their acting in defense of their freedom and bringing the preparations of Varro and his collaborators to nought. Whether their motives were quite so high-minded may be doubted by the sceptical. Varro's pillaging of the famous temple of Hercules/Melqart and his levying of substantial sums of money, ships, and supplies for conduct of the war indubitably alienated those who had no immediate profit from changes in the uppermost level of the ruling circle at Rome.[60] At any event, they had seized the occasion offered by Varro's absence and the arrival of news of Caesar's approach, so as to negotiate with the officers of the cohorts stationed there and to expel Gallonius from the city.[61] Hence, the spectre of a siege was averted and what might have proved an embarrassing and intractable situation was quickly resolved in Caesar's favour.

Unlike the Massiliotes, the Gaditanes conducted themselves precisely as Caesar believed that Roman allies ought. Expelling his enemies and closing the city's gates against them, the Gaditanes showed themselves faithful to Caesar and cognizant of the past benefactions that he had bestowed upon the city.[62] When quaestor to Antistius Vetus in 69–68, Caesar had established good

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59 Liv. 28.37.10.

60 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.18.1–6. Cf. J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Books 1–2*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1991), 223, who aptly remarks that Caesar's victories first over Pompeius in Italia and then over Afranius and Petreius in Hispania Citerior are likely to have led to practical reflection that Varro had little likelihood of success against the conqueror of Gallia. Faced with the prospect of a war of attrition, a rapid transferral of allegiance was their best choice. Paradoxically, by his failure to remain immobile, Varro swiftly found himself without a viable base of operations.

61 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.20.1–3.

62 Suggestive, but unfortunately vague, is a passing comment made during the defense of Balbus in 56 BCE against a charge of usurpation of the Roman citizenship: Cic. *Balb*. 43. Overall, see the prosopographical discussion provided by C. Nicolet, *L'Ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (312–43 av. J.-C.)*. 2 vols. (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d' Athènes et de Rome, 207), (E. de Boccard: Paris 1966–1974), 2.853–855. In general, for Cicero's speech on behalf of Balbus, see: C.E. Steel (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2013); K.A. Barber, *Rhetoric in Cicero's Pro Balbo. An Interpretation*, (Routledge: New York 2004); C.E. Steel, *Cicero, Rhetoric and Empire*,

relations with the city's leading members.[63] Amongst these figured L. Cornelius Balbus, who was to prove a constant figure at Caesar's side in the 50s and 40s BCE. Subsequently, it was reported that at that time Caesar had been moved by the vision of a statue of Alexander the Great within the temple of Melqart to lament that he himself had yet done nothing comparable to the deeds of the Macedonian.[64] When Caesar returned as proconsul to govern Hispania Ulterior in 61–60 BCE, he relied upon individuals such as Balbus in order to carry ahead his projects of military conquest and rapine. Upon returning to Rome, he was accompanied by Balbus, who played a key role in the creation of an *entente cordiale* with Pompeius and Crassus, the so-called "First Triumvirate".[65] Thereafter, serving once more as *praefectus fabrum* to Caesar and looking after his political and economic interests, Balbus was a leading figure in the failed diplomatic exchanges preceding and following the outbreak of civil war. Eventually, despite his not having been born a Roman citizen, Balbus would arrive at the supreme honour of the consulate (*cos. suff.* 40 BCE). Through a personal tie such as this, the Gaditanes' decision to abandon Varro for Caesar becomes all the more comprehensible. However, ever careful to represent the course of events as dependent upon his own choices as a general and politician, Caesar says nothing of the figure of Balbus.

(Oxford University Press: Oxford 2001). See also A.W. Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence. A Historian's Companion*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008). As for the issue of *civitas*, still the most incisive discussion remains that of P.A. Brunt, "The Legal Issue in Cicero, *Pro Balbo*," *CQ* 32 (1982) 136–147.

Attention has rightly been drawn to this passage's stunning conceit that Balbus was now a *hospes* within his native Gades: J. Nicols, "The Rituals of *Hospitium*: The *Tesserae Hospitales*," 190–198, in: J. Bodel and N. Dimitrova (eds.), *Ancient Documents and their Contexts. First North American Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy* (2011), (Brill: Leiden 2015), here 192 n. 4.

63 For the chronology, see *MRR* 2.136 n. 7.

64 Suet. *Iul.* 7.1–2.

65 For acute political analysis that illustrates how misleading this misnomer is, see G.R. Stanton and B.A. Marshall, "The Coalition between Pompeius and Crassus 60–59 B.C.," *Historia* 24 (1975) 205–219. An intriguing exposition of the history behind this historiographical error by analogy is furnished by R.T. Ridley, "What's in the name: The so-called First Triumvirate," *Arctos* 33 (1999) 133–144. While it would appear that the honour of primacy goes to the Habsburg functionary Stefano Schiappalaria, whose biography of Caesar first saw the light of day at Antwerp in 1578, it seems that it was the French savant and aristocrat Samuel Broe who made the decisive contribution with a two-volume *Histoire des deux triumvirats* that was published at Paris in 1681 and appeared in English translation at London in 1686.

Omission also envelops the nature of the reward that Caesar accorded to the Gaditanes for their fidelity at this critical juncture. Although not loath to accuse his enemies of bribery, Caesar carefully avoids any representation wherein he himself might appear to be engaged in such behaviour.[66] Consequently, readers learn only of fine words and phrases pronounced at Corduba and the restoration of private property and the replacement within the temple of Melqart of money and dedications that had been removed by Varro.[67] Only from later sources, in this instance literary as well, does it emerge that Caesar at some point granted Roman citizenship *en bloc* to the Gaditanes. The precise date is again in question, but here, as in the case of the Carmonenses, the extraordinary role played by the Gaditanes in mid-49 BCE suggests that Caesar rewarded them at this moment, making a proclamation to that effect either at Corduba or when he passed through Gades a couple of days later.[68]

Last, but not least, the list of those to whom Caesar was grateful concludes with the tribunes of the soldiers and centurions involved in the transferral of Gades' allegiance from Varro to Caesar. These officers had played a crucial role in the expulsion of Varro's deputy Gallonius from Gades. Their consent alone had rendered possible a bloodless coup.[69] Had they preferred to continue to support Varro and Pompeius Magnus, force would have been required to evict them or else a siege with all its travails would have followed. The six cohorts that Varro had stationed in Gades sufficed for military occupation of the site.[70] The officers who led their men in supporting the Gaditanes' decision to go over to the side of Caesar included at least three tribunes of the soldiers

66 McDonnell 1990: 55–66; cf. B. Woytek, *Arma et Nummi. Forschungen zur römischen Finanzgeschichte und Münzprägung der Jahre 49 bis 42 v.Chr.* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Wien 2003), 40 n. 129.

67 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.21.2–3.

68 In either case, however, not all was cause for cheer. Caesar is recorded as having levied large sums of money during his passage through the Spanish provinces (Cass. Dio 41.24.1). Moreover, he himself relates that he deployed the warships that had been constructed at the command of Varro (Caes. *B Civ*. 18.1, 21.4). Men and material cost money, and Caesar is unlikely to have been philanthropic in resolving the financial problem attached to deploying these warships.

69 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.20.2–3.

70 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.18.2. The old city-centre of Gades has been estimated at roughly 10 hectares: M.E. Aubet, *The Phoenicians and the West. Politics, Colonies, and Trade*, tr. M. Turton, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2001) 266; M. Dietler and C. Lopez-Ruiz, "Colonial Encounters in Ancient Iberia: A Coda," 299–312, in: M. Dietler and C. Lopez-Ruiz (eds.), *Colonial Encounters in Ancient Iberia. Phoenicians, Greek, and Indigenous Relations*, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago 2009), here 300.

and 36 centurions in theory.[71] Numbering nearly 40 men, this officer corps took the initiative, holding discussions with the leading men of Gades and bringing the rank-and-file around to the idea of a surrender. Willing to risk the charge of insubordination and treachery, these officers showed no little courage in subverting the garrison that Varro had installed at Gades. In the convoluted world of civil war, where recognition of the justice of the partisan cause is paramount, perjury and treason qualify men as role models of civic responsibility.[72] Rewards financial, material, and social there indubitably were, but once again Caesar envelops these in decent silence, limiting himself to remarking that rewards were given to certain communities and individuals. To have entered into the specifics would have destroyed the fast, idealistic pace of his narrative. Worse, it would have been a signal admission of the corruption that accompanied his relentless, victorious advance.

71 Cf. Carter 1993: 225, for the putative minimum number of tribunes of soldiers. As regards the centurions, it is worth recalling that there were regularly six centurions to a given cohort. Since Caesar writes of Varro as having seen to his two legions' being at full complement (Caes. *B Civ.* 2.18.1), it seems quite likely that none of the officer corps was lacking.

72 It is to be remarked that Caesar explicitly takes note of Varro's administration of an oath in order to bolster the loyalty that was due to him as Pompeius Magnus' representative (Caes. *B Civ.* 2.18.5: *provinciam omnem in sua et Pompei verba ius iurandum adigebat*). As on the other occasions in which Caesar's remarks the taking of oath, this proves pitifully inadequate. Nevertheless, recourse to such an instrument is revelatory of the mindset of the epoch. For other examples of oaths (*iusiurandum* or *iurare*) reported by Caesar, see Caes. *B Civ.* 1.76.3,5; 3.10.9, 13, 87.5–6, 102.2; *B Gall.* 1.3.7, 30.5, 31.7–9; 4.11.3. 6.12.4. It is to be remarked that the people exacting oaths are always Caesar's irredentist enemies (e.g. Labienus or Vercingetorix or the Helvetii), and that the oaths are expected to introduce an element of compulsion that will bring behaviour into line with what a member of the elite expects and requires. More formal, opaque language (*sacramentum dicere*) is employed on those rare occasions when Caesar is describing the oath of service administered to those serving under Caesar himself or his lieutenants, e.g. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.23.5. The difference between semantic fields is roughly the same as that between "oath" and "pledge" in English. For a more detailed examination, see L. Grillo, *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile. Literature, Ideology, and Community*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2012), 62–70; cf. R.W. Westall, *Caesar's Civil War and the Mediterranean World of 49–48 BC*. (Ph.D thesis: Stanford University: Stanford 2000), 400–402. In closing, it should only be added that the language applied to Caesar's enemies would have evoked the concept of *coniuratio*, with all the negative connotations which that word held for contemporaries.

3 Cn. Pompeius and Hispania

Caesar's victory over Pompeius Magnus' army deployed in Hispania Citerior was achieved, after a series of engagements near Ilerda and then marches and counter-marches to the interior, with a parley held in full view of the opposing armies on 2 August 49 BCE. Speaking on the Pompeian side was the senior *legatus* L. Afranius (*cos.* 60 BCE); response came from Caesar. Whether the report of this parley is historically accurate is something that may be reasonably held in doubt.[73] Whereas the speech attributed to Afranius is direct and to the point, as regards the circumstances then obtaining, that of Caesar is much more elaborate, recapitulating motifs encountered time and time again throughout Book 1 of the *Civil War*. Be that as it may, the speech indubitably offers insight into how Caesar wished to be seen and provides what is the clearest exposition of his own vision of Pompeius' activity in Hispania in the latter half of the 50s BCE. After a lengthy introduction in which he berates Afranius and Petreius for their stupidity and bad faith and emphasizes his own desire of peace, Caesar sets forth at length what is his sole, unbending condition for peace (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.85.5–12):

> … sed eos exercitus, quos contra se multos iam annos aluerint, velle dimitti. Neque enim VI legiones alia de causa missas in Hispaniam septimamque ibi conscriptam neque tot tantaque auxilia parata neque summissos duces rei militaris peritos. Nihil horum ad pacandas Hispanias, nihil ad usum provinciae provisum quae propter diuturnitatem pacis nullum auxilium desiderarit. Omnia haec iam pridem contra se parari; in se novi generis imperia constitui, ut idem ad portas urbanis praesideat rebus et duas bellicosissimas provincias absens tot annos obtineat; in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur; in se aetatis excusationem nihil valere, quod superioribus bellis probati ad obtinendos exercitus evocentur; in se uno non servari quod sit omnibus datum semper imperatoribus, ut rebus feliciter gestis aut cum honore aliquo aut certe sine ignominia domum revertantur exercitumque dimittant. Quae tamen omnia et se tulisse patienter et esse laturum; neque nunc id agere ut ab illis abductum exercitum teneat ipse, quod tamen sibi difficile non sit, sed ne illi habeant quo contra se uti possint. Proinde, ut esset dictum,

73 Carter 1991: 210, *pace* his claim of improbability regarding the sentiments of Caes. *B Civ.* 1.85.11.

provinciis excederent exercitumque dimitterent; si id sit factum, se nociturum nemini. Hanc unam atque extremam esse pacis condicionem.

… He merely wished that those armies that had now for many years been maintained against him be disbanded. Indeed, for no other reason had six legions been sent to Hispania and a seventh drafted there and numerous, powerful auxiliaries raised and experienced commanders sent out to lead them. None of these things served to pacify the Hispaniae, none of this had to do with the administration of a province that, on account of the length of its peaceful state, had no need of military assistance. All of these things had long been prepared against him. It was against him that new kinds of command had been established, so that the same man might direct affairs in the city (of Rome) from its gates and from a distance command two very warlike provinces for so many years. It was against him that the rights of the magistracies had been changed, so that people were not sent to provinces after praetorship or consulate but only if approved and chosen by a small clique. It was against him that the argument of age was invalidated, for men who had been tested and found good in previous wars were called forth to command armies. It was against him alone that what had always been given to all victorious generals—to return home, after having achieved success, with honour of some sort or at least without disgrace and to disband their army—was not being maintained. Nevertheless, he had patiently endured and would yet endure all of these things. Not even now was he acting so that he might keep for himself an army stolen from those men, which would nevertheless not be difficult for him to do, but so that they might not have an army to use against him. Therefore, as he had said, let them depart from their provinces and disband the army. If that was done, he would harm no one. This was the only and final condition for peace.

Without the disbanding of the army commanded by Pompeius' *legati*, there could be no peace. In making this request, with a view to justifying himself to a contemporary audience, Caesar reveals a great many things. On the one hand, there is the underlying goal of this particular campaign and the paranoia that informed Caesar's decisions.[74] On the other, there is Pompeius' constitutional

74 Cf. Grillo 2012: 85–91, 160–164; Westall 2000: 108–109. It should be added that employment here of the term "paranoia" in no way entails denying the artistic forcefulness of Caesar's

innovation that prefigured the principate of Augustus and Pompeius' imitation of Caesar himself. In the desire to be without peer or equal within the Roman state, Caesar did not dare allow Pompeius to retain an army, for *Realpolitik* considerations showed that it might be used against himself.

Caesar baldly states and then expatiates at length upon the overarching goal informing the Spanish campaign of 49 BCE: the disbanding of the Pompeian army in the Spanish provinces. While this goal receives its most memorable expression in Caesar's speech forming the concluding half of the parley, it can be discerned more than once in the course of the narrative of Book 1. In the wake of his failure to compel Pompeius to capitulate at Brundisium, Caesar abandoned the pursuit of his enemy, for practical considerations intervened. Assembly of the means for crossing the Adriatic would consume valuable time, and, equally significantly, he wished to avoid providing Pompeian commanders in charge of the veteran army and auxiliary forces in Hispania with an opportunity for launching an attack upon Gallia and Italia.[75] Similarly, in explaining to readers why he chose to proceed against M. Varro after his defeat of L. Afranius and M. Petreius, Caesar writes that he had decided not leave the war in Hispania unfinished "even though a great many urgent affairs required his attention in Italia".[76] In fact, in providing details of the preparations made by Varro for an eventual campaign, Caesar begins by focussing readers' attention upon the number of soldiers raised, two legions at full strength and a further 30 cohorts of auxiliaries.[77] Naturally, once Caesar had achieved complete victory, the original goal was of less importance and there is no discernible attempt to disband the legions taken from Varro in Hispania Ulterior.[78]

Even prior to the outbreak of civil war, Caesar and those collaborating with him had proposed a solution whereby both he and Pompeius disbanded their armies. To the dismay of Pompeius and a small clique of Caesar's opponents,

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expression of his case. Indeed, readers will easily call to mind contemporary examples of politicians whose public expressions are susceptible to a similar two-fold analysis.

75 Caes *B Civ*. 1.29.3: *interea veterem exercitum, duas Hispanias confirmari, quarum erat altera maximis beneficiis Pompei devincta, auxilia, equitatum parari, Galliam Italiamque temptari se absente nolebat*. It is to be noted that the reference to *auxilia* in this passage has helped to emend the text of Caes. *B Civ*. 1.85.6.

76 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.18.7: *Caesar etsi multis necessariisque rebus in Italiam revocabatur, tamen constituerat nullam partem belli in Hispaniis relinquere, quod magna esse Pompei beneficia et magnas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat*.

77 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.18.1: *dilectum habuit tota provincia, legionibusque completis duabus cohortis circiter XXX alarias addidit*.

78 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 2.20.8.

C. Curio's advancement of this proposal prior to the expiration of his tenure as tribune of the *plebs* had found overwhelming support in senatorial circles.[79] Caesar repeated this offer in the course of his invasion of Italia, to no effect.[80] Reappearing in his speech delivered before both his own army and that of Afranius and Petreius, it occurs in a logical relationship with another idea less often represented and not altogether accorded the value it merits, that of Pompeius' intention to use the army in Hispania against Caesar.

Obsessions are not necessarily, nor normally, the exclusive realm of society's weaker members and the politically dispossessed. The handbooks are replete with adjectives such as "objective" and "dispassionate logic" when describing the style of Caesar's *commentarii*.[81] Nor can the frequent repetition of a word or short phrase reasonably be said to be unknown to the style deployed by Caesar in the *Gallic War* and the *Civil War*.[82] However, in explaining his desire for the disbanding of Pompeius' army, Caesar repeatedly speaks of actions taken "against himself" and by this stress reveals a paranoia that has been overlooked or viewed only as a rhetorical device. Seven times in as many sentences, Caesar uses the prepositional phrases *contra se* (1.85.5,8,11) and *in se* (1.85.8,9[twice],10) to describe actions that objectively had little or nothing to do with Caesar himself. Despite the *variatio*, this focus upon behaviour supposedly meant to damage Caesar is striking, and hardly convincing. The government of Hispania and its concomitant armies had been entrusted to Pompeius in the mid-50s BCE, well before anyone dreamt of civil war, and changes in the system of appointing provincial governors were effected as a response to long-standing weaknesses inherent in the system bequeathed by Sulla and his generation. Interpreting the whole of recent history solely in terms of his own personal advantage, Caesar presents a highly tendentious narrative that is redolent of paranoia despite its seeming objectivity.[83]

Which is not to affirm that Caesar did not believe in what he relates in this instance. Again, the testimony of Pollio may serve to illuminate and, in

79 Plut. *Caes.* 30.5–6; *Pomp.* 58.7–8; *Ant.* 5.6–7 (on which, see C.B.R. Pelling, "Plutarch's adaptation of his source-material," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 100 (1980) 127–140, in part. 139–140; C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Antony*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 128–129); App. *B Civ.* 2.28.110, 30.119; Cass. Dio 40.62.3–4. Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.9.3.

80 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.9.5.

81 Cf. Carter 1993: 23: "apparent objectivity".

82 Cf. M. von Albrecht, *Meister römischer Prosa von Cato bis Apuleius. Interpretationen*, (Stiehm: Heidelberg 1971), one of the most brilliant and sensible treatments to issue from the twentieth century.

83 Cf. K. Raaflaub, "Caesar und die Friedensverhandlungen zu Beginn des Bürgerkrieges von

this instance, to confirm. There were those who reported that Caesar had initiated the civil war out of a fear of being destroyed by his enemies through prosecution in the courts; the recent, lugubrious instance of T. Annius Milo was cited in support of this thesis. That Pompeius Magnus as solitary consul had introduced soldiers into the city of Rome so as to create the calm necessary for that trial and condemnation added weight to this rumour. In support of this thesis of probable judicial persecution, Pollio recorded in the *Historiae* the words that Caesar had uttered when gazing upon the carnage of the battlefield (Suet. *Iul.* 30.4):

> Hoc voluerunt; tantis rebus gestis Gaius Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem.
>
> They wished for this. Despite my innumerable accomplishments, I, Gaius Caesar would have been found guilty in the courts if I had not sought assistance from my army.

One of those Italian elite who viewed Caesar's cause as the lesser of two evils, Pollio served as an officer in Caesar's army and, as fate would have it, participated in the battle of Pharsalus.[84] Present as a member of the general's staff, he merits credence when attesting to Caesar's fear of ruin in the courts at Rome. Whether well founded or not, this fear is yet another expression of that paranoia emerging from Caesar's own narrative of the Spanish campaign.

Constitutional innovation indubitably transpired under Pompeius, however, despite the doubts that must be entertained as regards Caesar's interpretation of its primary aim. Caesar's value, rather, lies in the fact that he offers contemporary documentation for the changes that took place. Indeed, were it not for

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49 v. Chr.," *Chiron* 5 (1975) 247–300, with the evocative title of "Der Sieg des Mißtrauens" appropriately enough given to this author's revisionist analysis of the peace-talks and overtures mades in the first months of 49 BCE.

84 M. Gelzer, "Die drei Briefe des C. Asinius Pollio," *Chiron* 2 (1972) 297–312, for an analysis of Pollio's cool appraisal of the political situation. Naturally, memories of the Social War and the wrongs real or imagined that were suffered at that time also influenced political alignments in the 40s BCE. As for Pollio's presence at Pharsalus and his attesting to Caesar's statement, cf. Plut. *Caes.* 46.1–2. Most recently in support of the authenticity of Pollio's report on Caesar's words at the sight of the dead on the battlefield of Pharsalus, see G.R. Stanton, "Why did Caesar cross the Rubicon?" *Historia* 52 (2003) 67–94, here 68–69. For a list of the more prominent of the modern sceptics, on the other hand, see Stanton 2003: 70 n. 11.

Caesar's partisan and highly tendentious references, knowledge of these far-reaching innovations would be little better than the outline of a shadow.

Pompeius' administration of the Spanish provinces while residing at or near Rome was revolutionary, but a natural and logical development of the institution of *legati* as it existed in the late Republic.[85] Caesar, for instance, had regularly left his *legati*, foremost amongst whom figured the unduly ambitious T. Labienus, in charge of legions beyond the Alps while he himself passed the winter in Gallia Cisalpina.[86] Similarly, Pompeius had temporarily quelled the nuisance of piracy through a campaign in which he was allowed by law to deploy *legati* throughout the whole of the Mediterranean basin. Operating far afield from their commanding general, these 24 *legati* obtained a signal success for Pompeius within the brief space of three months in 67 BCE.[87] Within such a context, the only thing that was particularly new was Pompeius' decision never to set forth for Hispania. Excuses were not lacking, but the continued residence of a provincial governor at or near Rome was manifestly irregular and novel.[88] This behaviour foreshadows perfectly one of the pilasters of the principate of Augustus and has more immediate echoes in the civil war dispositions of Caesar himself and the Second Triumvirate.

No less revolutionary was Pompeius' legislation enacted in 52 BCE in an attempt to rupture the insidious nexus that had arisen between election to political office at Rome and subsequent service abroad within the administra-

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85 For a thorough overview of the subject, see B. Schleussner, *Die Legaten der römischen Republik. Decem legati und ständige Hilfsgesandte*, (Vestigia, 26), (C.H. Beck: München 1978).

86 M.-W. Schulz, *Caesar und Labienus. Geschichte einer tödlichen Kameradschaft. Caesars Karriere als Feldherr im Spiegel der Kommentarien sowie bei Cassius Dio, Appianus und Lucanus*, (Spudasmata, Bd. 131), (G. Olms: Hildesheim 2010), a timely but inordinately lengthy contribution upon a subject of great interest. Those intending to write books upon history might do well to watch M. Gorbachev's farewell speech as president of the USSR, or to read the introduction to O. Maenchen-Helfen's book on the Huns. Alternatively, they may wish to consult the original: A. France, *Les opinions de M. Jérôme Coignard*, (Les Cent Bibliophiles: Paris 1914), 171–176.

87 M. Gelzer, *Pompeius. Lebensbild eines Römers*. Introduction and updated bibliography by E. Herrmann-Otto. (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2005), 70–79; for the number, see M. Gelzer, *Kleine Schriften*, eds. H. Strasburger and C. Meier. 3 vols. (Franz Steiner: Wiesbaden 1962), 2.180 and 196.

88 Readers will recall that Pompeius' youthful wife Julia suffered a miscarriage in 55 BCE and yet another, with fatal consequences in the following year. Moreover, Pompeius himself, as emerges from the scene at Naples at the decade's end, would seem not to have enjoyed the best of health as he advanced into old age.

tion of Empire.[89] Democracy meant electoral competition, and demographic growth augmented sensibly the vigour with which that competition was prosecuted.[90] All means were utilized, albeit not all equally legitimate. The last decade of the Republic is rife with charges and counter-charges of bribery and electoral fraud, perhaps the most striking instance being afforded by the fact that all four consular candidates for 54 BCE were disbarred for activity of this sort.[91] Since successful candidates for office at Rome expected to recoup their financial losses through lucrative provincial commands immediately after their year of domestic service, Pompeius attempted to put a hault to this vicious cycle by means of a temporal delay between domestic office and promagisterial service. An interval of 5 years would have proved devastating for those aspiring governors with significant levels of debt and in theory should have discouraged the behaviour typical of elections and enjoying a crescendo over the last few decades.[92] In short, Pompeius wished to outlaw precisely that behaviour which had brought Caesar and himself to the pinnacle of success. For that reason, in fact, did this excellent law survive the shipwreck of state that followed soon thereafter.

Frequently, there is the odd phrase or concept from Caesar's narrative that reappears within the declarations and constitutional disposition of the principate of Augustus, suggesting that Caesar's heir had read his adoptive father's account of civil war with attention. Both the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* of 52 BCE and Pompeius' enjoyment of proconsular *imperium* in the latter half of the 50s while residing in central Italia are but two conspicuous instances. It is impossible to prove that Augustus was influenced by a reading of Caesar's *Civil War*, but the work's content was relevant to his own situation.[93] Indeed, in all likeli-

89 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.85.9; Cic. *Att.* 8.3.3; Cass. Dio 40.56 (cf. 40.46); G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani. Elenco cronologico con una introduzione sull'attività legislativa dei comizi romani*, (Società Editrice Libraria: Milano 1912), 411–412.

90 For the democratic element in the Roman constitution at the end of the Republic, see F.G.B. Millar, *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic*, (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1998).

91 E.S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1974), far too sanguine about the prospects for survival of the free state.

92 For the issue of debt, see now M. Ioannatou, *Affaires d'argent dans la correspondance de Cicéron. L'aristocratie sénatoriale face à ses dettes*, (Romanité et modernité du droit), (De Boccard: Paris 2006), 376–377, on the significance of provincial revenues.

93 Despite its commendable breadth of vision as regards the ancient sources and excellent review of the modern literature, or perhaps for that very reason, the commentary of *RGDA* by A.E. Cooley, *Res gestae divi Augusti. Text, translation and commentary*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2009) suffers from a fundamental oversight of this particular

hood published in 43–42 BCE, the *commentarii* of Caesar will have contributed to Augustus' political fortune and offered a blueprint for the future.[94] Moreover, both a rhetorical education and his status as Caesar's heir should have rendered him disposed to reflect carefully upon Caesar's critique of the system of government that his opponent had slowly been implementing. What is distasteful in another might be pleasing if enjoyed by oneself.

Indeed, it is possible to discern aspects in which Pompeius' administration of Hispania was done in imitation of the model that Caesar himself had furnished in recent years. Caesar sarcastically describes the two provinces of Hispania Citerior and Hispana Ulterior as *bellicosissimae provinciae* (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.85.8).[95] However, the description is in all likelihood derived from the language employed to justify the attribution of six legions to Pompeius for the administration of these two provinces (with a seventh raised within Hispania).[96] When Cn. Pompeius Magnus and M. Licinius Crassus received extraordinary provincial commands in 55 BCE, the model was indubitably that afforded by Caesar's

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aspect. Only one passage from the *Bellum Civile* is cited, and then in rather oblique fashion. Certainly, Caesar should have been far more important to Octavian than was Cicero, despite the young man's flattering words to the elderly statesman. Upon cool reflection, it is the figure of Caesar that must lurk behind the proud assertion of conquest made at *RGDA* 26.2.

94 For the date of publication, see Hirt. *B Gall.* 8 praef. If the authenticity of the letter be accepted, then it would appear that the *corpus Caesarianum* was published as a complete entity at a moment subsequent to the assassination of Caesar. Further precision is to be had from the fact that Hirtius indicates that he had been slow to take up this difficult task. Publication in the latter half of 44 BCE or early in 43 BCE (prior to Hirtius' death) seems indicated. But for the fact that he receives little mention in what survives, it might be argued that conceivably the enigmatic and unjustly overlooked Q. Pedius (*cos. suff.* 43) contributed to the composition. At any rate, the letter of Hirtius to Balbus suggests not only an atmosphere of extreme unrest in Rome, but also that publication of the *Corpus Caesarianum* ought to be understand as an attempt to restore social cohesion to the Caesarians *vis-à-vis* the so-called *Pompeiani*.

95 Carter 1991: 211–212, quite rightly points to the contrast with *diuturnitas pacis* in the preceding sentence.

96 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.85.6; Brunt 1971: 473. Cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 52.4, where it may be suspected that the "4" legions reported is due to a corruption or misreading of "VI" in the text of Caesar available to Plutarch. Perhaps not irrelevant is the corruption that can be demonstrated as having occurred at Caes. *B Civ.* 1.23.4: *iis* (or *his*) *viris* rather than *IIIIviris*. For the various manuscript readings, see now Damon 2015A: 16. The fact that there is a discernible variation between *his* and *iis* (not only here, but throughout the *Bellum Civile*) is a sign that the corruption is ancient. In any case, Plutarch's claim that Africa also fell within Pompeius' *provincia* under the plebiscite of Trebonius in 55 BCE is groundless.

own extraordinary command fashioned in 59 BCE.[97] Both men were superbly wealthy and had already provided more than sufficient demonstration of ability to achieve military victories. By all reasonable expectations, they should have passed their remaining years between offering advice as senior statesmen and the luxury of *otium* in central Italia.[98] Only the unexpected, spectacular successes achieved by Caesar to the north of the Alps drove them to come out of that semi-retirement typical of the late Republic. Seeking to acquire further wealth and fame by the reduction of the northwestern portion of the Iberian peninsula, which yet enjoyed barbaric independence despite a long-standing Roman presence, Pompeius capitalized upon his past links forged in the 70s BCE, at the time of his campaigning against the insurrection led by Q. Sertorius.[99] To expedite their conquest of the remaining reserves of liberty in the Iberian peninsula, L. Afranius and M. Petreius had divided Celtiberia, Cantabria, and Lusitania between themselves and had campaigned in Pompeius' name in those regions until civil war provoked a change of policy.[100]

However, from his absence and conduct of the war through surrogates, it would seem that Pompeius pursued this goal only half-heartedly. At any rate, he had not accomplished the reduction of the last embers of independence, even after five years of government. That accomplishment, like much else, would have to await the concerted effort made by Augustus and his collaborators in the mid-20s BCE.

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97 Cf. R.T. Ridley, "The Extraordinary Commands of the Late Republic: A Matter of Definition," *Historia* 30 (1981) 280–297.

98 Indicative of the *mentalité* of the epoch is Cicero's vision of *otium* in Cicero: C. Wirszubski, "Cicero's *Cum Dignitate Otium*: A Reconsideration," *Journal of Roman Studies* 44 (1954) 1–13; cf. P. Boyancé, "*Cum Dignitate Otium*," *REA* 43 (1948) 5–22 = *Études sur l'humanisme cicéronien* (Bruxelles 1970) 114–134; P.A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1988), 56–68 (§ vii of "The fall of the Roman Republic"). Albeit somewhat older, their contemporary Lucullus affords an excellent of how they might have been expected to behave, retirement with honour and in splendid isolation.

99 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.29.3, 61.3; 2.18.7. These *clientelae* form the subject of the next and last section of the present chapter.

100 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.38.1, where textual emendation is necessary, but easily achieved to universal agreement. For clarification, cf. 1.38.3: *equites auxiliaque toti Lusitaniae a Petreio, Celtiberiae, Cantabris barbarisque omnibus qui ad Oceanum pertinent ab Afranio imperantur*. Perhaps they were inspired by Caesar's exploits in the region in the late 60s, for which see J. Osgood, "Julius Caesar and Spanish Triumph-Hunting," 149–162, in: C.H. Lange and F.J. Vervaet (eds.), *The Roman Republican Triumph Beyond the Spectacle*, (*Analecta Romana Instituti Danici*, Suppl. 45), (Edizioni Quasar: Roma 2014).

4 The Significance of *Clientelae*

Not surprisingly there were many vestiges of Archaic culture to survive into the late Republic. The poetry of Anacreon is one, the phenomenon of *clientelae* another. That is a fact often overlooked by those who would assume the paramount importance of *clientelae* through the late Republic and on into the Principate.[101] The social conditions that had called *clientelae* into being and allowed them to flourish had altered radically and irremediably with the acquisition of Empire in the late third and second centuries BCE. Introduction of the secret ballot and an unprecedented influx of wealth had wreaked havoc with this long-standing institution, in effect rendering it a fossil.[102] Less than a hand-

101 Foremost exponents of the fundamental importance of *clientelae* include: M. Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik*, (B.G. Teubner: Leipzig 1912); E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.)*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1958); R. Saller, *Personal patronage under the early Empire*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1982). Of the contrary opinion are: P.A. Brunt, "*Clientela*," 382–442, in: P.A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1988), in part. 382–419; N. Rouland, *Pouvoir politique et dépendance personnelle dans l'antiquité romaine. Genèse et rôle des rapports de clientèle*, (Collection Latomus, 166), (Latomus: Bruxelles 1979); Millar 1998. Those engaged in study of the literature seem unaware of this counter-tendency, perhaps because artists normally need patrons if they are to have the leisure for pursuit of their activities. For a carefully nuanced discussion of the exchange occurring between poets and their protectors, see P. White, *Promised Verse. Poets in the society of Augustan Rome*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1993), 14–27; cf. K. Verboven, *The Economy of Friends. Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late Republic*, (Collection Latomus, 269), (Latomus: Bruxelles 2002), 333. In marked contrast to Horace and Vergil, individuals such as Caesar and Asinius Pollio were rare in possessing both wealth and talent. For a revealing attempt to make sense of the economic position of the former, see White 1993: 12.

102 For the secret ballot, see L.R. Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar*, (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1966); A. Yakobson, *Elections and electioneering in Rome. A study in the political system of the late Republic*, (Historia Einzelschriften, 128), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1999), 124–147. Cf. R. Rilinger, *Der Einfluss des Wahlleiters bei den römischen Konsulwahlen von 366 bis 50 v. Chr.* (Vestigia, 24), (C.H. Beck: München 1976), 170–173, claiming that statistical study does not reveal any sensible influence exerted by those who oversaw elections (*Wahlleiter*). From the apparent failure to differentiate sub-periods within the overall timespan being studied, there is serious methodological doubt as to the value of this study's conclusions. Rather, as a result of the elite's inability to verify how people voted, the influence exerted by the elite must of necessity have been considerably diminished. As regards wealth, perhaps best remains the unimaginative and in some ways ingenuous survey of T. Frank (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*. 6 vols. (Johns Hopkins: Baltimore 1933–1940).

ful of references are made to *clientelae* by Caesar, and other ancient literature for the period is hardly any better. Indeed, in flat contradiction of many modern reconstructions, it emerges from the Ciceronian handbook to electioneering that *clientelae* constituted a relatively minor means of amassing votes.[103] Times had changed, and this Archaic institution no longer responded adequately as a means of influencing political life at Rome, where democracy and electoral corruption thrived in association.

Contrary to what the prevalent theory would suggest, Caesar only infrequently mentions *clientelae* in the course of his narrative of the events of 49–48 BCE, and then within the context of provincial government.[104] Strikingly, there is no trace whatsoever of Roman *clientes* in this narrative, even though there was ample opportunity for their mention. Equally remarkable, and contrary to the evidence of another source, Caesar has nothing to say about his own *clientelae* within Hispania Ulterior. As usual the focus is exclusively upon Pompeius, in this instance his ability to rely upon extensive *clientelae* for the prosecution of civil war. Caesar's presentation is decidedly partisan, but no less illuminating.

To be precise, only once does Caesar specifically mention the existence of Pompeius' *clientelae* in Hispania Citerior. Explaining to readers the reason why he proceeded to campaign against M. Varro in Hispania Ulterior despite the manifestly negligible threat that Varro posed in and of himself, Caesar writes (Caes. *B Civ.* 2.18.7):

> Caesar etsi multis necessariisque rebus in Italiam revocabatur, tamen constituerat nullam partem belli in Hispaniis relinquere, quod magna esse Pompei beneficia et magnas clientelas in citeriore provincia sciebat.
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> Even though Caesar was summoned back to Italia by many urgent affairs, he had nonetheless decided not to leave any part of the war in the His-

103 *Com. pet.* 17. It is to be remarked that this author implicitly draws a linguistic distinction between *clientes* and *amici*, with the latter group far broader in political terms than was usual in daily life and tantamount to the use of the former made only by modern scholars. In short, the modern reprisal of the term "client" is an improper and misleading deployment of an ancient category.

104 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.29.3, 61.3; 2.18.7; cf. 1.60.1–2. cf. M. Gelzer, *The Roman Nobility*, tr. R. Seager (Blackwell: Oxford 1969), 96; P.A. Brunt, "*Clientela*," 382–442, in: P.A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1988), here in part. 393. For *clientelae* in the Hispaniae, see also Cass. Dio 43.30.1; 45.10.1; App. *B Civ.* 5.143; cf. *BHisp.* 42, for failure to produce the desired results.

paniae unfinished, because he knew that Pompeius had conferred great benefits and had great *clientelae* in Hispania Citerior.

There was the risk that Afranius and Petreius and the forces so recently defeated in Hispania Citerior might again take the field against Caesar, should Varro be left free to foment trouble in the neighbouring province. In the breach, this judgement proved acute. While Caesar was absent concluding his Spanish campaign with Varro's surrender, Afranius and Petreius did in fact manage to salvage some cohorts from disbanding at the river Varus, so as to make their way to Pompeius' camp in Macedonia.[105] The existence of individuals and communities well disposed to Pompeius had made it imperative that Caesar take steps to render innocuous the veteran armies within the Spanish provinces.

It is to be observed that Caesar never once suggests that the *clientelae* of Pompeius might of their own volition take an active role. Rather, as in the above passage, so in the three other instances in which they are obliquely mentioned, the Spanish *clientelae* are represented as performing a subsidiary role when called upon to do so. This was in accordance with the exercise of Roman dominion and a certain distrust of provincials. Bound by past services (*beneficia*) that Pompeius had performed for them, the communities of Hispania Citerior were subject to an ethical imperative to take action if requested to do so, or if some member of the local elite were so unwise as to seek out trouble in the hope of future reward and advancement.[106] Theirs was essentially a passive role, that of providing materials and men when asked to do so; no sanctions other than brute military force might be invoked, however, if they failed to meet their ethical obligation to afford succour to a patron. Moreover, while

105 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.88.3: *Ciliciensis legio coniuncta cum cohortibus Hispanis, quas traductas ab Afranio docuimus, in dextro cornu erant conlocatae*. There is a distinct problem with use of the verb *docuimus*: either something has fallen out of the text, despite the seemingly complete closure of Book 1 and the lack of anything relevant in Books 2 or 3 (Carter 1993: 210–211; Kraner, Hofmann, and Meusel 1959[12]: 271; P. Fabre, *Jules César: La guerre civile*, 2 vols. (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1936), 81 n. 4), or this is an instance of an unfulfilled authorial promise (Fabre 1936: 81 n. 4), or else this is a case of confusion between the literary *commentarii* that have survived and the original work that has not. This third alternative seems most promising.

106 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.80.3, where it would appear that we are witness to a failed attempt at the creation of the bond of *clientela*. Despite the allusiveness and rhetorical, almost panegyrical quality inherent in adjectives such as *comes* and *socius*, the passage suggests that Androsthenes was seeking to become a *cliens* of Pompeius Magnus.

soldiers might be at stake, as is revealed by the case of the cohort Illurgavonensis that changed camp upon learning that their community had chosen to side with Caesar, there is no visibly consistent nexus between *clientela* and military service.[107] Such a secondary role is congruent with Caesar himself stressing the fact that the legions commanded by Pompeius' *legati* were long inured to combat and for that reason constituted a far from negligible threat to his rear.[108]

The relative infrequency with which *clientelae* are mentioned by Caesar is striking, but no less so is the fact that those few occurrences involve provincials or allies.[109] Yet, that should occasion no surprise, for the provincials did not enjoy the same rights as Roman citizens and social relations at the margins of Empire might reasonably be expected to have evolved more slowly than those at the centre.[110] As is well illustrated by the Sicilian communities that turned to Cicero when seeking judicial redress against the extortionate government of C. Verres, individuals and communities in the provinces had need of someone to protect and further their interests at Rome.[111] The "social contract" of *clientela* might eventually translate into practical benefits for the Roman patron, but such social capital was extremely uncertain and could hardly be viewed as on a par with money or other, material forms of wealth.[112] Moreover, as is demonstrated by the decision taken by the Massiliotes to support L. Domitius

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107 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.60.4.

108 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.29.3; see discussion in preceding section.

109 The relative infrequency of the terms *cliens*/*clientela* has been remarked by scholars dealing with the period (e.g. E. Deniaux, *Clientèles et pouvoir à l'époque de Cicéron*, (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 182), (École française de Rome: Roma 1993), 4–6, 189–190), but often considered no obstacle to a theory of pervasive influence exerted by patron-client relationships.

110 It may be instructive to compare the slower evolution of another social institution, language, in marginal situations.

111 Cic. *Div. Caec*. 11: *me defensorem calamitatum suarum, me ultorem iniuriarum, me cognitorem iuris sui, me actorem causae totius esse voluerunt*. For application of the term *patronus* within the juridical sphere, see J.-M. David, *Le patronat judiciaire au dernier siècle de la République romaine*. (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 277), (École française de Rome: Roma 1992), 49–119, which time and time again makes use of the rich dossier regarding Cicero's pleading the case for the Sicilians against Verres.

112 Hence, Pompeius' decision to remain in the Hellenistic East preparing his forces for an expedition against Italia as of spring 48 BCE. Pompeius liked to boast that he reckoned kings amongst his *clientes* (Cic. *Fam*. 9.9), but the financial resources of Macedonia, Asia, and Syria were certainly a more important factor in his decision of theatre for preparations. Rumours of his passage to Hispania, on the other hand, reveal a naive faith in armies and *clientelae*.

Ahenobarbus rather than declaring themselves for either Pompeius Magnus or Caesar, legal considerations might easily override any sense of debt for services rendered in the past.[113]

On another note, it is to be remarked that, with the sole exception of this instance concerning Massilia and Caesar's failure despite his past good offices as that community's patron, Caesar is altogether silent regarding himself. Contemporaries would likely have been aware that he had cultivated good relations, acquiring *clientelae* amongst the Gaditanes and other communities during his time as quaestor and then proconsul in Hispania Ulterior.[114] There is no doubt that Caesar himself had Spanish *clientelae*. However, the overall effect of this silence is to encourage readers to forget the numerous provincials well disposed to assist Caesar.[115] Unencumbered in the narrative by the social structures that helped to make it possible, Caesar's eventual success in this way emerges as dependent upon his personal intervention and ability to undertake swift and firm action, dramatically in contrast with the overwhelming forces of his enemies. The omission is not accidental, but rather a matter of style and taste, and literary artistry.

Lesser authors, by contrast, lay emphasis upon *clientelae* when speaking of the relations of Caesar and Pompeius with the provincials in Hispania. Purporting to relate a speech delivered at Hispalis by Caesar in the wake of death of the younger Cn. Pompeius, the anonymous author of the *Spanish War* stresses the attentions that Caesar had showered upon the communities of Hispania Ulterior over the years[116] (*BHisp*. 42.1–3):

> [1]... initio quaesturae suae eam provinciam ex omnibus provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse et quae potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse; [2]insequente praetura ampliato honore vectigalia quae Metellus imposuisset a senatu petisse et ea pecunia provinciam liberasse simulque

113 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.35.3–36.1.

114 The Gaditanes will have been essential to the success of Caesar's military projects for the northwestern portion of the Iberian peninsula, for which see now J. Osgood, "Julius Caesar and Spanish Triumph-Hunting," *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici* suppl. 45 (2014) 149–162.

115 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.61.3, seemingly at odds with claims to military success in 62–61 BCE.

116 For the unknown author of the *Bellum Hispaniense*, see N. Diouron, ed., *Pseudo-César: Guerre d'Espagne*, (Paris 1999) xi, xiv–xvii. As emerges from a detailed, comprehensive discussion of the author's style (Diouron 1999: lxx–lxxxiii; cf. G. Pascucci, ed., [*C. Iulii Caesaris*]*: Bellum Hispaniense* [Le Monnier: Firenze 1965] 24–26), he was in all likelihood a low-ranking officer or common soldier of the *X. Legio*. A citation or two from the work of Ennius do not suffice to create an elevated style.

> patrocinio suscepto multis legationibus ab se in senatum inductis simul publicis privatisque causis multorum inimicitiis susceptis defendisse; [3]suo item in consulatu absentem quae potuisset commoda provinciae tribuisse.
>
> [A]t the beginning of his quaestorship, he had decided to make that province above all others especially attached to himself. He had bestowed upon it those benefits that he could at that time. Subsequently, with greater status as praetor, he had asked and obtained from the Senate that the taxes imposed by Metellus be lifted and had freed the province from that impost. At the same time, upon accepting to act as patron, he had defended the province by personally introducing many embassies to the Senate and he had defended it in many cases of public and private law, thereby incurring feuds. Likewise, in his consulate, although absent, he gave to the province those benefits that he could.

Notwithstanding the lack of detail as to the benefits that Caesar had given to the provincials, there emerges a clear image of the relationship between a senator's activities when abroad and when once again in Rome. The senator eager to create a social and economic basis for power at Rome attended to the needs of the provincial elite who turned to him for assistance, as in the removal of the taxes that had been imposed by Metellus Pius by way of punishment in the 70s BCE.[117] Naturally, it was expected that the provincial elite would reciprocate for these services by testimonials and with money when their patron found himself in need.[118] At any rate, as is forcefully remarked in the sequel, it was not to be expected that they would aid and abet Pompeius Magnus' sons, who were at that time the declared enemies of Caesar and hence of the Roman state.[119]

Similarly, in earlier addressing the younger Cn. Pompeius Magnus in 46 with a view to persuading him to go to Hispania so as to carry on the struggle against

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117 Cf. *MRR* 2.83, 86; more generally *RE* 3.1 (1897) 1221–1224 s.v. "Caecilius Nr. 98" (F. Münzer).

118 Cf. Cic. *Flacc.* 25/61. Incidentally, it is to be remarked that there is no known attempt to have Caesar put on trial for malfeasance during his time as governor of Hispania Ulterior. On the other hand, as in the case of irregularities during his consulate, that may have been yet another reason for his desire to achieve a career that guaranteed ongoing immunity from prosecution: Suet. *Iul.* 30.3–4, citing not only Pollio, but also other, hostile sources, or so it would seem.

119 *BHisp*. 42.4–5. The identification of Caesar with the Roman state seems a guarantee of historical veracity.

Caesar there, M. Porcius Cato is represented as having stressed the advantages that the son enjoyed over the father, whose career had also commenced amid civil war.[120] Through the more dramatic medium of direct speech, Cato can be heard giving counsel to his younger contemporary (*BAfr*. 22.4–5):

> [4]Atque ille non ita amplis rebus patris gestis neque tam excellenti dignitate maiorum parta neque tantis clientelis nominisque claritate praeditus in rem publicam est ingressus. [5]Tu contra et patris nobilitate et dignitate et per te ipse satis animi magnitudine diligentiaque praeditus nonne eniteris et proficisceris ad paternas clientelas auxilium tibi reique publicae atque optimo cuique efflagitatum?
>
> That man, moreover, did not enter upon public life with such great and numerous deeds having been accomplished by his father, with so outstanding a status having been achieved by his elders, possessed of so many *clientelae* and a brilliant name. You, on the other hand, enjoy your father's renown and status and in and of yourself are sufficiently endowed with greatness and application. Will you not make an attempt and set forth for your father's *clientelae* so as to demand aid for yourself, for the state, and for every honourable man?

The stress upon the *clientelae* that might provide assistance is resounding, with an injunction to make use of the social capital accumulated by Pompeius Magnus to the salvation of every honourable man. The precise location of these "very numerous" *clientelae* eludes certainty. The dismal sequel with adventure in Mauretania and retreat to the Balearic islands is suggestive of mere incompetence.[121] However, echoing Caesar's language of *magnae clientelae* in Hispania Citerior, the speech does reveal how Romans viewed the provincials at moments of civil war.[122]

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120 Fortunately, the *Bellum Africum* is no longer attributed to Asinius Pollio. Awareness of this work's stylistic infelicities is greater, thanks to lexical studies of the past century.

121 Cf. M. Hadas, *Sextus Pompey*, (Columbia University Press: New York 1930), 42, 44–45. As regards Pompeius' *clientelae* in north Africa, see M. Coltelloni-Trannoy, *Le royaume de Maurétanie sous Juba II et Ptolomée: 25 av. J.-C.–40 ap. J.-C.* (Etudes d'antiquités africaines, 29), (CNRS: Paris 1997), 59–82; F. Bertrandy, "L'aide militaire de Juba Ier aux Pompéiens pendant la guerre civile en Afrique du Nord (50–46 avant J.-C.)," 289–297, in: *Actes du IVe colloque international sur l'histoire et l'archéologie de l'Afrique du Nord. Tome 2: L'armée et les affaires militaires*, (CTHS: Strasbourg 1988), 289–297.

122 For the influence allegedly exercised by Cato over the sons of Pompeius, see K. Welch,

Writing in an even more forceful vein and at a distance of more than a century from the event, Velleius Paterculus alludes to the adventurous inception of Pompeius Magnus' political career. Furnishing what seems irrefutable proof of the role that *clientelae* might play in determining Roman citizens' choices in domestic politics, he refers in passing to the army that Pompeius raised in Picenum in 83 BCE (Vell. 2.29.1):

> Sub adventum in Italiam L. Sullae Cn. Pompeius, eius Cn. Pompei filius, quem magnificentissimas res in consulatu gessisse bello Marsico praediximus, tris et viginti annos natus, abhinc annos centum et tredecim privatis ut opibus, ita consiliis magna ausus magnificeque conata executus, ad vindicandam restituendamque dignitatem patriae firmum ex agro Piceno, qui totus paternis eius clientelis refertus erat, contraxit exercitum.

> Shortly prior to the arrival of L. Sulla in Italia, Cn. Pompeius—the son of that Cn. Pompeius whom we have already had occasion to mention for the very splendid achievements performed during the Marsic war in the course of his consulate—at the age of twenty-three—113 years ago—with his own resources and on his own initiative dared great things and magnificently carried out what he attempted. To avenge and restore the honour of his country he assembled from the Picene territory a solid army, which was completely made up of the dependants of his father.

The temptation to rewrite the remote past in terms of that more recent is strong if not inevitable, and there are echoes here of both Caesar and Augustus, or so it would seem. The themes of vindication, honour, paternal resources, and youthful political engagement had enjoyed a fruitful afterlife.[123] Moreover,

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Magnus Pius. Sextus Pompeius and the transformation of the Roman Republic (Classical Press of Wales: Swansea 2012), 95–98. As recognized by Welch, the figure of Cato was more potent in death than the actual individual had been in life, and the debate that had been played out between Cicero and Caesar in their pamphlets was revived afresh in the period following the Caesar's death by tyrannicide. For Cato, see now K. Morell, *Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire* (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2017), notice of which I owe to the kind communications of the author and her former advisor.

123 For Augustus' imitation of Pompeius, see Cooley 2009: 33. Unfortunately, imitation is all to likely to have changed the perspective of Pompeius' own achievement, but that is a subject that remains to be investigated.

there exists a universal tendency towards memory's consumption, with well-defined contours and details disappearing at the passage of time.[124] That the *clientelae* of Pompeius were extensive in Picenum is beyond doubt, but there seems to be an elision of *clientelae* with the army that his father had formerly commanded. Veterans were not automatically *clientes*, in the free Republic.

Although writing subsequent to Velleius, Plutarch dilates upon this particular moment, thereby preserving crucial details that cast doubt upon Velleius easy narrative. Relying upon sources such as Posidonius and Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch preserves a more nuanced historical vision of Pompeius' creation of an army in Picenum in 83 BCE[125] (Plut. *Pomp.* 6.5–6):

> ἐκ τούτου Πομπήϊος ἔτη μὲν τρία καὶ εἴκοσι γεγονώς, ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀποδεδειγμένος στρατηγός, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῶι δοὺς τὸ ἄρχειν, ἐν Αὐξίμωι, πόλει μεγάληι, βῆμα θεὶς ἐν ἀγορᾶι, καὶ τοὺς πρωτεύοντας αὐτῶν ἀδελφοὺς δύο Οὐεντιδίους ὑπὲρ Κάρβωνος ἀντιπράττοντας διατάγματι μεταστῆναι τῆς πόλεως κελεύσας, στρατιώτας κατέλεγε, καὶ λοχαγοὺς καὶ ταξιάρχους κατὰ κόσμον ἀποδείξας ἑκάστοις τὰς κύκλωι πόλεις ἐπῄει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιῶν. ἐξανισταμένων δὲ καὶ ὑποχωρούντων ὅσοι τὰ Κάρβωνος ἐφρόνουν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀσμένως ἐπιδιδόντων αὐτούς, οὕτω κατανείμας ἐν ὀλίγωι χρόνωι τρία τάγματα τέλεια, καὶ τροφὴν πορίσας καὶ σκευαγωγὰ καὶ ἁμάξας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν παρασκευήν …
>
> Subsequently, despite the fact that he was 23 years old and had not been elected a general by the people, Pompeius appropriated the power of command for himself and set up a tribunal in the forum of Auximum, a populous city. There, he ordered by decree that the city's leading citizens, the two Ventidii brothers, cease their actions on behalf of Carbo and abandon the city. He levied soldiers, and provided them with tribunes, and centurions according to custom. Then he proceeded to make the rounds of the cities and to do the same thing there. All of those favouring Carbo were driven away and retreated, whereas the rest gladly adhered to his cause. Consequently, he quickly raised three legions and provided them with victualment, transport and waggons, and every other sort of equipment.

124 As with language, so memory too is a cultural artefact and thus subject to consumption. See the essay upon the heliotrope.

125 For the sequel, see Plut. *Pomp.* 7; Diod. 38/39.9.

Even though Plutarch had previously mentioned both the fact of Pompeius' estates and the good-will that the Picene communities felt towards him,[126] this narrative clearly depicts Pompeius as creating an army through his usurpation of the machinery of the Roman state. The son of a former consul (Cn. Pompeius Strabo, *cos.* 89 BCE), Pompeius had witnessed the levying of armies and did so at this time upon his own cognizance.[127] Three legions came together not as a result of voluntary adherence to a patron's call, something that would be most singular in the annals of the late Republic,[128] but through compulsion exercised by a self-appointed representative of the Roman state.

Paradoxically, this episode, the best evidence for the importance of *clientelae* in the late Republic, proves to be a chimera, whereas the other instances examined above are in fact demonstrations of the ineffectual nature of *clientelae*. While *clientelae* might translate into material assistance, that was not a foregone conclusion. Had this social institution exerted the power that is attributed to it, then Pompeius Magnus would surely have made his way to Hispania rather than remaining in the East to marshal his forces for another year's campaign. More astute than Sertorius or either of his own sons, Pompeius Magnus recognized the primary importance of money for the constitution and maintenance of armies.[129] Hispania had a role to play, since it produced most of the raw metals used to create coin within the Italian peninsula, but Pompeius knew that the

126 Plut. *Pomp.* 6.1: ἔχων μὲν αὐτόθι καὶ χωρία, τὸ δὲ πλέον ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡδόμενος. Curiously, if one believes in the overwhelming influence of *clientelae* as regards political decisions, Plutarch does not indicate any connection whatsoever between the possession of estates in that region and the cities' good-will towards the youthful Pompeius Magnus. In imitation, it seems wisest to distinguish between civic life and economic decisions as regards the weight of *clientelae*, just as may be observed in contemporary Italy. Time-serving collaboration and partisan activity are not one and the same thing.

127 Cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 3; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 28; Vell. 2.29.5; Tac. *Ann.* 13.6, for evidence of his earlier involvement in military campaigns.

128 For an earlier age there is the example offered by the Fabii and their *clientes*, who perished *en masse* at the battle of the Cremera, see T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome. Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC)*, (London 1996) 311, with further bibliography at 459 n. 46. See most recently for intriguing observations on the similarities between the figures of the sole survivor of the battle of the Cremera (Q. Fabius Vibulanus) and the hero of Hannibalic war (Q. Fabius Verrocosus Cunctator): J.H. Richardson, *The Fabii and the Gauls. Studies in historical thought and historiography in Republican Rome*, (Historia Einzelschriften, 222), (Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart 2012), 81–83.

129 So too, it may be added, were not only M. Brutus and C. Cassius, but also M. Antonius. Alas, none of them had learnt from Pompeius' example, that speed was of the essence. Had they imitated L. Sulla's example, the course of history might have been somewhat different,

money and precious metals to be had within the cities of the Hellenistic East allowed for more immediate fielding of an army and the envelopment of Italia from all sides.[130] Hence, he chose to remain in the East, thereby suffering yet another reversal.

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perhaps characterized by an *Imperator Antonius Dionysus*; cf. R. Syme, "Imperator Caesar: A Study in Nomenclature," *Historia* 7 (1958) 172–188.

130 Cf. Welch 2012: 43–57. The raising of another substantial military force in the East for use on land is, in my view, a key difference between Pompeius' strategy against Caesar in 49–48 and that pursued by his son Magnus Pius against the adopted Caesar the Younger in 43–36.

CHAPTER 5

Gallia

1 *Omnis Gallia Germaniaque*

In the culmination to his speech justifying civil war and the invasion of Italia, Caesar cites the achievements of those soldiers who had fought under his command in the 50s BCE, of course indulging in magnification of their nature. Emphasis is attained through anticipatory placement of the relative clause that offers a succinct description of Caesar's time as governor (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.7.7):

> hortatur, cuius imperatoris ductu VIIII annis rem publicam felicissime gesserint plurimaque secunda proelia fecerint, omnem Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint, ut eius existimationem dignitatemque ab inimicis defendant.
>
> He called upon them to defend from his enemies the standing and honour of the general under whose leadership they had most felicitously managed the state for nine years and fought countless successful battles and pacified the whole of Gallia and Germania.

The nebulous concepts of "administering the state" and "winning a great many victories" are given more precise definition through yet another, grandiose phrase in apposition, in which the claim is advanced that they had pacified "the whole of Gallia and Germania". The adjective *omnis* patently modifies both proper nouns.[1] As the occasion was a *contio*, that delivered in conjunction with the crossing of the Rubicon, Caesar could hardly be expected to belittle the successes that he had achieved through the aid of his soldiers.[2] Indeed, the theatrical rhetoric of the moment was such that, it would seem, there

1 F. Kraner, F. Hofmann, and H. Meusel, (eds.), *C. Iulii Caesaris Commentarii de Bello Civili*. Afterword and bibliography by H. Oppermann, (Weidmann: Berlin 1959[12]), 25, remarks that it can "only" apply to the first of these two proper nouns. However, as the commentators themselves concede, that runs counter to what most readers would understand. Cf. H. Meusel, *Lexicon Caesarianum*, 2 vols. (Weber: Berlin 1887–1893) 2.900 s.v. "omnis" I.A.a)β): "pertinet ad plura (bina) subst[antiva]". Caesar does not merit the benefit of the doubt, when his language seems misleading or inaccurate.

2 Overall, for the quality of *felicitas* as linked to Caesar, see now K. Welch, "*Nimium Felix*:

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were those who believed that their general had promised to reward them so generously that they might become *equites*.[3] The fluid nature of the concept of *imperium Romanum*, which was not strictly tied to territory, permitted Caesar to lay claim to more extensive conquests than was actually the case.

However, the claim builds upon the image created by Caesar within the *Gallic War* over the course of the previous decade. Focussing upon the successes achieved by the soldiers serving under his command and tending to enfold all but the most transparent of disasters within an aura of Roman victory, Caesar wrote a narrative to claim and justify his conquest of the whole of Gallia beyond the Alps.[4] At least as of the conclusion of the campaigning season of 58 BCE, he intended to lay claim to the conquest of the whole region. This vision is in evidence from the opening sentence of the *Gallic War*, which is as programmatic as it is descriptive.[5] In fact, Caesar subsequently deploys, with the occasional minor variation, the phrase *omni Gallia pacata*, which ablative absolute confirms the vision of the accomplishment of the campaigns of 58 and 57 BCE.[6] It is a phrase that begs the question, as regards the state of affairs in Gallia Transalpina prior to Caesar's arrival, but nevertheless stands in full agreement with the narrative that Caesar provides for his campaigns. Moreover, the report of the Germans as also obeying the orders of Caesar and the subsequent narrative of his expeditions across the Rhine together provide the basis for his specious claim to have "pacified" the whole of Germania as well as Gallia.[7]

Britannia is missing from this self-aggrandizing claim, but there was an excellent rationale for the island's absence. Caesar did make two expeditions to the island, and he took care to record these expeditions within the *Gallic War* for the sake of posterity.[8] Moreover, he did take hostages and attempt to levy tribute from the Celts inhabiting the island.[9] However, the project of

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Caesar's *Felicitas* and Cicero's *Philippics*," 181–213, in: T. Stevenson and M. Wilson (eds.), *Cicero's Philippics. History, Rhetoric and Ideology*, (Polygraphia Ltd: Auckland 2008).

3 Suet. *Iul.* 33; cf. Caes. *B Gall.* 1.42.6. For the equestrian census, see C. Nicolet, *L'Ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (312–43 av. J.-C.)*, 2 vols. (BEFAR, 270), (E. de Boccard: Paris 1966), here 1.48–68, with especial attention to the discussion (1.55–58) of the evidence indicating that it stood at HS 400,000 at the outbreak of civil war.

4 Cf. M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César*, (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1966²), 111–112.

5 Caes. *B Gall.* 1.1.1: *Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur.*

6 Caes. *B Gall.* 2.1.2, 35.1; 3.7.1, 28.1; cf. 7.1.1; Hirt. *B Gall.* 8.1.1, 46.1, 49.2.

7 For the former see, Caes. *B Gall.* 2.35.1.

8 Caes. *B Gall.* 4.21–38; 5.8–22.

9 For the hostages, see Caes. *B Gall.* 4. 38.5; 5.22.4, 23.1. As regards tribute, see Caes. *B Gall.* 5.22.4;

conquest was overall a dismal failure. The pearls that had attracted Caesar's avarice proved to be devoid of value; gold and silver were available in scarce quantities.[10] As if the natives' poverty were not enough, they were also loosely organized and troublesome. Emblematic of the whole undertaking is the quiet disappearance of the elephant that Caesar took care to transport to Britannia with his men, so as to overawe the natives.[11] Contenting himself with the record that he had been there, Caesar returned to the continent where other issues more readily resolved awaited him. Hence, the omission of Britannia from the specious description of his soldiers' accomplishments in the 50s BCE.

Of course, Caesar is not exceptional in the linguistic perversion displayed by his claim to have pacified the whole of Gallia and Germania. Rather, it is redolent of the totalitarian view typical of the military, perfectly attuned to the spirit of the times. Either there is victory or defeat, life or death, all or nothing. Any military organization that admits shades of grey and aims at half-measures is doomed to disaster from the outset. In the Graeco-Roman world, from earliest times, there was in evidence a tendency for both sides to claim victory in the case of a dubious military encounter. It was for this reason that inordinate lists of the conquered and thousands of enemy casualties were required to grace triumphal processions. In a world where the truth was

Diod. 5.21.2; Suet. *Iul.* 25.2. By contrast, see the contradictory testimony of Strab. 4.5.3, whose comment upon the fact that the cost of a military establishment would outweigh the tribute that might be exacted is revelatory of thoughts in that direction under Augustus.

10 Suet. *Iul.* 47.

11 Polyaen. *Strat.* 8.23.5. For a plausible explanation of why this episode does not appear within Caesar's narrative, see C.E. Stevens, "Julius Caesar's Elephant," *History Today* 9 (1959) 626–628, arguing that one of the natives took a poke at the animal and killed it unexpectedly. Curiously, the elephant is missing from recent biographies of Caesar (C. Meier, *Caesar*, (Severin und Siedler: Berlin 1982); A. Goldsworthy, *Caesar. The Life of a Colossus*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London 2006); and R. Billows, *Julius Caesar. The Colossus of Rome*, (Routledge: London 2009)), even if the last-mentioned does cite Polyaenus (Billows 2009: 274 n. 42). Notwithstanding the suggestion that Polyaenus has confused Caesar with the emperor Claudius (for whose use of elephants, see Cass. Dio 60.21.2), the depiction of an elephant upon the massive issue minted in 49 BCE (*RRC* 443) and the association of elephants with Caesar's Gallic triumph (Suet. *Iul.* 37; cf. Cass. Dio 43.22.1) together furnish indirect corroboration for the essential correctness of Polyaenus' account as it stands. Readers will also recall that the victorious proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus had made tour of Gallia ulterior with an elephant in 121 BCE (Suet. *Ner.* 2; A.L.F. Rivet, *Gallia Narbonensis, with a chapter on Alpes Maritimae. Southern France in Roman Times*, (B.T. Batsford: London 1988), 49 n. 12, for the precise date).

particularly malleable, there was a cool escalation in the rhetoric of victory, with one result being that extravagant claims were advanced in order to justify the governor's assumption of the title of *imperator* in its technical, jubilant sense. Caesar's claim to have conquered *omnem Galliam Germaniamque* is on a par with Pompeius Magnus' assertion that he had conquered fourteen nations during his tour of duty in the East in the latter half of the 60s BCE. Despite the hyperbole, they are not isolated instances of individual megalomania.

The subsequent historical record sheds light upon the nature of Caesar's achievement within Gallia Transalpina and Germania. Through memorably brutal actions and recourse to punitive measures, Caesar guaranteed the passivity of populations where he knew that he could not count upon good-will to bind them in lasting fashion to the Romans. Peace of a sorts obtained in the wasteland created by Roman arms.

The region appears to have remained quiescent throughout the 40s BCE, despite the problems of the Romans engaged in civil war. The campaigning of 51–50 BCE is proof that the defeat of Vercingetorix was not the final act of Gallic resistance to Roman rule, but, conversely, Caesar's departure did not lead to a weakening of the hegemony that had been established. Ever was an army stationed in the area, initially near Massilia and the mouth of the Rhône river.[12] Subsequently, with a view to consolidating Roman dominion of the landscape, colonies were established through the settlement of Caesarian veterans at such key sites as Arelate and Lugdunum in the latter half of the 40s BCE. This Roman presence together with the devastation that Gallic society had suffered over the course of the 50s BCE effectively curbed Gallic potential for rebellion. The Gallic lack of financial resources and human capital complemented the continuing, but limited Roman presence.

Only as of the early 30s BCE, did the Gauls feel the need and the ability to rebel against the Romans. Yet, the situation would not appear to have been too serious. It sufficed that M. Vipsanius Agrippa actively engage in repression in 38–37 BCE, going so far as to cross the Rhine and sow terror amongst the Germans.[13] Campaigns also occurred in the years 29–27 BCE, providing triumphs for M. Nonius Gallus, C. Carrinas, and Messalla Corvinus.[14] The withdrawal of

12 For legions in southern Gaul on the eve of civil war, see Rivet 1988: 64–68; P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1971), 467–468.

13 Cass. Dio 48.49.2–3; J.-M. Roddaz, *Marcus Agrippa*, (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 253), (École française de Rome: Roma 1984), 70–72.

14 For Nonius Gallus and Carrinas, see Cass. Dio 51.20.5, 21.6. As regards Messalla, see *Acta Triumphalia*. There exists some confusion in modern discussions as regards the *cursus* of Messalla, as a result of a mistaken inference from Cass. Dio 51.7.7. Notwithstanding the

troops for the final confrontation with M. Antonius and the Egyptian queen may have seemed an excellent opportunity to throw off the Roman yoke, but it must be wondered whether the spirit of rebellion was widespread.

Still, the conclusion seems inevitable that the Romans were given to chronic exaggeration of their achievements. The pacification of the whole of Gallia and Germania is on a par with the vision that Caesar had sought to disseminate of his activities in Hispania in the late 60s BCE. In the wake of his praetorship in 62 BCE, Caesar had been allocated Hispania Ulterior as his province to govern. Vigorous campaigning followed in 61 BCE. Irresistible in his progress, or so it was claimed with more art than veracity, Caesar carried the war as far afield as Brigantium at the northwestern extremity of the Iberian peninsula.[15] Favourably impressed by the reports that arrived, the Senate accorded Caesar a triumph. Not all were so easily persuaded, however. Other contemporary accounts, by contrast, claim that Caesar sacked communities that voluntarily opened their gates to him and that he found the fighting harder than expected, even maliciously implying that the Callaecian community of Brigantium surrendered because they had been overawed by the appearance of Caesar's fleet.[16] Had Caesar in fact achieved what he asserted, then there would have been no need for the legions that Pompeius' *legati* commanded in the continuing war of Roman conquest.[17] Nor would it have been necessary for Caesar's heir to spend many a season in the region in the early 20s BCE. The brevity of provincial appointments as a rule had the practical effect of limiting the victory of Roman arms.

2 Massilia an Ally

Curiously absent from Caesar's account of his conquest of Gallia Transalpina is any reference whatsoever to the city of Massilia. This absence occurs despite the city's evident importance to Caesar in 49 BCE and the praise accorded to the

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fact that Cassius Dio seems to be referring to Messalla Corvinus, postulation of his serving as governor of Syria in 29/28 BCE is not credible. There are no convincing parallels for the holding of two provincial commands in immediate succession by someone who was not an heir to Caesar.

15 Cass. Dio 37.53.4; J. Osgood, "Julius Caesar and Spanish Triumph-Hunting," 149–162, in: C.H. Lange and F.J. Vervaet (eds.), *The Roman Republican Triumph Beyond the Spectacle*, (*Analecta Romana Instituti Danici*, Suppl. 45), (Edizioni Quasar: Roma 2014).

16 Suet. *Iul.* 54.1; Cass. Dio 37.52–53.

17 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.85.

city by M. Cicero upon more than one occasion in the mid-40s. For instance, when attacking the Caesarian consul Q. Fufius Calenus in 43 BCE, whose principle fault lay in his being a partisan of M. Antonius, Cicero animadverts to the fidelity displayed by Massilia as an ally of Rome in the past (Cic. *Phil.* 8.18):

> Quo usque enim Massiliam oppugnabis? Ne triumphus quidem finem facit belli, per quem lata est urbs ea sine qua numquam ex Transalpinis gentibus maiores nostri triumpharunt? Quo quidem tempore populus Romanus ingemuit: quamquam proprios dolores suarum rerum omnes habebant, tamen huius civitatis fidelissimae miserias nemo erat civis qui a se alienas arbitraretur.

> How long are you going to besiege Massilia? Did not even a triumph bring the war to an end? It was a triumph in which there was carried (the image of) that city without which our ancestors had never triumphed over the peoples beyond the Alps? To be sure, the Roman people groaned at the time. Even though everyone had his own reasons for grief, nevertheless there was no citizen who thought that the sufferings of this most faithful city were foreign to himself.

The parading of the image of Massilia during Caesar's triumphal celebration of mid-46 BCE was not well received by the Roman populace, according to Cicero, for they allegedly remembered the crucial role that the city had played in the creation of a Roman empire beyond the Alps.[18] If Caesar displays amnesia, Cicero errs on the other side.

Still, the orator's hyperbole of *sine qua numquam* when he mentions the Roman victories won over the Transalpine peoples, so as to highlight the injus-

18 For the phenomenon of images carried in triumphs in the mid-first century BCE, see I. Östenberg, "*Veni vidi vici* and Caesar's triumph," *CQ* 63.2 (2013) 813–827; cf. I. Östenberg, "Triumph and Spectacle: Victory Celebrations in the Late Republican Civil Wars," 181–193, in: C.H. Lange and F.J. Vervaet (eds.), The Roman Republican Triumph Beyond the Spectacle, (*Analecta Romana Instituti Danici*, Suppl. 45), (Edizioni Quasar: Roma 2014), esp. 186–188; I. Östenberg, "*Titulis oppida capta leget*: The role of the written placards in the Roman triumphal procession," *MEFRA* 121 (2009) 461–470; I. Östenberg, *Staging the World. Spoils, Captives, and Representations in the Roman Triumphal Procession*, (Oxford 2009); E. La Rocca, "La processione trionfale come spettacolo per il popolo romano: Trionfi antichi, spettacoli moderni," 34–55, in: E. La Rocca and S. Tortorella (eds.), *Trionfi romani*, [Roma, Colosseo, 5 marzo–14 settembre], (Electa: Milano 2008). To her quite extensive list should now be added the following passages dealing with the city of Massilia: Cic. *Phil.* 8.18; *Off.* 2.28 (*portari in triumpho Massiliam vidimus*).

tice of the travails of this *civitas fidelissima*, need not dismay.[19] History is manifestly subservient to a high good, that of the defense of the Roman state against the tyrannical encroachment of Antonius and his partisans. Contemporary concerns, not historical truth, are what matter to the senior statesman. Even though he was a fellow-citizen of Arpinum with C. Marius, who had achieved a splendid victory in Gallia over the Teutones and Cimbri, Cicero exaggerates the case of Massilia with a view to the possible revocation of certain of the deceased dictator's measures, such as the confiscation of Massiliote land that had made possible the creation of the Roman colony of Arelate.[20] Massilia was a long-standing Roman ally in the western Mediterranean, but the city's population and power were relatively limited. Had it been otherwise, the city would likely have suffered the fate of Carthage. As matters stood, Massilia was instead the equivalent of Athens or Rhodes in the eastern Mediterranean during the Hellenistic period.

Naturally, in a world where diplomatic relations were often traced back to remote origins through the use of genealogy or similar devices, relations between Rome and Massilia were said to go back in time to the Phocaean expedition that founded Massilia. This claim, according to the testimony of the late antique excerptor Iustinus, was to be found within the universal history composed by Pompeius Trogus (Iustin. *Epit.* 43.3.4):

> Temporibus Tarquinii regis ex Asia Phocaeensium iuventus ostio Tiberis invecta amicitiam cum Romanis iunxit; inde in ultimos Galliae sinus navibus profecta Massiliam inter Ligures et feras gentes Gallorum condidit, magnasque res, sive dum armis se adversus Gallicam feritatem tuentur sive dum ultro lacessunt a quibus fuerant antea lacessiti, gesserunt.

> When Tarquin was king, coming from Asia the youth of the Phocaeans arrived at the mouth of the Tiber and entered into friendship with the Romans. Subsequently, they sailed to the further bays of Gaul and

19 For this passage, see G. Manuwald, *Cicero: Philippics 3–9*. Vol. 2: Commentary, (W. de Gruyter: Berlin 2007), here 978.

20 Regarding the foundation of the Roman colony of Arelate, see Suet. *Tib.* 4.1; cf. Mela 2.5.75; Plin. *HN* 3.36. For a listing of the epigraphic evidence for the colony's full name (*Colonia Iulia Paterna Sextanorum*), see Rivet 1988: 206 n. 5. It should further be remarked (Rivet 1988: 190) that archaeological evidence in the form of Greek pottery corroborates Avienus' assertion that there formerly stood upon this site the community of Theline and that the Massliotes were undoubtedly distressed when Caesar chose this as the site for construction of the fleet to be employed against them.

> founded the city of Massilia amongst the Ligurians and the savage peoples of the Gauls. There they performed deeds of note, both in repelling the savagery of the Gauls and in attacking those by whom they had previously been attacked.

Whichever Tarquinius was meant to be understood by Trogus, there can be little doubt that this claim of long-standing *amicitia* existed well before the Principate and the composition of Trogus' historical work.[21] Items such as the Ara Maxima with its Hellenic rites in honour of Hercules guarantee an early, abiding Hellenic presence within Rome in the Archaic period,[22] and the strong ties existing between Rome and the Etruscan community of Caere provide an analogous situation.[23] Despite the distance, the two communities did entertain cordial relations.

The undoubted presence of Phocaean and Massiliote traders in Rome in the last century of the so-called kings and the first centuries of the Republic in no way implicates intimate diplomatic relations nor long-term projects. The Massiliotes defeated the Carthaginians in a naval engagement off the coast of the northeastern Iberian peninsula in the early fifth century BCE, but, firmly land-bound at the time, Rome did not partake in this struggle over the commercial spheres of influence in the western Mediterranean.[24] The Romans were focussed upon achieving hegemony at the local level, gradually asserting themselves over their immediate Latin and Etruscan neighbours. Indeed, with the establishment of the Republic, Roman power in the region had suffered a marked reverse.[25] By contrast, enjoying a solid oligarchic constitution from the outset, the Massiliotes pursued trade throughout the western Mediterranean and through their economic ties exercised a strong cultural and political influ-

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21 For brief, cogent exposition of the guiding principle that informed the historical work of Pompeius Trogus, see A. Mehl, *Roman Historiography. An Introduction to its Basic Aspects and Development*, tr. H.-F. Mueller, (Wiley-Blackwell: Malden 2011), pp. 116–119. An awareness of the accomplishment of Livy is nicely indicated: Iustin. 38.3.11. It seems fair to characterize the work as in effect a "prequel" to the masterpiece of the recognized *doyen* of Roman historiography.

22 E.g. F. Coarelli, *Il Foro Boario. Dalle origini alla fine della Repubblica*, (Edizioni Quasar: Roma 1988), 127–128; cf. Coarelli 1988: 125, for the Massaliotes at Rome ca. 600 BCE.

23 For brief, but instructive synthesis, see *DNP* 2 (1997/1999) 906–907 s.v. "Caere" (S. Bianchetti).

24 T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome. Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC)*, (Routledge: London 1995), 210–214.

25 Cornell 1995: 304.

ence upon the neighbouring Celtic peoples.[26] Perhaps the most resplendent sign of the wealth and power that they exercised at this moment is the treasury that the Massiliotes built at the panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi in the late sixth century BCE.[27] Despite the unity brought by commerce, the cities of Rome and Massilia followed quite different trajectories.

Despite the recent defeat and destruction of Veii, Roman hegemony in central Italia suffered a drastic dramatic reversal ca. 390 BCE, when a marauding Celtic band defeated a Roman army at the river Allia and subsequently sacked the city of Rome. Whether or not the Celts also took the Capitol, the event impressed itself forcefully upon the collective memory of the Romans in subsequent centuries.[28] One consequence, as has been noted, was the creation of an especial monetary reserve known as the *aerarium sanctius*, which was to be utilized only in the event of the recurrence of this extreme peril.[29] Another is that accounts of this event in the historical narratives, created centuries later, were particularly susceptible to manipulation and invention. Livy's narrative can hardly be taken as sober fact, marked as it is by a manifest taste for high

26 For the constitution of Massilia, see especially Strab. 4.179; Cic. *Flacc.* 26/63. For a survey of the history of Massilia, see A.T. Hodge, *Ancient Greek France*, (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia 1998); A. Hermary, A. Hesnard, and H. Tréziny, *Marseille grecque, 600–49 av. J.-C. La cité phocéenne*, Hauts lieux de l'histoire, (Errance: Paris 1999). As regards *l'histoire événementielle* of the siege in 49 BCE, aside from the narrative provided in Chapter 2, see the classic treatments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: M. Clerc, *Massalia. Histoire de Marseille dans l'antiquité, des origines à la fin de l'Empire d'Occident* (*476 ap. J.-C.*), 2 vols. (Tacussel: Marseille 1927–1929); C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, 6 vols. (Hachette: Paris 1908–1926), here 3.566–602 (= Ch. XV: La chute de Marseille). Despite their age and the natural tendency towards chauvinism or fantasy, these latter are unsurpassed in terms of an eye for local detail and a sense of the drama of history.

27 For detailed analysis of the material remains of the Treasury of the Massaliotes at Delphi, see D. Laroche and M.-D. Nenna, "Deux trésors archaïques en poros à Delphes," 109–124, in: J.-F. Bommelaer (ed.), *Delphes. Centenaire de la "grande fouille" realisée par l'École française d'Athènes* (*1892–1903*). *Actes du colloque Paul Perdrizet, Strasbourg, 6–9 novembre 1991*, (Brill: Leiden 1992); A. Jacquemin, *Offrandes monumentales à Delphes*, (De Boccard: Paris 1999).

28 Enn. *Ann.* 7.227–228; Skutsch 1985: ad loc. As has been well remarked (H.I. Flower, *The Art of Forgetting. Disgrace and Oblivion in Roman Political Culture*, [University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill 2006] 295 n. 25), there is no trace whatsoever of T. Manlius in the oldest surviving Roman account of the Gallic sack. With the advent of Empire, it became congenial to overlook an inconvenient blot upon the city's early record.

29 See Chapter 1, Section 2. The name itself is evidence that the *aerarium* as a general institution pre-dates the Gallic sack.

drama and rhetoric.[30] Nevertheless, it withstands critical scrutiny far better than many another version of this same event. So, for example, the assistance that the Caeretans gave to the Romans on this occasion was invoked by others to explain the grant of Roman citizenship as a reward given at this moment, thereby explicating the mysterious phrase *tabulae Caeritum*.[31] Similarly, Massiliote ambassadors allegedly contributed to the ransom in gold and silver to be paid to the Celts in order that they might abandon Rome; remuneration came in the form of *proedria*.[32] The story is the manifest invention of a later epoch, meant to establish a commonality of interest at a moment when the Massiliotes called upon the Romans for military assistance against the Celtic and Ligurian populations beyond the Alps.

First, however, came the problem posed by Carthaginian expansion within the western half of the Mediterranean. The Romans sought Massiliote assistance. It was forthcoming for the simple reason that the Massiliotes, like their brethren in Sicilia, found themselves unable to defend their interests against Carthaginian encroachment. The only viable solution was to turn to the people who had repelled Pyrrhus and established their own hegemony over the Italian peninsular.

Assistance to the Romans during the First Punic War may be surmised, but the very little that survives of the historiographical literature dedicated to that crisis does not permit any positive statements whatsoever. Suggestive are the repeated Roman launching of massive fleets and the annexation of Sicilia and Sardinia as Roman provinces.[33] However, there survives no trace of direct involvement on the part of the Massiliotes.

The matter is different in the case of the Second Punic War. There are various reports of the assistance rendered to the Romans by the Massiliotes, laudatory but all the same likely to minimize the role of this faithful ally. Through the aid of the Massiliotes, Roman emissaries gathered information amongst the Celts as to the activities of Hannibal in 218 BCE.[34] Subsequently, in making his way

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30 E.g. Liv. 5.48: *vae victis*.

31 Gell. *NA* 16.13.7; Brunt 1971: 515–517; M. Humbert, *Municipium et civitas sine suffragio. L'organisation de la conquête jusqu'à la guerre sociale*, (Collection de l'École française de Rome, t. 36), (École française de Rome: Roma 1978), 410–412; T.J. Cornell, "The Recovery of Rome," *CAH* 7.2 (1989) 309–350, in part. 313–314. Cf. Liv. 5.50.3, *hospitium publicum*.

32 Iustin. *Epit*. 43.8–10.

33 For the fleets, see C. Steinby, *The Roman republican navy, from the sixth century to 167 B.C.* (Commentationes humanarum litterarum, 123), (Societas Scientiarum Fennica: Helsinki 2007).

34 Liv. 21.20, 25; cf. Polyb. 3.41.

towards Hispania with an expeditionary force in that same year, P. Cornelius Scipio passed by Massilia.[35] In the following year of 217 BCE, the Roman victory over the Carthaginians at the Ebro was due to information received from a pair of Massiliote ships engaged in reconnaissance.[36] Much later, in 211 BCE, there is report of four Massiliote triremes as accompanying the fleet of Scipio active off the coast of the Iberian peninsula.[37] Finally, in 207 BCE, the Massiliotes provided the Romans with timely information regarding the movements of Hasdrubal, thereby making it possible for the Romans to prevent him from joining his brother Hannibal with long overdue reinforcements.[38] According to the testmony of another historian somewhat closer in time to the events concerned, the Massiliotes often fought alongside the Romans, "especially at the time of the war against Hannibal".[39]

Recognizing the Roman ascendancy achieved between victory in the Second Punic War and their defeat of Philip V, the Massiliotes subsequently employed their influence with the Romans to seek favours for other cities and themselves.[40] Lampsacus erred in choosing sides in the conflict between the Romans and Antiochus III; Massiliote envoys pleaded for clemency on the basis of the blood-relations uniting them to the Lampsacenes.[41] That diplomatic success was achieved in 197 or 196 BCE.[42]

There followed, intermittently, problems with the Ligurians and neighbouring Celtic populations of southern Gallia. Maintaining a presence within Hispania, the Romans were not unaware of these difficulties. For instance, in 189 BCE the praetor L. Baebius was fatally ambushed by the Ligurians while travelling overland in order to reach his assigned province of Hispania Ulterior, escaping to Massilia only to die of his wounds a couple days later.[43] Subse-

35 Liv. 21.26; cf. Polyb. 3.61.

36 Liv. 22.19; cf. Polyb. 3.95.

37 Liv. 26.19.

38 Liv. 27.36.

39 Polyb. 3.95.7; cf. Cic. *Rep.* 1.43; E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*. 2 vols. (University of California Press: Berkeley 1984), 159.

40 See J.-L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique, de la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la guerre contre Mithridate*, (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 271), (École française de Rome: Roma 1988), 133–141; Gruen 1984: 65–66, 183, 313 n. 127, 542.

41 As regards this important and widespread phenomenon in general, see C.P. Jones, *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*, (Revealing Antiquity, 12), (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1999).

42 *SIG*[3] 591.27, 53–54, 59–60; cf. case of people of Soli and Rhodians mentioned at Liv. 37.56.

43 Liv. 37.57.

quently, vexed by a marked increase in Ligurian piracy, the Massiliotes sent envoys to the Senate so as to request Roman intervention in 181 BCE.[44] A campaign was undertaken and for a time the scourge of piracy abated. A generation later Massilia sent another appeal to Rome for assistance, this time because their colonies of Nicaea and Antipolis were being besieged by the Ligurian peoples of the Oxybii and Deciates. One of the three Roman envoys sent to urge peace upon the Ligurians was wounded and taken to Massilia, where he received medical care. In the sequel, the Romans despatched Q. Opimius Postumus (*cos.* 154 BCE) with an army, a short, bloody campaign followed, and a substantial part of the territory of the defeated peoples was consigned to the Massiliotes.[45] Yet a generation later, in 125 BCE, the Celtic nation of the Salluvii devastated Massiliote territory, resulting in yet another request for Roman military assistance. Fleeing domestic discord, temporarily, M. Fulvius Flaccus (*cos.* 125 BCE) forced the passage of the Alps and achieved a victory over the Salluvii on the field, subsequently returning to Rome to celebrate a triumph in 123 BCE.[46] Things were not so readily resolved, however. The region was assigned to yet another Roman general, C. Sextius Calvinus (*cos.* 124 BCE), producing yet another triumph in 122 BCE. This general also established a peregrine community named after himself, the *castellum* of Aquae Sextiae.[47] Situated some 40 km to the north of Massilia as a buffer, this diminutive foundation marks the beginning of a permanent Roman presence upon the Gallic landscape. Repeated Massiliote requests for Roman intervention lie at the basis of what was eventually to become a new province.

44 Liv. 40.18.

45 Polyb. 33.8–14.

46 Liv. *Per.* 60.

47 For the campaign, city, and triumph, see Diod. 34.23; Liv. Per. 61; Strab. 4.1.5; Vell. 1.15.4; Cassiod. s.a. 632 a.u.c. (*CM* 1.131); Degrassi 1963: 82–83, 560. C.H. Benedict, "The Romans in Southern Gaul," *AJPh* 63 (1942) 38–50, here 41; F. Benoit, "Résultats historiques des fouilles d'Entremont 1946–1967," *Gallia* 26 (1968), 1–31, here 4. See also A. King, *Roman Gaul and Germany* (University of California Press: Berkeley 1990) 36–37; C. Ebel, *Transalpine Gaul. The Emergence of a Roman Province*, (Brill: Leiden 1976), 66–67. Brief but detailed treatments are available for the site: Y. Lafond, "Aquae (III 5)," *DNP* 1 (1996/1999) 930; Rivet 1988: 212, 216 n. 1.

3 Massilia a Provincial Capital?

It is a truism that the concept of *provincia* as a task preceded that of *provincia* as a discrete geographical entity. The comic language of Plautus reveals an image that is fundamentally different from that which emerges from the legal prohibitions of the *lex Cornelia de maiestate* emanated a little over a century later.[48] With time and a greater knowledge of the abuses that might result in the management of Empire, it became desirable to circumscribe the activities of promagistrates.[49] They were insensibly transformed in effect from generals into governors, with their powers limited to a particular geographical region. This historical truth is quite well known, but bears repetition for erroneous beliefs tend to endure sanctioned by the passage of time and thanks to the simplistic vision of the past that they perpetuate.

Contrary to received wisdom, no province of Gallia Transalpina was established in 121 BCE.[50] That is not to affirm that the actions taken by Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus in that year were insignificant. The foundation of the colony of Narbo Martius and the creation of the Via Domitia mark a qualitative advance upon prior Roman involvement in the region. Now there was to be a permanent Roman presence upon the landscape through two features most distinctive of Roman culture: a Roman colony and a paved road facilitating the movement of armies and their victualment. However, prior to the dispositions made by Pompeius Magnus in the mid-70s BCE, there is no evidence for the regular despatch of promagistrates to govern Gallia Transalpina as a province in its own right. Rather, those Roman generals active in the area either had a specific mission—as in the case of C. Marius in 109–102 BCE—or were exercising a command that extended from the Rhône to Baetis—as in the case of Pompeius Magnus and Metellus Pius in the mid- to late 70s BCE. Indeed, had Gallia Transalpina been established as a province in 121 BCE, then the decision to create a colony at Narbo, peculiarly close to Hispania Citerior, would be inexplicable. Lying in

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48 For the evolution of the concept of *provincia*, see J.-M. Bertrand, "A propos du mot *provincia*: étude sur les modes d'élaboration du langage politique," *Journal des Savants* Jul.–Déc. 1989, 191–215. For the concept of *provincia* in the late second century BCE, see now J.S. Richardson, *The language of empire. Rome and the idea of empire from the third century BC to the second century AD*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2008).

49 For legislation *de repetundis*, see now B. Santalucia, *Diritto e processo penale nell'antica Roma*, (Giuffrè: Milano 1998^2), 104–122, 141–143, 157–160. To my knowledge, no one has ever drawn the direct connection between these two phenomena that seems rather self-evident.

50 *Pace OCD*^{3} 626.

proximity to the mouth of the Rhône, the site of the future Arelate would have been the more normal choice of situation for the foremost city of a Roman province. *Fasti* and geopolitics together point to the lack of any notion of Gallia Transalpina as a regular province at this moment.[51]

Which need not surprise. After all, more than half a century elapsed between the arrival of Roman arms in Anatolia and the creation of a province by the name of Asia.[52] Military adventure and the desire to punish Antiochus III for that monarch's pretentions to hegemony in Europe had led the Romans to cross the Dardanelles. Once there, however, they had not sought any territorial advantage for themselves. Rather, they had won repeated military victories only to assign hegemony within Anatolia to their loyal allies, the rulers of Pergamum in particular.[53] The situation obtaining beyond the Alps was similar, in that the Romans despatched military forces upon more than one occasion in order to establish a peaceful order that was to be dominated by the local allies, in this case the Massiliotes. Despite their undoubted interest in the spoils of war, the Romans of the late second century yet displayed an aversion to assuming any further responsibilities for the administration of territories abroad. In Gallia Transalpina in the 70s BCE, as in the East in the succeeding decade, it was Pompeius Magnus who broke rank with tradition, instituting yet another province to be ruled by Rome.

It may not be impertinent to press the analogy with Pergamum further. By virtue of its leading position within the region prior to establishment of the province as a fixed geographical entity, Massilia, like the former capital of the Eumenid kingdom, made decisions that eventually precluded it from assuming the status of provincial capital that its wealth, cultural hegemony, and political heritage should have guaranteed.[54] In particular, it was the decision to close

51 Ebel 1976: 98–100, esp. testimony of Cic. *Font.* 14, *ex Cn. Pompei decreto*.

52 Cf. R. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire. The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.* (University of California Press: Berkeley 1995), 338, for the parallel afforded by Roman treatment of Achaea. Military dominance did not automatically translate into administration and its related problems.

53 For a useful survey of the history of the first century of the Roman province of Asia, see J.-L. Ferrary, "Rome, les Balkans, la Grèce et l'Orient au deuxième siècle av. J.-C.," 729–788, in: C. Nicolet (ed.), *Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen. Tome 2: Genèse d'un empire*, (Nouvelle Clio: L'histoire et ses problèmes), (Presses universitaires françaises: Paris 1978); J.-M. Bertrand, "Rome et la Méditerranée orientale au premier siècle av. J.-C.," 789–845, in: C. Nicolet (ed.), *Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen. Tome 2: Genèse d'un empire*, (Nouvelle Clio: L'histoire et ses problèmes), (Presses universitaires françaises: Paris 1978).

54 The same might also be said of Utica in the sequel. Caesar's decision to found Car-

their gates against Caesar's forces and to provide assistance instead to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus that proved disastrous.

Until the outbreak of civil war in 49 BCE, the Massiliotes had benefited immensely from their alliance with Rome, and many a Roman promagistrate or envoy had spent time in the city. Q. Opimius had granted the territory of the Oxybii and Deciates to the Massiliotes after defeating those Celtic peoples in 154 BCE.[55] C. Sextius Calvinus had defeated Celtic peoples and granted the coastal region to the east of Massilia to the Massiliotes in 122 BCE.[56] After his victory over the Cimbri and Teutones, C. Marius consigned to the Massiliotes the canal that his soldiers had created at the mouth of the Rhône.[57] In the mid-70s and 50s BCE, respectively, Pompeius Magnus and C. Caesar likewise bestowed material and economic rewards upon the Massiliotes as a sign of gratitude for their loyalty as allies of the Romans.[58] The historical record is indubitably defective, and it is quite difficult to believe that no benefit accrued to the Massiliotes from the passage of yet other governors such as M. Fonteius and C. Valerius Flaccus.[59] Indeed, in the case of the former, it is to be expected that the Massiliotes would have willingly testified for the prosecution had Fonteius not taken care to appease them through concessions of some sort. After all, as M. Cicero remarked in his speech of defense for Fonteius, Massilia contained "the bravest and most faithful of allies, who through the resources and rewards of the Roman people had found recompense for the dangers of the wars against the Gauls".[60] Without the assistance, or at the least the tacit compliance of the Massiliotes, there would never have been the resounding string of Roman victories proclaimed by triumphs between the latter half of the second and the middle of the first century BCE.

No less striking is the attested presence of Roman promagistrates or envoys in Massilia in the course of the second and first centuries BCE. At the cost of some repetition, the list is worth reviewing. Wounded by the Ligurians

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thage anew should not be viewed in isolation from his treatment of the defeated city of Utica.

55 Polyb. 33.10.12.

56 Strab. 4.1.5.

57 Strab. 4.1.8.

58 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.35.4, a vexatious passage to be discussed at length below.

59 A. Alföldi, "Les deniers de C. Valerius Flaccus frappés à Marseille et les dernières émissions de drachmes massaliotes," *Revue Numismatique* 11 (1969) 55–61.

60 Cic. *Font*. 5/13: *est item urbs Massilia, de qua ante dixi, fortissimorum fidelissimorumque sociorum, qui Gallicorum bellorum pericula praecipuis ⟨populi Romani⟩ praemiis compensarunt.*

while travelling to take up his command in Hispania Citerior, L. Baebius was taken to Massilia, where he died of the wounds received.[61] Wounded by the Oxybii while attempting to carry out his mission, the envoy Flaminius was likewise taken to Massilia, this time to felicitous outcome.[62] Another governor of Hispania Citerior, C. Valerius Flaccus, is known to have minted coins at Massilia during his sojourn in the city in the mid-80s BCE.[63] In a doleful repeat performance of the incompetent generalship displayed at Corfinium but a few months before, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus made Massilia his base of operations while attempting to take possession of his province of Gallia Transalpina in mid-49 BCE.[64] Last but not least, Sextus Pompeius moved from Hispania Citerior to station himself in Massilia while awaiting the Senate's repeal of his status as a public enemy in 43 BCE.[65] The list is meagre and patently incomplete, but not for that any less striking. Contrary to what might have been concluded from the absolute silence of Caesar's *Gallic War*, Massilia occupied an important position in the strategic and economic thought of governors of Gallia Transalpina and Hispania Citerior.

For those two reasons had both Pompeius Magnus and C. Caesar seen fit to make themselves *patroni* of Massilia during their time in the region. Concrete, practical considerations, not any form of altruism for the sake of self-esteem, dominated their thinking as regards this allegedly ancient ally of the Romans. The attribution of territories and fiscal revenues to allies lay within the discre-

61 Liv. 37.57. Mortality while engaged in provincial government, or travelling to assume it, was not an uncommon experience. For a list of commanders who perished, see N. Rosenstein, *Imperatores Victi. Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1990), 179–204 (= App. 1).

62 Polyb. 33.9.7.

63 Alföldi 1969: 55–61. See also G. Depeyrot, *Les Monnaies hellénistiques du Marseille*, (Moneta, 16), (Moneta: Wetteren 1999); M.H. Crawford, *Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic. Italy and the Mediterranean economy*. (Methuen: London 1985), 166.

64 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.34.2.

65 App. *B Civ*. 4.84; cf. Vell. 2.102.3, for death of L. Caesar at Massilia in AD 2. See K. Welch, *Magnus Pius. Sextus Pompeius and the transformation of the Roman Republic*, (Classical Press of Wales: Swansea 2012), 153–154 and fig. 14 (coin of Q. Nasidius). As regards the figure of C. Verres and the likelihood that he spent his exile elsewhere—contrary to frequent, unsubstantiated assertions made by modern authors—see G.P. Kelly, *A History of exile in the Roman Republic*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2006), 189 no. 36. It is to be suspected that more than one scholar has misremembered matters, confusing C. Verres with T. Annius Milo, for whom the record is most clear and incontrovertible: Kelly 2006: 195–196 no. 44.

tion of the governor, although requiring a basis in *Realpolitik* if the governor's *acta* were to be approved upon his returning to Rome. Pompeius and Caesar had abetted the city's interests because doing so furthered their own causes respectively in the reconquest of Hispania from the partisans of Sertorius and the establishment of Roman hegemony over the whole of Gallia Transalpina. Both were acutely aware of the resources that Massilia commanded as a result of the fact that this city, *fidelissima socia* of the Romans according to Cicero's usual hyperbolic formulation, sat astride the major routes of communication in the northwestern quadrant of the Mediterranean.

Explaining to Caesar the cause for their *aporia* in the spring of 49 BCE, the 15-member board (*pentekaidekaprotoi*) that constituted the city's directorate cited the fact that the Massiliotes were conscious of having benefited from the patronage of both Caesar and Pompeius.[66] According to Caesar's representation of the interview, which is plausible in its detail even though he is at pains to portray the Massiliotes as incapable of obtemperating to their own rhetoric, they made specific reference to the *beneficia* that had been received in the 70s and 50s BCE (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.35.4–5):

> Principes vero esse earum partium Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem, patronos civitatis, quorum alter agros Volcarum Arecomicorum et Helviorum publice eis concesserit, alter bello victos Sallyas attribuerit vectigaliaque auxerit. Quare paribus eorum beneficiis parem se quoque voluntatem tribuere debere et neutrum eorum contra alterum iuvare aut urbe aut portibus recipere.

> But the leaders of those factions were Cn. Pompeius and C. Caesar, the patrons of the city. Of these two, the one had officially granted the fields of the Volcae Arecomici and Helvii to them, and the other had assigned to them the Sallyas, who had been defeated in war, and increased their fiscal revenues. Therefore, they ought to display equal gratitude for those men's equal benefactions, and they ought not to help one of the two against the other or take him into their city or harbours.

66 For this political body, see Strab. 4.1.5; Caes. *B Civ*. 1.35.1. Aristotle is known to have composed a *Constitution of the Massaliotes* (Athen. *Deipn*. 13.576), but this text only survives via indirect transmission (e.g. Strab. 4.C179–189). As regards the specific institution of the *pentekaidekaprotoi*, see Strab. 4.179; cf. Cic. *Rep*. 1.27; 28.42, where this institution is likened to that of the "Thirty" at Athens.

Matters are confounded by uncertainty over which *beneficium* had been performed by which *patronus*, for Latin usage allows that *alter … alter …* may either mean "the former … the latter …" or serve in chiasmus to opposite effect. The latter interpretation seems somewhat more likely in view of the reputation that Massiliotes enjoyed for eloquence.[67] What is not in doubt is the assertion that Massilia had benefited immensely from the favour of both men. Their estimate of the importance of Massilia was based upon a cool appraisal of the strategic and economic significance of the city's geopolitical situation.

Enjoying the status of *civitas libera*, Massilia had benefited in material terms from the victories that paved the way for the creation of the province of Gallia Transalpina. Incapable of holding their own against the Celts, for whom contact with Hellenic culture had proved a catalyst leading to an appreciable improvement in social organization, the Massiliotes had repeatedly called upon the Romans to wage war in their defense. Presumably the city enjoyed a brilliant renaissance thanks to these victories achieved by Roman arms, but the final price was nothing short of submission.[68] Miscalculation in the midst of civil war proved fatal. The city did not lose her freedom, but the punishment imposed by a vengeful Caesar deprived Massilia of the status of provincial capital that would have otherwise been hers in the natural course of things.

4 Geopolitical Considerations

For a brief, glimmering moment Cicero and like-minded contemporaries drew encouragement from the reports that came to them of affairs beyond the Alps. Inept aggression by one of Caesar's partisans had caused the standard of rebellion to be raised amongst the Intimilii, one of the Celtic peoples inhabiting the litoral linking Italia with Gallia Transalpina.[69] Even more significantly, for observers in Rome or elsewhere in Italia, the defiant stance taken by Massilia

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67 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 2.12.4. For another opinion, see C. Goudineau, "Le statut de Nîmes et des Volques Arécomiques," *Revue Archéologique Narbonnaise* 9 (1976) 105–114, in part. 109, where it is argued that the text is irremediably corrupted. It should be added that Carter deems the names an intrusive gloss. That seems improbable, in view of the style utilized (viz. *praenomen + cognomen / nomen gentilicium*).

68 S.T. Loseby, "Marseille: A Late Antique Success Story?" *Journal of Roman Studies* 82 (1992) 165–185, esp. 179–180 for the apparent economic recession of the early imperial period. Arles replaced Massilia as the principal regional entrepôt until the fourth century.

69 Cic. *Fam.* 8.15.

was evidence that perhaps the West was not lost at all. Commenting upon affairs in correspondence with his friend Atticus in early May 49 BCE, Cicero remarked (Cic. *Att.* 10.12A.3; cf. 10.10.4, 10.14.2):

> Hispanias spero firmas esse. Massiliensium factum cum ipsum per se luculentum est tum mihi argumento est recte esse in Hispaniis. Minus enim auderent si aliter esset, et scirent. Nam et vic⟨in⟩i et diligentes sunt.

> I hope that the Spanish provinces hold firm. The action of the Massiliotes is not only valuable in and of itself, but also a sign to me that all is well in the Hispaniae. They would be less daring if it were otherwise, and they would know. For they are both close at hand and careful.

The geographical situation of the Massiliotes and their national character together gave Cicero cause to hope that Hispania would not be lost and that the renegade proconsul might yet be brought to heel. In the midst of winter, at a moment when news only slowly percolated thanks to the effective closure of traffic upon the Mediterranean, the Massiliotes were better situated to know what was happening in the struggle between the lieutenants of Caesar and Pompeius. Moreover, the caution of the city "without which the Romans had never won a triumph beyond the Alps" suggested that Caesar's plight was more desperate than might have been thought in the wake of his rapid conquest of the Italian peninsula.

Cicero expresses no overt geopolitical analysis, for he was no true general, despite aspiring to the title of *imperator* in recognition of his having temporarily quashed brigandage upon the slopes of Mt. Amanus.[70] Moreover, Atticus' letter describing the situation of Massilia in April 49 is unfortunately lost.[71] Nonetheless, an appreciation of geopolitical realities can be discerned in the scattered statements of Cicero upon this topic and in Caesar's narrative of how he dealt with the Massiliotes' decision to close the gates of their city to him and to afford assistance to his putative successor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. No one could be blind to the strategic importance of the Massiliotes' decision, and it

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70 It is to be recalled that he was flanked by Q. Tullius Cicero and C. Pomptinus during his time campaigning in Cilicia. For the subject of Cicero's activities and aspirations to be recognized as *imperator* at this late date, see M. Wistrand, *Cicero imperator. Studies in Cicero's correspondence 51–47 B.C.* (Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis: Göteborg 1979). Readers will remember, of course, that he had earlier spurned such a route to distinction in and after 63 BCE.

71 Cic. *Att.* 10.10.4 = SB 201.4.

was for this reason that Caesar delayed his rapid descent upon Pompeius' lieutenants in Hispania and assigned three legions to the city's reduction.

The position occupied by Massilia was strategically important.[72] Making use of the best natural harbour along the whole of southern Gallia, Massilia was situated but some 20–25 kilometers to the east of the estuary of the Rhône river. Moreover, the city lay upon the main overland route of the region, which ran roughly parallel with the Mediterranean seashore from Pisa to Narbo Martius and Tarraco. Hence, control of Massilia signified command of all the principal routes of communication and transport. The fleet of the Massiliotes readily commanded access to the Rhône, which served as the easiest and preferred means of entry to the interior of Gallia Transalpina. Passage across the Alps to reach the same destination was dubious in the best of times, with the passes frequently blocked by heavy snows if not by the enterprising hostility of the native tribes.[73] As for passage along the coast in order to move from the Italian to the Iberian peninsula, travel by sea was out of the question in the event of hostility, for the Massiliote fleet might easily intercept any vessels that they chose to hinder.[74] Travel overland was hardly much better, for there was the problem of over-extended supply-lines that might be easily broken with a minimal use of manpower by the Massiliotes.[75] By virtue of her position, Massilia not only guarded access to Hispania or to Italia, but was also effectively the key to Gallia.

Despite Caesar's studied attempt to write Massilia out of the narrative in relating his conquest of Gallia Transalpina, the outbreak of a Roman civil war highlights the crucial role played behind the scenes by the city in the previous decade.[76] The Massiliotes' decision to align themselves with Caesar's legally

72 E.g. Cass. Dio 41.21.3, for the significance of the Caesarian naval victory at Massilia. Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.59–60, which is much more oblique because of its emphasis upon Caesar as the agent of success and fortune.

73 For resolution of this chronic problem, which only became truly annoying once Rome had made the strategic decision to become a continental power and shifted from use of the sea to use of land transportation in western Europe, see *RGDA* 26.3; Strab. 4.6.6–7; Cass. Dio 53.25.2–5, 26.3; 54.20.1, 22; *ILS* 94 = EJ no. 166; Plin. *HN* 3.20.136–138 = EJ no. 40. Control of the Alps was crucial to the secure and timely passage of men and supplies between Italia and Gallia Transalpina or Illyricum.

74 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.36.2.

75 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.34.4.

76 It is worthwhile remarking that Caesar never refers to Massilia at any point in the *Bellum Gallicum*, whereas he does frequently name the Rhodanus or Rhône river and neighbouring peoples such as the Volcae Arecomici. Writing for a Roman audience situated in Rome, of course, he played to the chauvinism of his public.

appointed successor in the government of Gallia Transalpina proved a fatal mistake that was to have enduring consequences. However, it also reveals a great deal more. For one thing, this choice illustrates an attentive observer's estimate of the relative balance of forces between the opposing Roman factions. For another, it betrays the Massiliotes' self-confidence, which is to be explained in terms of their having a vision of the events of the 50s BCE that is not identical to that provided by Caesar's *Gallic War*. Unaware of how things would turn out, the Massiliotes chose to align themselves with the losing side, thereby offering eloquent testimony to their confidence in themselves and their allies as well as yet another sign of the parlous position of Caesar.[77] Even after his unexpectedly rapid and relatively bloodless conquest of Italia, Caesar found victory elusive and former allies were willing to abandon him.

The decision taken by the Massiliotes was all the more grave in that Caesar's forces active in Hispania depended upon over-extended supply-lines reaching back to the heart of Gallia and even Italia for the men and materials with which to prosecute their offensive. In describing the difficulties encountered during the campaign against L. Afranius and M. Petreius in Hispania Citerior in mid-49 BCE, Caesar explicitly refers to these supply-lines, for late winter flooding temporarily caused a break in communications (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.48.4):[78]

> … neque maximi commeatus qui ex Italia Galliaque veniebant in castra pervenire poterant.

> … and the extremely extended supply-lines that were coming in from Italia and Gallia were unable to arrive at the camp.

With his focus primarily upon the military element, Caesar subsequently sheds a partial light upon the composition of these convoys from far afield. They included Rutenian archers and Gallic cavalry as well as 6,000 infantry, or so it would seem.[79] Not for Caesar nor his audience the inane details in which only a quartermaster or *praefectus fabrum* could glory. It would be of interest to know whether there arrived in droves livestock from the plains of the Po

77 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.80.3.

78 The reading *commeatus* is a Renaissance emendation (Beroaldus) of *comitatus*, which is to be found in all the manuscripts. Nevertheless, as remarked by J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Books 1–2*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1991), 194, the sense of this sentence plausibly calls for such an intervention.

79 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.51.1–2.

or caravans of wheat from the hills of Etruria, but these things are veiled in a decent silence.[80]

In relying upon supplies from Gallia and Italia, Caesar was effectively repeating not only his own course of action in the conquest of Gallia, but also that adopted nearly three decades previously by Pompeius Magnus and Metellus Pius in their campaign against Q. Sertorius. To maintain their armies in that campaign, Pompeius and Metellus had wintered in Gallia Transalpina in alternate years.[81] Moreover, when there occurred a failure of the Gallic harvest in 75 BCE, Pompeius wrote to the Senate, menacingly asking for supplies from Italia.[82] There was no need for Caesar to write a menacing letter to the Senate. His recent campaign in Italia had already assured him that he might rely upon both Italia and Gallia for supplies for the Spanish campaign. What captures the attention in this instance is the repetition of logistical structures spanning incredibly long distances, but viewed as necessary for victory.

Massilia, of course, did not constitute the sole, nor necessarily the primary threat to the logistical structures supporting Caesar's invasion of Hispania. Still smouldering were the embers of the failed Celtic rebellion of 52 BCE. As recorded by Caesar himself, that uprising had been widespread and come close to achieving success. The defeat and surrender of Vercingetorix was not the end of the story.[83] Contrary to literary narratives, history is a seamless continuum, even if the pace may vary considerably from one moment to another.

80 For the livestock of the valley of the Po, see Polyb. 2.15; 12.4.8; Strab. 5.1.12. Perhaps not immaterial is the vision of swine being driven from Calabria and Bruttium to market in late antique Rome. As regards the wheat grown in Etruria, see Varr. *Rust.* 1.44; 1.9.6; T. Frank, *Rome and Italy of the Republic*, volume 1, in: T. Frank, ed., *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*. 6 vols. (Baltimore 1933–1940), 1.364 ("Etruria was especially important in this respect [i.e. as regards wheat growing]"). For an earlier age, with similar strategic needs and preoccupations, see Liv. 28.45.

81 Sall. *Hist.* 2.98.9, for Metellus.

82 Sall. *Hist.* 2.98.6–10. For the question of what might be termed the "authenticity" of this letter, which is an issue comparable to that for the speeches in the historical work of Thucydides, see P. McGushin, *Sallust: The Histories*, translated with introduction and commentary, 2 vols. (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1992–1994), 1.242.

83 It is tempting to draw a comparison with the fall of the Wall of Berlin and the collapse of communism as predicated by F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press: New York 1992). Triumphalist narratives tend to stop short, especially when reality again obtrudes. Unfortunately, Fukuyama's verbal play upon a word that may mean "termination" in terms of a narrative or "goal" from a philosophical perspective, much touted and used by neo-conservatives, has had deleterious consequences for the pursuit of contemporary American foreign policy.

With an artist's eye for effect and the politician's sense of where a limit might be invented, Caesar chose to conclude his narration of the conquest of Gallia with the campaign of 52 and the defeat of Vercingetorix.[84] The events of 51–50 BCE were narrated by A. Hirtius in an attempt to link that narrative to Caesar's account of the civil war in the years 49–48 BCE.[85] Despite the interval of time separating Hirtius' narrative from the events that it recounts and notwithstanding the failure of a rebellion to materialize in 49 BCE, there emerges the vision of a political landscape that was anything but pacified. The victory over Vercingetorix stood in need of consolidation. Numerous campaigns and punitive raids were required in 51–50 BCE.[86] Discontent continued, and only terror and repression kept it in abeyance. Against this backdrop, the Massiliotes' decision to close their city's gates to Caesar assumed an importance it would not otherwise have possessed. It had the potential to serve as the catalyst for yet another rebellion amongst the Celtic populations of Gallia Transalpina.

Accordingly, Caesar halted in the vicinity of Massilia until he was certain of containment of the rebellion that might be sparked by the city's refusal to open its gates to him. Arriving there in mid-April, he remained until early June, spending the better part of two months in installing an army and creating a fleet so as to place the city under a total blockade.[87] The need to create a fleet from raw materials betrays a certain ineptitude upon the part of the conqueror of Gallia and Germania, who seems never to have entertained the thought that the Massiliotes might be moved to refuse him entrance to their city. Apparently, he had believed that the agreement of the Massiliotes to the stationing of a Roman garrison within their city was a foregone conclusion. Otherwise, just as he had moved troops across the Alps and into the foothills of the Pyrenees with a view to anticipating his enemies' movements, he would indubitably have found a plausible reason for the creation of a small fleet to guard the lower

84 T.P. Wiseman, "The publication of *De Bello Gallico*," 1–10, in: K. Welch and A. Powell (eds.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. The War Commentaries as Political Instruments*, (Duckworth: London 1998); T.P. Wiseman, *The Roman Audience. Classical Literature as Social History*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015), 101–102.

85 Hirt. *B Gall.* 8.praef. 2. See J.F. Gaertner, and B.C. Hausburg, *Caesar and the Bellum Alexandrinum. An Analysis of Style, Narrative Technique, and the Reception of Greek Historiography*, (Hypomnemata, 192), (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 2013).

86 E.g. Hirt. *B Gall.* 8.24–25 (operations against Ambiorix); 25 and 45 (operations of Labienus against the Treviri).

87 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.36.4–5; KHM 1959[12]: 370.

reaches of the Rhône.[88] Indeed, he had already moved an army into place with the summoning from winter quarters of the VI, X, and XIV legions under the command of his *legatus* C. Trebonius.[89] Caesar departed to assume command of the invasion of Hispania only after the besieging army had taken up positions and the fleet had been committed to the sea, leaving C. Trebonius and D. Brutus as the respective commanders.

5 Chagrin at Massilia

For the proconsul who had declared that he was fighting a civil war in order to defend his *dignitas*, there could be no brooking the refusal of the Massiliotes to open their gates to Caesar in early April 49 BCE. Aside from cool calculations of *Realpolitik* and the geopolitical importance of Massilia, there was also the issue of Caesar's personal honour. By the reception that they accorded to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (*cos.* 54 BCE) after having told Caesar that they were unable to decide between Caesar and Pompeius, the Massiliotes gravely offended Caesar. Feeling a visceral dislike for Ahenobarbus and unwilling to recognize him as his own duly appointed successor in Gallia Transalpina, Caesar perceived the Massiliote reception of Ahenobarbus as a personal affront to himself. Incapable or unwilling to distinguish between his own person and the Roman state that he purportedly wished to protect, Caesar took umbrage and treated the Massiliote decison as a hostile act, deploying three legions and a small fleet against a faithful, long-standing ally of the Roman people.

The Massiliote decision gains in significance if it be recalled that a Massiliote embassy had been present in Rome at the moment of the outbreak of civil war in January 49 BCE. Although he notes their presence and their interview with Pompeius Magnus prior to that general's abandonment of Rome, Caesar does not record what was the reason for their travelling to Rome. There is room for speculation. But perhaps best is a rather simple explanation suggested by Caesar's own description of the benefactions that he and Pompeius had con-

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88 For anticipatory attack in the case of Hispania Citerior, see M. Rambaud, "Les marches des Césariens vers l'Espagne au début de la guerre civile," 845–861, in: *L'Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine. Mélanges offerts à Jacques Heurgon*, (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 27) (École française de Rome: Roma 1976), 845–861. As regards the invasion of Italia, see discussion in Chapter One.

89 *Pace* Caes. *B Civ.* 1.36.4. For this revealing fact, see H.-M. Ottmer, *Die Rubikon-Legende. Untersuchungen zu Caesars und Pompeius' Strategie vor und nach Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges*, (Boldt: Boppard am Rhein 1979), 38.

ferred upon the community. According to what seems the preferable reading of the evidence, Caesar had granted to the Massiliotes territories belonging to the Volcae Arecomici and the Helvii. It is to be remembered that Caesar's *acta* as governor of Gallia Transalpina had not yet been approved. Moreover, even in the months immediately preceding the civil war, Caesar's *acta* seemed most unlikely ever to achieve that status.[90] It may not be overly bold to suggest that the Massiliote embassy present at Rome early in 49 was intent upon persuading the Senate to recognize Caesar's administrative disposition in their favour.[91]

Notwithstanding the fact that the Massiliote embassy present at Rome had conferred with Pompeius Magnus prior to returning home, Caesar expected to encounter no obstacle in his military occupation of the city. Otherwise, the construction of a fleet would have been well underway, if not finished, by the time of his arrival there in early April.[92] The reasons for this errant judgement were multiple.

First and foremost, there was Caesar's putative status as *patronus* of Massilia. The bestowal upon Massilia of lands of the Volcae Arecomici and Helvii was quite recent, and the gratitude felt for this act should have consequently been all the stronger. Caesar has Pompeius label this act of generosity on Caesar's part as *nova Caesaris beneficia*.[93] No specific date is recorded, but the oblique testimony offered by Caesar's *Gallic War* points to 52/51 BCE. The Volcae Arecomici and Helvii seem to have figured amongst those Celtic peoples who had sought to re-assert their liberty at the moment of the uprising led by Vercingetorix. Hence, within the context of 52 BCE, Caesar records the pressure that

90 K. Raaflaub, *Dignitatis Contentio. Studien zur Motivation und politischen Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius*, (Vestigia, 20), (C.H. Beck: München 1974), 31–35; L. de Libero, *Obstruktion. Politische Praktiken im Senat und in der Volksversammlung der ausgehenden römischen Republik (70–49 v. Chr.)*, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1992), 47.

91 It is to be presumed that the Massiliote ambassadors were present with a view to addressing the Senate in the course of the sessions to be held in February. For normal practice, see R.W. Westall, "Embassies of the middle and late Republic: Movement to, from, and within the city of Rome", 23–36, in: I. Östenberg, S. Malmberg, and J. Bjørnebye (eds.), *The Moving City. Processions, Passages and Promenades in Ancient Rome*, (Bloomsbury: London 2015), 24.

92 For the time needed to "cure" wood for ship-building, see J. Radkau, *Wood. A History*, tr. P. Camiller, (Polity Press: Cambridge 2012), 74; cf. R. Meiggs, *Trees and timber in the ancient Mediterranean world*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1982), 125. Although belonging to the experiences of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, the observations quoted by Radkau afford precious insight into what was in all likelihood a very similar reality for the Romans of the late Republic.

93 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.34.3.

was exerted by Vercingetorix upon the Volcae Arecomici and the Helvii.[94] An increase in the revenues of Massilia should have earned the city's goodwill.[95]

Secondly, like most of his peers, Caesar does not appear to have entertained much respect for the martial abilities of contemporary Hellenes.[96] By general accord, they were not on a par with that displayed by the men of Sparta and Athens at the time of the Persian wars. The Mithridatic wars had not revealed any brilliant capacity for military action. As for the Massiliotes in particular, surrounded as they were by a sea of barbarism, they had repeatedly called upon the Romans for military assistance against their Celtic and Ligurian neighbours over the past century and a half. Conscious of possessing a sizeable veteran military force, Caesar did not expect to meet with refusal from the Massiliotes when he sought permission to enter their city and occupy it through a Roman garrison.

Indeed, over the course of the 50s BCE, Caesar had repeatedly provided evidence of an ability to survive even when most observers would have considered his prospects dim at best. In 58 BCE the knowledge that the proconsul was marching north to engage the Helvetii in combat must have gladdened his enemies, thanks to recollection of the disaster suffered by L. Cassius in 107 BCE.[97] Similarly, if the subsequent proposal of Cato is any indication, the prospect of Caesar's fighting the Germans will have offered his enemies renewed hope that he would be put out of the way.[98] It is within this light that we should read Pompeius' countenancing the *ratio absentis* for Caesar in legislation dating to 52 BCE.[99] Frankly, report of Caesar's death was expected in Rome at any

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94 Caes. *B Gall.* 7.7.4, 64.6.

95 It seems appropriate to recall that it was likewise at the close of the 50s BCE that Caesar rewarded his soldiers by doubling their remuneration. See B. Woytek, *Arma et Nummi. Forschungen zur römischen Finanzgeschichte und Münzprägung der Jahre 49 bis 42 v.Chr.* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Wien 2003), 537–545, for the increase in pay for Roman legionaries effected by Caesar, which must be linked to their good faith in the civil war that followed.

96 Indeed, the names of the Massiliote generals Parmenon and Hermon and that of Apollonides, the president of the Six Hundred, have virtually disappeared, but for the stray reference surviving within the commentaries on Lucan's historical epic: schol. ad Lucan. 3.375, 524.

97 Caes. *B Gall.* 1.7.4.

98 Plut. *Caes.* 22.4 (= *FRH* 44 [Tanusius Geminus] F3a = Peter F3); cf. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 51.1–5; *Crass.* 37.2–3 = *Synkr. Nic. et Crass.* 4.2–3. See also App. *Gall.* 18.2 (= *FRH* 44 [Tanusius Geminus] F3b).

99 L. Gagliardi, *Cesare, Pompeo e la lotta per le magistrature, anni 52–50 a.C.* (Giuffrè: Milano 2011), 105–149, for a convincing exegesis (Suet. *Iul.* 28.2–3; Cass. Dio 40.56.1–3). Founded

moment. Having survived these previous challenges and purporting to have conquered the whole of Gallia and Germania, Caesar entertained no doubt as to being welcomed within Massilia.

In the final analysis, it is worth recollecting that, for all its fame and extensive possessions, the city of Massilia was rather unprepossessing in terms of size. On the most optimistic estimate, that of a local historian fiercely proud of his subject, the city of Massilia ought to be reckoned at less than 10,000 souls.[100] The figure is of necessity an extrapolation, albeit a reasonable one, from the more reliable statistic of the city's surface area. In the mid-first century BCE, the circuit of the walls of Massilia can be traced with with a high degree of certainty and shown to have enclosed a surface area of ca. 50 ha.[101] Somewhat less than that of the old city-centre of Ostia, this figure was altogether dwarfed by that of Rome as defined by the so-called Servian wall, which came to an imposing 426 ha.[102] Confirmation for the correctness of the demographic estimate comes from Caesar's evidence for the number of ships deployed by the Massiliotes in mid-49 BCE: 17 long-ships and a great many smaller vessels.[103] The deployment of this naval stock would have necessitated no more than 2,000 to 2,500 men at most.[104] Aware that maritime fighting would be required and not one to stint in preparations, Caesar contented himself with creating of fleet of just 12 warships.[105] Manifestly Massilia did not have the appearance of being able to present a serious challenge to Roman arms.

The impression created by diminutive Massilia's decision to oppose the conqueror of the whole of Gallia and Germania was sensational, to say the least. One Italian community after another had opened its gates without hesitation

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upon an eye for the details of legal procedure, this is a compelling reconstruction of an affair that has caused much debate.

100 C. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*. 8 vols. (Hachette: Paris 1908–1926), 1.210. Cf. F. Lot, *Recherches sur la population et la superficie des cités remontant à la période gallo-romaine*. 3 vols. (Champion: Paris 1945–1953), 1.175, where cool scepticism is expressed.

101 L.-F. Gantes, "La topographie de Marseille grecque. Bilan des recherches (1829–1991)," 71–88, in: *Marseille grecque et la Gaule*. *Etudes Massaliètes* 3 (Université de Provence: Lattes 1992), 85, based upon the archaeological discoveries subsequent to World War II. The general line of the rampart, which defines the Hellenistic city, seems to have continued in use under the Principate. Cf. Gantes 1992: 72, for an estimated surface area of 12 ha in the first half of the sixth century BCE.

102 A. Claridge, *Rome*. *An Oxford Archaeological Guide*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1998), 59.

103 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.56.1–2.

104 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 2.4.1, on the plentiful supply of rowers and captains.

105 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.36.4.

as Caesar descended along the Adriatic coastline in an attempt to hem in his opponents. Now, at last and in the most unexpected of quarters, courage was found to withstand the terrors of a siege (Lucan. 3.388–392):

> Iam satis hoc Graiae memorandum contigit urbi
> aerternumque decus, quod non inpulsa nec ipso
> strata metu tenuit flagrantis in omnia belli
> praecipitem cursum, raptisque a Caesare cunctis
> vincitur una mora.
>
> Already the Greek city had in this sufficient fame
> and eternal glory, because she, not cast down nor
> laid low by fear, held up the headlong rush of war
> as it blazed everywhere, and, when all was taken by Caesar,
> she alone was conquered with delay.

The delay that this cost Caesar and the chagrin involved subsequently decided him upon harsh treatment of the Massiliotes when they finally surrendered. As in the subsequent case of Gomphi, Caesar salved his pride when he found it expedient to visit condign punishment upon Massilia, lest other cities be tempted to lend assistance to his enemies.

Anger scintillates from Caesar's text as he relates Massiliote faithlessness and the punishment that followed this breach of faith. There is a deft juxtaposition of the verbal neutrality adopted by the Massiliotes and their active aggression under the auspices of Ahenobarbus, just arrived within their city.[106] "Moved by these injuries", Caesar initiates the siege and blockade of the city.[107] The two naval engagements that occurred in the following months are described in dramatically charged terms, with Caesar unusually choosing to focus upon the pathos of the besieged city's inhabitants and the desperation of the Massiliotes who fought.[108] With malicious understatement, he observes that not a single one of Nasidius' ships was lost in the second battle, where the Massiliotes lost over half of their naval stock.[109] In the wake of Roman advances in the siege by land, there follows an eloquent, deceptive plea by the Massiliotes

106 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.35.5 and 1.36.1–3.

107 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.36.4: *quibus iniuriis permotus*. For the concept and its significance for Roman politics in action, see D.F. Epstein, *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics, 218–43 B.C.*, (Croom Helm: London 1987).

108 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.4 and 2.6.1.

109 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.7.1–2.

for armistice.[110] Again the Massiliotes display bad faith in dealing with Caesar's representatives and soldiers, but are soon compelled to accept the hopelessness of their situation. The resumption of operations by Caesar's soldiers and their abandonment by Nasidius together force them to abandon hope. Aware of what was soon to occur, Ahenobarbus again ignominiously abandoned his command and fled in the midst of a storm, leaving the city alone to face the wrath of the conqueror. When Caesar returned shortly thereafter, he ordered the Massiliotes to surrender all their weapons, naval stock, and money within the public treasury, stationing two legions within the city as a garrison and sardonically commenting that he had saved the Massiliotes "because of the city's great antiquity rather than on account of the services that they had rendered him".[111]

In describing his interview with Massiliote representatives in early April 49 BCE, Caesar claims, with dubious logic, to have exhorted the Massiliotes to imitate the moral example offered by the whole of Italia, rather than submit to the orders of a single individual. From what follows it is clear that he had in mind the imminent arrival of Ahenobarbus. However, any disinterested observer would have remarked that it was Caesar who had acted contrary to the wishes of the whole of Italia, as expressed in time-honoured fashion by a resolution of the Senate.

Inevitably, any formalist, constitutionalist attempt to resolve the impasse caused by the conflict between Caesar and Pompeius could not expect to meet with favour from Caesar. By accepting Ahenobarbus into their city, the Massiliotes in effect recognized the illegitimacy that now attached to Caesar's exercise of power. The fact that Ahenobarbus had but lately been himself a prisoner of Caesar at Corfinium only rendered the decision all the more offensive. *Patroni* could hardly expect the communities of which they were benefactors to go to war for them. On the other hand, they did perform *beneficia* with an eye to augmenting their personal prestige.[112] Hence, the rebuff that Caesar suffered before the walls of Massilia earned his vindictive ire and undying ignominy for the city. As a result, a series of punitive measures of an administrative nature were taken, and the city's effigy was paraded in the Gallic triumph held at Rome in July 46 BCE.

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110 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.12.

111 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.22.6.

112 C.F. Eilers, *Roman patrons of Greek cities*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2002), 97.

6 Massilia and Phocaea, or the Theme of *Libertas*

The loss of Massilia constituted a grievous reverse for Caesar's enemies. Had this faithful ally of Rome been able to break the blockade imposed by Caesar, then the successes achieved with incredible rapidity in Italia and Hispania would have been set at nought. Lines of communication, by both land and sea, would have been at risk, and the resources of Gallia Ulterior would have permitted Ahenobarbus to worry Caesar's forces on every side. Perhaps even more importantly, Massilia had, for one brief moment, served as a symbol of what was at stake in this conflict. Juridically a *civitas libera* and hence in theory not subject to the commands of a Roman proconsul, Massilia was fighting for her freedom in resisting Caesar's desire to enter the city and install a garrison there. Like the tribune of the *plebs* L. Metellus, the Massiliotes by their actions highlighted the hollowness of Caesar's claims to be concerned with the *libertas* of his fellow-citizens.[113]

Those of the Senate who had fled Caesar's occupation of the Italian peninsula by and large gathered in temporary, self-imposed exile at Thessalonica. There they learned of Massilia's capitulation to Caesar towards the very end of 49 BCE. The city had sought and secured a truce perhaps as early as the beginning of August, but the actual capitulation took place only after Caesar's return towards the end of October.[114] Only late July by the reckoning of the sun, the season was yet favourable to the passage of information by way of sea. Indeed, L. Afranius was leading some of the Spanish cohorts of his former army eastwards at this very moment in order to join Pompeius in Macedonia.[115] Forty-five days, or a month-and-a-half, seems expeditious for information to travel from Massilia to Thessalonica. In all likelihood, news of the city's surrender arrived in Thessalonica towards the middle of December 49 BCE.[116]

Seizing the chance to portray themselves as the upholders of *libertas*, no less a sham than that pretended by Caesar, the rump Senate in Thessalonica

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113 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.91.2. Not all treaties are equal in application, and the modern desire to find that fact expressed in the legal language of diplomacy is patently misguided. For the theme, on the other hand, see now S. Dmitriev, *The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2011).

114 KHM 1959^{12}: 371–372.

115 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.88.3; J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Book 3*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1993), 210–211.

116 This deduction is easily forgotten in view of Caesar's omission and the way in which Dio's narrative is constructed, separating the event from its original location: Cass. Dio 41.25.3, 43.1, 44.1.

attributed the status of *civitas libera* to Massilia's mother-city Phocaea.[117] This Ionian community lying upon the western coast of Anatolia was now but a mere shadow of its former self in the glorious age of the mid-sixth century BCE. Prior to the Persian conquest and the subsequent growth of other great powers, such as Athens and Carthage, Phocaea and the other Ionian communities in Asia Minor had dominated the main lanes of the Mediterranean for some decades.[118] Now Phocaea was an insignificant, sleepy seaside community. Despite the language of the decree passed by the Senate resident in Thessalonica, the status accorded to Phocaea was meant not so much to offset the damage inflicted upon Massilia as to win the hearts and minds of the Greek-speaking East, whose material and financial support was the key to Pompeius' eventual victory in civil war.[119]

Accordingly, the senatorial decree utilized the forms and slogans of Hellenic diplomacy in order to achieve this end. Blood relationship was invoked and *libertas*, or rather ἐλευθερία, was bestowed in a relatively sophisticated attempt to reconcile Hellenic communities in the East to Roman financial exactions in the midst of a Roman civil war.

Whether genuine or fictitious, kin relationships played a fundamental role in Graeco-Roman diplomacy. Archaic history was characteristically understood in terms of genealogies, with lengthy lists linking contemporary or legendary rulers to heroes and the gods. The descent of Romulus from Aeneas and that of the Spartan kings from Hercules are but two well-known instances of the phenomenon. Viewing the novel and new as simply a rediscovery of the old, the ancients analogously constructed diplomatic relations upon the basis of putative kinship linking the two communities concerned. So, for example, the Senate in its declarations had frequently recognized their Gallic allies the Aedui as "brothers and kin" of the Roman people.[120] It was this same idea of kinship that motivated the Massiliotes to speak in defense of the

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117 Cass. Dio 41.25.3; Lucan. 5.53 (*Massiliaeque suae donatur libera Phocis*). For the history of the *metropolis*, see *RE* 20.1 (1941) 444–448 s.v. "Phokaia" (J. Keil).

118 Thuc. 1.13.6.

119 Although Dio's claim that the attribution was effected by Pompeius is an anachronism to be expected of an author writing under the Principate, the report that freedom was given in recompense for the Massiliotes' loss of all except the mere name of freedom is surely accurate reflection of the original language of the *senatus consultum*. As for the raising of funds in the East, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.4–5, naturally without any reference to Phocaea.

120 Caes. *B Gall*. 1.33.2; D.C. Braund, "The Aedui, Troy, and the *Apocolocyntosis*," *Classical Quarterly* 30 (1980) 420–425.

interests of the Lampsacenes before the Senate in 197 BCE.[121] The Lampsacenes were kinsmen of the Massiliotes, for their city was also said to have been founded by the Phocaeans.[122] Viewed against the backdrop of this cultural milieu, the decision of the Senate in Thessalonica to reward the Phocaeans for the sufferings endured by the Massiliotes becomes comprehensible and perhaps inevitable.

Freedom was a periodically recurring *Leitmotiv* of the Hellenic world from the Archaic age onwards.[123] After the age of expansion and then resistance to encroachment by the Lydian ruler and others, there had followed inexorable conquest by the Persians. In response to this challenge, most memorably manifested by the Persian wars of the early fifth century BCE, freedom had become a widespread political slogan within the Hellenic world. Paradoxically, it was to prove an ennobling *casus belli* for Alexander the Great. Naturally the successors to the Macedonian conqueror obsequiously included this concept within their public pronouncements, and the Romans did no less as they progressively wrested territories from the Antigonid and Seleucid monarchs. Even though the form had long since been emptied of its original content, the Romans proclaimed themselves the political heirs of Themistocles by their alleged concern for Hellenic freedom. Finding collaboration profitable and less onerous, their Greek subjects and allies were content with this state of affairs.[124]

As a result, it should occasion no surprise that there is evidence for the cross-fertilization of historiography and contemporary events as regards the theme of freedom. On the one hand, representation of the naval battle at Massilia was influenced by the historiographical tradition for the Persian wars. On the other hand, representation of the Persian conquest of Phocaea seems influenced by the decision taken at Thessalonica to award that city its freedom. Caesar, for his part, is more pragmatic and eschews complex ideological constructions, but does nevertheless seem to contrast implicitly his treatment of Massilia with that accorded to Athens by L. Sulla nearly four decades previously.

In the course of one of the two naval engagements fought at Massilia, C. Acilius, one of the rank and file of the Legio X. gave a signal display of martial valour, effecting the capture and sinking of an enemy ship despite having lost his right

121 *SIG*^{3} 591; Gruen 1984: 542–543.

122 Euseb. *Chron. Can.* 95D s.v. 654/3 BCE; P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Lampsakos*, (Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien, 6), (R. Habelt: Bonn 1978), 107–108; *pace* Strab. 13.1.19, claiming a Milesian intervention.

123 For a recent, detailed review of the subject, see Dmitriev 2011: 15–141.

124 Plut. *De re publica gerenda* 805A, 824C–E.

hand.[125] The accomplishment recalls that of the Athenian hoplite Cynegirus, who was said to have participated in the battle of Marathon.[126] The similarity might be deemed cause for suspecting the veracity of this story told about Acilius, especially since there is no trace of the episode in Caesar's *Civil War* and Caesar's account of the two naval engagements are so full as to discourage any suspicion of textual disruption.[127] Yet, the evidence of Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, and Suetonius as an ensemble suggests that Acilius was mentioned by Livy, who was conceivably drawing once more upon the antecedent and dramatically composed *Historiae* of C. Asinius Pollio. The heroic vision of the gravely wounded soldier using his shield's boss to beat back the enemy and take the ship would have been congenial to Pollio, already a known author of tragedies, and may well inform Horace's reference to seas "discoloured" by Italian slaughter when allusively describing the contents of Pollio's work.[128]

If the Persian wars might provide a model for contemporary accounts of the Roman civil war, with equal power was contemporary debate able to influence the representation of the Persian conquest of Phocaea. From what little survives, it would appear that as of the late Republic there existed two alternative chronologies for the foundation of Massilia. The high chronology situated that event ca. 600 BCE. The low chronology, by contrast, claimed that the city's settlement had been occasioned by the Persian conquest of Phocaea and accordingly dated it ca. 545 BCE. Writing a universal history at Rome in the 20s BCE, the Alexandrian rhetorician Timagenes adopted the low chronology, thereby giving its causal explanation canonical status even when authors such as Eusebius of Caesarea perpetuated the high dating.[129] Writing twenty years or more after the Caesarian siege and conquest of Massilia, Timagenes may nonetheless have been influenced by the debate concerning freedom at that particular time, especially since he seems to have then been present in Rome. It is to be

125 Val. Max. 3.22; Plut. *Caes.* 16.2; Suet. *Iul.* 68.4; cf. Lucan. 3.609–633, where this accomplishment is transferred to a Massiliote.

126 Hdt. 6.114. Valerius Maximus and Suetonius both explicitly point out the parallel. Presumably their source(s) did the same.

127 As opposed to other, clear evidence for an indubitably lacunose text. For instance, see H.C. Avery, "A Lost Episode in Caesar's *Civil War*," *Hermes* 121 (1993) 452–469, esp. 459–460 on the Illyrian episode missing from the transmitted text. Another instance may be that of the omitted omens preceding the battle of Pharsalus, for which see App. *B Civ.* 2.68.281–69.288.

128 Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.33–36. While the 30s offered numerous naval battles, Pollio seems not to have gone beyond 40 BCE.

129 For the *testimonia* and fragments for Timagenes of Alexandria, see *FGrHist* no. 88.

remembered that this obstreperous individual was the guest of Pollio, having fallen out of favour with the Princeps. The version that he propagated is ideologically charged; of that there can subsist no doubt. Under threat from the Persians, the Phocaeans had abandoned their homeland in order to sail west and create a new community where they might live in freedom. The banalization is simple, but effective and highly relevant to the use that the Senate at Thessalonica made of Phocaea in response to Caesar's taking of Massilia. It is also what might have been expected of a writer described as "the enemy of Roman good fortune".[130]

Firmly convinced of the justice of his cause, Caesar appears rather to have wished readers to draw a favourable contrast between himself and another renegade proconsul, L. Sulla. Although Caesar portrays the Massiliotes as naturally inclined to be mendacious and meriting the blockade that he had instituted, he represents himself as having nevertheless taken care to avoid the indiscriminate slaughter that would have followed his soldiers' immediately entering the city that had caused them so much grief (Caes. *B Civ.* 2.13.3–4):

> Caesar enim per litteras Trebonio magnopere mandaverat, ne per vim oppidum expugnari pateretur, ne gravius permoti milites et defectionis odio et contemptione sui et diutino labore omnis puberes interficerent; quod se facturos minabantur aegreque tunc sunt retenti quin oppidum irrumperent, graviterque eam rem tulerunt, quod stetisse per Trebonium quominus oppido potirentur videbatur.

> For Caesar by means of a letter had emphatically ordered Trebonius not to allow the city to be taken by force, lest the soldiers in outrage at their treachery, at the contempt shown for themselves, and at the length of the operation should kill all the men of military age. They were threatening to do just this, and it was with difficulty that they were hindered from breaking into the city at this time. They were quite resentful that it seemed that it was on account of Trebonius that they did not take possession of the town.

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130 That Pollio nurtured a viper in his bosom need not disconcert. After all, he was remarked for his adherence to frankly speaking one's mind, or *parrhesia*: For Pollio's habit of speaking his mind, see A.B. Bosworth, "Asinius Pollio and Augustus," *Historia* 21 (1972) 441–473; cf. L. Morgan, "The Autopsy of C. Asinius Pollio," *Journal of Roman Studies* 90 (2000) 51–69. Rather, possessing or perhaps vaunting a capacity for self-criticism, he seems to have appreciated others also inclined to question the purity of Roman motives and the nature of their successes.

Reading in a similar vein is Caesar's description of his punishment of the Massiliotes. Sardonic in his exercise of clemency, which he evokes without having to expressly name "this new means of conquest", he notes that they deserved far less (Caes. *B Civ*. 2.22.5–6):

> Massilienses arma tormentaque ex oppido, ut est imperatum, proferunt, navis ex portu navalibusque educunt, pecuniam ex publico tradunt. Quibus rebus confectis Caesar magis eos pro nomine et vetustate quam pro meritis in se civitatis conservans …
>
> The Massiliotes brought their weapons and catapults out of the town, as had been ordered; they led their ships forth from the harbour and dockyards, and surrendered the money from their treasury. When these things had been done, Caesar, sparing them rather on account of the fame and antiquity of the city than because of anything they had done for him …

For any contemporary reader, there should have immediately come to mind the contrast with the treatment accorded to Athens by L. Sulla in 86 BCE. After a lengthy, difficult siege, Sulla had ordered his men to enter the city by night and expressly permitted them to indulge in rape and looting.[131] As a result of the subdued language of Caesar's rebuff and the lack of violence involved in the moment of Caesar's taking of Massilia, Caesar emerges as the more effective leader, if a comparison was intended. Then, as upon a later occasion, Caesar might well have castigated his predecessor for being a political illiterate.

131 Plut. *Sull.* 14 (cf. *Mor.* 202e); Paus. 9.33.6 (cf. 1.20.6); Gran. Licinian. 35.61 p. 19 Criniti; App. *Mithr.* 38–39. Overall, see Kallett-Marx 1995: 212–219; C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, tr. D. Lucas Schneider. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1997), 306–311.

CHAPTER 6

Africa

Introduction

In the unforgettable judgement of Theodor Mommsen, Rome was content to behold the corpse of Carthage in the aftermath of the Third Punic War (149–146 BCE).[1] The formulation is hasty and myopic. True, the Romans consciously fractured the Carthaginian power, razing Carthage to the ground and granting freedom to a number of cities as well as dividing the spoils of war with the Numidians. Nonetheless, the *provincia* of Africa came into existence, and Romans did engage in exploiting the economic opportunities offered by the territory's extraordinary natural resources. Various items bespeak a lively interest in Africa on the part of the Romans. There was the attempt to create a Roman colony upon the former site of Carthage, which enterprise proved abortive only because of political contention at Rome. There was the widespread presence of Roman and Italian merchants active, which gave rise to the incident that provoked the war against Jugurtha. There was the imposition of tribute, which yielded dietary staples constituting the basis for the urban development of Rome as an imperial capital. Within the century that followed the destruction of Carthage and annexation of Africa, the Romans display no signs of neglecting the new province, even if exploitation was neither systematic nor always swift to occur.[2]

Caesar's narrative affords an opportunity to reflect upon the relevance of Africa to Rome within the emerging imperial system, if only entrenched misconceptions may be avoided. First and foremost amongst the latter is the seductive, anachronistic thesis that Caesar derives his information from reports written primarily by C. Asinius Pollio. Fortunately, there is sufficient internal evi-

1 T. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, (Weidmannsche Buchhandlung: Berlin 1886[3]), 5.623; cf. C. Lepelley, "Hans-Georg Pflaum et l'Afrique romaine," 26 n. 25, in: S. Demougin, X. Loriot, P. Cosme, and S. Lefebvre (eds.), *H.-G. Pflaum, un historien du xxe siècle*, (Droz: Genève 2006).

2 For concise, useful surveys introducing the history and problems of Roman Africa, see: J. Desanges, "L'Afrique romaine et libyco-berbère," 627–656, in: C. Nicolet (ed.), *Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen. Tome 2: Genèse d'un empire*, (Presses universitaires françaises: Paris 1978); C. Briand-Ponsart and C. Hugoniot, *L'Afrique romaine. De l'Atlantique à la Tripolitaine, 146 av. J.-C.–533 ap. J.-C.* (A. Colin: Paris 2005).

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dence to permit discernment of the sources for Caesar's narrative, thereby allowing a clearer vision of its evidentiary value.

Subsequently, investigation of the Caesarian narrative may focus most profitably upon three principal areas. Of these two are intimately connected between themselves: provincial administration and the disposition of armies. Both the administrative confusion that obtained within the province of Africa in 49 BCE and the rapidity with which legions were called into being are indicative of a capillary Roman presence upon the territory and the important role that Africa played within the Roman economy. It was Africa's production of grain, the third area to be examined here, that rendered the possession of Africa indispensable to the master of Italia. As is revealed by analysis of *l'histoire événementielle* of late 49 BCE, without Africa Caesar could not expect to maintain peace and order within the imperial capital over the long-term, nor even within the ranks of his own legions. As suggested by the fleet moored before the provincial capital of Utica, the grain of Africa was the condition *sine qua non* for economic tranquillity and the rule of law at Rome and within the Italian peninsula.

1 The Sources of Caesar's Narrative

The evaluation of any historical account depends in large part upon identification of the sources underlying the narrative at hand. Not all language has the same value. The character of witnesses is relevant to a judgement of their affirmations, whether within the setting of a courtroom or for the studied reflection of the historian. Hence, the knowledge that Caesar himself is ultimately to be deemed the author of the *Civil War* is of inestimable value to the historian. As a protagonist in the events that he relates, Caesar was in a position to know the truth, if anyone did. Which is not to claim that he is truthful, for often he can be convicted of artfully altering or misrepresenting the actual course of events. On the other hand, whatever the truth of any given affirmation within Caesar's work, it is insufficient to assert that he relied upon his non-literary *commentarii* in composing the *Civil War*. That does not resolve, but merely postpones the question of sources. Effectively, three possible categories exist: the autopsy of Caesar himself, the testimony of others, and possible invention by Caesar. It was the interaction between these three categories, as mediated by the historical imagination of Caesar, that gave rise to the narrative of the *Civil War*.

This question of the sources for Caesar's account occurs in its most acute form in the narrative of Curio's north African campaign of mid-49 BCE. Caesar was not present on the territory at the time nor, as far as is known, had he ever

been there. Only in the campaign of 46–45 BCE did he at last set foot upon the African continent, putting at risk both life and reputation. The information that Caesar presents to readers, therefore, must derive from sources other than his own autopsy. Surprisingly, despite the subject's intrinsic interest, thought concerned with the identity of these sources is far from rigorous or convincing.

The situation is perhaps best initially exemplified by analysis of a passage that comes from the conclusion of Caesar's account of the campaign led by Curio in mid-49 BCE. In this passage, replete with the drama to be expected of an expedition that ended disastrously, Caesar relates what happened to the legionaries who made up the expeditionary force (Caes. *B Civ.* 2.43.1–44.2):

> His rebus cognitis Marcius Rufus quaestor in castris relictus a Curione cohortatur suos, ne animo deficiant. Illi orant atque obsecrant ut in Siciliam navibus reportentur. Pollicetur magistrisque imperat navium ut primo vespere omnis scaphas ad litus appulsas habeant. Sed tantus fuit omnium terror ut alii adesse copias Iubae dicerent, alii cum legionibus instare Varum iamque se pulverem venientium cernere, quarum rerum nihil omnino acciderat, alii classem hostium celeriter advolaturum suspicarentur. Itaque perterritis omnibus sibi quisque consulebat. Qui in classe erant proficisci properabant. Horum fuga navium onerariarum magistros incitabat: pauci lenunculi ad officium imperiumque conveniebant. Sed tanta erat completis litoribus contentio, qui potissimum ex magno numero conscenderent, ut multitudine atque onere non nulli deprimerentur, reliqui hoc timore propius adire tardarentur. Quibus rebus accidit ut pauci milites patresque familiae, qui aut gratia aut misericordia valerent aut navis adnare possent, recepti in Siciliam incolumes pervenirent. Reliquae copiae missis ad Varum noctu legatorum numero centurionibus sese ei dediderunt. Quorum cohortis militum postero die ante oppidum Iuba conspicatus, suam esse praedicans praedam, magnam partem eorum interfici iussit, paucos electos in regnum remisit, cum Varus suam fidem ab eo laedi quaereretur neque resistere auderet.

> Upon learning of these things, the quaestor Marcius Rufus who had been left at the camp by Curio exhorted his men not to lose hope. They begged and pleaded to be taken back to Sicilia by the ships. He promised to do so and ordered the captains of the ships to bring their all of their boats in to shore in the early evening. However, so great was everyone's fear that some said that the forces of Juba were present, others said that Varus was approaching with his legions and they could already see the dust caused by their arrival—neither of which things had at all taken

> place—, and yet others suspected that the enemy fleet would rapidly swoop down. So, in a state of general fear, each and every man took thought for himself. Those who comprised the military fleet made haste to depart. The flight of these ships bestirred the captains of the supply ships. A few skiffs complied with duty and the order that had been given. But on the packed shores there was such quarrelling for as many of this large number to embark as possible that as a result some skiffs began to sink due to the weight of the numbers embarked and and the others hesitated to approach out of fear of the same fate. Since matters stood thus, it happened that only a few soldiers, who were heads of families—who were able to make use of gratitude or mercy or were able to swim out to the ships—were taken aboard and safely reached Sicilia. The remaining forces sent some centurions as envoys to Varus by night and surrendered themselves to him. On the following day, catching sight of the cohorts of these soldiers before the town, Juba said that they were his spoils and ordered the greater part of them to be killed. A select few were sent back to his kingdom. Varus complained that his good faith was injured by this, but he did not dare to resist.

Eschewing numbers as is usual within the tradition of Classical historiography, Caesar leaves readers with the impression that a lucky few managed to effect their escape, whereas the vast majority were condemned to a desultory fate at the hands of the Numidian monarch Juba. In short as the focus shifts from one actor to another, from the Caesarian quaestor to the stranded men and from the Numidian king to the powerless proconsul, the implications of this military disaster emerge in full clarity. The victory of Caesar's enemies means that control of the province has effectively passed from the Romans to their Numidian ally.

To whom was Caesar indebted for the details of this tragic vision that he has fashioned with such care? According to the analytical school of the nineteenth century, C. Asinius Pollio is a plausible candidate as the source for Caesar's information.[3] Although the analytical school is now held in discredit, for the premiss that Caesar merely linked together accounts written by others is belied by attentive philological analysis, that surmisal continues to enjoy a vigorous

3 E.g. R. Menge, *De auctoribus commentariorum de bello civili qui Caesaris nomine feruntur*, (Hofbuchdruck: Weimar 1873). A similar stance may be perceived in Kornemann 1896 (see below), who sought to restore Pollio on the basis of Appian. This has had a decisive influence on the work of Gabba and therefore most twentieth-century scholars.

existence.[4] The thesis of Caesar's dependence upon Pollio for information should be resisted notwithstanding its power of seduction.

The rationale underlying modern identification of Pollio as Caesar's source for the expedition in north Africa is comprehensible, even though the thesis does not withstand scrutiny. It is well established that Asinius Pollio took part in Curio's fatal expedition to north Africa. In his account of that expedition, Appian of Alexandria more than once refers explicitly to the actions of Pollio.[5] For reasons not altogether convincing, Pollio narrowly avoided meeting with the fate of Curio. Subsequently, he was amongst those fortunate enough to effect their escape from the shores of Africa amidst the general chaos of an improvised withdrawal. Thus Appian, with modern commentary. But Pollio went on to write the *Historiae*, an account of the 40s BCE that visibly informs parts of Appian's narrative. From this follows the temptation to believe that he wrote an account that lies behind that of Caesar. Writing the *Historiae* in the 30s and 20s BCE, Pollio manifestly composed that work long after Caesar had written the *Bellum Civile*, presumably in late 48 BCE. Nevertheless, since Curio can hardly have written an account of what followed his death, there has been the temptation to suggest that Pollio was the author of the correspondence informing Caesar of the defeat in north Africa. In other words, Pollio wrote an account that prefigured by some two decades that which he later composed for the *Historiae*. Expressed thus, the thesis is possible but not probable.

Decisive refutation, however, comes from a closer inspection of Appian's narrative and its comparison with that of Caesar. *Quellenforschung* with an eye for focalization reveals that Pollio is a most unlikely source for Caesar.

4 J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Books 1–2*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1991), 228: "But someone else must have completed the story for (Curio), and it is tempting to conjecture that this person was Gaius Asinius Pollio … Pollio may even have supplied the whole story." It will occasion no surprise that Pollio has also been saddled with authorship of the *Bellum Africum*, an informative work of history but quite defective in terms of literary polish. Names ought not to be arbitrarily assigned.

5 App. *B Civ*. 2.45.185–186, 46.187. For an overall examination of the relationship of Appian to Pollio, see now R.W. Westall, "The Relationship of Appian to Pollio", *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici* 38 (2013) 7–34; R.W. Westall, "The Sources of the *Emphylia* of Appian of Alexandria", pp. 106–148, in: K. Welch (ed.), *Appian's Rhomaika. Empire and Civil War*, (Classical Press of Wales: Swansea 2015). Bluntly expressed, attribution to Pollio must be excluded thanks to narratological analysis, for the focus is altogether wrong in view of what is securely known about Pollio as a historian. For Pollio's recurring protagonism within the *Historiae* that he wrote, see L. Morgan, "The Autopsy of C. Asinius Pollio," *Journal of Roman Studies* 90 (2000) 51–69, here 54–55; cf. E. Kornemann, "Die historische Schriftstellerei des C. Asinius Pollio," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie und Pädagogik* Suppl. 22 (1896) 555–692, here 601.

An eyewitness to history and protagonist in the events that he described, Pollio emphasized the role that he had played. For example, he represented his abandonment of Curio on the field of battle as motivated by a desire to secure the Caesarian encampment near Utica (App. *B Civ.* 2.45.185–186):

> Ἀσίνιος μὲν δὴ Πολλίων ἀρχομένου τοῦ κακοῦ διέφυγεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν Ἰτύκηι στρατόπεδον σὺν ὀλίγοις, μή τις ἐξ Οὐάρου γένοιτο πρὸς τὴν δόξαν τῆς ἐνταῦθα κακοπραγίας ἐπίθεσις· Κουρίων δὲ φιλοκινδύνως μαχόμενος σὺν ἅπασι τοῖς παροῦσιν ἔπεσεν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶι Πολλίωνι μηδένα ἄλλον ἐπανελθεῖν ἐς Ἰτύκην.
>
> In fact, when this disaster began, Asinius Pollio had fled with a few men to the camp at Utica, lest Varus should make an attack in the belief that a disaster had happened there. Curio fell fighting bravely together with all of those who were present, so that no else besides Pollio returned to Utica.

Similarly, he claimed for himself a leading role in attempting to persuade the captains of the merchantmen (*naves onerariae*) anchored offshore from Utica to provide assistance in transporting the defeated army back to Sicilia (App. *B Civ.* 2.46.187):

> Ἀσίνιος δ’ ἐς τοὺς παρορμοῦντας ἐμπόρους ἀκατίωι διαπλεύσας ἐδεῖτο αὐτῶν ἐπιπλεῦσαί τε καὶ τὸν στρατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν.
>
> But Pollio, sailing out in a skiff to the merchantmen that lay at anchor offshore, asked them to sail in to shore and to take on board the army.

Whatever the truth of these two assertions, the absence of Pollio from Caesar's account of the very same events is remarkable.[6] It may readily be granted that Caesar rewrote whatever material he had available for composing his narrative. However, the complete removal of the loyal Pollio is improbable, especially since Caesar does mention other individuals and the roles that they played.[7]

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6 Indeed, it should be remarked that it was likely Caesar's omission of Pollio from the *Bellum Civile* and the publication of that work in or soon after 43 BCE that provoked Pollio (*cos.* 40 BCE) to write a "rejoinder" (in the form of the *Historiae*) that ostensibly set the record straight. There was much to correct. Moreover, as an active partisan (or ally) of M. Antonius in the late 40s and early 30s BCE, Pollio will have then found it politically opportune to situate himself as a true Caesarian.

7 It is to be added that Caesar was not stinting in praise, if he believed it merited. So, for

Quellenforschung, in short, reveals the thesis of Pollio as Caesar's source to be nothing other than a chimera.[8]

Rather, application of the same principle of focalization to Caesar's narrative reveals other individuals who are more plausibly postulated as the sources for the information that is to be found there. At the very outset of his narrative for the African campaign, Caesar makes mention of the *legatus* C. Caninius Rebilus, whom he had attached to C. Scribonius Curio as an adjutant for the expedition meant to secure Sicilia and Africa.[9] Coming from a praetorian family, Rebilus had acquitted himself well in serving Caesar as a *legatus* in the campaign against Vercingetorix and the following years of reprisal and consolidation.[10] Entrusted with making a diplomatic overture at Brundisium in March 49 BCE, he was subsequently assigned to Curio, seemingly in order to contribute military experience as well as to keep the young man's ambitions under surveillance.[11] Surviving the debacle to figure amongst those who returned to Africa with Caesar in the expedition of 47–46 BCE, Rebilus became proconsul of that province and later had the dubious honour of a suffect consulship for only a part of the last day of 45 BCE.[12] In view of both his rank and the esteem with which Caesar regarded him, surely Rebilus was one of Caesar's sources

example, he singles out for mention such individuals as Scaeva and Crastinus: Caes. *B Civ.* 3.53.4–5 and 3.91.1–4, 99.2–3 respectively. By means of a display of extraordinary valour, even a soldier from the rank-and-file (e.g. Caes. *B Civ.* 2.35.1–2: *Fabius Paelignus quidam ex infimis ordinibus*) might be singled out for honorable mention.

8 Therefore, even if without discussion to justify his position, it is welcome to see that a recent treatment of Curio's campaign in north Africa makes no such affirmation: A. La Penna, "La campagna di Curione in Africa: La narrazione e l'interpretazione di Cesare," 175–210, in: G. Urso (ed.), *L'ultimo Cesare. riforme progetti poteri congiure. Atti del convegno internazionale, Cividale del Friuli, 16–18 settembre 1999*, («L'Erma» di Bretschneider: Roma 2000).

9 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.24.2.

10 Caes. *B Gall.* 7.83.3, 90.6; Hirt. *B Gall.* 8 *passim*. In general, see *RE* 3.2 (1899) 1478–1479 s.v. "Caninius Nr. 9" (F. Münzer). It is worth adding that Rebilus disappears after the defeat of Curio, until he reappears in Africa in 46 BCE (*B Afr.* 86.3; 93.3).

11 For the diplomatic overture, made through Scribonius Libo, see Caes. *B Civ.* 1.26.3–5. As for Rebilus' military experience as a factor in his attachment to Curio, cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 2.34.4: *tum Rebilus, legatus Caesaris, quem Curio secum ex Sicilia duxerat, quod magnum habere usum in re militari sciebat, "Perterritum," inquit, "hostem vides, Curio; quid dubitas uti temporis opportunitate?"* The focalisation is extraordinarily suggestive.

12 For Rebilus' subsequent presence in Africa, during the campaign of 47–46 and afterwards, see *B Afr.* 86.3, 93.3. As for his suffect consulship, which occasioned mirth from Cicero, see Cic. *Fam.* 7.30.1; Plut. *Caes.* 58.1.

of information for the African campaign, through despatches and eventually by personal communication.

Another individual worthy of notice is the quaestor Marcius Rufus, who had likewise been given the commission of accompanying Curio upon the expedition aimed at securing Sicilia and Africa.[13] Appearing at the very outset of the narrative, in command of the warships that had accompanied the fleet of Curio and then stationed at anchor off of Utica, Marcius Rufus reappears in the disastrous finale, seeking to reassure his men and trying unsuccessfully to achieve their embarkment for Sicilia.[14] Juridically ranking second only to the expedition's commander C. Curio, Marcius Rufus had an obligation to write to the Senate to explain what had happened. There can be little doubt that Caesar will have also received correspondence to explain and exculpate. Moreover, as with Rebilus, there will in all likelihood have been a personal interview during Caesar's passage through Italia en route to launch the campaign against Pompeius in Macedonia. That Marcius Rufus disappears from the historical record after this disaster is no obstacle to his testimony having been utilized by Caesar, for plague raged in time of war and the quaestor may have served as a scapegoat in the absence of the hapless Curio.[15]

Others there will have been who spoke with Caesar and described for him the events that had produced such a desultory outcome in Africa. Amongst these may be reckoned Pollio, who is known to have subsequently accompanied Caesar in the campaign fought in Macedonia. But these unnamed, unknown individuals can safely be excluded from the ranks of those whose written accounts influenced the composition of Caesar's own narrative.

Yet, there remains one written source to be considered, the letters that passed back and forth between Caesar's enemies in mid-49 BCE. Pompeius

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13 *RE* 14.2 (1930) 1586 s.v. "Marcius Nr. 94" (F. Münzer); cf. *DNP* 7 (1999) 861 s.v. "Marcius [I 24]" (J. Fündling). It is there plausibly suggested that he was the son of Nr. 95, the Q. Marcius Rufus who served as a *legatus* under M. Licinius Crassus in the latter's campaign against Spartacus.

14 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.23.5, 24.1, 43.1.

15 For plague, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.2.3; R. Syme, *Augustan Aristocracy*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1986), 21–25. The outbreak and spread of infectious diseases is hardly surprising in view of the massive transferral of men and animals over long distances in the civil war years. The epidemic of influenza in the wake of the Great War affords an instructive parallel.

As for the possibility that Marcius Rufus was treated as a scapegoat in late 49 BCE, if he survived to live that long, it is to be remarked that Curio himself is represented by Caesar as having expressed shame at the possibility of a personal interview with Caesar in the event of defeat: Caes. *B Civ*. 2.42.4.

and his peers were well informed of events in the West, as emerges from the actions that the Senate in exile in Thessalonica took. Not only was Phocaea accorded the status of *civitas libera* to compensate for the sufferings of Massilia, but the Numidian monarch Juba was also granted the status of *socius atque amicus populi Romani* as a reward for his part in the defeat of Curio's expeditionary force.[16] Correspondence and couriers naturally constituted the basis of information for these measures. Accordingly, upon taking possession of Pompeius' camp after victory at Pharsalus, Caesar came across a mass of letters (Dio 41.63.5):

> ἀμέλει καὶ τὰ γράμματα τὰ ἀπόθετα τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Πομπηίου κιβωτίοις εὑρεθέντα, ὅσα τινῶν τήν τε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εὔνοιαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δύσνοιαν ἤλεγχεν, οὔτ' ἀνέγνω οὔτ' ἐξεγράψατο ἀλλ' εὐθὺς κατέφλεξεν.

> Indeed, even all of the letters that were found stored in the baggage of Pompeius, if they convicted anyone of good-will towards that man or of ill-will towards himself, he neither read nor copied them, but immediately burnt them.

Whether or not one wishes to accept ingenuously the claim that Caesar did not peruse all of his enemies' correspondence,[17] the report appears to confirm what might have otherwise been reasonably inferred. The victor of Pharsalus

16 Cass. Dio 41.42.7. For commentary on this passage, see F. Hinard and P. Cordier (tr. and comm.), M.-L. Freyburger-Galland (ed.), *Dion Cassius: Histoire romaine, livres 41 et 42*, (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 2002), 67 n. 3; cf. N. Berti, *La guerra di Cesare contro Pompeo. Commento storico a Cassio Dione libro XLI*, (Ricerche dell'Istituto di storia antica dell'Università cattolica di Milano, 3), (Jaca Book: Milano 1987), 103–108.

17 The seizure of correspondence in the enemy camp and the victorious commander's refusal to read it are a *topos* that serves to define the statesman in Roman historiography: C.F. Konrad, *Plutarch's* Sertorius. *A Historical Commentary*, (University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill 1994), 218; D. Kehoe, "Tacitus and Sallustius Crispus," *Classical Journal* 80 (1984–1985) 247–254, here 249 n. 9. For the period of the civil wars, abundant instances survive. There is Pompeius' refusal to accept Perperna's offer to look at the papers of the deceased Sertorius in 72 BCE: Plut. *Sert.* 27.2–3; *Pomp.* 20.4. There is not only Caesar's refusal to look at Pompeius' papers after Pharsalus in 48 BCE (cited above in the text), but also his refusal to look at those of Scipio after Thapsus in 46 BCE: Cass. Dio 43.13.2. There is Caesar the Younger's refusal to look at the papers of Sex. Pompeius subsequent to the eviction of Lepidus in 45 BCE: App. *B Civ.* 5.132.543. Last but not least, there is Caesar the Younger's refusal to look at the papers of M. Antonius after the capture of Alexandria in 30 BCE: Cass. Dio 52.42.8.

presumably culled strategic information from the correspondence of Pompeius with a view to an eventual campaign against his enemies in north Africa.

Capture of the correspondence of his enemies best explains items such as Caesar's knowledge of the ineffectual remonstrances of P. Attius Varus with Iuba and the ultimate fate of those soldiers who failed to escape from Africa. It also explains most convincingly how Caesar, writing in late 48 BCE, knew that the senators Ser. Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus rode in the train of Juba as the monarch made his triumphant entry into Utica.[18] Unless motivated by personal spite, these sorts of details are too specific to be explained by the invocation of authorial invention. That latter mechanism is capable only of explaining general items, such as the account according to which Curio and his cavalry fell fighting to the last man.[19] Rhetorical tropes are to be distinguished from incidental detail.

As is in the way of things, definitive solutions are lacking. However, there may be some merit in having demonstrated that long-standing questions can with profit be formulated anew, so as to shed fresh light upon the genesis of Caesar's text. The revelation that the influence of Pollio is no more than an illusion may prove beneficial, encouraging a more thorough comparison of Caesar's narrative with others dealing with the same material and illustrating the multiplicity of conflicting interests normally subsumed by the label of Caesarian faction. On the other hand, from a recognition of the multiplicity of sources of information used, Caesar's ability to fashion a dramatically charged narrative may now be all the more evident.

2 Legitimacy of Command

One of the strengths of the Roman system of provincial administration was its flexibility, but as a result of civil war it was that very characteristic that exacerbated the chaos evident in Africa in mid-49 BCE. The simplistic antithesis of Caesarian and Pompeian fails to convey the nature of the dispute for control of this important province, offering a banal reading of the evidence of Caesar and other contemporaries.[20] No fewer than five individuals exercised

18 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.44.3.

19 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.42.5.

20 Thus, for example, A. Goldsworthy, *Caesar. The Life of a Colossus*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London 2006), 493. However, that same author's suggestion that it was Caesar's account of the north African expedition that occasioned criticism by Asinius Pollio is shrewd and plausible, albeit unlikely to be the whole truth of the matter. Highly suggestive is

or claimed the administration of Africa in 49 BCE: Q. Ligarius, C. Considius Longus, L. Aelius Tubero, P. Attius Varus, and C. Scribonius Curio. Notwithstanding an abundance of legislation regarding provincial government, the transferral of power was plagued by imprecision and occurred upon an *ad hoc* basis. That flexibility allowed for a wide range of solutions in the face of local crises, but also permitted endemic disorder in the event that there was a crisis at the centre. Hence, with its grain supply for the capital, Africa was fiercely contested by various factions. This was in effect a crisis of legitimacy that mirrored the crisis over Caesar's *provincia* that had initially given rise to civil war.

Despite a relatively well defined hierarchy of command, so as to obviate problems arising from illness, death, or distance, the succession of provincial governors was inherently fluid. There existed no fixed moment in the calendar when one governor would enter upon his duties and the other would withdraw to Rome and private life. Indeed, there was a temporal overlap that would be deemed intolerable by modern jurists. The previous governor enjoyed a period of thirty (30) days within which to leave the province subsequent to meeting with his successor. This flexibility stands in marked contrast with the fixed calendar for magistracies held within the city of Rome. Distance from Rome, poor communications, and the exigencies of defending provincial territory may all be invoked to explain this state of affairs. Be that as it may, there can be no question this system could occasion conflict at the local level, especially when disagreement obtained within the Senate at Rome. Illustrative of the potential for chaos even in a time of profound peace is the studied dilatoriness with which Appius Claudius Pulcher formally ceded the command of Cilicia to M. Tullius Cicero in mid-51 BCE. Aware of Cicero's imminent arrival, Pulcher withdrew to the opposite end of the province so as to avoid meeting him and thereby extend his own command by a month's time.[21]

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the wording of Suet. *Iul.* 56.4: *Pollio Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se, vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit; existimatque recripturum et correcturum fuisse*. Criticism may also be discerned in Pollio's account of the enemy casualties suffered at Pharsalus, rectifying the figures provided by Caesar: Plut. *Caes*. 46.3.

21 Cic. *Fam*. 3.6.3. Somewhat confusingly, however, Cicero reckons his year as governor of Cilicia as commencing upon his setting foot within the province: Cic. *Fam*. 5.15.1. Equally problematic and well-known is the question of whether the promagistrate's *imperium* ceased only at the moment in which he set foot across the *pomerium* of Rome, as might appear to be suggested by the celebrated case of Caesar's predecessor in Gallia Ulterior, C. Pomptinus, who waited for over a decade in order to hold a triumph: T.C. Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*. 2 vols. (Oxford University Press: Oxford

Further complicating matters was the recent change in administrative law, with the passing of the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* in 52 BCE. Seeking to break the nexus between finances for electoral victory at Rome and government of a province at the end of an urban magistracy, Pompeius had written a law stipulating a period of five (5) years between magistracy and pro-magistracy.[22] The tactic seems to have functioned, albeit briefly, for the last names of the *fasti* of the free Republic proclaim the renewed stranglehold of the old families.[23] Yet, when it came to observing the laws, it would appear that Pompeius viewed them as valid for all but himself and his immediate family.[24] With breathtaking facility, Pompeius approved the allocation of the province of Syria to his father-

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2000), 578–580, 593, 596. For this vexed constitutional issue, see A. Giovannini, *Consulare imperium*, (Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 16), (Friedrich Reinhardt: Basel 1983), 16–17, 25, 42. Making fundamental corrections to the classic discussion of Mommsen, Giovannini highlights the fact that the tribunician intercession was valid for one Roman mile beyond the *pomerium* and furthermore observes that there are recorded instances where commanders nonetheless felt at liberty to punish soldiers for indecorous or mutinous behaviour within the city of Rome. Civil rights—and especially those relating to the expression of thoughts or ideas—are always subject to negotiation and dependent upon societal norms constraining authorities' actions.

22 There exists an extensive and weighty body of literature regarding the *lex Pompeia de provinciis*, amongst which the following pieces are of particular note: C.E.W. Steel, "The *Lex Pompeia de Provinciis* of 52 B.C.: A Reconsideration," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 61 (2012) 83–93; A.J. Marshall, "The Lex Pompeia de provinciis (52 B.C.) and Cicero's *imperium* in 51–50 B.C. Constitutional aspects," *ANRW* 1.1 (1972) 887–921; G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani. Elenco cronologico con una introduzione sull'attività legislativa dei comizi romani*, (Società Editrice Libraria: Milano 1912), 411–412; K. Morell, *Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire* (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2017 [*non vidi*]). The problem is vexed, but it should be observed in closing that there is no text whatsoever that clearly and unambiguously states that such a law was passed or ever existed. If one interprets the evidence as pertaining to a series of *senatus consulta* in the late 50s BCE, then the seeming contradictions and problems in Caesar's (admittedly tendentious) text disappear. In short, it seems wise to view the *lex Pompeia de provinciis* as a modern chimera on a par with the *lex Cornelia de provinciis*, the latter being an invention that was decisively revealed by Giovannini 1983: 73–101. For the present, that must suffice, as full demonstration requires more space than can be reasonably devoted to it here.

23 Cf. E.S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1974), 155–158. Perhaps most striking and to the point is the appearance of related Claudii Marcelli as consuls in the three consecutive years of 51, 50, and 49 BCE.

24 Cf. Tac. *Ann.* 3.28.1 (*suarum legum auctor idem ac subversor*); cf. A.J. Woodman and R.H. Martin, *The Annals of Tacitus. Book 3*, edited with commentary, (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 32), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1996), 256.

in-law Metellus Scipio, who had held the consulate only in 52 BCE. Manifestly personal interest was deemed superior to the law, if one had the political support available to avoid eventual prosecution.

The earlier career and precise extent of the period in which C. Considius Longus was active as governor of Africa are enshrouded in uncertainty, for a lack of detailed biographical information is coupled with ignorance over application of the *lex Pompeia de provinciis*. He is known to have governed Africa at the very end of the 50s BCE, for there is unambiguous record of his having returned to Rome from that function to begin campaigning for the consulate on the eve of civil war. Hence, a praetorian governor, as had normally been the case in the century since the Third Punic War and the destruction of Carthage. However, there is no record of the year in which he served as praetor nor is his age specifically attested.[25] Candidacy for the consulate implies a minimum age of 42 years, but he may well have been a decade or so older. The difference is on the order of that between C. Marius and L. Sergius Catilina. Therefore, if analogy with the case of Cicero in Cilicia be found acceptable, he may have been praetor in 57 BCE or earlier, serving as governor only for the period 51–50 BCE. On the other hand, if the *lex Pompeia* contained a grandfather clause or required a 5-year interval only between the consulate and government of a province, then Considius may have been praetor as recently as 52 BCE.[26] Whatever the truth of the matter, he returned to Africa upon the outbreak of civil war and remained there for the duration of the conflict, actively opposing the interests of Caesar. This resistance came to an end when he was killed by his Gaetulian bodyguard while fleeing the province in 46 BCE.[27]

In leaving Africa to return to Rome late in 50 BCE, Considius had put a *legatus* in charge of the province, the youthful Q. Ligarius. The decision attracts attention for contravention of the usual practice. Cicero, for example, had left his quaestor C. Coelius Caldus in charge of Cilicia notwithstanding serious misgivings.[28] Again, the record is unfortunately lacunose, even if the possibility that the young L. Iulius Caesar served as quaestor to Considius is not without its

25 Cf. *BAfr*. 89.2, for a son who was presumably 20–25 years of age.

26 Brennan 2000: 546, 712–713; cf. F. Hurlet, "*Pro consule uel pro praetore*? À propos des titres et des pouvoirs des gouverneurs prétoriens d'Afrique, de Sicile et de Sardaigne-Corse sous la République romaine (227–52 av. J.-C.)," *Chiron* 42 (2012) 97–108, here 104.

27 *BAfr*. 93.1–2. Neither the first nor the last occasion on which cupidity led an especial corps to betray its trust.

28 Cic. *Fam*. 2.15.4; *Att*. 6.6.3.

allure.[29] Whatever the cause for Considius' unusual decision, Ligarius acquitted himself marvellously.[30] The province continued to slumber in profound peace until refugees from the wreck of Italia brought the winds of war and hastily turned to making preparations for defense against the coming storm.

Already as of March or April 49 BCE, control of the province had been asserted by the former governor P. Attius Varus, who appears to have been held in considerable trust by Pompeius Magnus. Occupying Auximum with a handful of cohorts and ordering the holding of levies throughout the whole of Picenum, or thus Caesar, Varus had initially, without success, been engaged in the defense of that region.[31] Prominence in the defense of Pompeius' native region is suggestive. So, too, is his behaviour both putative and documented in the wake of that debacle. Although he had been governor of Africa as recently as 55–53 BCE, it hard to credit that he seized control of the province on his own cognizance and without any standing in law.[32] Moreover, of necessity travel after the loss of Picenum took him through the region of Apulia, whither Pompeius was moving his troops for a general retreat via the port of Brundisium. Whether travelling by sea or overland, Varus' trajectory should have taken him very close to Pompeius.[33] Postulating an encounter between the two men is effortless and sensible. From the long authority that Varus was to exercise in Africa and his unflagging dedication to the Pompeian cause, it might be thought that Pompeius appointed him *legatus pro praetore* then and commissioned him to secure the defense of Africa against eventual attack by a Caesarian expeditionary force.[34] Knowledge of Africa and good relations with

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29 Cf. career of M. Iunius Brutus: both men born ca. 85–84 BCE. Such a reconstruction would shed a new, tragicomic light upon the passage in which Caesar describes L. Iulius Caesar's precipitate flight landwards when faced with the fleet of Curio: Caes. *B Civ*. 2.23.3.

30 Cic. *Lig*. 2–4.

31 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.12.3–13.5.

32 Notwithstanding the contrary affirmation of Caes. *B Civ*. 1.31.2: *sua sponte*. For the gubernatorial *fasti* of Africa in the 50s BCE, see (as cited above) Brennan 2000: 546, 712–713; Hurlet 2012: 104.

33 It is to be remarked, in passing, that the young L. Caesar probably accompanied P. Varus to Africa from Pompeius' headquarters in Apulia. The timing perfectly coincides.

34 *ILS* 5319; cf. Carter 1991: 181, citing the inconclusive evidence of Cic. *Lig*. 22. Cicero does not specify how Varus came into possession of the *fasces* and admits of more than one construction. On the other hand, the epigraphic evidence for Varus' titulature, albeit subsequent to the arrival of Cato the Younger and Metellus Scipio, is highly suggestive, for Varus is unlikely to have received a new charge from them. Moreover, operating as a *legatus pro praetore* on behalf of Pompeius, he would have been covered by the *SCU*: Caes. *B Civ*. 1.5.3.

the inhabitants will have commended this individual who apparently derived from Picenum and seems to have been acquainted with, if not distantly related to, Pompeius Magnus.[35]

It required an adventurous spirit to effect the crossing from Italia to north Africa in the first months of 49 BCE. The winter season with its theoretical closure of traffic upon the high seas had just begun, for the civil calendar was nearly two months ahead of the solar year. A lesser mortal might have awaited the return of spring, for safety of travel and the opportunity that delay gave for avoiding weighty responsibility. P. Attius Varus, however, would seem to have made the crossing with all haste possible.[36] Once in Africa, he levied two legions, saw to the naval defense of the province's coastline, and communicated with the Numidian monarch Juba over the possibility of receiving military assistance in the event of an attack by one of Caesar's generals.[37] In this flurry of activity, he was aided by the young L. Iulius Caesar, Q. Ligarius, and Considius Longus, as well as at least one of the officers to be pardoned and released by Caesar in the wake of Domitius Ahenobarbus' capitulation at Corfinium.[38]

By the time of the arrival of L. Aelius Tubero, whom the Senate had appointed governor of Africa in traditional fashion in early January 49 BCE, the securing of the province for Pompeian interests was a *fait accompli*. With a certain satisfaction Caesar describes the reception that Varus accorded to Tubero (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.31.3):

> Hic venientem Uticam navibus Tuberonem portu atque oppido prohibet neque adfectum valetudine filium exponere in terra patitur, sed sublatis ancoris excedere eo loco cogit.

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35 *RE* 2.2 (1896) 2256–2257 s.v. "Attius Nr. 32" (E. Klebs); cf. T.P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C.-A.D. 14*, (Oxford University Press: London 1971), 42, on Picenum as a region especially attached to the cause of Pompeius. The fact that P. Attius Varus was entrusted with raising troops in Auximum at the moment of crisis strongly suggests to my mind that he could claim this city for the origins of his family. Cf. Plut. *Pomp*. 6.5, for similar action taken at Auximum by Pompeius in the mid-80s BCE. The implication of that text is that Pompeius' families had estates and family focussed upon that particular city.

36 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.31.2: *protinus*. Of like judgement is Klebs 1896: 2256 (immediately after loss of Picenum).

37 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.31.2; 2.23.3, 25.3.

38 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.23.2; 2.28.2. It is to be added that the absence of the name of P. Attius Varus from the list of those senators taken captive at Corfinium incidentally constitutes proof that he himself had not been present at that debacle as well.

> As Tubero approached Utica with his ships, he barred him from the harbour and the town and refused to allow him to set his sick son ashore. Rather, he forced him to pull up anchor and to depart from there.

Whether or not the illness of Tubero's son was a subterfuge, Varus manifestly refused to allow there to arise a situation within which Africa might pass under the command of someone who by his dilatoriness had shown himself to be a lukewarm partisan at best.[39] Control of the grain produced by Africa was vital to the Pompeian strategy of winning this civil war through the slow starvation of Italia.[40] Caesar, of course, prefers that readers focus upon the constitutional irregularity involved in Varus' refusing access to the duly appointed governor, leaving in the dark both Varus' status (on hypothesis) as a *legatus pro praetore* under Pompeius and the sanction provided for his actions by the *SCU* urging proconsuls to take all measures deemed necessary in order that the Roman state not suffer harm.

Like obfuscation enfolds the constitutional niceties of C. Scribonius Curio's taking of Sicilia and subsequent attempt to secure Africa for Caesar and the holding of the capital. Tribune of the *plebs* in 51–50 BCE, C. Curio had ingratiated himself with Caesar through manoeuvring that made it impossible at the time to evict the proconsul from Gallia Ulterior.[41] However, Curio was not yet of an age to serve as praetor or governor of a province, if the laws and custom were to be observed. Quaestor as recently as 54 BCE, he would appear to have been born in 85 BCE, and hence was merely thirty-six-years-old at the outbreak of civil war.[42] Notwithstanding this formal impediment, he was entrusted with the government of Sicilia and Africa, for Caesar's debt to him was weighty and his skill as an orator and politician consummate. Naturally, not a word is dedicated to these considerations and problems in Caesar's narrative. Rather, focus

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39 Highly suggestive in this context is the role played by L. Afranius' son during the campaign in Hispania some months later: Caes. *B Civ*. 1.74.6, cf. 1.84.2. Tubero, disabused, subsequently made his way by sea to Macedonia: Cic. *Lig*. 27. The distrust of Varus and Pompeius may have resided in a cool appreciation of his administrative abilities rather than concerning his political sentiments. Neither father nor son excelled in government.

40 Cf. Cic. *Att*. 9.9.2; 9.10.3; 10.8.4, starvation and then invasion, with a view to repeating the success enjoyed by L. Sulla some three decades previously. Old generals are invariably given to fighting the last war.

41 M.H. Dettenhofer, *Perdita Iuventus. Zwischen den Generationen von Caesar und Augustus*, (C.H. Beck: München 1992), 52–62.

42 *MRR* 2.224. For the minimum ages required for the assumption of office, see E. Badian, "Caesar's *cursus* and the intervals between offices," *Journal of Roman Studies* 49 (1959) 81–89.

is upon the charismatic figure of Curio and the chaos that he was despatched to quell.

The precise status of Curio as he invaded first Sicilia and then Africa is not clear, nor was it for contemporaries. Caesar's language prevaricates, suggesting different things to different audiences at different moments. Hence, in initially describing the dispositions taken to secure the grain-supply for Rome, Caesar writes (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.2):

> Mittit in Sardiniam cum legione una Valerium legatum, in Siciliam Curionem pro praetore cum legionibus III.
>
> He despatched his lieutenant Valerius to Sardinia with one legion, and he sent Curio as governor to Sicilia with three legions.

This deceptively straightforward, bipartite sentence implies that of the two men only one, Q. Valerius Orca, was a *legatus* of Caesar. That interpretation seems to find corroboration in Caesar's later describing the adjutant Caninius Rebilus as *legatus Caesaris*.[43] However, in Caesar's representation of Curio's addressing his assembled men, Curio refers to himself hyperbolically as having been content with the designation of *miles Caesaris*.[44] Confirmation for the interpretation of this phrase as signifying the status of *legatus Caesaris* seems to be provided by the affirmation that Curio would never face Caesar as having lost the army that the latter had entrusted to him.[45] If Curio was Caesar's *legatus*, then with what right could he accept acclamation as *imperator* by his soldiers?[46] If he was a governor in his own right, then why speak of himself as being subordinate to Caesar?

Elicited from the testimony of Caesar with the greatest of difficulty, this juridical confusion is openly highlighted by a dialogue that Cicero reports himself as having had with Curio during the latter's descent through Campania in mid-April 49 BCE. Writing to his friend and intimate Atticus and possessed of no reason to falsify the matter, Cicero reports, with a vividness that would have been worthy of the dictates of contemporary historiography (Cic. *Att.* 10.4.9–10):

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43 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.34.4; cf. 2.24.2.

44 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.32.14.

45 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.42.4.

46 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.26.1, 32.14.

> "Quid isti," inquam, "sex tui fasces? Si a senatu, cur laureati? Si ab ipso, cur sex?" "Cupivi," inquit, "ex senatus consulto surrupto; nam aliter ⟨non⟩ poterat. At ille impendio nunc magis odit senatum. 'A me,' inquit, 'omnia proficiscerentur.'" "Cur autem sex?" "Quia duodecim nolui; nam licebat."
>
> "What of those six fasces of yours?" I asked. "If they are from the Senate, why do they have laurel? If from the man himself, why six?" "I asked for them," he said, "in accordance with a decree stolen from the Senate. It was impossible to do otherwise. But he now really hates the Senate. He said, 'Everything will come from me.'" "But why six?" "Because I did not want twelve, even though I could have had them."

Despite Curio's facetiousness over a "snap" decree of the Senate, it emerges clearly that there was an inconsistency in his having six laureate *fasces* to designate the *imperium* that he wielded.[47] The laurel denoted his subordination to C. Caesar, whereas the number six implied that he was acting under his own authority as a praetorian governor appointed by the Senate.[48] In short, as revealed by the irreverent claim that Curio could have had twelve *fasces* had he so desired, the forms of government were no longer held in respect. All was confusion.

Obtemperating to public opinion nonetheless, Caesar glosses over the irregularity of Curio's position and seeks to justify Curio's presence in Africa with the claim that Varus had usurped power there. For this reason does he write of provinces *vacuae ab imperiis*.[49] The entry of Varus into Africa is put on par with the taking of Sardinia and Sicilia by Orca and Curio respectively, which is to overlook both the (probable) commission entrusted to Varus by Pompeius and the fact that Q. Ligarius consigned the province to Varus, if he did not in fact give it back to Considius.[50] The omission is misleading and fraudulent, irre-

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47 The translation of Bailey stands in need of rectification here. *Surrupto* is manifestly the ablative singular of the perfect participle of *surripio* as in (1) "to steal" or (2) "to remove by stealth": *OLD* 1847 s.v. "surripio". In other words, it seems that Curio, apparently under the influence of the affair of the *aerarium sanctius*, was boasting of having received a commission "stolen"—or extorted, if one prefers—from the Senate.

48 T. Mommsen, *Römische Staatsrecht*, 3 vols. in 5. (S. Herzel: Leipzig 1887^3–1888^3), 1.385 n. 3; Bailey 1968: 4.404.

49 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.31.1–2.

50 The order of their arrivals in Africa is unknown, as is the question of whether Considius had actually laid down his *imperium* by crossing the *pomerium* when back in Rome. The act of candidacy would imply that he did in fact enter the city and cease to hold *imperium*,

spective of the view that one takes of the legality of the *SCU*.[51] By ignoring the fact that power had been transferred in orderly fashion in Africa and focussing upon the refusal to receive Tubero, Caesar justifies the expedition undertaken by Curio, who had allegedly been invested by the Senate with power to intervene in Sicilia and Africa. In the name of *libertas*, all was permitted.

The evidence offered by Caesar is partial and incomplete, in that he explicitly draws attention to the pretentions of only three of the five individuals to have governed or laid claim to govern Africa in 50–49 BCE. Tubero, Varus, and Curio are indicated as putative governors. Considius is named without any reference to his having very recently been in command of the province, and of Ligarius no mention is made whatsoever. Despite the incomplete nature of this representation or perhaps for this very reason, there emerges a clear vision of the contested legitimacy of those who would govern the province of Africa. The claims of Caesar's enemies to wish to defend the Roman constitution ring hollow, and a similar lack of justification may be discerned in prevarication over the status of Curio. Truth and rule of law were the first victims claimed by civil war at Rome.

3 Roman Armies in North Africa

Despite the province's strategic importance for the control of Rome, Africa was without any garrison whatsoever at the moment of the Civil War's inception. Or so it has been prematurely proclaimed.[52] The evidence is admittedly opaque, but does exist. Scattered references to the Roman soldiers stationed in Africa between the province's creation and the late 80s together point towards a variable situation in which as many as five or six legions might be present.[53] After the conclusion of Pompeius' campaign against Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus in 81–80, silence. From this it has been concluded, not entirely without

but the situation in Italia late in 50 was such that he may have decided to wait outside the city-limits to see what developments would follow.

51 A.W. Lintott, *Cicero as Evidence. A Historian's Companion*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2008), 144; idem, *Violence in Republican Rome*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1999^{2}), 155–180; idem, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1999), 91–92, with further bibliography.

52 P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C.–A.D. 14*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1971), 229 (table), 452. In direct contrast, although without any supporting arguments or documentation is: Carter 1991: 1.181, 230.

53 Brunt 1971: 452.

reason, that the province was devoid of a garrison. However, a comparison with the other provinces suggests rather that a minimal force of merely one legion, probably under-strength, was maintained for any eventual display of might that the governor should deem necessary. Moreover, Caesar's evidence for Africa in mid-49 is consonant with such a reconstruction.[54] P. Attius Varus is depicted as having levied two legions subsequent to his arrival in Africa, but three legions are represented as being at the disposition of the Varus and Longus at the moment of Curio's arrival.[55] While Considius Longus, too, may have levied a legion upon his return to Africa, various considerations militate against such a view. For one thing, he would have been doing so with the permission of Varus, and that is excluded by Caesar's language regarding two legions. In addition, since the army that Varus ranged against Curio at Utica consisted of more than one legion, the legion commanded by Longus cannot have been one of the two that were levied by Varus. Therefore, enveloped by the obscurity of long peace, one legion had constituted Africa's garrison in recent decades.

This pacific state of affairs is to be explained by the lack of any visible threat from neighbouring communities and rulers. Condign punishment visited upon Jugurtha had sufficed to warn rulers in the region that it was unwise to run counter to the interests of Rome. Civil war in the 80s, it is true, had rendered complicated the practical application of this fundamental truth. By definition, civil war meant that the interests of Rome were identified with one side or the other. Hence, the ease with which a mistaken choice might be made. Indeed, the spread of the conflict meant that such choices were inevitable. The partisans of C. Marius took possession of Africa under the leadership of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus.[56] Hiempsal II was toppled from his throne and replaced by his relative Hiarbas.[57] Upon the reconquest of Rome, however, Sulla despatched Pompeius *pro praetore* with six legions for the securing of Sicilia and Africa.[58] Within forty days of his making landfall in Africa, it is claimed,

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54 As was recognized by S. Gsell, *Histoire ancienne d'Afrique du Nord*. 8 vols. (Hachette: Paris 1928), 7.32; 8.4.

55 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.31.2 (*duas legiones*); 2.23.4 (*legionem*), 27.3 (*legiones*).

56 *MRR* 2.69, 77; *RE* 5A (1903) 1327–1328 s.v. "Domitius Nr. 22" (F. Münzer); *RE* 21B (1952) 2069–2074 s.v. "Pompeius" Nr. 31 (F. Miltner).

57 *RE* VIIIB (1913) 1394–1395 s.v. "Hiempsal II" (Lenschau), here see col. 1394; *RE* VIIIB (1913) 1388 s.v. "Hiarbas" (Lenschau), where a convincing reconstruction of Hiarbas' ties to the Gaetulian royal house is made on the basis of the Vergilian use of the adjective *Gaetulus* (Verg. *Aen*. 4.36, 196, 326) with regard to a mythical suitor of queen Dido of Carthage.

58 *MRR* 2.84–85.

Pompeius had eliminated Domitius and restored Hiempsal to his ancestral throne.[59] Despite the fact that he was merely twenty-four years old, Pompeius celebrated a triumph *de Africa* upon his return to Rome, in commemoration of his having battled down L. Cornelius Sulla's Roman enemies and their allies in Africa.[60]

For this reason, too, together with the natural desire to avoid entanglements that might hinder future decisions, was there a complete absence of alliances. The Senate would appear to have had no interest whatsoever in a military venture that would result in the further annexation of land in north Africa. It might be suspected that *equites* and senators profited handsomely from the trade that was conducted with Numidians and others.[61] Avarice unencumbered by considerations for the masses at Rome and in Italia, nor by any eventual need to offer relief to an ally in difficulty, was attractive. The absence of alliance in effect kept potential allies in a precarious state. That was only to the benefit of those who ruled and managed money in Rome.

Consequently, Curio had no great fear of the forces that he would find ranged against himself in Africa. Whatever men might be fielded would be recent recruits, not possessed of any *esprit de corps*. The one legion that would appear to have regularly existed in Africa had not seen any service worthy of the name, and was in all likelihood under-strength at the moment that civil war began.[62] In other words, a veteran formation in name only. The two, other legions that Varus commanded at the moment of Curio's disembarkment had been formed merely a couple of months previously, in May or June.[63] These

59 Plut. *Pomp*. 12.5: οὕτως φασι. In general, see H. Heftner, *Plutarch und der Aufstieg des Pompeius. Ein historischer Kommentar zu Plutarchs Pompeiusvita. Teil 1: Kap. 1–45*, (Europäische Hochschulschriften, R. III, Bd. 639), (Peter Lang: Frankfurt am Main 1995), 112, remarking Plutarch's ability to synthesize extremely rich source material so as to shed light only or primarily upon questions of character rather than of detailed historical interest. Unfortunately, there is no observation made by Heftner as regards this particular passage with its vague attribution and its use of the "rhetorical number" of "40 days".

60 Granius Licinianus 38–39B; A. Keaveney, *Sulla. The last republican*, (Croom Helm: London 1982), 195. Cf. R. Seager, *Pompey the Great. A political biography*, (Blackwell: Oxford 2002^2), 29, who observes a judgement *non liquet* as regards the choice between the years 81 and 80 BCE. At present the evidence allows for the celebration of this triumph on 12 March in either year theoretically, even if I would tend towards the latter in view of the uncertainties of winter travel in the Mediterranean.

61 Cf. A.J.N. Wilson, *Emigration from Italy in the republican age of Rome*, (Manchester University Press: Manchester 1966), 42–54, with a somewhat different emphasis.

62 Cf. the situation that greeted Cicero in Cilicia in mid-51 BCE.

63 For the estimated date of Varus' arrival in Africa, see the first section of this chapter.

forces gave promise of being as disorganized and unreliable as those that had determined upon surrender when they found themselves besieged within Corfinium and led by a commander intent only upon his personal safety, or so it is said.[64] Formations without training, and possibly some actual experience, were worthless. And the recent failures of P. Attius Varus in Italia scarcely suggested that he would be a charismatic general capable of inspiring his men to victory, especially when confronted by an enemy whose optimism resided in their past successes and demonstrated capacity.[65]

Conversely, Curio's operations amongst the Bruttii,[66] in Lucania, and in Sicilia had offered a chance to render his legions a united fighting force. Three of the four legions that Curio took with him to Sicilia for the eventual invasion of Africa had been levied by L. Domitius Ahenobarbus only as recently as January 49.[67] Hence, after military service of merely a month or so, they had been compelled to the disgraceful act of surrendering themselves and their commander to Caesar. In the wake of Corfinium, it is fair to say, they had acquired new resolve as a fighting force by their victorious descent through the Bruttii and Lucania. Subsequently, without the shedding of any blood, or so it is avowed, they had occupied Sicilia.[68] Arriving at Messana in the last week of April 49 BCE, the delegation led by C. Asinius Pollio intimated to M. Porcius Cato that he should withdraw from the island, and that stalwart defender of the Republic promptly abandoned any idea of offering resistance. In a public address wherein he gave notice to the Sicilians of his decision, he is said to have to castigated Pompeius Magnus for entering upon an unncecessary war without having first made proper preparations.[69] Be that as it may, Cato's

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64 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.20.1, where the word *secessio* is suggestively employed to describe the assembly wherein the soldiers made their decision. Cf. Carter 1991: 176.

65 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.13.1–4; cf. 2.34.6.

66 For discussion of the onomastic practice used to designate the region that is today known as Calabria, see S. Mazzarino, "Si può dire Bruttium? La denominazione tardoromana dell'attuale Calabria," 1.213–220, in: S. Mazzarino, *Il Basso Impero. Antico, tardoantico ed èra costantiniana*, 2 vols. (Dedalo: Bari 1974–1980).

67 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.25.1, 30.2 (corrupt); 2.23.1, 37.4; cf. App. *B Civ.* 2.32.129; P.A. Brunt, "Two great Roman landowners," *Latomus* 34 (1975) 619–635, here 619–620, for the number of cohorts commanded by Domitius at Corfinium. As is well remarked by Brunt, they were indubitably under-strength.

68 Plut. *Cat. Min.* 53.1–3; App. *B Civ.* 2.40.162; cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.5 (*adventu Curionis cognito*).

69 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.5: *queritur in contione sese proiectum ac proditum a Cn. Pompeio, qui omnibus rebus imparatissimis non necessarium bellum suscepisset et ab se reliquisque in senatu interrogatus omnia sibi esse ad bellum apta ac parata confirmavisset.* Cf. R. Fehrle, *Cato Uticensis*, (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1983), 248–251. Cato's

cession of Sicilia to Curio enheartened the soldiers of the latter, and gave rise to the false expectation that the remainder of the war might be as easily won as the Italian campaign.

Yet, the ease with which Curio and his men took the regions of southern Italian and Sicilia led him to consider two legions out of a total of four sufficient for the African campaign.[70] That was a fateful decision. Since it was done with the seeming approval of the assistant provided by Caesar, viz. Caninius Rebilus, it may be opined that youthful overconfidence was not merely the only cause. After all, Rebilus was a seasoned soldier, versed in the art of war and its varying fortunes.[71] The reasonable concern that Pompeius might attempt an invasion from the East presents itself. The Athenians had done so in their expedition against Sicilia nearly four centuries previously, and Pyrrhus had more or less repeated their performance a century and a half later. Pompeius might do the same. Worthy of remark in this context is the persistence of rumours that claimed Pompeius was leading an army through north Africa to the relief of his embattled forces in the Iberian peninsula.[72] Against this eventuality had Curio placed a fleet in readiness at Messana, which in the event proved useless even in hindering the passage of L. Nasidius's small squadron to the northwestern Mediterranean.[73] The maintenance in Sicilia of two of his four legions assumes another aspect. Holding forces in reserve was standard military practice, and recent events made it a reasonable surmise that the resistance offered by Curio's enemies would collapse upon the first sign that he gave of bold determination.

Nevertheless, at the moment of extreme danger, P. Varus displayed resourcefulness and obstinacy. He somehow managed to convince the merchantman fleet that Curio found anchored at the harbour of Utica not to set sail for Rome

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abandonment of Sicilia is hard to fathom, if one believes that Pompeius truly had a predominantly maritime strategy in place.

70 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.23.1.

71 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.34.4: *legatus Caesaris, quem Curio secum ex Sicilia duxerat, quod magnum habere usum in re militari sciebat*. Rebilus is most likely the primary source for Caesar's narrative. Naturally, he had much to conceal and explain away.

72 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.39.3, 60.5.

73 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.3. The criticism of Curio in this instance seems unjust and unwarranted. Moreover, be that as it may, the highlighting of Curio's defective generalship offers readers a foretaste of what is to come in the second half of Book 2 and nicely distinguishes Caesar from his defeated *legatus*. On another note, for the route taken by Nasidius after his abandonment of Massilia, cf. P. Arnaud, *Les routes de la navigation antique. Itinéraires en Méditerranée*, (Errance: Paris 2005), 34, 121 (on attested voyages between Massilia in southern Gaul and Igilgili in north Africa).

with its precious cargo of grain. The accomplishment may sound trivial, but persuading nearly 200 captains to risk financial loss and ruin can scarcely have been an easy task.[74] Moreover, Varus brought back into service the warships that had been in drydock since Pompeius' campaign against the pirates two decades previously.[75] As is shown by M. Cato's seeing to the repair of old warships and ordering new ones from the communities of Sicilia,[76] Varus was not the only person to worry about naval stock for the prosecution of the civil war. However, Caesar's account implies that there were very few warships, if any, that guarded the coastline of Africa as a rule. The squadron of ten vessels commanded by the youthful and impetuous L. Caesar consisted entirely of warships that had been repaired for the present emergency. Given the lack of ample naval stock for military purposes, ships in drydock were preferable to new creations: they would be far more seaworthy.[77] This deploying of stock that had been relegated to storage is yet another sign of Varus' thorough acquaintance with the people and resources of Africa.[78]

Moreover, P. Varus created two legions from the Roman citizens resident in Africa.[79] In theory, that means that Varus armed 8–10,000 citizens in the period May–July 49 BCE.[80] Again, the arduous nature of the task that confronted him is not to be underestimated. Citizens who had gone abroad were far less likely to assume the burdens of military service, than their peers who had remained in the homeland. Since they had left Italia in order to acquire wealth abroad, they presumably had far less to gain from any participation in a civil war that was concerned with the question of who would govern Rome. In fact, the inhabitants of Utica had initially posed resistance to Varus, for they enjoyed privileges as a consequence of legislation passed by Caesar during his consulate in 59 BCE.[81] It was through his knowledge of the people and communities of Africa, as well as through his representing the interests of Pompeius, that Varus was able to persuade and coerce Romans resident there to take up the obligation of military service incumbent upon citizens. Most eloquent of the

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74 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 2.43.3, when few accepted the more lucrative venture of rescuing the remainder of Curio's expeditionary force.

75 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.23.3. For the campaign and its consequences, see P. De Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999), 179–186.

76 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.4.

77 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.58.3: *etiam tarditate et gravitate navium impediebantur.*

78 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.31.2: *hominum et locorum notitia et usu eius provinciae.*

79 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.31.2: *dilectuque habito duas legiones effecerat.*

80 Cf. Brunt 1971: 452 and 474, for legionary size and recruitment.

81 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.36.1; *B Afr.* 87; Carter 1991: 1.235–236.

difficulties to be encountered are subsequent claims, whether true or not, that he and his colleagues went so far as to enroll any sort of man who was sufficiently old enough to bear arms.[82]

P. Varus situated his three legions at the principal cities of Utica and Hadrumetum, thereby creating the widest possible coastline defense. There were easily 600 km of coastline to defend against the expeditionary force that Curio would seek to disembark. From Thabraca in the northwest to Thaenae in the southeast, there were many excellent sites at which Curio might land his forces with relative ease and speed. Varus possessed neither the men nor the material resources for attempting to prevent Curio's landing. The squadron which caught sight of Curio's approaching fleet was obviously too small to block access to the coastline of Africa. However, as is implied by Caesar's veiled criticism of the cowardice displayed by L. Caesar under those circumstances, it was large enough to harry and cause substantial damage to Curio's fleet.[83] To be remarked in this regard is the fact that the warships accompanying that fleet numbered merely twelve. Despite the vast number of merchantmen serving as transports, Curio's fleet was none too heavily defended. Through a combination of timely information and delaying action, Varus might have hoped to concentrate his forces and act with sufficient speed to destroy Curio's army. That is precisely what Scipio and his generals came close to doing when Caesar effected his landing in the region in late 47 BCE.[84]

As was to be expected, Varus was unable to concentrate his men with sufficient speed and the numerical superiority enjoyed by Curio gave this latter the expected, initial victory. Luck had been on Curio's side in terms of a fair wind that allowed him to reach a point of the African shore that was sufficiently removed from Utica and Hadrumetum to give him the tranquillity in which to disembark and order his men. Within two days' time, Curio had marched his expeditionary force to the Bagradas river, within striking distance of Utica.[85] Unable to prevent Curio's landing and knowing that his own position was the goal of Curio's invasion, Varus continued with preparations to resist the siege that would eventually come.[86] In fact, since Varus likely had information to the effect that Curio had occupied Sicilia with four legions, the failure to call upon

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82 *B Afr*. 36.1; cf. J.C. Dumont, *Servus. Rome et l'esclavage sous la République*, (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 103) (École française de Rome: Roma 1987), 679–681.

83 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.23.3–5.

84 *RE* 10A (1917) 240–243 s.v. "Iulius Nr. 131" (P. Groebe).

85 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.24.1.

86 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 2.25.2.

Considius Longus for assistance is entirely comprehensible.[87] There was the likelihood that the remainder of Curio's forces might soon arrive in the vicinity of Hadrumetum. The problem with defense is repelling the enemy as soon as is feasible. To that end, reinforcements at Utica were needed. But whence were they to come?

Lack of men was an endemic problem for Varus, to be resolved only with reliance upon Juba. From descriptions of the fighting that occurred in 47–46, it emerges that the increase in legions in Africa was due to the arrival of forces from elsewhere. As of the inception of that campaign, the Pompeians were able to field ten legions, of uncertain strength.[88] Three of these had seen service in Africa during the campaign of 49. Another three to five had been salvaged by Cato and Scipio from the wreck of Pharsalus.[89] The remaining two to four legions had apparently been recruited in Africa in the meantime. As was demonstrated by the inconclusive preparations made by Q. Cassius for an invasion from the Iberian peninsula, P. Varus could hardly expect to rest upon his laurels.[90] The defeat of Curio meant a respite in which to carry on with the work of protecting against further Caesarian attacks, not an end to the fighting. The relevance of Africa to the food-supply of Rome gave assurance that only Pompeius' defeat of Caesar would bring peace.[91] That the soldiers in these legions should have been Roman citizens was natural and to be expected. On the other hand, sources favourable to Caesar claim that his enemies turned to natives, *stipendiarii aratores*, freedmen, and even slaves in order to fill out the ranks of their legions.[92] The vision is partisan, but plausible. It was standard rhetorical practice to delegitimize one's opponents by accusing them of having drawn upon disreputable categories for soldiers. But the evidence, such as it is, demonstrates that all and sundry engaged in this practice with little regard for

87 It would be unrealistic to believe that no shipping passed between Sicilia and Africa during the interval. Cf. *B Afr.* 1.4.

88 *BAfr.* 1.4; Brunt 1971: 474, offers an analysis that is lacking in important respects.

89 Collectively, the units brought to Africa by Cato numbered nearly 10,000 men, if *myrias* is to be interpeted literally: Plut. *Cat. Min.* 56.4; cf. 55.1, for fifteen cohorts left with Cato at Dyrrachium.

90 *BAlex.* 51.1–52.1, 56.5–6.

91 Instructive are both Sulla's despatching the young Pompeius Magnus to retake Africa in the late 80s BCE and Cato the Younger's exhorting Sextus Pompeius to go to Spain so as to raise an army with which to march upon Rome, much as his father is reported by Sallust to have threatened to do during the difficult years of campaigning against Sertorius.

92 *BAfr.* 20.4, 35.4, 36.1. It is to be observed that only two of these categories are mutually exclusive.

scruple.[93] Hence, the suspicion that rhetoric may reveal a fundamental truth. When citizens were not to be found, aspiring candidates might be selected from other elements of the population.

4 The Grain of Africa

In terms of sheer volume, the most important of the products of Africa was grain. Passing the provinces of Rome's empire in review, to underscore the magnitude of Pompeius' elimination of piracy in 67 BCE, Cicero specifically dilates upon the provinces of Sicilia, Africa, and Sardinia to the edification of the masses. For Cicero and his audience, these are the three pillars upon which Rome's grain supply rests. Hence, it was worth remarking the courage that Pompeius had displayed by taking to the sea at a moment when the sailing season was not yet begun (Cic. *Leg. Man.* 12.34):

> Qui nondum tempestivo ad navigandum mari Siciliam adiit, Africam exploravit, in Sardiniam cum classe venit, atque haec tria frumentaria subsidia rei publicae firmissimis praesidiis classibusque munivit.
>
> Even though it was not yet the sailing season, this man dared to sail to Sicilia, to go about Africa, and to visit Sardinia with a fleet, and he fortified these three granaries of the Roman state with the most solid of garrisons and fleets.

The order of this listing is geographical in nature, following the winds and giving a historical vision of the route taken by Pompeius in assuring the safety of the grain supply for Rome.[94] Of these three provinces, however, Africa was arguably already by far the most important as a source of grain for the city.

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93 Cf. Dumont 1987: 679–681.

94 For maritime movements, see Arnaud 2005: 158–159, 160–164, together with map at 154–155. Another representation of this same moment is provided by: Plut. *Pomp.* 26.7–27.1, where the detail that Pompeius returned to Rome via Etruria provides confirmation of the itinerary indicated by Cicero, but muddled by Plutarch. Overall, see M. Gelzer, *Pompeius. Lebensbild eines Römers*. Introduction and updated bibliography by E. Herrmann-Otto. (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2005), 74. For the subsequent charge as *curator annonae*, see Plut. *Pomp.* 49–50, which seems based in part upon descriptions of the previous operation. One possible explanation is that Cicero simply reiterated the vision that he had already formulated in the mid-60s.

Net production is unknown, but it has been plausibly estimated that Africa annually exported roughly 8,000,000 *modii* of grain to Rome in the form of tax in the late Republic and earliest Principate. That is more than the combined total estimated for Sicilia and Sardinia for the same period.[95]

By the outbreak of civil war in January 49 BCE, Pompeius will have been intimately acquainted with the production levels and transportation facilities for all three of these provinces, for the war against the pirates was but one of three occasions in which he dealt with the matter. His first overseas appointment, in fact, had been to retake Sicilia and Africa for L. Sulla, so as to render the reconquest of Italia secure and enduring. Performing that task promptly and with all due terror in 81–80 BCE,[96] he earned a triumph and acquired the cognomen *Magnus*.[97] Subsequently, after the command against the pirates, he had visited the three provinces by virtue of his extraordinary service as *curator annonae* in 57 BCE.[98] From a concern with the shipping that ensured Rome's grain supply and through personal autopsy of the regions involved, Pompeius and his closest collaborators were well informed as to the agricultural resources of Africa, Sicilia, and Sardinia. Hence, the fact that M. Cato was active in Sicilia and P. Attius Varus in Africa arouses no surprise, despite the unusual nature of the commands that they exercised.[99]

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95 For Africa, see P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World. Responses to Risk and Crisis*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 182, citing Plut. *Caes.* 55 (Africa Nova) and Liv. 43.6.13, cf. 11 (Cirta and Carthage). For Sicilia, see Garnsey 1988: 182, 200. During the extraordinary situation that obtained in the late 70s BCE, Verres was procuring annually 3 million *modii* + 3 million *modii* + 800,000 *modii* from Sicilia, to the (allegedly) acute distress of the island's farmers. In the absence of ancient statistics for Sardinia, conjecture based upon first-hand experience must do, and this suggests that an annual tithe of 1 million *modii* would have been quite possible. See R.J. Rowland, "The Production of Sardinian Grain in the Roman Period," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 5 (1990) 14–20, where modern statistics prior to the twentieth century are deployed to make a case for a surplus production on the order of 1,250,000 *modii* (if one extrapolates from 260,000+ individuals on a ratio of 5 *modii* per person as suggested in another context by Garnsey). It is worth adding that Caesar himself made much of the fact that the tithe to be furnished by the newly established province of Africa Nova would provide the people of Rome with an additional 1,200,000 *modii* (Plut. *Caes.* 55.1, expressed in Attic *medimnoi*).

96 *Pace* Plut. *Pomp.* 10.5.

97 Cf. Seager 2002^2: 28.

98 Plut. *Pomp.* 49–50; Cass. Dio 39.9.3; K.M. Girardet, "*Imperia* und *provinciae* des Pompeius 82 bis 48 v.Chr.," *Chiron* 31 (2001) 153–209, in part. 187–196, on constitutional niceties.

99 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30–31. Of especial note is the fact that M. Aurelius Cotta chose to flee to Africa upon being ejected from Caralis: Caes. *B Civ.* 1.30.3. That movement is in accord

Indeed, it is to be recalled that the most incredible testimony to the wondrous fertility of Africa comes from none other than M. Terentius Varro, a long-standing intimate and close advisor of Pompeius. Having composed for Pompeius *aides-mémoire* such as an account of senatorial procedure and the intriguingly entitled *Ephemeris navalis ad Pompeium*, Varro collaborated with Pompeius over three decades and for this reason was his *legatus* in Hispania Ulterior in the latter half of the 50s BCE. Attentive to agricultural practices and their results throughout the Roman world, Varro affirms a very high yield for three areas in particular, one of them the environs of Byzacium (Varr. *Rust.* 1.44.2):

> In Italia in Subaritano dicunt etiam cum centesimo redire solitum, in Syria ad Gadara et in Africa ad Byzacium item ex modio nasci centum.

> Indeed, they affirm that the yield is a hundred-fold in the territory of Sybaris in Italia and that one hundred modii are likewise produced by one modius at Gadara in Syria and at Byzacium in Africa.

Within the purported setting of a discussion held in 57 BCE, at which moment Pompeius was *curator annonae*, this review of productivity is striking despite its brevity. Yields upon the order of 100:1 are virtually without parallel in the ancient sources, and regarded with a sceptical eye by modern connoisseurs.[100] Yet, advancing this claim soberly within the context of a manual dedicated to farming and against the backdrop of a grain crisis at Rome, Varro provides evidence for the Roman vision of Africa's utility, if not for the region's actual ability to produce. It was only for the region's fertility, it may be suspected, that the Romans did not altogether cede the former territory of Carthage to the Numidian monarch.

Epigraphic and literary testimony attest to the regular exportation of African grain in the century following the destruction of Carthage and the creation of the Roman province. Particularly suggestive is the evidence regarding the properties of the family of the *novus homo* M. Caelius Rufus. In 62–61 BCE,

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with another attested route (e.g. Cic. *Vat.* 12), but somewhat unexpected in that he was a cousin of Caesar. As with the younger L. Iulius Caesar, bonds of blood did not serve to determine political allegiance in time of civil war. Still worth consulting is D.R. Shackleton Bailey, "The Roman nobility in the second civil war," *Classical Quarterly* 10 (1960) 253–267.

100 Cf. Plin. *HN* 5.24; 17/16.41; 18.94–95. Comprehensible scepticism is displayed by R.M. Haywood, "Roman Africa," (Baltimore 1938) in Volume 4, in: T. Frank (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*. 6 vols. (Johns Hopkins: Baltimore 1933–1940), 4.21.

Caelius had visited Africa as a *contubernalis* of the governor Q. Pompeius Rufus in order to gain experience abroad and so as to look after the affairs and estates of his father in that province. As remarked by Cicero in citing this episode, Caelius' sojourn in Africa was precisely what was expected of young men who were not yet of an age to be members of the Senate.[101] The properties in question, or at least a significant portion, were seemingly located along the southern coastal strip of Africa. For instance, there was the *vicus* of Horrea Caelia, a small farming community some 30 km to the north of Hadrumetum.[102] Although unequivocally documented only as of the mid-third century, as the site of a bishopric, the name points to its genesis at a much earlier date.[103] Also indicative of the extensive landholding in this region are the *figlinae Caelianae* attested at Hadrumetum.[104] In the following generation, a freedman of this family, M. Caelius Phileros to be precise, achieved the supreme honour within the province of Africa, serving as *duumvir* for the newly re-established Roman colony of Carthage.[105] The influence exerted by the Caelii and their agents need not surprise, for Africa was a region that permitted the rapid accumulation of wealth by enterprising Italian families who sought to achieve a prominent role in politics at Rome.

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101 Cic. *Cael.* 30/70: *in qua provincia cum res erant et possessiones paternae, tum etiam usus quidam provincialis non sine causa a maioribus huic aetati tributus*.

102 J. Schnetz, *Itineraria Romana*. 2 vols. (B.G. Teubner: Leipzig 1929–1940), 1, p. 7, 8; Mommsen, *CIL* 8.1 p. 18; G.E. Rickman, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*. (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1980), 109; Haywood 1938: 4.22, in Frank, *ESAR*.

103 For Horrea Caelia, see G.E. Rickman, *Roman Granaries and Store Buildings*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1971), 320; Mommsen, *CIL* vol. 8, p. 18, on the presence of this community's bishop at the Council of AD 258.

104 E. Deniaux, "Recherches sur les propriétés foncières des amis de Cicéron en Afrique," 143–153, in: *L'Africa romana. Atti del XII convegno di studio, Olbia, 12–15 dicembre 1996*, (Editrice democratica sarda: Sassari 1998), 143–153; E. Deniaux, *Clientèles et pouvoir à l'époque de Cicéron*, (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 182), (École française de Rome: Roma 1993), 394; J. Kolendo, "Les domaines des Caelii en Afrique au Ier siècle avant notre ère," *Bulletin archéologique du C.T.H.S.* 19B (1985) 53–61; S.B. Jackson, "Marcus Caelius Rufus," *Hermathena* 126 (1979) 55–67; Dettenhofer 1992: 80, 140, 159; I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*, (Collection Latomus, 142), (Latomus: Bruxelles 1975), 311–313 no. 105, here in part. 311; T.P. Wiseman, *Catullus and his world. A Reappraisal*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1985), 62.

105 J. Gascou, "Le carrière de Marcus Caelius Phileros," *Antiquités africaines* 20 (1984) 105–120. This individual's activity can be traced over the 40s BCE, and the duumvirate seems to belong to 30/29 BCE.

Caesar himself, incidentally, provides evidence for the scale of the exportation of grain from Africa to Italia and possibly elsewhere. In relating the initial successes enjoyed by Curio in prosecuting the African expedition, Caesar remarks the seizure of a sizeable merchantman fleet given to the transportation of grain and other goods. Capitalizing upon the initial terror caused by his arrival, Curio had ordered the ships' captains to abandon Utica and to anchor offshore from his camp at Castra Cornelia (Caes. *B Civ*. 2.25.6):

> Interim adventu longarum navium Curio pronuntiare onerariis navibus iubet, quae stabant ad Uticam numero circiter CC, se in hostium habiturum loco qui non ex vestigio ad Castra Cornelia navis traduxisset. Qua pronuntiatione facta temporis puncto sublatis ancoris omnes Uticam relinquunt et quo imperatum est transeunt. Quae res omnium rerum copia complevit exercitum.
>
> In the meantime, upon the arrival of the warships, Curio ordered an announcement to be made to the grain-ships which were at anchor at Utica and roughly 200 in number. They were to be told that he would reckon as enemies any who did not forthwith bring their ships over to Castra Cornelia. After this announcement had been made, they at once all lifted anchor and abandoned Utica and crossed over to where he had commanded. This provided the army with an abundance of all things.

These merchantmen in all likelihood were given primarily to transporting grain and olive oil, the two foremost agricultural products of Africa. Since there was an abundance of salt and fresh water at Castra Cornelia,[106] Curio by ancient standards required only grain and olive oil in order for his men to enjoy *omnium rerum copia*.

Statistics are never straightforward, and ancient ones least of all. Nevertheless, some hope of interpretation may be derived from contextualizing the size of this fleet against later imperial ordinances for the shipment of grain from the provinces to Rome.[107] In particular, Claudius and Marcus Aurelius granted

106 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.37.5: *castra erant ad bellum ducendum aptissima natura loci et munitione et maris propinquitate et aquae et salis copia, cuius magna vis iam ex proximis erat salinis eo congesta*. For the provisioning of salt, see the detailed discussion furnished by C. Carusi, *Il sale nel mondo greco (VI a.C.–III d.C.). Luoghi di produzione, circolazione commerciale, regimi di sfruttamento nel contesto del Mediterraneo antico*, (Edipuglia: Bari 2008), 111–112.

107 For general considerations, see now W. Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," *Classical*

privileges to shipowners who had seen to the transportation of a fixed amount of grain within an established period. As laid out by Claudius, these privileges were dependent upon the carrying of 10,000 *modii* (ca. 70 tonnes) over 6 years. Subsequently, the amount to be transported was elevated to 50,000 *modii* (ca. 350 tonnes) over the same period.[108] The figure required by Claudius thus furnishes an appropriate upper-limit, for the trend was towards larger shipping. In turn, that figure is to be divided by three in order to obtain a regular year's shipment, for the legislator must have expected bad years and weather to intervene. The resulting figure is 3,333 *modii* for each of 3 years, which looks remarkably similar to other, administrative statistics.[109] Rounding upwards and postulating a berth of 3,500 *modii* for a *navis oneraria* in the late Republic as well as early Principate, we find that the fleet of sequestered by Curio would, in theory, have been capable of carrying a maximum of 700,000 *modii*.[110] Even a mere fraction of that capacity, for instance 1/2, justifies Caesar language of "abundance".

From the minimal evidence provided by Caesar, it is quite unclear whether this cargo derived only from the immediate vicinity of Utica or involved a larger area of Africa. However, once again other, contemporary statistics provide a context within which to judge the scale of this cargo. In annexing the Numidian kingdom of Iuba and creating the province of Africa Nova, Caesar imposed a tribute of 1,200,000 *modii* upon that province.[111] That tribute hardly represented more than a fraction of the total exports of the region. On the other hand, when M. Varro gathered grain in Hispania Ulterior, he amassed at Gades only 120,000 *modii*.[112] Falling between these two extremes, the figure of 350,000

Quarterly 46 (1996) 222–238. As a specific instance of an attempt to contextualize the data, perhaps not altogether infelicitous despite the bold attempt at allegorical interpretation of Greek paintings put on public display in Rome, see R.W. Westall, "The Forum Iulium as Representation of *Imperator* Caesar", *Römische Mitteilungen* 103 (1996) 83–118.

108 *Dig*. 50.5.3; P. Garnsey and R. Saller, *The Roman Empire. Economy, Society and Culture*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1987), 88.

109 Cf. Suet. *Iul*. 42, for the requirement that 1/3 of shepherds be of free status.

110 This figure should have sufficed to feed 20,300–30,000 persons for a year, if one reckons a maximum of 30 *modii* or a minimum of 22.5 *modii* per person p.a. See P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World. Responses to Risk and Crisis*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 191–192 n. 26; P. Garnsey, "Grain for Rome," 118–130, in: P. Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C.R. Whittaker (eds.), *Trade in the Ancient Economy*, (Chatto & Windus: London 1983), here 118. In short, the "abundance" that is claimed by Caesar is anything but hyperbole.

111 Plut. *Caes*. 55.

112 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.18.4.

modii obtained for the fleet at Utica suggests that the cargo concerned only local production, despite the vicinity of the river Bagradas and the considerable production of the African interior.

Other considerations also point towards the fleet at Utica as reflecting only a local reality. For one thing, there were many significant ports aside from Utica, to the east and south of Clupea: Neapolis, Hadrumetum, Ruspina, Thapsus, Thaenae. Indeed, thanks to its central location and perhaps on account of its being populous, Hadrumetum served as the second centre for directing operations against the north African expedition of Curio.[113] Albeit the capital of Africa, Utica certainly cannot have seen the whole or even a majority of the province's grain pass through its so-called port.[114] Moreover, the Romans had indubitably kept for themselves the most fertile areas of the former Carthaginian territory despite making a display of generosity to the Numidian monarch for his part in the destruction of Carthage. Lastly, much naval stock was likely absent, whether having remained in Italia or abroad to do service for Pompeius and Caesar's enemies in Macedonia. The transportation of Afranius and his men from Hispania Citerior to Macedonia will have required the use of such shipping, and it is not to be excluded that P. Attius Varus redirected the African grain towards Dyrrachium and the Epirote coastline with a view to helping prepare for an eventual invasion of Italia. African stock present in Italia at the time of Pompeius' abandonment of the peninsula had also, in all likelihood, been pressed into service to take men from Brundisium across to the opposite shore of the Adriatic.[115]

This state of affairs naturally spelt famine and social unrest for the city of Rome. Without a predictable abundance of victualment, the imperial capital became an explosive mixture of dispossessed masses and ineffectual ruling elite. Cognizant of the need for speed in taking measures to guarantee the capital's supply, Caesar had thought to provide Curio with a large enough army for the conquest of both Sicilia and Africa. In the event, Curio's failure rendered

113 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.23.3–4.

114 A. Lézine, "Utique, notes de topographie," 1241–1255, in: *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire offerts à André Piganiol*, 3 vols. (S.E.V.P.E.N.: Paris 1966), commenting upon the topographical evidence that emerges indirectly from Caesar's narrative. Cf. R. Haensch, *Capita provinciarum. Statthaltersitze und Provinzialverwaltung in der römischen Kaiserzeit*, (Kölner Forschungen, 7), (Philipp von Zabern: Mainz am Rhein 1997), 19 (capital), 34 (praetorium).

115 It is worthwhile comparing this situation with that for the population of Gades absent upon maritime errands elsewhere: Strab. 3.5.3 C169. Only in the most felicitous of circumstances, or the most abject, do residency and citizenship coincide.

the Italian situation precarious. Even with the departure of large numbers of people from the capital, the inaccessibility of Africa and the disruption of shipping in the western Mediterranean together provoked a shortage.[116] The evidence is extremely meagre, for only Appian mentions this significant fact.[117] Caesar cannot be expected to report a populace angry at him. However, the very brevity of Caesar's sojourn at Rome is particularly suggestive. Aside from the need to prosecute the war with all due speed, there was the likelihood that a prolonged presence in the city would provoke the riots that are reported in the course of the following year.

This dire situation had been foreseen by Cicero and was the primary aim of Pompeius' strategy of abandonment and then encirclement of Italia. Only once chaos reigned would Pompeius be prepared to re-enter Italia, secure in the knowledge that Caesar's logistical basis would be a shambles even if his men were not prepared to betray him.[118] Upon setting sail for Macedonia, Cicero wrote to his wife Terentia, tentatively suggesting that she withdraw from Rome. Despite his oblique language, Cicero seems to have had a clear vision of the economic difficulties and social unrest that would follow from the prospect of a scarcity of grain at Rome (Cic. *Fam.* 14.7.3):

> Tu primum valetudinem tuam velim cures; deinde, si tibi videbitur, villis iis utere quae longissime aberunt a militibus. Fundo Arpinati bene poteris uti cum familia urbana, si annona carior fuerit.
>
> I should like you first of all to look after your health. Next, if you see fit, make use of those country estates that will be as far from soldiers as possible. You could readily make use of the estate at Arpinum with the city household, in the event grain should become more expensive.

Riots replete with stoning and the menace of arson had followed recurrent grain shortages at Rome in the 60s and 50s BCE.[119] Anxious lest his wife and

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116 It is imperative to add that the production of the Italian peninsula will have plummted sensibly, which will have rendered the capital and the rest of Italia all the more dependent upon grain imported from external sources. Cf. Lucan. 1.28–29, which appears to be the poet's own fantasy but possesses a compelling plausibility in view of the agricultural manpower shortage that inevitably accompanied the enrollment of fifty legions or more.

117 App. *B Civ.* 2.48.196; cf. Cass. Dio 41.16.1.

118 Cic. *Att.* 7.9.2; 9.9.4.

119 Garnsey 1988: 200–201, 206; C. Virlouvet, *Famines et émeutes à Rome des origines de*

daughter find themselves in danger's path, Cicero hoped that they would leave the city for the countryside.[120] Pompeius, by contrast, hoped for precisely this popular expression of violence so as to dislodge Caesar from power.

On the other hand, the defeat of Curio's expedition to north Africa not only meant a crisis of famine at Rome, but also, it would seem, helped to spark the mutiny that occurred amongst Caesar's legions at Placentia in the autumn of 49 BCE. No source explicitly states the causal link, and the historiographical fallacy *post hoc propter hoc* is a potential risk. Nonetheless, two pieces of evidence strongly suggest that the one generated the other. First, there is the temporal connection that is made explicit by Appian with the transitional phrase "in these same days".[121] Secondly, there is the odd moment of choice for mutiny. Despite victories in Hispania and Gallia, the soldiers did not rebel until they were in northern Italia, probably in late October or November. It seems most logical to conclude that, despite their putative claims to have mutinied because of the lack of a chance to pillage and plunder, they chose this particular moment because of the news of Caesarian reverses suffered in both Africa and Illyricum. In view of the numerous wild rumours that were circulating at the time, it is to be expected that confirmation of the reality of the defeat of Curio and his expeditionary force will have arrived in northern Italia only a month or so after the fact. Indeed, individuals such as Caninius Rebilus and Asinius Pollio probably met with Caesar in northern Italia prior to his returning to Rome to hold the consular elections for the coming year.

Seeking to maintain the goodwill of the populace at Rome, Caesar showed himself attentive to the grain supply. Thanks to the military occupation of Sardinia and Sicilia, it was possible to bring grain in from those regions. Moreover, especial concern for stability is revealed by the appointment of new governors for those provinces as of late 49 or early 48 BCE.[122] Aware of widespread, seething popular discontent at Rome over the problems with the grain supply,

la République à la mort de Néron, (École française de Rome: Roma 1985). Even if the circumstances are quite different, for a dramatic depiction of the violent reality of riots, cf. Verg. *Aen.* 1.148–153; Plut. *Cat. min.* 44.3–4; R.D. Williams, *The Aeneid of Vergil, Books 1–6. Edited with Introduction and Notes*, (Macmillan: Basingstoke and London 1972), 172; Lintott, 1999^2: 214–215 no. 54.

120 For Cicero's fears for the well-being of Tullia and her expected child, see Garnsey 1988: 201–202, with an illuminating list (198–202); S.M. Treggiari, *Terentia, Tullia and Publilia. The Women of Cicero's Family*, (Women in the Ancient World), (Routledge: London 2007), 101–108.

121 App. *B Civ.* 2.47.191.

122 App. *B Civ.* 2.48.197.

Caesar also promised 300 *denarii* to each member of the *plebs frumentaria* as a means of purchasing time and quiet.[123] These are not things that Caesar himself reports, but then he was concerned in his own brief narrative to focus upon the continuity that had been provided for constitutional forms and the correct observance of the law. Focussing upon high politics, Caesar rather draws readers' attention to his election as dictator for the sake of overseeing elections, his own election to a second consulate after the due and proper interval of 10 years, and his celebration of the Latin festival at the Mons Albanus.[124]

Notwithstanding Caesar's reticence to enter into the details of problems arising from Curio's inability to take Africa, evidence from elsewhere within Caesar's text and historical parallels suggest further remedies taken to alleviate the situation. As has been remarked in discussing the significance of the Massiliote refusal to align themselves with Caesar, logistical lines for supplying Caesar's with grain on the Spanish campaign extended to the interior of Gallia Ulterior and as far abroad as Italia.[125] Whether Caesar means by the latter term Gallia Cisalpina or Etruria and other regions upon the Tyrrhenian coastline, such a system of supply is striking and provides a possible solution to how the lack of grain from Africa or the eastern half of the Mediterranean was made good. It is more than probable that Caesar ordered the exportation of grain from Hispania and Gallia Ulterior to Rome in order to compensate for the missing stock. Varro's action in gathering grain to send from Hispania Ulterior to the relief of Massilia affords further support to this reconstruction.[126] So, too, does the fact that olive oil was later exported upon an industrial scale from Hispania Ulterior to Rome for distribution to the *plebs frumentaria*.[127] The lack of explicit evidence ought not to disconcert, for this operation would not have produced

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123 App. *B Civ.* 2.48.198; cf. Cass. Dio 41.16.1. For an overview of the situation, see Garnsey 1988: 201–202. Lest the sum be viewed as a bonanza, it should be added that the evidence suggests a grave inflationary crisis in course.

124 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.21.5; 3.1.1–2.1. For Caesar's attention to constitutional form as regards the manoeuvres leading to his election and comportment as *consul iter* for 48 BCE, see K.M. Girardet, "Caesars Konsulatsplan für das Jahr 49: Gründe und Scheitern," *Chiron* 30 (2000) 679–710; idem, "Die *Lex Iulia de Provinciis*: Vorgeschichte, Inhalt, Wirkungen," *RhM* 130 (1987) 291–321, in part. 305–306.

125 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.48.4.

126 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.18.1.

127 E. Rodriguez Almeida, *Il Monte Testaccio. Ambiente, storia, materiali,* (Edizioni Quasar: Roma 1984). Work upon the material remains that constitute Monte Testaccio is ongoing, but there have been no substantial revisions of this interpretation enunciated nearly three decades ago. For further bibliography, see above Chapter 4: Hispania.

any clear physical remains nor was it worthy of attention from accounts dedicated to political narratives, not to the quotidian realities of life in the imperial capital.

Lastly, the grain of Africa and the disaster of Curio's expedition may provide the key to an understanding of the final movements of M. Caelius Rufus in 48 BCE. Caesar had manifestly misjudged his man; of that there can be no doubt. But then the mystique that invests leaders is normally the creation of others, a pyschological mechanism that renders the world a less troubling place. Had Caesar possessed the keen insight with which he is so often credited, he would surely not have left Caelius at Rome to stir up the already anxious masses. Left to their own devices, Caesar's collaborators suppressed Caelius with passage of a *senatus consultum ultimum*, the same mechanism that had provided Caesar with a pretext for civil war.[128] Loyal but lame, to say the least. Yet, it is Caelius' reaction that merits further notice. Claiming that he was setting off in order to complain to Caesar, Curio took a most circuitous route, ending his days outside the walls of Thurii.[129] Far to the west of Tarentum and situated within the region of Lucania, Thurii lay close to the Via Annia, hardly a route taking one towards Macedonia in timely fashion.[130] Rather, the route was perfect for passage to Africa. As the proprietor of extensive estates in Africa, Caelius may well have found himself in financial straits as a result of the failure to bring his grain to Rome. Hence, his presence at Thurii suggests that he was preparing to change sides and join the representatives of Pompeius active in Africa.

Conclusion

The figure of C. Scribonius Curio dominates Caesar's narrative of the disastrous expedition in Africa undertaken in mid-49 BCE. In his mid-30s, Curio was a promising and engaging youth (*iuvenis*). Indeed, in the expedition to Africa, he resembles in certain, fundamental respects the young Pompeius Magnus, who had likewise been sent to Africa by L. Sulla upon a similar mission. As for Sulla, so with Caesar the relationship to the youthful commander in the field proved

128 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.21–22.

129 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.22.3.

130 Indeed, while he could still have embarked for Greece from Thurii, it is more likely that he would have used a minor port such as that of Lupiae (modern Marina di Lecce) as did C. Octavius in the spring of 44 BCE (App. *B Civ*. 3.10.35), had he been intent upon crossing the Adriatic.

fraught with problems and unresolved ambiguities. Curio's legal status and his death were the most outstanding of these, for Curio was immensely popular at Rome as a result of the skill with which he had defended Caesar's interest and revealed the hollowness of claims of concern for the well-being of the Roman state. Caesar, of necessity, had to reward Curio for his skilful opposition of the tribunician veto to any and all attempts to replace Caesar in his *provincia*. Hence, the command of four legions with the mission of occupying Sicilia and Africa so as to secure the grain supply for the imperial capital. However, there obtruded the question of the legal validity of any decisions taken by that portion of the Senate which had remained in Italia. Then, there was also the issue of Curio's charismatic leadership. But for the disaster in Africa, it would have been Curio, and not M. Antonius, who proved Caesar's political heir. Caesar's narrative of the African expedition is in some ways tantamount to a *laudatio funebris*, exalting Curio in death and thereby defending the mistaken choices that Caesar himself had made.[131]

The failure of Curio's expedition meant more than the disgraceful loss of two legions. It spelt famine for Rome. Nothwithstanding the success obtained in securing both Sicilia and Sardinia, failure to retake Africa meant that there would be a significant shortfall in the amount of grain available to feed the urban masses. Higher food prices and rents were to be expected, with the concomitant social and political chaos that manifested itself intermittently in 48–47 BCE. The sources of grain were likely quite diversified, but the removal of Africa and Egypt from the market of Rome constituted an irreparable loss. The problem was aggravated by the fact that Curio's failure left the shipping of the western half of the Mediterrranean at risk. Transferral of Afranius' soldiers from Hispania Citerior to Macedonia is but one sign of a structural problem that called into question the brilliant successes that Caesar had achieved in Italia, Gallia, and Hispania. Within this context there occurred the mutiny at Placentia, yet another indication that the situation of Caesar would be untenable over the long-term. Faced with the prospect of a large-scale revolt amongst his own men, Caesar had no choice but to launch the Macedonian campaign as soon as possible.

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131 For a different, but similar perspective, see G.O. Rowe, "Dramatic Structures in Caesar's *Bellum Civile*," *TAPA* 98 (1967) 399–414. It is worth adding that Curio's father had passed away in 53 BCE, whereas Curio's son by Fulvia—whom he had married after the death of P. Clodius—was too young to have performed this function. The son did not long survive the downfall of M. Antonius, Fulvia's last husband and by default his stepfather: Cass. Dio 51.2.5; Syme 1988: 31, 39, 264.

CHAPTER 7

Macedonia

1 Caesar Fleeing Forwards

Caesar's narrative for the years 49–48 BCE is marked by a distinct hiatus between Massilia's capitulation and the defeat of Curio, on the one hand, and Caesar's election to the consulate, on the other. Silence envelops the disaster in Illyricum and the mutiny at Placentia. It appears that this state of affairs is due to a conscious choice made by the author, rather than to be attributed to a chance *lacuna*.[1] One consequence that follows is the heightened impression of the brevity of Caesar's sojourn within the Italian peninsula upon returning victorious from his campaigns in Gallia and Hispania. Elections, various pieces of legislation, and measures for alleviating the present financial crisis were accomplished during Caesar's time in Rome. Then, having also celebrated the Latin festival so as to maintain the goodwill of the gods, he renounced the dictatorship and departed for Brundisium. Eleven days had been consumed in accomplishing all of this.[2] Last seen leaving Massilia for Italia in the middle of Book 2, Caesar now presents readers with a synthetic listing of what he accomplished at Rome in a very brief timespan. Then, goals achieved, Caesar departs once more in order to take up yet another military campaign.

Upon arrival in Brundisium, Caesar appears to have embarked the first half of his expeditionary force immediately, or after a delay of a day or two at most. Indeed, the theme of rapidity recurs explicitly at this point, for Caesar remarks that it was only the lack of sufficient naval stock for transporting the whole of his army that kept him from rapidly bringing the war to an end.[3] Be that as it may, as of 4 January 48 BCE, Caesar and perhaps as many as 25,000 soldiers embarked for the expedition to be conducted in the province of Macedonia. In order to transfer as many soldiers as possible to the next theatre of warfare, he ordered the soldiers to embark without the usual accompaniment of servants and baggage (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.6.1):

1 Cf. J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Book 3*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1993), 151. See also C. Damon, *Studies on the text of Caesar's Bellum civile*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015), 105–108, even if that focusses on problems usually at the level of the sentence or phrase.

2 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.2.1.

3 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.2.2; cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 1.29.1.

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> Caesar ut Brundisium venit, contionatus apud milites, quoniam prope ad finem laborum ac periculorum esset perventum, aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent, quo maior numerus militum posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent, conclamantibus omnibus, imperaret quod vellet, quodcumque imperavisset, se aequo animo esse facturos, II Nonas Ianuarias naves solvit.
>
> When Caesar reached Brundisium, he delivered a speech to the soldiers. Since they had almost arrived at the end to their labours and dangers, they should with a serene mind leave their slaves and luggage behind in Italia. They should embark on the ships with the minimum necessary, so that as large a number of soldiers as possible might be embarked. They should expect everything from victory and from his generosity. They all shouted in reply that he should command what he wished and that they would with a serene mind do whatever he had commanded. On 4 January he ordered the fleet to set sail.

Thus, at the very closure of the sailing season, Caesar launched his invasion of Macedonia. Caesar's proverbial *celeritas* permitted him once again, unexpectedly to seize the initiative from his enemies.

In describing his haste to prosecute the campaign in Macedonia, Caesar inadvertently gives the appearance of flight, albeit forwards in order to survive the onslaught that would have come with spring's arrival in 48 BCE. The image is paradoxical, but applied by Caesar himself to Pompeius when describing the latter's haste to arrive in Epirus and make dispositions to counter the beachhead that Caesar had managed to establish.[4] The logistical argument for *milites expediti* is persuasively set forth by Caesar in the *contio* at Brundisium, which speech in many ways parallels that reportedly delivered at Ravenna in January 49 BCE, but the vision of lightly equipped soldiers would have been associated primarily by an ancient audience with a rout.[5] It was in an effort to

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4 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.13.1–2: *ut … fugae simile iter videretur*.

5 For the use of the perfect participle *expeditus* in comparable historical writing, see Liv. 2.11; 5.16; 6.3; 7.34, 37; 8.33; 9.9, 31, 43, 44; 10.12, 34; 21.32, 36, 46, 47; 22.2,16, 21, 23, 55; 24.41 (2×); 25.9, 21; 26.9, 24; 27.1, 18, 40; 28.7, 13, 14, 23, 34; 30.9.1; 31.16, 24, 40, 46; 32.6, 16; 33.6, 19; 34.19, 26 (2×), 28; 35.27 (2×); 36.15, 16, 29, 30, 31; 37.16, 18, 41; 38.4, 34; 40.21, 41; 42.55; 44.1, 2, 3, 4, 43; Tac. *Ann*. 1.50, 56, 60; 2.7; 3.74; 4.25; 12.39; 13.41; *Hist*. 2.40, 45, 52, 83; 3.2, 50, 61, 77; 4.3, 34, 42; 5.11. Of no little interest, moreover, is the extension of the military metaphor to the language of civil discourse (e.g. Tac. *Ann*. 3.53).

escape from the battlefield in the wake of defeat that soldiers normally took no thought for their servants and baggage. Similarly, the crossing of the sea despite the arrival of winter is something more consistent with flight than the launching of an offense. However, as had been made clear by the mutiny at Placentia and the scarcity of grain in Rome, Caesar's hold upon the West was precarious despite his repeated victories. Fleeing from the problems of Italia, he hastened forwards to the encounter with Pompeius, knowing that time's passage could only strengthen the cause of those forces ranged again himself.

Hence, at the very moment when most generals should have been preparing to go into winter quarters, Caesar chose rather to commence yet another, audacious offensive. Inactivity was too dangerous, and certain to produce defeat. But the date of the embarkation of Caesar and his soldiers ought not to mislead. The civil calendar then obtaining was nearly two months in advance of the solar year, an irritual situation that would find remedy only in 46 BCE.[6] To be precise, the date of 4 January 48 BCE was in fact 6 November 49 BCE according to the solar year.[7] Unaware or forgetful of this disparity, subsequent historians misinterpreted the evidence of Caesar and other contemporaries. Consequently, authors writing under the Principate are unanimous in their erroneous vision of Caesar's launching his invasion of Macedonia with a crossing of the Adriatic sea soon after the winter solstice.[8] This was clearly not the case. In fact, it is worth recalling that the Late Antique strategist Vegetius observed that the traditional season of *mare clausum* lasted from 11 November to 10 March.[9] Caesar,

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6 For a wide-ranging survey of this matter, readers should now consult in the first instance: D. Feeney, *Caesar's Calendar. Ancient Time and the Beginnings of History*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 2007). As regards the need to rectify this reform only a couple of decades later, see A. Jones, "Calendrica II: Date Equations from the Reign of Augustus," *ZPE* 129 (2000) 159–166.

7 J. Beaujeu, "Les dernières années du calendrier pré-julien," 13–32, in: *L'Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine. Mélanges offerts à Jacques Heurgon*, (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 27), (École française de Rome: Roma 1976), here 17–18; P. Brind'Amour, *Le calendrier romain. Recherches chronologiques*, (Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa: Ottawa 1983), 120. For the calendrical reform implemented by Caesar, see now Feeney 2007: 193–199. Cf. J. Rüpke, *Kalender und Öffentlichkeit. Die Geschichte der Repräsentation und religiösen Qualifikation von Zeit in Rom*, (W. de Gruyter: Berlin 1995), 369–391; J. Malitz, "Die Kalenderreform Caesars: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte seiner Spätzeit," *Ancient Society* 18 (1987) 103–131.

8 Lucan. 8.467–469; Plut. *Caes.* 37.3; *Pomp.* 65.4; App. *B Civ.* 2.52/55; Flor. *Epit.* 2.13.36; Cass. Dio 41.44.2.

9 Veget. *De re mil.* 4.39; J. Rougé, *Recherches sur l'organisation du commerce maritime en Méditerranée sous l'Empire romain*, (S.E.V.P.E.N.: Paris 1966), 32–33; cf. E. de Saint-Denis, "Mare

therefore, was yet in time, albeit at the last possible moment according to conventional wisdom. In crossing at such a late season and with only half of his force, Caesar did effectively make trial of his fortune, and the impreparation of his enemies revealed the wisdom of this choice. "Many are the surprises of war".[10]

Comparison with Caesar's response to defeat suffered near Dyrrachium later in the early spring of that same year is instructive. There was no retreat to Italia, contrary to what conventional wisdom or a regard for personal safety might have suggested. Rather, Caesar perceived that it was imperative that he advance even further into the province of Macedonia if he were to have a chance to reverse his fortunes. Withdrawal to Italia and the preparation of new military forces were a chimera to be resisted. Inaction would have followed in the attendant chaos; defeat would have been inevitable. There was a chronic lack of naval stock to assure the transportation of Caesar's soldiers back to Italia. Equally grave, despite his official status as *consul iterum*, Caesar would have found uncertain support had he returned to Italia in defeat. The success encountered by the demagogic projects of M. Caelius Rufus and T. Annius Milo, *inter alios*, suffices to reveal a precariously balanced political landscape. Consequently, after suffering defeat near Dyrrachium, Caesar chose to cross the Pindus mountains and to take his army into Thessalia, so as to recoup their forces for another trial of strength. This bold refusal to capitulate to circumstances helps to explain Caesar's swiftly moving to initiate the campaign in Macedonia shortly after the mutiny of Placentia.

Demonstration that in conducting the Macedonian campaign Caesar was fleeing forwards irretrievably refutes one of the more celebrated historiographical representations of the civil war of 49–48 BCE. Caesar, it is claimed, sought surrepititiously to sail back to Italia, only to be defeated by the force of the wintry gale winds. Omission from Caesar's narrative might be deemed sufficient

clausum," *REL* 25 (1947) 196–214; J. Rougé, "La navigation hivernale sous l'Empire romain," *REA* 54 (1952) 316–325.

10 For this Hellenic proverb, see Cary 1916: 4.77 n. 1, commenting on Dio. 41.44.2 (τὸ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου). For other instances, see Thuc. 3.30; Polyb. 29.6; Diod. 20.30, 67; Cic. *Att.* 5.20.3. It ought to be added that this proverb re-appears at Cass. Dio 49.5.1, within the context of the naval struggle between Caesar the Younger and Sextus Pompeius. That, in all likelihood, points to Cassius Dio's reliance upon a source that covered the entire course of the Roman civil wars of the 49–30 BCE. Had the phrase been one of which Dio was personally fond, surely he would have used it elsewhere within his work. On the other hand, the recurrence of the proverb within a similar situation and within the same chronological framework renders virtually certain the idea that it was lifted from another author writing in Greek.

cause for belief in the historicity of this episode. However, considerations of character and the practice of *Quellenkritik* in conjuction with *Quellenforschung* together undermine the credibility of this report. Not the well informed and sober C. Asinius Pollio, but the tendentious T. Ampius Balbus is probably to be identified as the ultimate source for a story that originally portrayed Caesar in a less than brilliant light.[11]

The fullest developed version of the episode of Caesar's purported attempt to retreat is offered by Plutarch in his chronologically arranged biography of Caesar. Whether written before or after the same author's biography of Pompeius Magnus, this work draws upon the same group of sources and the differences are those to be expected of an author revisiting a theme (Plut. *Caes.* 38):

> ἐν δὲ Ἀπολλωνίαι Καῖσαρ οὐκ ἔχων ἀξιόμαχον τὴν μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, βραδυνούσης δὲ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν, ἀπορούμενος καὶ περιπαθῶν, δεινὸν ἐβούλευσε βούλευμα, κρύφα πάντων εἰς πλοῖον ἐμβὰς τὸ μέγεθος δωδεκάσκαλμον ἀναχθῆναι πρὸς τὸ Βρεντέσιον, τηλικούτοις στόλοις περιεχομένου τοῦ πελάγους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων. νυκτὸς οὖν ἐσθῆτι θεράποντος ἐπικρυψάμενος ἐνέβη, καὶ καταβαλὼν ἑαυτὸν ὥς τινα τῶν παρημελημένων ἡσύχαζε. τοῦ δὲ Ἀώου ποταμοῦ τὴν ναῦν ὑποφέροντος εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν, τὴν μὲν ἑωθινὴν αὔραν, ἣ παρεῖχε τηνικαῦτα περὶ τὰς ἐκβολὰς γαλήνην ἀπωθοῦσα πόρρω τὸ κῦμα, πολὺς πνεύσας πελάγιος διὰ νυκτὸς ἀπέσβεσε· πρὸς δὲ τὴν πλημμύραν τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τὴν ἀντίβασιν τοῦ κλύδωνος ἀγριαίνων ὁ ποταμός, καὶ τραχὺς ἅμα καὶ κτύπωι μεγάλωι καὶ σκληραῖς ἀνακοπτόμενος δίναις, ἄπορος ἦν βιασθῆναι τῶι κυβερνήτηι· καὶ μεταβαλεῖν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ναύτας ὡς ἀποστρέψων τὸν πλοῦν. αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀναδείκνυσιν ἑαυτόν, καὶ τοῦ κυβερνήτου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ἐκπεπληγμένου πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, Ἴθι, ἔφη, γενναῖε, τόλμα καὶ δέδιθι μήδεν· Καίσαρα φέρεις καὶ τὴν Καίσαρος τύχην συμπλέουσαν. ἐλάθοντο τοῦ χειμῶνος οἱ ναῦται, καὶ ταῖς κώπαις ἐμφύντες ἐβιάζοντο πάσηι προθυμίαι τὸν ποταμόν. ὡς δὲ ἦν ἄπορα, δεξάμενος πολλὴν θάλατταν καὶ κινδυνεύσας ἐν τῶι στόματι συνεχώρησε μάλα ἄκων τῶι κυβερνήτηι μεταβαλεῖν. ἀνιόντι δὲ αὐτῶι κατὰ πλῆθος ἀπήντων οἱ στρατιῶται, πολλὰ μεμφόμενοι καὶ δυσπαθοῦντες εἰ μὴ πέπεισται καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς μόνοις ἱκανὸς εἶναι νικᾶν, ἀλλ' ἄχθεται καὶ παραβάλλεται διὰ τοὺς ἀπόντας ὡς ἀπιστῶν τοῖς παροῦσιν.

11 For the most thorough edition to date of the fragments of this individual's lost historical work, see now *FRH* 34 "T. Ampius Balbus" (C.J. Smith): 1.354 (introduction); 2.730–731 (*testimonia* and fragments); 3.463 (commentary). The current thesis exposed here goes beyond that material, and was in fact written independently and prior to the appearance of the laudable monument that is *FRH*.

> At Apollonia Caesar did not have with himself a force that could be put into battle and he was vexed and upset over the slowness of the force on the other side (of the Adriatic). Therefore, he conceived an incredible plan. Unbeknownst to all, he embarked on a boat that had only twelve oars to be taken back to Brundisium, even though the sea was guarded by enemies with massive fleets. So, he embarked by night disguised as a slave, and seating himself apart like someone of no account he kept to himself. As the river Aous was carrying the ship down to the sea, the morning breeze, which at that time of day normally created a calm at the mouth of the river by driving back the waves, was extinguished by a strong gale from the sea that had been blowing through the night. The river became choppy on account of the swelling of the sea and the counter-current of its billows; and as it was beaten back with a loud din and violent eddies, it became so rough that it was impossible for the captain of the boat to navigate. So, he commanded the sailors to change course so as to take the boat back. Upon learning this, Caesar revealed himself and, seizing by the hand the captain, who was astounded at the sight, he said, "Come on, my good man, be bold and fear nothing. You carry Caesar and the fortune of Caesar that sails with him." The sailors forgot the storm and, laying into their oars, strove with might and main against the river. But, seeing that it was impossible, since the ship had taken on much water and was at risk in the river's mouth, Caesar reluctantly permitted the captain to change course. As he returned, he was greeted by the soldiers *en masse*. They were much vexed and upset that he did not think he could win with their help alone, and that he was rather worried about and took risks for those absent as if he did not trust those who were present.

There is the trenchant eye for incidental detail and psychological analysis. Plutarch provides a specific geographical location for the episode, locating it in that period of anxiety prior to the tardy arrival of reinforcements under M. Antonius and Q. Calenus. Alas, it is pure invention.[12]

From its appearance in a variety of other authors, it can safely be concluded that Plutarch took the episode from Livy. But there is no need to hold that Livy derived the episode in turn from Pollio. Indeed, various considerations

12 C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Caesar*, (Clarendon Ancient History Series), (Oxford 2011), 344. Unfortunately, preferring Pollio to Livy and minimalising the manifest signs of Plutarch's use of the latter, Pelling invites readers to think of much of the Plutarchan biography of Caesar as derived from Pollio, which would indubitably enhance its value but can hardly be correct in terms of historical method.

exclude such a thesis. For one thing, the vision of Caesar seeking to re-cross the Adriatic in utter secrecy is intrinsically unflattering and at odds with the vision of the charismatic leader transmitted by Pollio. For another, the recrimination expressed by Caesar's soldiers is most improbable. Thirdly, the general tone is altogether irreconcilable with the critical stance adopted by Pollio in the *Historiae*. Rather, as transmitted, the episode has the appearance of an anti-Caesarian libel rewritten by Livy in order to render it palatable. Without the grandiose exhortation to the captain to take courage, this episode would be appropriate to the work of Ampius Balbus, one of the opposition whom Caesar found particularly irksome. Indeed, accused by Caesar of cowardice, Ampius had all the more reason to make the same insinuation regarding Caesar.[13] On the other hand, the bathetic finale reveals the hand of the rhetorical schoolmaster, an attempt by Livy to turn invective into panegyric.[14]

Caesar, to leave partisan invention by the wayside, had no intention nor desire to return to Italia despite anxiety over the numbers of troops available to him in Epirus in the early months of 48 BCE. The lessons of the civil war fought nearly four decades previously were well known to him. Two duly elected consuls, Cornelius Cinna and Carbo, had both been destroyed by their inability to take the initiative and abandon Italia so as to carry the war into Macedonia against the rebellious proconsul L. Sulla. Cinna had fallen victim to mutiny by his soldiers.[15] Carbo had been forced to abandon Italia and eventually fallen into the hands of the youthful Pompeius Magnus, by whom he had been unceremoniously executed.[16] For a time, Caesar himself had been hunted by Sulla's agents because of his ties to Cinna, marriage to Cinna's daughter Cornelia and occupation of the flaminate of Iupiter.[17] Through personal experience, Caesar recognized the perils inherent in a static defense of Italia in time of civil war. In view of the problems with the grain supply for the capital and the uneasy allegiance of his soldiers, despite their recent victories, Caesar had no choice but to flee forwards if he were to survive.

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13 For the date of Ampius Balbus' work, therefore, it may not be irrelevant that Caesar's *Bellum Civile* seems to have seen the light of day only as of 43/42 BCE. Surely, the unflattering depiction of Ampius' behaviour at Ephesus will have rankled.

14 Cf. Liv. 21.28, for the elephants crossing the Rhône.

15 *RE* 4.1 (1900) 1282–1287 s.v. "Cornelius Nr. 106" (F. Münzer).

16 *RE* 18.3 (1949) 1024–1031 s.v. "Papirius Nr. 38" (F. Münzer).

17 *RE* 10.1 (1917) 186–259 s.v. "Iulius Nr. 131" (Groebe), here 187; M. Gelzer, *Caesar. Politician and Statesman*. tr. P. Needham. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 20–21 (English).

2 Pompeius' Preparations for 48 BCE

Pompeius, by contrast, emerges from Caesar's narrative as dilatory and encumbered by a signal lack of imagination. Although enjoying an entire year within which to assemble both soldiers and resources, Pompeius was yet unprepared for Caesar's arrival on the coast of Epirus as of the beginning of 48 BCE. Through artful combination of an initial summary of the strategic situation with an account that focusses upon Caesar's actions and Pompeius' reaction, Caesar thereby ingeniously manages to stress both the might available to his enemy and his enemy's inability to make good use of it. When focalization turns to the figure of Pompeius and the daunting challenge awaiting Caesar and his expeditionary force, the opening words of the first sentence proclaim the advantage that Pompeius had enjoyed: "Pompeius had a year's time for the gathering of resources, since that period had been warfare free and unhindered by an enemy's presence".[18] Yet, notwithstanding his enjoyment of a full nine months for the marshalling of his legions, Pompeius was caught unprepared by Caesar's landfall upon the Epirote coastline. The consequence, as we have noted, was a rapid march forwards that Caesar was able to depict paradoxically as having the appearance of a rout.[19] Indeed, Pompeius' dilatoriness is effectively heightened by the narrative choice to delay reporting of the response that followed swiftly upon receipt of news of Caesar's arrival.[20]

The initial focus upon Pompeius at the beginning of Book 3 of the *Civil War* is dedicated to an ornate, rhetorically effective description of the preparations that Pompeius had undertaken with a view to the campaign for the following year. By means of lists, of varying length and complexity, Caesar evokes the total strength of which his enemies disposed for the campaign of 48 BCE. In four

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18 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.3.1: *Pompeius annuum spatium ad comparandas copias nactus, quod vacuum a bello atque ab hoste otiosum fuerat.* For the sake of a readable English translation, the author has permitted himself the luxury of breaking up the sentence and rendering the perfect participle *nactus*, in apposition to the sentence's subject *Pompeius*, as a finite verb. *En passant*, it is also worth drawing attention to the *chiasmus* appearing in the *quod*-clause.

19 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.13.1–3.

20 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.11.2, with more than one change of scene intervening. This stands in marked contrast to the rapid succession of events leading from Caesar's election as consul to his arrival in Brundisium and immediate departure for Macedonia. It was to be expected that narrative time would slow down upon arrival in Epirus, but not that Caesar would also permit himself to direct readers' attention elsewhere, for instance the inconclusive operations of M. Octavius along the coast of Dalmatia and further north in the Adriatic (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.9).

lists of alternating detail, Caesar indicates those regions and rulers or communities in the eastern Mediterranean that provided Pompeius assistance in the form of maritime stock, money, soldiers or cavalry, and grain.[21] Except for the description of the contingents that the allied rulers contributed, Pompeius is the subject of the verbs of the main clauses. Playing upon Pompeius' *cognomen* Magnus, so as to emphasize the nature of these thorough and time-consuming preparations, Caesar repeatedly resorts to the adjective *magnus* in quantifying the warships, money, and allied contingents.[22] Appropriately enough, the superlative form *maximus* is employed in regard to the decisive issue of grain.

Having provided an impression of the vast resources that were ranged against himself, Caesar then sketches the strategic situation obtaining within the Adriatic at the opening of 48 BCE. Although numbers are lacking here, as opposed to the list of legions and allied contingents, the listing of Roman commanders detailed to oversee the various regional contributions eloquently conveys likewise a sense of the difficulty of the campaign to be undertaken.[23] Next, without troubling to specify where Pompeius was nor what forces were actually already present in Epirus, Caesar shifts the focus back to himself and his setting sail from Brundisium. It was with Caesar that the offensive lay, as things turned out.

The Caesarian interpretation of Pompeius' strategic plans for 48 BCE, however, is manifestly based upon what Caesar himself did, not what would have happened had he proved tardy or incapable of crossing the Adriatic. Explaining the disposition of enemy forces along the Epirote coastline, Caesar attributes to Pompeius the limited goal of preventing Caesar from landing an expeditionary force in the province of Macedonia (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.5.2):

> Hiemare Dyrrachi, Apolloniae omnibusque oppidis maritimis constituerat, ut mare transire Caesarem prohiberet, eiusque rei causa omni ora maritima classem disposuerat.

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21 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.3.1–5.1.

22 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.3.1 (*magnam ... classem ... magnam*), 3.2 (*magnam ... pecuniam ... magnam*), 4.2 (*magnum numerum*), 4.5 (*magna Pompeius praemia*), 5.1 (*frumenti vim maximam*). Both the anaphora of the adjective to be discerned at 3.3.1–2 and the unusual placement of the name of Pompeius between adjective and the noun that it modifies at 3.4.5 are particularly worthy of note. In this context, it is worth observing also that Caesar never utilizes the *cognomen* of Magnus to designate Pompeius.

23 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.5.2–4. Excessive faith should not be placed in the figure of 500 or 600 warships recorded elsewhere: Plut. *Pomp*. 64; App. *B Civ*. 2.49.204; Cass. Dio 41.52.2. These statistics are the numerical equivalent of Caesar's *magnam classem*.

> He had decided to winter at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and all of the towns along the seacoast, in order to prevent Caesar from crossing the sea. For that reason, he had arranged the fleet all along the seacoast.

Hindrance was realistically one of the functions of the navy, but can hardly have been the reason for the amassing of troops in proximity to the Adriatic sea. Indeed, had that been Pompeius' goal, then it would be hard to conceive why the delay in stationing those troops in their winter quarters. Rather, Pompeius had kept them at Beroea throughout the whole of the year so as to engage them in training exercises.[24] Moreover, the very fact that Caesar writes of "wintering" (*hiemare*) at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other communities located upon the coastline is suggestive of a strategy that looked beyond the static positioning of troops in a defensive arrangement.[25] It appears that Pompeius was preparing for an invasion of Italia in the spring of 48 BCE.

Confirmation is to be had from Cicero's description of Pompeian strategy as it was outlined in Italia in the first weeks of 49 BCE. As he later reported to Atticus in a letter composed in mid-March, Cicero had been present at discussions of how Caesar was to be resisted and brought into submission (Cic. *Att.* 9.9.2):

> Nec vero dubito quin exitiosum bellum impendeat, cuius initium ducetur a fame. Et me tamen doleo non interesse huic bello! In quo tanta vis

24 Plut. *Pomp.* 64.2–3 and 7; App. *B Civ.* 2.49.200. For Beroea and its overall significance in the Roman province of Macedonia, see F. Papazoglou, *Les villes de Macédoine à l'époque romaine*, (BCH, suppl. 16), (École française d'Athènes: Athens 1988), 141–148; *DNP* 2 (1997/1999) 577 s.v. "Beroia [1.A]" (M. Errington). As regards this particular episode, see C. Carsana, *Commento storico al libro II delle Guerre Civili di Appiano*. Parte I. (ETS: Firenze 2007), 168–169; P. Greenhalgh, *Pompey, the Republican Prince*, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London 1981), 191–192. Carsana convincingly observes that it is possible to discern "una fonte comune" behind the narratives of Plutarch and Appian in this instance. However, in contrast with her identification of that source as Pollio in accordance with a long-standing tradition in modern scholarship, I would tend to suggest that the source is in all likelihood Livy. The episode, it should be stressed, is indeed a wonderful piece of theatre, on the order of what may be discerned in the surviving books of Livy's work.

25 It may not be inopporture to draw a comparison with the positioning of *castra* by Caesar during the Gallic campaigns of the 50s BCE. The *castra* were situated with a view to the offensive operations to begin with the coming of spring and the advent of the next campaigning season. For a *mentalité* comparable to that of "Fortress Europe" in the 1940s, it would be necessary to wait until close of the third century CE and the establishment of defensive systems such as the *litus Saxonicum* or "Saxon Shore".

> sceleris futura est ut, cum parentis non alere nefarium sit, nostri principes antiquissimam et sanctissimam parentem, patriam, fame necandam putent. Atque hoc non opinione timeo, sed interfui sermonibus. Omnis haec classis Alexandria, Colchis, Tyro, Sidone, Arado, Cypro, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodo, Chio, Byzantio, Lesbo, Smyrna, Mileto, Coo ad intercludendos commeatus Italiae et ad occupandas frumentarias provincias comparatur. At quam veniet iratus! Et iis quidem maxime qui eum maxime salvum volebant, quasi relictus ab iis quos reliquit.
>
> I have no doubt that a destructive war is looming, and it will begin with famine. Nonetheless, I am sorry to be participating in this war! In it there will be such wickedness that, while it is scandalous not to provide one's parents with food, our leaders are of the opinion that the oldest and most holy of parents—our country—ought to be killed by famine. And this is not an idle fear on my part: I was present at the conversations. A fleet is being organized from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna, Miletus, and Cos. This whole fleet is meant to cut off the supply-lines to Italia and to seize the provinces that provide grain. How wrathful will he be when he comes! Especially with those who had especially wished him well, as if he had been abandoned by those whom he abandoned.

Famine imposed by naval blockade was to be followed by an invasion of the Italian peninsula, with Pompeius punishing those who had failed to join him in abandoning Italia before Caesar's initial advance. Rooted in Pompeius' long experience of military command and civilian government, the "Themistoclean plan" of reliance upon naval power was to be coupled with an invasion of Italia.[26] The question, as far as it concerned the personal fates of individuals such as Cicero, was whether to remain quietly in Italia or to risk the hazards of travel in order to be within the camp of Pompeius at the moment of victory so as to avoid condign punishment.

What would have followed Pompeius' return to Italia was likewise clear to all and sundry. In taking leave of Rome, Pompeius had asserted that he would make no distinction between those who remained behind and those who joined Caesar's camp.[27] Neutrality was not allowed. Rather, in imitation of

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26 Cic. *Att.* 10.8.4: *cuius omne consilium Themistocleum est. Existimat enim qui mare teneat eum necesse ⟨esse⟩ rerum potiri … Navalis apparatus ei semper antiquissima cura fuit. Navigabit igitur, cum erit tempus, maximis classibus et ad Italiam accedet.*

27 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.33.2.

L. Sulla, Pompeius and his allies envisioned instituting the proscriptions anew. This was already clear to Cicero in mid-March, as he wavered over what to do. Claiming that Pompeius had been contemplating a Themistoclean strategy for the past couple of years, Cicero went so far as to assert that Pompeius had been "thinking in terms of Sulla and proscriptions" that whole time.[28] Confirmation, if needed, was to be had from Crassipes, who arrived a couple of days later, reporting that the talk of Pompeius and his collaborators in Brundisium was that of "unadulterated proscriptions, Sulla pure and simple".[29] In short, Pompeius intended a campaign in 48 BCE that would have recalled that accomplished by Sulla in 82–81 BCE. Victory would have been quickly followed by the slaughter of enemies and legal proceedings against those not deemed to have sufficiently contributed to the cause.[30]

Pompeius was not the only person to take Sulla for a model for his actions at this time. Caesar himself affirmed that his appointment of Curio for the expedition to Sicilia and Africa was no less justified nor more innovative than had been Sulla's appointment of Pompeius to the same task some three decades previously.[31] More savagely if no less realistically, one of the two consuls for 49 BCE, L. Lentulus, is alleged by Caesar to have boasted amongst his friends and collaborators that he would be another Sulla (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.4.2):

> Lentulus aeris alieni magnitudine et spe exercitus ac provinciarum et regum appellandorum largitionibus movetur seque alterum fore Sullam inter suos gloriatur, ad quem summa imperi redeat.

> Lentulus was moved by the enormity of his debts and by the expectation of an army and provinces and the gains to be had from the recognition of kings as allies. He boasted amongst his friends that he would be another Sulla whose lot it would be to enjoy supreme power.

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28 Cic. *Att*. 9.10.6. The verb *sullaturio* is of no little interest as a neologism arising from political behaviour.

29 Cic. *Att*. 9.11.3. It will be recalled that it was in exceedingly poor taste to drink *merum vinum*. Transferral of the metaphor to the realm of politics is again revealing of general culture and specific concerns. Also revealing of general cultural norms, but in this instance as regards marriage and divorce, is the fact that the information derives from Cicero's former son-in-law Furius Crassipes. For that individual and his passing matrimonial alliance to Cicero, see S.M. Treggiari, *Roman Social History*, (Classical Foundations), (Routledge: London 2002), 56, 60; *RE* 7.1 (1910) "Furius Nr. 54" (F. Münzer); Bailey 1965: 2.186–187.

30 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.83.3.

31 Cic. *Att*. 9.14.2.

Reported by Caesar alone, this information might justifiably be held for suspect. It was in his interest to depict his opponents as desperately intransigent and given to the most horrific of solutions. The spectre of proscriptions contrasted unfavourably with Caesar's free liberality with pardon. However, there existed a prophecy affirming that three Cornelii would rule over Rome.[32] Cited as recently as 63 BCE, by the vicious Cornelius Cethegus to justify his ill-fated allegiance to Sergius Catilina, that prophecy may well have influenced Lentulus' actions and words, if not implicitly used by Caesar to impart credibility to denigration of his enemy.[33]

Be that as it may, Pompeius was thinking of the campaign for 48 BCE in terms of the strategy that had formerly been employed by L. Sulla in 82–81 BCE, as might have been expected in view of the similarity of circumstances and the role that had then been played by Pompeius. Then Sulla had made a landing at Brundisium with merely five legions.[34] Although commanding men who were mostly recent recruits, now Pompeius had nine legions under his command and he would have embarked them for Brundisium with the opening of the new sailing season.[35] Maintaining control of Africa and with a sizeable fleet deployed in the Adriatic, he was able to blockade Italia effectively and use the weapon of famine to prepare the terrain. Caesar's need to aggregate troops in the east and south with a view to an expedition to Macedonia naturally changed the patterns of redistribution of food materials significantly and aggravated a problem that was already acute. Within this context, landing his nine legions upon the Apulian coast, Pompeius might readily expect armed opposition to crumble and Caesar's destruction at the hands of mutinous troops.

As things turned out, Pompeius underestimated his enemy and seems not to have realized that this self-evident course of action would require precisely the response formulated by Caesar. Having kept his army long employed in exercises at Beroea, in the eastern portion of Macedonia, Pompeius was leading

32 S. Weinstock, *Divus Julius*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1971) 98 n. 2, 193.

33 Cic. *3 Cat.* 9; Sall. *Cat.* 47.2 (with the comments of J.T. Ramsey, *Sallust's Bellum Catilinae*, edited with introduction and commentary, [Scholars Press: Chico, California, 1984], 186–187); Plut. *Cic.* 17.4; App. *B Civ.* 2.4.

34 Plut. *Sull.* 27.6. This is part of a larger citation of Sulla's autobiography: Plut. *Sull.* 27.5–13 (= *FRH* 22 F24 = Peter F18 = Chassignet F20).

35 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.5.1 specifying that the one legion from Cilicia consisted of veterans from two legions that had formerly served in that province. As for the two legions from Asia, he does not indicate whether or not they were drawn from former soldiers or merely Romans living abroad for other purposes.

his men to their winter quarters at the moment of Caesar's arrival. The news reached him in Candavia, at a distance of only 7–10 days' normal marching time from the Epirote coastline.[36] Unexpectedly, the carefully laid plans for winter quarters for Pompeius' expeditionary force were thrown into confusion. The repeat performance of Sulla's invasion of Italia and destruction of the followers of Marius and Cinna was not to be.

3 Life in the Military

Problems followed from the war of position in which Caesar's campaign stagnated upon arrival in the province of Macedonia. Entrenched lines and a lack of sufficient supplies together brought Caesar to the brink of disaster near Dyrrachium. Towards late spring in 48 BCE, one day was witness to three intense engagements at Dyrrachium itself and another three amid the circumvallations of Caesar and Pompeius.[37] In these engagements, Caesar's men displayed signal valour and were duly rewarded (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.53.2–5):

> Nostri non amplius XX omnibus sunt proeliis desiderati. Sed in castello nemo fuit omnino militum quin vulneraretur, quattuorque ex una cohorte centuriones oculos amiserunt. Et cum laboris sui periculique testimonium adferre vellent, milia sagittarum circiter XXX in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt, scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina CXX. Quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritus et de re publica, donatum milibus CC [atque] ab octavis ordinibus ad primipilum se traducere pronuntiavit—eius enim opera castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat—cohortemque postea duplici stipendio, frumento, veste, cibariis militaribusque donis amplissime donavit.

> No more than twenty of our men were lost in all of these engagements. However, there was not a single soldier in the fort who was not wounded, and four centurions from one cohort lost their eyes. Moreover, since they wished to present him with evidence of their toil and danger, they

36 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.11.2.

37 Subsequently, in the wake of another yet more bloody engagement some days later, Caesar was reportedly moved to remark, "Had the enemy possessed a general capable of victory, victory would have been theirs" (Plut. *Caes*. 39.8; *Pomp*. 65.8–9). In view of his criticism of Pompeius' tactics at Pharsalus (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.92), the report is credible.

> counted out for Caesar the nearly 30,000 arrows that had been shot into the fort, and, when the shield of the centurion Scaeva was brought to him, 120 holes were found in it. In return for his services to himself and to the state, Caesar ordered that he (i.e. Scaeva) be rewarded with HS 200,000 and that he transfer himself from the eighth rank to lead centurion—for it was agreed that it was largely thanks to that man's work that the fort had been saved—and he very generously rewarded the cohort subsequently with double pay, grain, clothing, rations, and military decorations.

Practical benefits, in addition to the martial glory accruing from these exploits, were the goal of Caesar's public rewarding and then commemorating by the written record. Well aware of the deprivation and sacrifice involved in this campaign, Caesar sought to make the remarkable bravery of Scaeva paradigmatic for the rank-and-file.[38] With its focus upon tangible goods, the episode sheds precious light upon the quotidian reality of life in the military.

Naturally, there is a linguistic ambiguity, not intended by the author but no less requiring elucidation. The adjective *duplici* might perhaps be thought to modify only the first element in the list, *stipendio*.[39] However, the parallel afforded by the consul Cn. Pompeius Strabo's rewarding a squadron of Spanish cavalry some four decades previously strongly suggests that all of the items listed, save the military decorations, were provided in double quantity.[40]

After the mention of money, which of course stands at the head of the list, there comes wheat, or *frumentum*.[41] Indicative of its significance is not only

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38 For other accounts of Scaeva's courage, see Val. Max. 3.2.23; Lucan. 6.140–262; Plut. *Caes.* 16.2; Suet. *Iul.* 68.4; App. *B Civ.* 2.60; Flor. 2.13.40. The judgement expressed by Carter 1993: 183, is to be shared: "For all these the present passage must surely be the ultimate, if indirect, source." Cf. C. Scantamburlo, *Svetonio, Vita di Cesare. Introduzione, traduzione e commento*, (Commenti a testi latini e greci per l'insegnamento universitario, 1), (Plus—Pisa University Press: Pisa 2011), 219. Livy is most likely the missing link.

39 The certainty that the celebrated elephant denarius (*RRC* 443) was minted only as of 49 BCE makes it virtually certain that Suetonius' source erroneously anticipated the doubling of soldiers' pay (in perpetuity, no less) by a couple of years. Whereas a doubling might have been countenanced after the magnificent victory of 52 BCE, nothing for the years 51–50 BCE suggests that Caesar proved so generous in the aftermath. On the other hand, the money paid upon despatching soldiers for use in the East and the promises made at the outset of the civil war together also suggest that it was only after the invasion of Italia that he doubled soldiers' pay.

40 *ILS* 8888; Carter 1993: 183. Cf. Polyb. 6.35; Liv. 7.37.2.

41 Whether this was *triticum durum*, *triticum turgidum* or *triticum vulgare* is a question that may be left to the speculation of those specialising in agronomy. No satisfactory

its position within this list, but also the fact that it is the only edible resource that Caesar remarks in his account of the exhaustive preparations undertaken by Pompeius Magnus in 49 for the coming year's campaign.[42] Likewise, when describing the preparations made by Afranius and Petreius for their exodus from Ilerda, Caesar singles out for mention the amount of *frumentum* that each soldier was ordered to carry.[43] Prepared most often in the form of bread, wheat constituted the staple of soldiers' diet and its absence was seen as the prelude to starvation and defeat. Hence, the fortuitous circumstance that an Epirote root known as *chara* made possible the baking of an edible bread subsitute when *frumentum* proved in short supply behind the Caesarian lines.[44] The grain of Thessalia was essential to the restoration of morale and strength to Caesar's defeated forces in the weeks preceding battle at Pharsalus.[45]

Next in the list appears the category of *vestis*, or clothing. From comparison with a list of grievances presented to Tiberius' son Drusus by the troops active in Pannonia in 14 CE, it would seem that this category does not include weapons and outfittings for tents.[46] Rather, it seems limited to the tunics and cloaks with which one might drape the body so as to hide nudity and keep warm.[47] Even in late spring, the weather in Epirus would have been cool enough to make extra cloaks appreciated. Moreover, active service will have likely meant the consumption of clothing at an appreciable rate. Be that as it may, this category

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evidence has thus far come to light that may help to resolve the matter: A. Marcone, *Storia dell'agricoltura romana*, (Carocci: Roma 1997), 80. What matters is the certainty that Latin authors use *frumentum* to designate only wheat in its various species: J. André, *Les noms de plantes dans la Rome antique*, (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1985), 106.

42 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.5.1, cited and discussed above. It is to be remarked, furthermore, that the phrase *frumentum commeatusque* appears as a standard formula in the writings of Caesar, when describing the provision of armies with supplies. See A. Labisch, *Frumentum Commeatusque. Die Nahrungsmittelversorgung der Heere Caesars*, (Anton Hain: Meisenheim am Glan 1975), 37–41.

43 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.78.2.

44 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.47.2–48.2; cf. Lucan. 6.106–117; Plin. *HN* 19.144; 20.96; Plut. *Caes*. 39.2; Suet. *Iul*. 68.2; App. *B Civ*. 2.61.252; Polyaen. 23.24. For the identification of this root, see André 1985: 61.

45 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.84.1: *re frumentaria praeparata confirmatisque militibus*.

46 Tac. *Ann*. 1.17: *hinc vestem arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi*. On this dramatic assertion, see F.R.D. Goodyear, *The annals of Tacitus. Book 1.1–54*, (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentary, 15), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1972), 204; G.R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier*, (Thames & Hudson: London 1969), 89–91.

47 Cf. Plut. *Aem*. 31.8.

may well also have included the boots (*caligae*) that were a fundamental aspect of the soldier's identity and essential to his well-being.[48] The constant movement of soldiers indubitably took a high toll in terms of footwear as well as health.[49] Overall, without proper footwear and covering an army is unlikely to continue in existence for long.

Following this category comes that of the more general *cibaria*, to be understood as rations or victuals. Within that category fall a variety of food-stuffs that supplement and round out a diet based upon wheat in the form of bread. So, for instance, it is to be expected that salt was one of the items indicated by the expression *cibaria*. Salt was another key ingredient to bread in the Roman tradition and an essential component of the human diet. Hence, during the African expedition, the youthful and relatively inexperienced C. Curio had displayed solicitude for an adequate supply of salt for his soldiers.[50] Another item certainly falling within this category was meat, whether that of swine, sheep, or cattle. Elsewhere, indeed, Caesar remarks the fact that there was fortunately an abundance of meat, which in part made up for the lack of grain experienced by his soldiers during the campaign of Dyrrachium.[51] Normally, however, meat was consumed only prior to battle, as is shown by the practice of the *Suovetaurilia*.[52] Vegetables and fruits, for instance legumes and figs, also figured in the category of *cibaria*, albeit manifestly dependent upon geographical location and the season of year.[53]

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48 Cf. Plin. *HN* 7.43–44/135; Cass. Dio 48.12.

49 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.2.3.

50 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.37.5.

51 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.47.6; cf. Caes. *B Gall*. 7.17.2–3.

52 Plut. Caes. 43.3; cf. App. *B Civ*. 2.68.281. For modern discussions, A.K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War, 100 BC–AD 200*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1996), 148–149 (*suovetaurilia*), 261–262 (drink), 292–293 (meat ration); R.W. Davies, *Service in the Roman Army*, (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh 1989), 191–206. It is to be observed that Goldsworthy makes no remark about the time of day at which the meat ration and drink were given to soldiers. This seems somewhat odd in a book dedicated to recovering the "face of battle".

53 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.47.6; cf. Plut. *Pomp*. 67.5. Fig-trees do not grow just at Tusculum, as is known to anyone who has ever walked the landscape of peninsular Italy and Greece, looked at the maps adorning the books of F. Braudel, or read excavation reports providing information on the eating habits of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Since the figs of Tusculum were not proverbial—witness their absence from Otto's *Sprichwörter*—it must be assumed that reference was being made to the property of Cato, Cicero, or another of the faction opposed to Caesar. For senatorial *villae* at Tusculum, see T.P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C.–A.D. 14*, (Oxford University Press: London 1971), Appendix III, 191; I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*, (Collection Latomus, 142), (Bruxelles

Although not mentioned for the simple reason that it did not figure amongst the things offered to Scaeva in reward for his services, drink is an associated category that merits brief consideration at this juncture. From Caesar's total silence, it might be surmised that Roman armies were abstemious as a rule, with wine being provided only on the eve of battle or circulating after a victory had delivered the enemy's goods into the possession of the soldiers. Confirmation is to be had from the behaviour displayed those of Caesar's men who drunkenly committed outrage in the wake of their sacking the Thessalian community of Gomphi.[54] Rather, as emerges from time to time, water was the overriding factor in choosing a site for encampment and the possible extension of fortifications.[55] Although naturally occurring and free, water was no less precious.

Completing the list of rewards that Caesar granted in recognition of his soldiers' courage is mention of *dona militaria*, or decorations. Decorations were the least useful of the rewards apportioned, from a practical point of view. Yet, in terms of *esprit de corps*, they were perhaps the most important of all, for they were invested with especial meaning and by definition the mark of extraordinary merit. That emerges from Caesar's taking the trouble to include this act of recognition within his partisan narrative of the events of 49–48 BCE. To the same effect is the episode in which a conscripted slave felt greater joy at the silver torque awarded him by Metellus Scipio than the sum of gold offered by Labienus.[56] Therefore, what did Caesar as *consul iterum* award to

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1975), Table III, 444–454. Overall, for the muncipal context, see M.C. Gervasoni, *Les magistrats des cités italiennes de la seconde guerre punique à Auguste. Le Latium et la Campanie*, (École française de Rome: Roma 1998).

54 App. *B Civ*. 2.64.268. In fact, it is to be imagined that it was the ready presence of wine, or beer for the less discerning, that rendered the maintenance of military discipline so difficult within an urban context. Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.31.4, 110.2.

55 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.66.6: *item ab angulo castrorum sinistro munitionem ad flumen perduxerat circiter passus CCCC, quo liberius ac sine periculo milites aquarentur*. Cf. 3.15.1–4, 97.4; *B Alex*. 5–9. Overall, there is infrequent mention of troops engaged in gathering firewood and procuring water for the camp or finding food for soldiers and mounts. Notice is taken only when exceptional circumstances made it impossible to perform these daily activities for a prolonged period. In closing, it should be observed that water figures prominently as a factor (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.84.1) in Afranius and Petreius' surrender to Caesar on 2 August 49 BCE.

56 Val. Max. 8.14.5; V.A. Maxfield, *The Military Decorations of the Roman Army* (B.T. Batsford: London 1981), 57, 135. Again in all likelihood Livy is the source for this edifying story. Implicit in the story told by the author of the *Bellum Africum* is a strong criticism of Labienus: J. Linderski, "Q. Scipio Imperator," 145–186, in: J. Linderski (ed.), *Imperium sine*

the soldiers who had served with courage under Scaeva? The *corona graminea*, otherwise known as the *corona obsidionalis*, might be imagined, in view of the fact that their bold action had caused the enemy to desist from its attack upon their fortified position.[57] Or, as a consequence of the linguistic perversion prevailing in time of civil war, the *corona civica*, or oak crown is possible, on the claim that Scaeva and his men had saved citizens' lives.[58] Alternatively and more simply, golden torques or arm-bands might be envisaged.[59] Whatever the precise nature of these *dona militaria*, they expressed the bravery of the recipients and invited others to emulation.

At the head of the list, by contrast, stands the most practical encouragement of cold cash, with which momentary pleasures and eventually a farm might be purchased. Caesar claims to have doubled the pay of the men serving in Scaeva's cohort. The affirmation is credible, but not without difficulty. Between the mid-Republic and the early Principate, there is no precise statement as to the amount annually paid to a common soldier. There is merely Suetonius' report: "He doubled the pay of the legions for all time to come".[60] Late and imprecise, for Roman accounting rules out a literal interpretation of this claim, the report is nevertheless provided with a credible context. The action is mentioned amid many items pointing distinctly to the period 53–50 BCE: the death of Julia, the death of P. Clodius, the conquest of Gallia Transalpina. In view of the need to guarantee the support and good-will of his soldiers in the event of a civil war, Caesar did well to display generosity thus and at this juncture. Hence, it would appear that the soldiers who participated in the conquest of Gallia were handsomely rewarded at the decade's end with an annual stipend

fine. T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1996), 168–169. There runs through the narratives of these civil war years a strong current of criticism regarding recourse to slaves and *liberti* in order to have sufficient soldiers to fight what was a citizens' war.

57 *Pace* Plin. *HN* 22.9–13. There is no reason to think that Pliny did any more than compile a list from literary sources, just as, for lack of anything better, his modern counterparts. The records kept by the military were ephemeral in the extreme. For a wide-ranging and detailed discussion, see now S.E. Phang, "Military Documents, Languages, and Literacy," 286–305, in: P. Erdkamp (ed.), *A Companion to the Roman Army*, (Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World), (Wiley: Malden, Mass. 2007).

58 Cf. Lucan. 6.147–148.

59 Cf. *BAfr*. 8.14.5, cited above.

60 Suet. *Iul*. 26.3: *legionibus stipendium in perpetuum duplicavit*. Cf. B. Woytek, *Arma et Nummi. Forschungen zur römischen Finanzgeschichte und Münzprägung der Jahre 49 bis 42 v.Chr*. (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Wien 2003), 23–25, 537–545.

of HS 900.[61] From that fact, if it is such, it would follow that Caesar rewarded Scaeva's cohort by granting an annual stipend of HS 1800 to each and every soldier.

Naturally, the most privileged treatment was reserved for Scaeva, who had given an example to his men and the rest of Caesar's army. Again the hard cash comes first and then the honour of advancement in rank. The reward of HS 200,000 is startling, as it was meant to be. Half the sum required to achieve equestrian or senatorial status at the time, this monetary reward was more than 100 times what a centurion might expect to earn annually within the army serving under Caesar in the late 50s BCE. Although not quite as good as the bestowal of the ring denoting equestrian status, the degree of generosity shown is extraordinary.[62] The advancement from eighth position to *primipilus* was also striking and aimed at encouraging others to follow Scaeva's example.[63] From the bravery and dedication displayed at Pharsalus by individuals such as Crastinus, it would appear that this policy effectively counteracted all of the deprivations and doubts experienced in the course of the campaign near Dyrrachium.[64] Brutal and often preternaturally short, life in the miiltary offered

61 Cf. R. Alston, "Roman Military Pay from Caesar to Diocletian," *Journal of Roman Studies* 84 (1994) 113–123, esp. 113–114 for the evidence of the literary sources for the period extending from the middle Republic to the Severan dynasty. Although Alston does not deal with the vexed question of when Caesar made the change and indeed glides over it in complete silence, it would appear that when Alston writes of an increase in stipend that began in "*c.* AD 49" (p. 115) he actually means "*c.* 49 BC" and therefore that he dates this significant change to the very moment of the outbreak of civil war.

62 Caes. *B Gall.* 1.42.5–6; cf. Suet. *Iul.* 33. From the very outset in 58, Caesar emphasized generosity.

63 *Mutatis mutandis*, one is tempted to cite Voltaire's "pour encourager les autres". More soberly, see Dobson 2000: 143, re-stating forcefully the case for the primipilate being an annual post, in accordance with the Republican tradition of the appointment of centurions for a single campaigning season. Complementary, but focussing upon the person of Scaeva, is the observation of Maxfield 1981: 236: "[E]ven if he did not receive immediate promotion, [Scaeva] had marked himself out as a warrior of quality". For the overall subject, see B. Dobson, "Legionary Centurion or Equestrian Officer? A Comparison of Pay and Prospects," *Ancient Society* 3 (1972) 193–207; B. Dobson, "The Significance of the Centurion and *Primipilus* in the Roman Army," *ANRW* 2.1 (1974) 392–434; B. Dobson, *Die Primipilares. Entwicklung und Bedeutung, Laufbahnen und Persönlichkeiten eines römischen Offiziersranges*, (Rheinland Verlag—Habelt: Köln-Bonn 1978). Lastly, for a re-visitation and magisterial survey of this subject, see B. Dobson, "The *Primipilares* in Army and Society," 139–152, in: G. Alföldy, B. Dobson, and W. Eck (eds.), *Kaiser, Heer und Gesellschaft in der Römischen Kaiserzeit. Gedenkschrift für E. Birley* (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2000).

64 For Crastinus, see Caes. *B Civ.* 3.91.1–4, 99.3. By contrast, the decision of the two Allobrogic

the possibility of economic and social advancement to those who acquitted themselves with honour and survived having done so.

4 Other Than Soldiers

Although surviving only in the most meagre of fragments, Pollio repeatedly reveals himself as willing to demonstrate independence of thought as regards Caesar. It was not a question of loyalty to the cause, for he steadfastly proclaimed himself a Caesarian throughout the 40s and afterwards.[65] Rather, Pollio's freedom of speech and willingness to correct Caesar publicly in terms of fact are to be understood as the adoption of a historiographical stance calculated to instil faith in the author.[66] Hence, he not only reported Caesar's infamous words uttered in sight of the carnage of Pharsalus, but also contradicted his commander as regards the number and nature of the casualties suffered (Plut. *Caes.* 46.3):

> τῶν δὲ ἀποθανόντων τοὺς πλείστους οἰκέτας γενέσθαι περὶ τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ χάρακος ἀναιρεθέντας, στρατιώτας δὲ μὴ πλείους ἑξακισχιλίων πεσεῖν.

> (Pollio also asserts that) most of the dead were servants killed in the capture of the palisade, whereas no more than 6,000 soldiers fell.

The fact that the vast majority of the dead were domestics serving in the camp of Pompeius dramatically alters the complexion of Caesar's victory.[67] Large

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brothers to desert Caesar for Pompeius, despite their having been richly rewarded by Caesar, is a sign of the desperation that infested the ranks in the course of operations at Dyrrachium. So, too, the unwise choice of Androsthenes (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.80.3) is a sign that Caesar's very surival was in doubt.

65 [Cic.] *Fam.* 10.31–33; M. Gelzer, "Die drei Briefe des C. Asinius Pollio," *Chiron* 2 (1972) 297–312.

66 L. Morgan, "The Autopsy of C. Asinius Pollio," *Journal of Roman Studies* 90 (2000) 51–69.

67 Cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 72.4; J. Roth, *The logistics of the Roman army at war (264 B.C.–A.D. 235)*, (Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, 23), (Brill: Leiden 1998), 107. This latter version seems more detailed, but the overall wording suggests that here Plutarch is working by memory at a greater distance from the moment in which he read Pollio's account. Accordingly, between the *Life* of Caesar and that of Pompeius, preference is to be accorded to the former, as a more faithful citation of Pollio and less encumbered by rhetorical amplification. Cf. R.W. Westall, "The Relationship of Appian to Pollio", *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici* 38 (2013) 95–121, here 100–101; R.W. Westall, "The Sources of the *Emphylia* of Appian

numbers of Roman war dead amongst the opposing side cohered with Caesar's presentation of civil war as an evil that had been forced upon him, casting his enemies as the opponents of peace.[68] Paradoxically, inflated casualty figures in all likelihood also increased the sense of achievement felt by the victorious Caesarians.[69] By attesting to a historical reality different from that portrayed by Caesar, Pollio provides a narrative that corrects and redimensions one of the key moments in the creation of the Caesarian myth.

Through his critique of Caesar's version, Pollio also, incidentally, provides a salutary reminder of the vast numbers of inglorious dead whose work facilitated the life of legionaries. Servants, personnel, and merchants all contributed to the economic feasibility and logistical functioning of Roman armies in the field. Various levels of infrastructure, official and unofficial, made the legion possible.

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of Alexandria", pp. 106–148, in: K. Welch (ed.), *Appian's Rhomaika. Empire and Civil War*, (Swansea 2015), here 150.

68 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.90.1–2; K. Raaflaub, "Caesar the Liberator? Factional Politics, civil war, and ideology," 35–67, in: F. Cairns and E. Fantham (eds.), *Caesar Against Liberty? Perspectives on his Autocracy*, (Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar, 11), (Francis Cairns: Cambridge 2003), 35–67.

69 In the final analysis, these men must have constituted the initial audience at which Caesar aimed. Who else would have so appreciated the self-sacrifice displayed by Crastinus and the many others who died fighting on behalf of Caesar and the "free" Republic? Over the course of the 50s BCE, Caesar will have had abundant opportunity to discover that the *commentarii* were as effective in terms of internal consumption, or even more so than they might prove at Rome. Comparison with behaviour in evidence in the civil war armies of 49–30 BCE seems opportune, especially since there are frequent references to pamphlets aimed at an audience of soldiers. In 46 BCE Caesar sought to undermine the loyalty of his enemies' troops in north Africa in 46 BCE (Cass. Dio 43.5.1–2), and Scipio countered by doing the same (Cass. Dio 43.5.3; *B Afr*. 32.4). In 44 BCE Caesar's heir and adoptive son Caesar the Younger sought to use pamphlets to undermine the loyalty of the soldiers of M. Antonius (App. *B Civ*. 3.44.179; Westall 2015: 137–138, for speeches, letters, and pamphlets). In 42 BCE the same technique was utilized to undermine the loyalty of the army of M. Brutus prior to the second engagement at Philippi (Cass. Dio 47.48.1). Last but not least, M. Antonius utilized this technique in an effort to undermine the loyalty of the army of Caesar the Younger during the latter's advance on Alexandria in 30 BCE (Cass. Dio 51.10.2–3). In this latter instance, the subversion of the propaganda by Caesar the Younger's reading this literature aloud to his soldiers nicely illustrates how we need not infer from the existence of such literature that literacy was widespread or common in Roman armies. For further discussion, see W.V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1989), 253.

The category of *calones* seems to designate domestic servants for legionaries and officers. It is the technical equivalent of *mancipia* or *servitia*.[70] Hence, it most likely lies behind Plutarch's varying rendition in Greek of Pollio's Latin terminology. Only in exceptional circumstances does Caesar make use of this technical word, but that need occasion no surprise. Caesar tends to eschew technical vocabulary.[71] Moreover, he focusses attention primarily upon himself and the soldiers who fought on his behalf. Servants were taken for granted, except in those situations where they might make good a lack of numbers or provide other, unusual services. Thus, at a difficult moment in the Gallic campaigns of the mid-50s, Caesar relied upon *calones* in order to camouflage the fact that his effective forces were far inferior in number to their Celtic opponents.[72] Similarly, during the Spanish campaign of mid-49 BCE, recourse was had to the *calones* when a dearth of wheat required that men be despatched further abroad to procure food-stuffs at the very moment when operations at Ilerda were at their most difficult.[73] This commission gave them something useful to do while simultaneously removing useless mouths from the camp. For the same reason, it is to be suspected, Caesar had embarked his men at Brundisium without their servants (*mancipia*), for he was well aware of the problems of food-supply to be encountered upon arrival in Epirus.[74]

Far less frequently remarked, the category of grooms, or *pueri*, seems to be distinct from that of *calones*, even if they too were likely of servile status.[75] Again it is Plutarch, citing an episode related by Pollio, who provides the most detailed and interesting information. During the African campaign of 47–46, an enemy attack was launched while Caesar's cavalry were engaged in watching a local play the flute, having entrusted the care for their horses to their

70 N. Rouland, *Les esclaves romains en temps de guerre*, (Collection Latomus, 151), (Latomus: Bruxelles 1977), 39; cf. Roth 1998: 101–115, for a fuller, more nuanced and problematic discussion. Particularly illuminating are the references to *calones* and *servi*, apparently concerning the same group, in the Gallic column coming to the relief of Caesar's forces encamped near Ilerda: Caes. *B Civ*. 1.51.2,6; cf. 3.6.1; *B Alex*. 73.3.

71 E.g. use of the word *platea* in the course of describing the siege of Brundisium: Caes. *B Civ*. 1.27.3; R.W. Westall, *Caesar's Civil War and the Mediterranean World of 49–48 BC*, (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University: Stanford 2000), 85–88.

72 Caes. *B Gall*. 2.24, 26, 27; cf. 6.36, 40.

73 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.52.4.

74 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.6.1: *Caesar … contionatus apud milites … aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent*. Cf. *B Afr*. 54.4.

75 As is well known, the metaphorical use of "child" to designate a slave appears only in the Classical period, but is widespread and common for certain occupations: *LSJ*[9] 1289 s.v. "παις III"; *OLD* 1514 s.v. "puella 4"; 1514–1515 s.v. "puer 5".

grooms.[76] In view of the wealth implied by possession of a horse, it might be thought that cavalrymen had not only grooms, but also personal servants, at their disposal.[77] That, however, is merely speculation.

The category of *lixae* seems to designate official legionary personnel who contributed to the daily functioning of economic life within the camp.[78] Yet, strange to say, this category makes no visible appearance within the writings of Caesar. The first appearance of this word falls within the anonymous *Bellum Africum*, in a description of Labienus' harrying the forces of Caesar while they were changing encampments.[79] From comparison with the similar episode that occurred at Ilerda in mid-49 BCE, it might have been expected that the author would refer to *calones*, not to *lixae* and *mercatores*. However, in the absence of *calones* in any significant numbers amongst Caesar's forces, it would appear that *lixae* and *mercatores* were performing their function.[80]

External to the legions, *mercatores* were nonetheless a key element in the infrastructure constituting their logistical support. It was this category that normally provided most of what a legion consumed in the ordinary course of its operations. Again Caesar is silent, not from a desire to avoid the technical but because of the fact that merchants did not figure as a distinct social category in the fighting that he describes.[81] Still, their presence can be inferred from various bits of testimony. For one thing, in seeking to impress upon readers the difficulties caused by insufficient grain during the campaign of Ilerda, Caesar remarks that the price rose to HS 40 for one *modius*.[82] Whatever Caesar

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76 Plut. *Caes*. 52.7.

77 Cf. Plut. *Pomp*. 22.4–6; C. Nicolet, *The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome*, tr. P.S. Falla, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1980), 83–84, for the memorable scene in which Pompeius presented himself for the census of 70 BCE.

78 Roth 1998: 93–101.

79 *BAfr*. 75.3: *lixarum mercatorumque qui plaustris merces portabant interceptis sarcinis*.

80 Cf. *BAfr*. 54.4, cited above for the official dishonourably discharged in part because he had used shipping to bring his *familia* across from Sicilia.

81 Sall. *Iug*. 26.

82 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.52.2; J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Books 1–2*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1991), 196. Carter's remarks are sensible, and it is unfortunate that he did not have the courage to correct the text and translation accordingly. Had the transmitted figure *XL* been expressed in the denomination of *denarii*, it would have been the equivalent of 200 *sestertii* per *modius*, or roughly 50 times the market price. That sort of steep increase would have produced a revolution. Now, for the text and a discussion, see C. Damon (ed.), *C. Iulii Caesaris commentariorum libri III de bello civili, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 2015), 34 ad 1.52.2. Overall, it seems better editorial practice to print the abbreviations for HS or X̶ rather than the expanded forms for these monetary

was paying to feed his soldiers, and he may not have been paying anything whatsoever, this information reveals both contact with merchants and detailed information regarding market prices. In another vein, Caesar refers generically to "other goods and supplies" useful in case of siege when describing whatever else, aside from grain, the Massiliotes seized at Domitius' command.[83] Both this language and the subsequent actions of the Massiliotes suggest that *merces*, or goods, comprised items such as rope and nails. Without these items and the raw materials from which they came, e.g. flax and iron, warfare could only be ineffectual and of brief duration.

The world generated within and near to the legionary camps by these various categories of individual was perhaps as close to industrialized society as Antiquity ever came. Visions of serried ranks advancing into battle and the sound of trumpets at the first rush ought not to mislead.[84] The orderliness of the legionary camp in its layout was matched by an unparalleled disposition of resources and an emphasis upon producing a few, simple items *en masse* in timely fashion.[85] The primary items to be produced by the thousands were: sandals, tents, helmets, shields, swords, javelins, and arrows.[86] Abattoirs and tanneries, kitchens, forges and armouries—all of these items of necessity complemented soldiers' living-quarters within the camp. Yet other spaces for markets, prostitution, and taverns may have existed as well, in more peaceful circumstances or when there was sufficient money available to attract those plying the trades involved.[87] However, the simple, ineradicable fact obtains that

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units. Surely, the abbreviations are a more faithful reflection of the appearance of the original text (which is to be desired except when it might lead into error). Who today among native speakers would print the expanded forms for dollars ($), euros (€), or pounds (£) when they are accompanied by a numerical figure?

83 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.36.3: *frumenti quod inventum est in publicum conferunt; reliquas merces commeatusque ad obsidionem urbis, si accidat, reservant.*

84 Cf. Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.17–24. Curiously, the foremost article dedicated to the legion as society fails to grasp this essential aspect of military life: R. MacMullen, "The Legion as a Society," *Historia* 33 (1984) 440–456.

85 For the Roman legionary camp, the *locus classicus* remains the admiring description of Polyb. 6.26–42. This emphasis upon order was allegedly even to be found in the way in which Romans sacked cities: Polyb. 10.16–17; P. Erdkamp, "Polybius and Livy on the Allies in the Roman Army," 47–74, in: L. de Blois and E. Lo Cascio (eds.), *The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC–AD 476)*, (Brill: Leiden 2007).

86 For a useful general review and illustrations of the equipment of the legionary in this period, see P. Connolly, *Greece and Rome at War*, (Greenhill Books: London 1998 rev.), 228–234.

87 For careful discussion of the evidence for this complicated subject, see P.M. Allison, *People*

the legionary camp was a site of industrialized production. That nothing more came of this is to be attributed to the inconsistency of the stimulus; once a war had been won, soldiers could expect to be disbanded in the normal course of things.

5 Supply-Lines

Without raw materials and food, however, not only would production come to a halt, but the army itself would cease to exist. Constantly referring to *commeatus* and logistical problems in the course of his commentaries, Caesar was particularly aware of this truth.[88] As at Avaricum and Alesia, in the face of an enemy well prepared and resolute, the situation of Caesar's army in Epirus was particularly grim during the late winter and early spring of 48 BCE.[89] When there came offers of assistance from communities located further away, Caesar was quick to seize upon them (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.34.2):

> … cum ad eum ex Thessalia Aetoliaque legati venissent qui praesidio misso pollicerentur earum gentium civitates imperata facturas, L. Cassium Longinum cum legione tironum, quae appellabatur XXVII., atque equitibus CC in Thessaliam, C. Calvisium Sabinum cum cohortibus V paucisque equitibus in Aetoliam misit; maxime eos, quod erant propinquae regiones, de re frumentaria ut providerent hortatus est.

> Since ambassadors had come to him from Thessalia and Aetolia to promise that if garrisons were sent the communities of those peoples would do what was commanded, he sent L. Cassius Longinus with a legion of new recruits (which was called the XXVII) and 200 cavalry to Thessalia, and

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and Spaces in Roman Military Bases, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2013). Of particular relevance and interest is the example furnished by the Republican camp at Numantia: App. *Hisp.* 85; Allison 2013: 25.

88 Labisch 1975: *passim*; P. Erdkamp, *Hunger and the Sword. Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264–30 B.C.)*, (J.C. Gieben: Amsterdam 1998), 46–83; cf. Roth 1998: 156–222 (supply-lines), 223–243 (sources of supply).

89 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.47.5. These earlier travails most certainly contributed to the *esprit de corps* to be observed within Caesarian ranks. Adversity encountered and overcome is a marvellous social tonic. That same judgement informs Caes. *B Civ.* 3.28.4 (*hic cognosci licuit, quantum esset hominibus praesidi in animi fortitudine*), delivered in the midst of an account showing the different fates encountered by veterans and recent recruits.

> to Aetolia C. Calvisius Sabinus with five cohorts and a few cavalry. Since the regions were close nearby, he especially urged them to arrange for the supply of grain.

Whether these offers were spontaneous as is implied by Caesar or in response to prior queries made by representatives of Caesar is immaterial, even if the latter seems more likely. Rather, two other aspects are noteworthy. First, there is Caesar's emphasis (*maxime*) upon his urging his lieutenants to take steps to ensure the grain supply for those forces active near Dyrrachium. The primary goal was that of securing those supplies that could not be shipped across the Adriatic.[90] Secondly, there is Caesar's observation that the men sent to Thessalia under the command of Cassius Longinus were recent recruits. A sceptical observer might remark that this was a wise choice, for men who had not suffered through the Gallic campaigns might well prove rebellious in the present circumstances.

Of course, the clear reference to Thessalia and Aetolia intrigues, perhaps affording far more questions than answers. Thessalia was celebrated for its plains and agricultural fertility.[91] Similarly, despite more mountainous terrain, Aetolia might be envisioned as a source of grain in view of its climate.[92] Yet, how did Caesar expect grain to arrive from these regions? Neither was within easy reach of Epirus, in terms of the movement of grain and other supplies. The Peneus river in Thessalia ultimately flows eastwards, ending in the Thermaic

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90 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.42.3.

91 For the grain of Thessalia and its documented use (*SEG* 34:558; *AE* 1377–1378) for supplying the city of Rome in one instance, see P. Garnsey, Gallant, and Rathbone, "Thessaly and the Grain Supply of Rome during the Second Century B.C.," *Journal of Roman Studies* 74 (1984) 30–44; P. Garnsey and D. Rathbone, "The Background to the Grain Law of Gaius Gracchus," *Journal of Roman Studies* 75 (1985) 20–25, here 25 (Appendix); P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World. Responses to Risk and Crisis*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 187.

92 Strab. 10.2.3; cf. S. Bommeljé and J. Vroom, "'Deserted and untilled lands': Aetolia in Roman times," *Pharos* 3 (1995) 65–130, here 76–78. Striking and significant though the placement of graves over public buildings in Thermon unquestionably is, as evidence for cessation of the former use and maintenance of those communal structures, the dating of these graves to the first century BCE (Bommeljé and Vroom 1995: 92 no. 37) is not certain. It is conceivable that the devastation wrought by the Aegraei and Dolopes in the early 50s BCE (Cic. *Pis*. 91: *Aetoliae repentinus interitus*)—or a similar phenomenon unattested—was the antecedent to this dramatic change in use. On the other hand, the transformation may have merely been one of the consequences of the synoecism linked to the establishment of Nicopolis by Augustus.

gulf. The Achelous river in Aetolia instead flows southwards, pouring into the Corinthian gulf. The maritime blockade that hindered supplies from arriving from the Italian peninsula would have proved equally effective against ships bringing grain from Thessalia or Aetolia.

Therefore, inland transportation routes were of necessity utilized. The rivers of Aetolia and Thessalia might at a first glance seem to provide a ready alternative.[93] The realities of geography, however, meant that such was not the case. On maps lacking any clear indication of altitudes, the rivers Aous (270 km) and Achelous (240 km) might seem to furnish an easy means for circumventing the blockade of the Adriatic. Yet, these rivers were only navigable for a small portion of their total length. Pouring into the Corinthian gulf, the Achelous was navigable only as far as the fortified city of Stratos ca. 38 km upstream from the estuary.[94] Moreover, there was a difference of ca. 2000 m in altitude between the estuary in the region of Calydon and the source of the Achelous in the Pindus.[95] A similar situation obtained for the Aous river. Consequently, with their gorges, rapid waters, and drastic changes in altitude, the rivers of western Greece were not suited for traffic.[96] Transportation to the interior, but overland, was the only way of circumventing the blockade meant to cut off Caesar's supplies from abroad.

Caesar's sending troops to the regions of Thessalia and Aetolia ought not to be interpreted as deploying those soldiers themselves in the menial task of transportation. Rather, these armed forces served as protection for the provisions on the one hand and an incentive for the locals on the other. Caesar's narrative of the civil war in Epirus and surrounding regions is focussed primarily upon the struggle between the armies of Pompeius and Caesar in the vicinity of Dyrrachium, but revealing reference is made to both aspects of the presence of Caesarian troops in Thessalia and Aetolia in that same period.

The reality of Roman military occupation is visible, albeit expressed in terms that are relatively opaque and anodyne. Caesar tends to use the language of public order and security in describing the measures taken so as to provide grain and other supplies for his army in Epirus. The military operations conducted by Cassius Longinus and Calvisius Sabinus are described in terms of the "recovery" of territory, e.g. the recovery of Calydon in Aetolia and Orchomenus

93 For a modern comparison, readers might think of river-traffic in the southern US and central Europe.

94 Strab. 10.2.2.

95 For a telling comparison, readers might wish to keep in mind the difference in altitude between Denver and San Francisco.

96 Hammond 1967: 8.

in Boeotia.[97] Whereas Caesar takes care to observe that operations in Aetolia were conducted with the approval of "all the Aetolians",[98] he elsewhere admits to the fact that not all of the Greek communities willingly opened their gates to his soldiers.[99] The Caesarian forces had a clear military role to perform, and it may well be surmised that they provided garrisons to replace those of Pompeius that had been expelled.[100] Security, it may further be imagined, was provided not only for the communities, but also for the transportation and stockage of grain as it made its way from the regions of the Corinthian gulf northwards to the main forces of Caesar operative in the vicinity of Dyrrachium.[101]

Military occupation was not in and of itself the aim of these operations, however. Rather, it served as a means to the end of procuring grain for the Caesarian expeditionary force deployed in the vicinity of Dyrrachium. As Caesar himself writes by way of explanation at the very outset, when relating the sending of Cassius Longinus to Thessalia and Calvisius Sabinus to Aetolia, "(h)e strongly urged them to take thought for the grain supply since these regions were close nearby".[102] What that might involve is revealed when Caesar subsequently indicates that he also sent *legati* northwards in Epirus, so as to expand the area from which grain was requisitioned: "because these regions were further afield, he ordered magazines (*horrea*) to be established at fixed points and assigned the transportation of grain to the neighbouring communities".[103] *Vectura* or *angaria*, i.e. the public provision of transportation, was one of the most common of liturgies that the Romans imposed upon provicincial communities, and, because of its potential for abuse, it was one of the most hated.[104] Should the local population prove reluctant or incapable, the presence of the military would serve as an incentive. Caesar's soldiers, therefore, may have assisted in the construction of magazines (*horrea*), but they most certainly provided garrisons to safeguard these grain depots and oversaw the locals' performance of the menial task of transportation.

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97 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.35.1, 56(55).4.

98 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.35.1.

99 Caes. *B Civ*. 56(55).4: *nonnullas urbes per vim expugnavit.*

100 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.35.1.

101 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.42.3.

102 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.34.2.

103 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.42.3.

104 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.32.2. For discussion and further bibliography, see R.W. Westall, "Simon of Cyrene, a Roman citizen?," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 59 (2010) 489–500, here 498.

Notwithstanding the care invested in procuring grain for Caesar's army, supplies proved less abundant than needed and the legionaries' diet was wanting in a daily foodstuff. Proof of this comes in two pieces of evidence. First and most directly, Caesar reports that his soldiers were compelled to resort to ingenuity and the use of the local root *chara* as a substitute for grain in the production of bread.[105] Supply-lines in all likelihood furnished Caesar's army with *chara* as well as grain as the siege drew on and the resources of the immediate environs of Dyrrachium were exhausted. Secondly, a portion of Caesar's Gallic cavalry went over to the army of Pompeius, which act of betrayal was a sign of loss of confidence due to the difficulties of the siege.[106] A well-fed army tends to be a loyal army, whereas defection is a sign that basic necessities are wanting. Since the Gallic cavalry who went over to Pompeius had lived through the hardships of the campaigns of Alesia and Avaricum and remained faithful to Caesar at that time, their defection at this moment is a telling indication of just how precarious Caesar's position was as a result of inadequate supply-lines and military reverses.[107]

However, there does exist a parallel for the postulated crossing of the Metsovon pass with grain for Caesar's army near Dyrrachium. In describing the measures taken by Caesar the Younger after his victory at Actium, Plutarch suggestively alludes to the means whereby the inhabitants of Chaeronea had furnished grain for the army of M. Antonius (Plut. *Ant.* 68.8–9):

> Ἐκ τούτου Καῖσαρ μὲν ἐπ᾽ Ἀθήνας ἔπλευσε, καὶ διαλλαγεὶς τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὸν περιόντα σῖτον ἐκ τοῦ πολέμου διένειμε ταῖς πόλεσι πραττούσαις ἀθλίως καὶ περιεκεκομμέναις χρημάτων, ἀνδραπόδων, ὑποζυγίων. ὁ γοῦν πρόπαππος ἡμῶν Νίκαρχος διηγεῖτο τοὺς πολίτας ἅπαντας ἀναγκάζεσθαι τοῖς ὤμοις καταφέρειν μέτρημα πυρῶν τεταγμένον ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀντίκυραν θάλασσαν, ὑπὸ μαστίγων ἐπιταχυνομένους· καὶ μίαν μὲν οὕτω φορὰν ἐνεγκεῖν, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν ἤδη μεμετρημένοις καὶ μέλλουσιν αἴρεσθαι νενικημένον Ἀντώνιον ἀγγελῆναι,

105 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.48.1–2.

106 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.59–61.

107 Cf. M.-W. Schulz, *Caesar und Labienus. Geschichte einer tödlichen Kameradschaft. Caesars Karriere als Feldherr im Spiegel der Kommentarien sowie bei Cassius Dio, Appianus und Lucanus*. (Spudasmata, 131), (G. Olms: Hildesheim 2010), 234, regarding a similar situation in the previous year. For analysis that often persuasively highlights the manner in which Caesar obfuscates the fact that his lieutenants suffered three embarrassing reversals during the campaigning season of 49 BCE, see Schulz 2010: 214–227 (C. Scribonius Curio in Sicilia and Africa), 227–235 (Q. Cassius in Hispania ulterior), 235–239 (C. Antonius in Illyricum).

> καὶ τοῦτο διασῶσαι τὴν πόλιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τῶν Ἀντωνίου διοικητῶν καὶ στρατιωτῶν φυγόντων διανείμασθαι τὸν σῖτον αὐτούς.
>
> Subsequently, Caesar sailed to Athens, and, after having arranged a settlement with the Greeks, he distributed the grain remaining from the war amongst the cities that were doing poorly and had been stripped of their money, slaves, and beasts of burden. At any event, our great-grandfather Nicarchus used to relate that all of the citizens were forced to carry a set measure of wheat on their shoulders to the sea at Anticyra, with whips used to hasten them along. They had transported one load in this manner, and they had already measured out the second and were about to carry it when it was announced that Antonius had been defeated and this saved the city. The officers and soldiers of Antonius immediately took to flight, and (the people) distributed the grain amongst themselves.

Once the grain arrived at Anticyra, upon the northern coast of the Corinthian gulf, it was transported by ship to Antonius' forces at Actium, notwithstanding the blockade being imposed by M. Agrippa.[108] The use of the freeborn citizens of Chaeroneia, rather than merely slaves and mules or other pack-animals, reveals the urgency of the situation.

The operations involved in the establishment of supply-lines for the transportation of grain from Epirus to Caesar's encampment were cumbersome and complicated. Caesar's lucid prose and the reduced scale and lack of geographical detail in most maps hide significant problems that had to be surmounted if his soldiers were to continue to eat. Not for nothing did individuals such as the elder L. Cornelius Balbus and P. Ventidius advance in honours as a reward for their having resolved problems of this sort.

Without fear of exaggeration, it may be estimated that at least some 6,000–8,000 mules were employed in transporting grain to Caesar's army.[109] Capable

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108 C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Antony*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 289.

109 Erdkamp 1998: 80. Particularly suggestive is the statistic (Erdkamp 1998: 80 n. 118) that Wellington's army in 1813 numbered roughly 80,000 men and depended upon some 12,000 mules for transportation. Since the Macedonian campaign of 49–48 BCE was effected largely during the winter months, it would have been all the easier to requisition and deploy mules and muleteers.

It should be added that mules also eat and that their consumption should perhaps be reckoned into the figure of grain that was transported. Illustrative of the problem is a joke recorded in a graffito etched on the wall of a hostel: *CIL* 9.2689 = *ILS* 7478; J.-A. Shelton,

of carrying a total of 100 kg at most, mules can traverse 40 km in a day's time.[110] However, in view of the difficult, impermeable nature of the Epirote landscape, it is not realistic to think in terms of distances straight as the crow's flight. Hence, although Epirus is roughly 100 km in a straight line running northwest-southeast, travel over that distance might in reality require two to four times the amount of time normally needed to cover gently rolling plains. Consequently, an estimate of 5–10 days for travel across the length of Epirus might seem reasonable.

Nonetheless, that vision would be optimistic, and deleterious to the achievement of victory. In winter, rains and snow are to be expected in the Balkans. The elements are inimical to the satisfactory and timely progress of supply-lines, giving rise to muddy trails and congestion. They also, in the case of grain, put at risk the very material being transported. Damp grain is likely to rot, ceasing to be edible and thereby defeating the whole purpose of the exercise.[111] For these practical reasons, as well as because requisitioned transport is easier to deploy within the territory of those to whom it belongs, the movement of grain from Epirus to Caesar's army was effected by stages. In other words, recourse was had to a system of convoys relaying material from one site to the other.

To deal with this immense flow of material, depots (*horrea*) were created at certain stages along the routes taken by the supply-lines.[112] Whereas the Parthini stored grain in underground cellars situated beneath their houses, these depots were public structures presumably made of wood and standing above-ground.[113] They would have been on the order of those attested by the excavation of legionary sites of the early Principate.[114] The construction of these depots will have been straightforward and rapid, for there is an abundance of wood in this mountainous portion of Greece. Providing Caesar's legionaries with the raw materials and additional manual labour, the local populace rendered possible the creation of impromptu places for storage.

To conclude this survey, the quantities of grain involved were far from negligible. It is estimated that an army of 40,000 men—to be reckoned more exactly

As the Romans Did. A Sourcebook in Roman Social History, (Oxford University Press: New York 1988), 330 no. 326.

110 Erdkamp 1998: 70, 73.

111 Caes. *B Civ*. 2.22.1: *pestilentia … panico etiam vetere atque hordeo corrupto*.

112 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.42.3: *quodque hae regiones aberant longius, locis certis horrea constituit vecturasque frumenti finitimis civitatibus discripsit*.

113 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.42.5: *frumentumque omne conquisitum spoliatis effossisque eorum domibus*.

114 Cf. G.E. Rickman, *Roman granaries and store buildings*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1971), 219–220 (Britain), 239–240 (Germany).

as 32,000 soldiers and 8,000 support—would normally consume 60,000 kg of grain upon a daily basis.[115] Without entering into the difficult subject of wastage, which is sometimes estimated as being as high as 50%, this signifies that there daily arrived within Caesar's camp a column of 600 mules or their equivalent.[116] Reckoned in terms of a month, this amounts to 1,800,000 kg at a minimum. Expressed alternatively, such consumption involved the production of far more than 2240 acres.[117] In view of the rough and mountainous terrain of Epirus, it is no surprise that Caesar's supply of grain ran short and that he was anxious to retreat by the time that spring had arrived.

6 The Provincial Burden

Withdrawing southeastwards from Dyrrachium in June, Caesar passed through the Pindus mountains and crossed over to Thessalia, where he took immediate steps to restore the fighting capacity of his army.[118] This involved providing them with a respite from combat and the chance to eat well and recover their physical force. The town of Gomphi was the first Thessalian community that Caesar approached for assistance.[119] Aware of the reverses that Caesar had suffered of late, the people of Gomphi chose to refuse assistance. However, their expectation of successfully resisting a siege and being rewarded by Pompeius quickly proved illusory (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.80.1–7):

> Coniuncto exercitu Caesar Gomphos pervenit, quod est oppidum primum Thessaliae venientibus ab Epiro; quae gens paucis ante mensibus ultro ad Caesarem legatos miserat, ut suis omnibus facultatibus uteretur, praesidiumque ab eo militum petierat. Sed eo fama iam praecurrerat quam supra docuimus de proelio Dyrrachino, quod multis auxerat part-

115 The figure expressed in kilograms is obtained by applying the ratio (commonly accepted) of 6 *modii* = 40 kg.

116 Erdkamp 1998: 72.

117 Goldsworthy 1996: 291–292: "Therefore, in a week, a legion of 5,000 men would consume the produce of about 70 acres."

118 It is essential to recall that the calendar then in force was in fact two months ahead of the solar year. Hence, Caesar could expect to benefit from the harvest about to take place in Thessalia. That is something to which he himself makes reference, in explaining to readers the rationale informing his movements: Caes. *B Civ*. 3.81.3.

119 *RE* 7.2 (1912) 1584–1585 s.v. "Γόμφοι" (Stählin). For the city's plundering by Caesarian soldiers, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.80; Plut. *Caes*. 41; App. *B Civ*. 2.64; Cass. Dio 41.51; Flor. 2.13.41.

ibus. Itaque Androsthenes, praetor Thessaliae, cum se victoriae Pompei comitem esse mallet quam socium Caesaris in rebus adversis, omnem ex agris multitudinem servorum ac liberorum in oppidum cogit portasque praecludit et ad Scipionem Pompeiumque nuntios mittit, ut sibi subsidio veniant: se confidere munitionibus oppidi, si celeriter succurratur; longinquam oppugnationem sustinere non posse. Scipio discessu exercituum ab Dyrrachio cognito Larisam legiones adduxerat; Pompeius nondum Thessaliae appropinquabat. Caesar castris munitis scalas musculosque ad repentinam oppugnationem fieri et cratis parari iussit. Quibus rebus effectis cohortatus milites docuit quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter prius quam auxilia concurrerent. Itaque usus singulari militum studio eodem quo venerat die post horam nonam oppidum altissimis moenibus oppugnare aggressus ante solis occasum expugnavit et ad diripiendum militibus concessit statimque ab oppido castra movit et Metropolim venit sic ut nuntios expugnati oppidi famamque antecederet.

With his army re-united, Caesar went on to Gomphi, which is the first town of Thessalia to be encountered by those coming from Epirus. A few months before this community had of their own volition sent ambassadors to Caesar to the effect that he might use all of their resources and they had sought from him a garrison of soldiers. However, the rumour which we have already mentioned regarding the battle at Dyrrachium had now arrived there in advance, and the battle had increased with the telling. Consequently, Androsthenes, the leading magistrate of Thessalia, preferred to be Pompeius' associate in victory rather than Caesar's ally in adversity. Accordingly, he gathered together into the town from the fields the whole mass of slaves and free people and he closed the town's gates and sent messengers to Scipio and Pompeius to come to his assistance. He said that he trusted in the town's fortifications, if assistance were quickly forthcoming, but he was unable to withstand a long siege. Upon learning that the armies that left Dyrrachium, Scipio had taken his legions to Larisa; Pompeius was not yet near to Thessalia. Once the camp had been fortified, Caesar ordered the creation of scaling ladders and mantlets for an immediate siege and the preparation of fascines. Once these things had been done, he addressed his soldiers, setting forth just how useful it would be in alleviating their lack of all things to take possession of a full and prosperous town, at the same to strike terror into the other communities by this city's example, and for it to occur quickly

> before help might arrive. Thus, thanks to the outstanding enthusiasm of his soldiers, on the very same day on which he arrived he commenced the siege of a town with extremely lofty walls after the ninth hour and captured it before sunset. He handed the town over to his soldiers to sack and immediately moved his camp from the town and went to Metropolis so that he preceded messengers or rumour that the town had been captured.

Although Caesar's army was in parlous condition and had been compelled to abandon Epirus in order to survive, it was yet capable of revealing itself a terrifying expression of Roman power. By closing their gates against Caesar's army, the people of Gomphi had behaved as enemies and were treated accordingly. The city's rapid destruction provided Caesar's army with much needed supplies, reinforced morale amongst the ranks, and gave a display of what other cities might expect if they failed to comply with the consul C. Caesar.

Providing essential background for readers, Caesar not only situates Gomphi in geographical terms, but also reveals a discrepancy between the city's formerly favourable stance and its present choice to trust in relief from the victorious Pompeius Magnus. The tragic quality of this choice is highlighted by the latent irony that exists between Androsthenes' message and the actual course of events. Whereas the Thessalian *stategos* (general) envisioned the possibility of withstanding a siege for some days, Caesar's army proved capable of taking the city within a matter of hours.[120] An example was to be furnished for the other communities of Thessalia. Caesar's laconic description of the siege and sack of Gomphi is all the more effective through what it fails to report. By sunfall the city had fallen to Caesar's soldiers and he had granted them leave to sack and pillage at will.[121] With that terrible denouement, Caesar takes leave of the captured city.

Rather, in the sequel, Caesar focuses upon the behaviour of the people of Metropolis at news of the siege and sack of Gomphi. As in the rapidity of the capture of Gomphi, so, too, there are doubts raised by Caesar's claim that the inhabitants of Metropolis had no news of the event prior to his army's arrival outside their city-walls.[122] Learning of the fate that had befallen Gom-

120 Caesar heightens the effect of rapidity with verbal virtuosity at the end: Carter 1993: 202.

121 For an excellent synchronic survey of Roman behaviour, see A. Ziolkowski, "*Urbs direpta*, or how the Romans sacked cities," 69–91, in: J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Roman World*, (London 1993).

122 Cf. Carter 1993: 202; Suet. *Iul.* 54.1, may provide the key to this problem.

phi, the people of Metropolis decided to accommodate the consul and his army (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.81.1–2):

> Metropolitae primum eodem usi consilio, isdem permoti rumoribus portas clauserunt murosque armatis compleverunt, sed postea casu civitatis Gomphensis cognito ex captivis, quos Caesar ad murum producendos curaverat, portas aperuerunt. Quibus diligentissime conservatis, collata fortuna Metropolitum cum casu Gomphensium nulla Thessaliae fuit civitas praeter Larisaeos, qui magnis exercitibus Scipionis tenebantur, quin Caesari parerent atque imperata facerent.
>
> The people of Metropolis initially did the same thing. Stirred by the same reports, they closed their gates and filled their walls with armed men. Afterwards, however, when the fate of the town of Gomphi was learned from prisoners whom Caesar had taken care to have led forward to the wall, they opened their gates. Since they were very carefully protected, when the fate of the people of Metropolis was compared with the misfortune of the people of Gomphi, there was no community in Thessalia—apart from that of the people of Larisa, who were occupied by the sizeable armies of Scipio—that did not obey Caesar and do as he commanded.

The exemplary punishment meted out to the recalcitrant inhabitants of Gomphi had a salutary effect upon the behaviour of those Thessalian communities not directly occupied by the armies of Caesar's enemies. Supplies were immediately forthcoming.

The choices that inform Caesar's narrative focus serve to highlight the strategic and logistical considerations that determined the treatment accorded to Gomphi and Metropolis. It is instructive to compare this laconic account with the alternative version of the sack of Gomphi that was furnished by the *Historiae* of C. Asinius Pollio. Preserved as a result of its appeal to the imagination of Livy and those who drew upon that historian, Pollio's version is remarkable for its dramatic focus upon the disorderly behaviour of Caesar's soldiers and the desperation of the inhabitants of Gomphi. Reworking Pollio's narrative as transmitted by Livy and Seneca the Elder, Appian gives a pointed, pathetic vision of Caesar's retreat from Epirus and his wrath at finding the gates of Gomphi closed to him and his soldiers (App. *B Civ.* 2.64.267–269; cf. Plut. *Caes.* 41.7–8):

> καὶ τάδε εἰπὼν ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν εὐθὺς μετήιει καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἐς Θεσσαλίαν νυκτὸς ὑπεχώρει λανθάνων· Γόμφους τε πόλιν μικρὰν οὐ δεχομένην αὐτὸν ἐξεῖλεν ὑπὸ

> ὀργῆς καὶ ἐπέτρεψε τῶι στρατῶι διαρπάσαι. οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἐκ λιμοῦ πάντων ἐνεπίμπλαντο ἀθρόως καὶ ἐμεθύσκοντο ἀπρεπῶς, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν οἱ Γερμανοὶ γελοιότατοι κατὰ τὴν μέθην ἦσαν ... λέγεται δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς Γόμφοις γενέσθαι παθήματα γενναῖα καὶ νεκροὺς τῶν ἐπιφανῶν γερόντων ἐν ἰατρείωι φανῆναι, κυλίκων αὐτοῖς παρακειμένων ἀτρώτοις, εἴκοσι μὲν ὡς ἐκ μέθης κατακεκλιμένους ἐπὶ τὸ ἔδαφος, ἕνα δ᾽ ἐπὶ θρόνου παρακαθεζόμενον οἷα ἰατρόν, ὃς τὸ φάρμακον αὐτοῖς ἄρα παρέσχε.
>
> Upon speaking thus, he made his way directly to Apollonia and from there he retreated to Thessalia by night so as to escape notice. In anger he sacked the small town of Gomphi because it refused to receive him and he handed it over to his army to pillage. Since they had been starving, they incontinently took their fill of all edibles, and became disgracefully drunk, especially the Germans, who were extremely ridiculous in their drunkenness ... It is said that there were sufferings of note in Gomphi and that the corpses of eminent community elders were found, unwounded, in a pharmacist's shop; twenty of them were sprawled on the floor as though drunk, with goblets lying next to them, whereas one of the group was seated upon a chair like a physician, and it was he who surely had administered the poison to them.

Even if the Germans are singled out for censure, the episode casts discredit upon Caesar and the army as a whole.[123] For one thing, the Germans constituted the elite core of Caesar's cavalry.[124] For another, as was to be expected, the city's sack was accompanied by a number of atrocities and acts worthy of being recorded.[125] Gomphi met with the very fate from which Caesar had consciously

123 Carsana 2007: 202.

124 M. Speidel, *Riding for Caesar*, (B.T. Batsford: London 1994), 12–13.

125 Cf. Tac. *Hist.* 3.33; R. Ash, *Ordering Anarchy. Armies and Leaders in Tacitus' Histories*, (Duckworth: London 1999), 13–14. The Tacitean narrative of the sack of Cremona may also owe not a little to Pollio's account of the destruction of Perusia. Documented as present at Pharsalus (e.g. Suet. *Iul.* 30.4; Plut. *Caes.* 46.1–3) and by temperament inclined to report such items (cf. Morgan 2000: 54–54; E. Kornemann, "Die historische Schriftstellerei des C. Asinius Pollio," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie und Pädagogik* Suppl. 22 (1896) 555–692, here 601), even if disreputable, Pollio is a likely candidate for the ultimate source of information regarding this episode. Unvarnished truth was a hallmark feature of Pollio's *Historiae*, on the model of Thucydides. Cf. Thuc. 7.29, for the Thracians' massacre even of schoolchildren at Mycalessus. Of course, Livy once again will have been the vector, here as in the case of the death of Pompeius Magnus at Pelusium: J. Moles, "Virgil, Pompey, and the

saved Corfinium the year before.[126] Pollio's account implicitly condemns Caesar for this disorderly conduct. Although not what might have been expected of someone who served as a lieutenant to Caesar in this campaign, the unadorned truth is typical of Pollio's historiography and its claim to liberty of speech.[127]

In line with the traditions of Roman historiography, Pollio furnished a narrative that focussed upon the ethical dimension of the events that he was describing. Caesar, by contrast, prefers to offer readers an account that tends towards the technical and considerations of *Realpolitik* when the actions narrated are open to moral condemnation.[128] Nonetheless, both accounts are in substantial agreement, complementing one another. The drunken excesses of the Germans and Caesar's other soldiers provide dramatic confirmation that Caesar's army made good the privations that they had endured during their time near Dyrrachium. The "bustling and rich" town of Gomphi served "to alleviate the lack of all things" that Caesar's army suffered.[129] Food, drink, finished goods, and raw materials were all to be had from the sack of Gomphi.

That provincial communities were expected to provide sustenance and aid to Roman armies and representatives of the Roman state was a cornerstone of imperial administration. Without the material support of the governed, Roman government was impossible over the long-term. However, as exemplified by the *lex Iulia de repetundis* of Caesar's first consulate, there were limits to what might be exacted from the provincial communities.[130] Magistrates and promagistrates and their representatives were subject to legal sanction for their misbehaviour. Conversely, there arises the question of what penalties might be

Histories of Asinius Pollio," *The Classical World* 76 (1983) 287–288. In any case, remarkable is the coincidence of the survival of one temple in both instances and the noting of this within the historical record.

126 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.21.2; cf. 1.23.4. Indeed, there is also the fact that Ahenobarbus is reported (Caes. *B Civ*. 1.22.6; Plut. *Caes*. 34.6–8) to have sought to commit suicide when the city's capitulation became certain. As demonstrated by the later behaviour of M. Cato at Utica, this was deemed ethically acceptable in the light of Stoic teaching.

127 Unless, that is, the account is to be attributed to a source such as Strabo.

128 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.31.4: *deductis Pergamum atque in locupletissimas urbes in hiberna legionibus maximas largitiones fecit et confirmandorum militum causa diripiendas his civitates dedit*. For analysis of Metellus Scipio's behaviour in Asia and its evocation during Caesar's time there shortly after victory at Pharsalus, see the following chapter of the present book.

129 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.80.6, text cited above.

130 Cic. *Att*. 5.16.3. For a relatively detailed survey of the contents of the *lex Iulia de repetundis*, known to have had at least 101 chapters, see B. Santalucia, *Diritto e processo penale nell'antica Roma*, (Giuffè editore: Milano 1998^2), 157–160.

legitimately inflicted upon a community that had failed in its duty. Rather than speculate upon complex, theoretical norms, it is more germane to recognize that the law tended to lie upon the side of the powerful. Self-help as in the case of Gomphi would have gone unpunished as long as the commander proved victorious in the field.[131]

The practical consequences of a Roman army's presence might prove disastrous for the local economy. Neither consumption nor production are positive phenomena in an absolute sense. Indeed, when occurring in the absence of an exchange of goods or money, they can only have a deleterious effect upon the economy. Supplying Caesar's army meant both a loss of current wealth and depressed economic activity for decades to come.[132] Like the Parthini and many another provincial community in the years 49–48 BCE, the inhabitants of Gomphi were faced with an insoluble dilemma.[133]

Albeit in theoretical terms alone, the quantity of materials required to maintain a Roman army in the field is worth specifying, so as to give a more precise idea of what was being asked of the people of Gomphi and the other provincial communities. Moral indignation is easy, but exact information hard to find. Yet, an image may be obtained from a marshalling of evidence for the various items used or consumed by soldiers. Food and drink comprised items such as the legionary's ideal daily ration of 1.4 kg of bread, 0.45 kg of meat, 1 litre of wine, and 5 cl of olive-oil.[134] Amongst the raw materials required, on the other hand, there figured iron, wood, leather, and wool. Outfitting a soldier can be reckoned to have involved roughly 6 kg of iron, 9,500 cm^3 of wood, 1 m^2 of leather, and 1 kg of wool.[135] After the hard winter of deprivation near Dyrrachium, Caesar's men had need of all of these things. For a small community such as Gomphi, which is probably to be reckoned in the range of 5,000–7,500 inhab-

131 Cf. F. Millar, "The World of the Golden Ass," *Journal of Roman Studies* 71 (1981) 63–75, here 71–72 (= 261–262, in the version published with: S.J. Harrison [ed.], *Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel*, [Oxford 1999]).

132 cf. F. Santangelo, *Sulla, the Elites and the Empire. A Study of Roman Policies in Italy and the Greek East.* (Impact of Empire, 8), (Brill: Leiden and Boston 2007), 41. Comparison with East Germany and the overall situation of Communist-dominated eastern Europe in the post-1945 settlement may not be inopportune. Reconstruction, as it was achieved in western Europe after the cataclysm of the Second World War, is neither easy nor assured. To cite another example, that of inner Detroit in the wake of the Watts Riots of the 1970s, once (relative) affluence is gone, it may be impossible to restore.

133 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.42. Hence, Caesar's grant of freedom to the Thessalians: Plut. *Caes*. 48.1.

134 Goldsworthy 1996: 291.

135 Cf. Goldsworthy 1996: 209–219.

itants at most, Caesar's army of 25,000 men will have seemed a plague of locusts, rapidly consuming alimentary reserves and strategic resources used for agricultural production.[136] The impromptu, forced redirection of capital from agriculture to military ends created what was in effect an economic no man's land about the army.

136 For the size of Gomphi, instructive parallels are provided by the Italian communities of the late Republic. There were more than 300 towns within Italia proper as of the mid-first century BCE, according to P.A. Brunt, "The army and the land in the Roman revolution," *Journal of Roman Studies* 52 (1962) 69–86, here 71. If that same author's statistic of 1,200,000 Roman citizens living outside of Rome be applied to these communities, then, with the addition of women and children, they should have had a population of 12,000 on average. If one reckons the servile population as another 1/3, the average population would have come to 16,000. The actual spread must have been more on the order of 5,000 to 30,000, with Fidenae and Tarentum at opposite ends of the spectrum. As for Caesar's army, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.89.2.

CHAPTER 8

Asia

1 From Pharsalus to Alexandria

In spite of the mishaps of recent months, Caesar's army rapidly recovered its strength during the interlude in Thessalia and defeated a force twice its size on the plains of Pharsalus. With that victory the military power of Pompeius Magnus was at an end and the civil war seemingly all but finished. Only the failure to capture Pompeius and the other leaders of the opposition rendered Caesar's victory incomplete, unfinished. Many fled north and westwards to the fleet stationed off the coast of Epirus, whereas Pompeius took the opposite direction, fleeing to the Aegean and then gradually making his way towards Syria and Egypt.[1] Amidst the initial chaos of the battlefield, however, only the fact of a Caesarian victory was immediately evident. The pursuit of Pompeius commenced once it had been ascertained that he was not amongst the dead or captured and those forces remaining near Pharsalus had been compelled to surrender. The civil war was not yet at an end.

Acting with characteristic rapidity and decisiveness, Caesar secured the surrender of more than 24,000 soldiers from the former army of Pompeius and Scipio and their allies.[2] With like resolution he made dispositions regarding his own army and the status of the local population.[3] Then, no less energetically, Caesar commenced his pursuit of Pompeius (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.102.1):

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1 Plut. *Cic.* 39; *Cat. Min.* 55; App. *B Civ.* 2.87.364. Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.5, only bothering to note that L. Domitius Ahenobarbus was killed was attempting to flee. Of Cato, Scipio, Afranius, and other leaders, Caesar says nothing.

2 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.99.4.

3 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.106.1. As regards the liberty accorded to the Thessalians, see Strab. 14.656; Plut. *Caes.* 48.1; App. *B Civ.* 2.368; P.-S.G. Freber, *Der hellenistische Osten und das Illyricum unter Caesar*, (Palingenesia, 42), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1993), 13. They had already received their liberty in 196 BCE, and not even L. Sulla seems to have withdrawn this privilege from them in the intervening period. Hence, it would appear that Caesar's measure was nothing more than a recognition of the *status quo* existing prior to civil war and an attempt to restore normalcy to the region. Later reference to Pharsalus as a *civitas libera* (Plin. *HN* 4.29), on the other hand, suggests that that community received privileged treatment from Augustus at the moment of the new disposition introduced in 27 BCE. For the establishment of the new province of Achaea, see F. Papazoglou, "Quelques aspects de l'histoire de la province de la Macédoine," *ANRW* 2.7.1 (1979) 302–369, here p. 325 with n. 105; cf. J. Vanderspoel, "Provincia Macedonia,"

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> Caesar omnibus rebus relictis persequendum sibi Pompeium existimavit quascumque in partis se ex fuga recepisset, ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset, et quantumcumque itineris equitatu efficere poterat cotidie progrediebatur legionemque unam minoribus itineribus subsequi iussit.
>
> Forgetting everything else, Caesar reckoned that he ought to pursue Pompeius to wherever he fled, lest Pompeius prove able to raise new forces and renew the war. Accordingly, he daily advanced as far as was possible for the cavalry, and he ordered a legion to follow with marches that were somewhat less lengthy.

Resuming the thread of his narrative, after brief reference to the effect that the news of Pharsalus had had upon events at Brundisium and on the Strait of Messina, Caesar succinctly informs readers both of the rationale informing his decision and the means whereby it was implemented. Subsequently the focus shifts from Caesar himself to the movements of his quarry. Readers follow Pompeius as he moves amidst haste and uncertainty from Macedonia to Lesbos, whence to Cilicia and Cyprus, abandoning his plan to take refuge in Syria and finally ending at the confines of Egypt. Not unnaturally, the report of Caesar's arrival (*adventus*) recurs as a *Leitmotif* in the course of this detailed narrative, for this news influenced Pompeius' movements.[4]

Caesar does not unduly stress the rapidity of his movement across the landscape of the eastern Mediterranean in pursuit of Pompeius. Caesar's rapidity of movement, or *celeritas Caesariana*, was well known to contemporaries.[5] The

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251–275, in: J. Roisman and I. Worthington (eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, (Wiley-Blackwell: Malden, Mass. 2010), here p. 269.

4 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.102.4 (*cognitoque Caesaris adventu ex eo loco discessit*), 8 (*iamque de Caesaris adventu fama ad civitates perferebatur*).

5 Cf. Cic. *Att*. 16.10.1, describing M. Antonius late in 44 BCE. For contemporary reports of the *celeritas Caesariana*, see Cic. *Att*. 7.22.1; 8.9A.2; 8.14.1; 16.10.1; Vell. 2.51.2; cf. Caes. *B Gall*. 7.40–41; Plut. *Caes*. 17.5. For the last-cited testimony, the ultimate source is in all likelihood C. Oppius: *FRH* vol. 3, p. 484 comm. on *FRH* 40 F7 (= Plut. *Caes*. 17.6–7). For modern treatments of the topic, see W.K.A. Drumann, *Geschichte Roms in seinem Übergange von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung*, edited by P. Groebe. 6 vols. (Gebrüder Borntraeger: Berlin 1906^{2}), 3.723; L. Grillo, *The Art of Caesar's Bellum Civile. Literature, Ideology, and Community*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2012), 14–15; cf. G. Walser, *Bellum Helveticum. Studien zum Beginn der caesarischen Eroberung von Gallien*, (Historia Einzelschriften, 118), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1998), 77–80, 87–88; R. Combès, *Imperator. Recherches sur l'emploi et la signification du titre d'imperator dans la Rome républicaine*, (Paul Dehan: Paris 1966), 288–298;

conquest of Gallia had given abundant demonstration of this quality, and Caesar's actions throughout the whole of the civil war confirmed that it was a characteristic that endured. Yet, despite the fact that Caesar did write a poem to commemorate his travelling from Rome to Hispania within less than a month's time, *celeritas* is not a noun that he applies to himself in the *Bellum Civile*.[6] Rather, he focuses upon the object of his movements, naming the places that Pompeius visited and providing an analysis for his erratic, hesitant advance from Macedonia to Egypt. Occasionally, at Amphipolis and then at Antioch, the report of Caesar's imminent arrival causes his enemies to abandon their current plans and to move elsewhere.[7] Caesar represents for Pompeius a hidden threat that may emerge from the landscape at any given moment. This narrative choice is far more effective as a means of depicting the swiftness of Caesar's pursuit.

However, although highly effective from a literary point of view, this narrative choice raises sundry questions regarding historical reality. Caesar's narrative is singularly opaque as regards his own movements.[8] Caesar mentions only three points in the itinerary that took him from Macedonia to Egypt in the late summer of 48 BCE: Amphipolis, Asia, and Alexandria. Mention of Amphipolis is in fact oblique, for Caesar observes that it was the report of his arrival there that caused Pompeius to lift anchor and sail away from that city.[9] Subsequent mention of Asia is hardly much more assistance, although occurring within a context of focalization upon Caesar.[10] The province of Asia covered an extensive portion of territory in western Anatolia, and Caesar does not specify which cities he visited during his brief time there.[11] Immediately following this comes

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M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César*, (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1966²), 251–254; E.S. Ramage, "Aspects of propaganda in the *De Bello Gallico*: Caesar's virtues and attributes," *Athenaeum* 91 (2003) 331–372, here 339–341.

6 Suet. *Iul.* 56.5; cf. Strab. 3.160; App. *B Civ.* 2.429; Oros. 6.16.6; M. Gelzer, *Caesar. Der Politiker und Staatsmann*. Introduction and updated bibliography by E. Baltrusch, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2008), 251.

7 Cited above; cf. the similar situation for P. Lentulus and L. Lentulus at Rhodes: Caes. *B Civ.* 3.102.7.

8 It is tempting to compare this situation with that of Odysseus surrounded by a cloud in Phaeacia: *Odyss.* 7.14–17, 139–145. The *adventus* or *ephiphaneia* has a miraculous appearance to it. Unlike Odysseus, however, Caesar was the ruler and in coming he granted benefactions to the populace that he visited.

9 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.102.4.

10 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.105.1, 106.1.

11 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.106.1: *paucos dies*. This is a problem to which we shall return in the sections to come. It would appear that "Asia" is here an instance of *antonomasia* for "Ephesus".

mention of his arrival in Alexandria. The itinerary is minimalist and furnishes no indication of the amount of time involved in the passage from Macedonia to Egypt, unless allowance be made for the nebulous phrase "a few days". Indubitably effective in representing the rapidity of the chase, Caesar's narrative nonetheless suffers from a grave loss of historical specificity.

The usual remedy is that of integrating Caesar's testimony with the evidence provided by other authors. The approach has much to commend itself, but is not without grave methodological shortcomings. Not all authors are equally deserving of credit, nor is it clear that all witnesses cited by the moderns actually provide evidence bearing upon the current problem. To be precise, visions of Caesar's sojourn at Ilium and subsequent sailing from there for Alexandria would appear to be untenable. The deliciously ironic tableau of an ignorant Caesar tromping over the ruins of Ilium bears all the marks of being nothing more than a product of the hyperbolic imagination of Lucan, and Strabo's reference to the benefactions that Caesar conferred upon Ilium does not state nor even imply a visit there by the victorious general.

Of those authors whose works survive, Lucan alone affirms that Caesar visited Ilium in the course of his pursuit of Pompeius Magnus. There are moments when Lucan is known to be reporting what he found in his sources, amongst which there figures the narrative composed by Livy.[12] Nevertheless, there exist good reasons for believing that the episode positing Caesar's presence at Ilium is not one of these. Arguments from silence are by their very nature problematic, but the silence of other authors is highly suggestive. Indeed, the absence of the episode from Plutarch's biography of Caesar must be deemed conclusive, for Plutarch was alert to parallels with the career of Alexander the Great and is known to have utilized Livy as a source for this life.[13] Invention within the context of an historical epic ought not to disconcert. As is shown by items such

12 Cf. schol. ad Lucan. 7.471 Endt: *proprium nomen est 'Crastine' eius militis, qui primus tela iaculatus est, ut ait Titus Livius 'primus hostem percussit nuper pilo sumpto primo Gaius Crastinus'.*

13 Cf. Plut. *Caes*. 48.1–2. For Plutarch's use of Livy, see C.B.R. Pelling, "Plutarch's method of work in the Roman lives," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979) 74–96, here 88. Cf. idem, *Plutarch: Life of Caesar*, (Clarendon Ancient History Series), (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2011), 48–49, which downplays the use of Livy. In his publications since that of 1979, Pelling has consistently attributed a major role to Pollio, in view of the shared items between Plutarch and Appian. The inference that Pollio was Plutarch's source rather than Livy rests primarily upon two premises that are highly dubious: (1) that Appian's text is a thinly disguised re-write of the *Historiae* of Pollio and (2) that Plutarch was most interested in historical veracity as that is defined by modern canons.

as the presence of Cicero at the battle of Pharsalus and the account of young Cn. Pompeius' nocturnal consultation of a Thessalian witch, poets enjoyed a freedom to invent that was not permitted to their peers in the more pedestrian arts.[14]

Another reason for believing the episode to be of Lucan's own making is the rank ignorance attributed to Caesar. Although initially described as "a devotee of glory" (*famae mirator*), Caesar repeatedly displays a signal incapacity to perceive what he is looking at. Each and every one of the rocks of Ilium has a history. Yet, Caesar "in ignorance" (*inscius*) crosses the dried-up riverbed of the Xanthus.[15] Subsequently, "without a care in the world" (*securus*) he walks through the tall grass, tromping upon the grave of Hector.[16] Then, thinking to pass amidst a heap of stones, he earns the native guide's rebuke for failure to respect the altar of Zeus Herkeios.[17] The vision of Caesar as a tourist at Ilium is exquisitely unflattering and cannot be attributed to Livy or any historian willing to portray Caesar in a favourable light. Conversely, enemies such as T. Ampius Balbus or independent thinkers on the order of Cremutius Cordus can hardly be expected to have dedicated time to this sort of denigration. As slyly suggested by Lucan's consequent apostrophe of Caesar, the episode is of the poet's own manufacture.[18]

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14 Lucan. 6.569–830; 7.61–123. The historical truth of the speech attributed to M. Cicero prior to the battle of Pharsalus is on a par with that of the consultation of the Thessalian witch the night before the battle. The one illuminates the other, and gives a just estimation of the credibility of Lucan.

15 Lucan. 9.974–975.

16 Lucan. 9.975–977.

17 Lucan. 9.977–979.

18 Lucan. 9.980–986. For an extended and brilliant analysis of the whole episode, see C. Tesoriero, "Trampling over Troy: Caesar, Virgil, Lucan," in: C. Walde (ed.), *Lucan im 21. Jahrhundert*, (K.G. Saur: München 2005). The author had the good fortune to hear an earlier version of that paper delivered at a conference held at the Villa Virgiliana at Cumae in June 2002. Tesoriero refrained from expressing a judgement on the historicity of the episode, judiciously limiting himself to analysis of what Lucan makes of it.

For Caesar's visit to Troy, aside from the fundamental contribution of Tesoriero 2005, see also: D. Spencer, "Lucan's Follies: Memory and Ruin in a Civil-War Landscape," *G&R* 52 (2005) 46–69; E. Narducci, *Lucano. Un'epica contro l'impero. Interpretazione della Pharsalia*, (Laterza: Bari 2002), 177–180; A.F. Rossi, "Remapping the past: Caesar's tale of Troy (Lucan *BC* 9.964–999)," *Phoenix* 55 (2001) 313–326; W.R. Johnson, *Momentary Monsters. Lucan and his Heroes*, (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, 47), (Cornell University Press: Ithaca 1987), 118–123; O. Zwierlein, "Lucans Caesar in Troia," *Hermes* 114 (1986) 460–478; F. Ahl, *Lucan. An Introduction*, (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, 39), (Cornell

A final reason for disbelief is furnished by problems of methodology when any attempt is made to integrate the testimony of Lucan with that of the other authors who report Caesar's passage through Asia in the late summer of 48 BCE. Plutarch's description of Caesar's movements implies either that he visited the island of Cnidus or that he received an embassy from the Cnidians at one of the foremost cities on the mainland.[19] Appian's narrative is likewise vague, but indicative of Caesar's having met with embassies from the various communities of the province of Asia prior to sailing to Rhodes as a preliminary to his journey to Egypt.[20] Dio limits himself to an elliptical remark to the effect that Caesar put the affairs of Asia in order.[21] Against this fragmentary, but united testimony, that of Lucan stands in patent discord. The poet claims that Caesar sailed directly from Ilium to Alexandria (Lucan. 9.1000–1005):

Sic fatus repetit classes et tota secundis
vela dedit Coris, avidusque urgente procella
Iliacas pensare moras Asiamque potentem
praevehitur pelagoque Rhodon spumante relinquit.
Septima nox Zephyro numquam laxante rudentes
ostendit Phariis Aegyptia litora flammis.

Having spoken thus, he went back to the fleet
and set sail with a favourable northerly wind.
Before the driving gale, he eagerly
made up for untimely delay at Ilium,
sailing past mighty Asia and
shunning Rhodes in the foaming sea.
The Zephyrus never gave respite to the cords
and the seventh night revealed the shores
of Egypt by the flames of Pharos.

The obdurate will seek to combine all of these testimonies, claiming not altogether improbably that the seven days at sea remarked by Lucan are consis-

University Press: Ithaca 1976), 209–222. See most recently N.W. Bernstein, "The Dead and Their Ghosts in the *Bellum Civile*: Lucan's Visions of History," 257–282, in P. Asso (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Lucan*, (Brill: Leiden 2011), esp. 267–268.

19 Plut. *Caes.* 48.1; cf. App. *B Civ.* 2.116.486, for Caesar's having been a guest of Theopompus on Cnidus.

20 App. *B Civ.* 2.89.373.

21 Cass. Dio 42.6.3.

tent with the three days reported by Appian.[22] However, Lucan unambiguously writes of Caesar's sailing past Asia (*praevehitur*) and shunning the island of Rhodes (*relinquit*).[23] Lucan's testimony is not complementary to, but rather at variance with that of the other authors. The conclusion is ineluctable that Lucan has invented the episode at Ilium as a congenial substitute for Caesar's time at such leading cities as Pergamum and Ephesus.[24]

Freed from the constricting and contradictory testimony of Lucan, scholarship can appraise with fresh vision the trajectory followed by Caesar in his passage from Pharsalus to Alexandria between 9 August and 2 October 48 BCE. The initial date for this period is furnished by calendrical evidence for the battle at Pharsalus, whereas the closing date is provided by Livy, albeit in epitomized form. However, Caesar himself provides the basis for reconstructing the chronology of that period (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.106.1):

> Caesar paucos dies in Asia moratus, cum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum Aegyptum iter habere propter necessitudines regni reliquasque eius loci opportunitates cum legione una, quam se ex Thessalia sequi iusserat, et altera, quam ex Achaia a Q. Fufio legato evocaverat, equiti usque DCCC et navibus longis Rhodiis X et Asiaticis paucis Alexandriam pervenit.

> Caesar delayed in Asia for a few days. Upon learning that Pompeius had been sighted at Cyprus, he conjectured that he was making his way to Egypt on account his links to the kingdom and that region's other resources. Together with the one legion that he had ordered to follow him from Thessalia and another that he had summoned from his legate

22 Lucan. 9.1004; App. *B Civ.* 2.89.375; incautiously listed as separate voyages by P. Arnaud, *Les routes de la navigation antique. Itinéraires en Méditerranée*, (Errance: Paris 2005).

23 For the verb *relinquere*, cf. Lucan. 8.244, 247. Since Pompeius is known not to have stopped anywhere between Mytilene and Attaleia/Syedra in southernmost Anatolia, these passages demonstrate that correct interpretation of the verb at 9.1003 cannot take Lucan to imply that Caesar had temporarily stopped at Rhodes.

24 For an instructive parallel, readers are referred to the historiographical fiction of Cicero's presence at Pharsalus: Lucan. 7.63. For clear evidence to the contrary, see Cic. *Div.* 1.68; 2.114 (for company with M. Varro at Dyrrachium); Liv. *Per.* 111; Plut. *Cic.* 39.1; *Cat. min.* 55.3; cf. D. Magnino, *Plutarchus: Vita Ciceronis. Introduzione, commento e traduzione*, (Biblioteca di studi superiori. Storia antica ed epigrafia, 44), (La "Nuova Italia": Firenze 1963), 130; J.L. Moles, *Plutarch: The Life of Cicero*, with an introduction, translation, and commentary, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1988), 188, 192. Manifestly divinities are not the only additions to the factual record to be found in historical epic (e.g. Cicero, *de consulatu suo*).

> Q. Fufius in Achaea, 800 cavalry, and 10 Rhodian warships as well as a few from Asia, he passed to Alexandria.

Accompanied by his elite cavalry units, Caesar was able to traverse immense distances rapidly, as is demonstrated by his swift arrival in Amphipolis while Pompeius was still at anchor. Yet, one of the two legions that accompanied Caesar to Egypt followed him overland from Pharsalus to Ephesus. If the brief crossing of the Hellespont be omitted, then the distance involved is roughly 900 km. At the relatively straightforward rate of 25 km daily, such a distance requires 45 days in theory. On the premise that the legion accompanying Caesar overland began its march on 11 August, then arrival in Ephesus might have been as early as 17 September. On the other hand, since Caesar is reported to have arrived in Alexandria on 2 October, departure from Ephesus by ship probably occurred on 25 September. In other words, Caesar may have spent some 7–8 days in Ephesus, dealing with embassies from the various communities of Asia and putting affairs in order while awaiting news of Pompeius' latest movements.[25] Once certain report was to be had, he acted swiftly in order to reap the full fruits of his victory at Pharsalus.

2 Ephesus Capital of Asia

The metropolis of Ephesus was arguably not only the most populous and economically thriving city within the province of Asia, but also in effect the provincial capital. Pergamum had served as the capital of the Attalid kingdom and presumably enjoyed primacy in the initial stages of Roman annexation.[26] However, the failed revolt of Aristonicus afforded an occasion for a change in fortune, for the worse. Deriving benefit from their maritime situation, the Ephesians provided the Romans with timely and crucial naval support in the

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25 For the considerations underlying current reconstructions, see W. Judeich, *Caesar im Orient*, (F.A. Brockhaus: Leipzig 1885); L.E. Lord, "The Date of Julius Caesar's Departure from Alexandria," *Journal of Roman Studies* 28 (1938) 19–40; T.R.E. Holmes, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire. Vol. 3: 50–44 B.C.*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1923), 484 n. 8.

26 Thus K.J. Rigsby, "*Provincia Asia*," TAPA 118 (1988) 123–153, here 140. For an alternative vision, which situates this change in status much later and in direct relationship to the establishment of the Principate, see D. Knibbe and W. Alzinger, "Ephesos vom Beginn der römischen Herrschaft in Kleinasien bis zum Ende der Principatszeit," ANRW 2.7.2 (1980) 748–830, here 759.

crushing of that rebellion. The Ephesian fleet destroyed that of Aristonicus at Cyme, thereby forcing the pretender to withdraw to the interior of Asia and creating the conditions for Roman victory. Hence, although direct testimony is lacking, it would seem likely that Ephesus served as the principal residence of the province's governor.[27] This best explains the documented presence of L. Lucilius at Ephesus in the late 90s or that of Q. Tullius Cicero in the late 60s.[28] The change in regional capital was indicative of a change in masters, marking the establishment of a new regime.

Various and sundry items indirectly attest the primacy accorded to Ephesus in the Republic. For instance, the presence of a significant number of statues commemorating Romans at Ephesus bespeaks the city's leading position within the province of Asia.[29] Similarly, it was in Ephesus that the Ionian league (*koinon*) erected a dedication to honour Caesar's victory at Pharsalus.[30] Likewise suggestive of the city's primacy is its situation in lists of the communities of Asia. Thus, when relating the slaughter of Romans that followed upon the initial success enjoyed by Mithridates in the first Mithridatic war, Appian begins the list with the city of Ephesus, according second position to Pergamum.[31] Most significant, however, are actions. For example, it was in Ephesus that Sulla delivered an address to the leading citizens of the various cities of Asia after he had set the affairs of the province in order.[32] Although represented

27 Rigsby 1988: 141; idem, "The Era of the Province of Asia," *Phoenix* 33 (1979) 39–47, here 47. For a contrary view, see M. Sartre, *L'Anatolie hellénistique, de l'Egée au Caucase* (*334–31 av. J.-C.*), (Armand Colin: Paris 2004²), 213 n. 58. For the situation obtaining in the province of Asia, see R. Haensch, *Capita provinciarum. Statthaltersitze und Provinzialverwaltung in der römischen Kaiserzeit*, (Kölner Forschungen, 7), (Philipp von Zabern: Mainz am Rhein 1997), 298–321, esp. 312–315 for the evidence (e.g. Cic. *Att.* 5.13.1; cf. Cic. *2 Verr.* 1.85; *Flacc.* 32; *Att.* 5.13.2; 5.20.10; *Fam.* 13.55.1; 13.57.2) for the role of Ephesus.

28 For L. Lucilius, see *IPr* 111.139, *pace* R. Kallet-Marx, *Hegemony to Empire. The Development of the Roman* Imperium *in the East from 148 to 62 B.C.*, (University of California Press: Berkeley 1995), 147 n. 83. For Q. Cicero, see Cic. *Q. fr.* 1.2.14.

29 App. *Mithr.* 21.81.

30 A.E. Raubitschek, "Epigraphical Notes on Julius Caesar," *Journal of Roman Studies* 44 (1954) 65–75, here 65 (no. E), 75; Dittenberger, *Syll.*³ 760.

31 App. *Mithr.* 23.88.

32 App. *Mithr.* 61.250, 252. Conversely, as emerges from App. *Mithr.* 23.87, Mithridates had executed the hapless Roman governor Cassius at Pergamum. The choice of city would seem to have been dictated by a desire to indicate a return to the *status quo* obtaining prior to the establishment of Roman rule. Cf. F. Santangelo, *Sulla, the Elites and the Empire. A Study of Roman Policies in Italy and the Greek East*, (Impact of Empire, 8), (Brill: Leiden and Boston 2007), 107, "It is quite likely that it was Sulla himself who decided the move of

in a different guise, Scipio's convening the leading men of Asia at Ephesus during the winter of 49–48 BCE was in all likelihood modelled after Sulla's previous action.[33]

Of course, whether in Asia or elsewhere, Roman governors were frequently itinerant. The dual requirements of adjudication and defense made it impossible for all but the most moribund to pass a lengthy period of time in one place. Hence, the rather full record for Caesar and Cicero represents those two governors as constantly moving about the areas that had been assigned to them in the 50s BCE.[34] Such a record is not to be had for Asia in the late Republic. On the other hand, the province's administrative history is well documented, allowing insight into the demands that must have been made upon the governor's time there. The province of Asia was divided into 44 administrative districts.[35] Between personal involvement and the appointment of individuals to represent him in arbitrating the inter-state disputes of Asia or those to which Romans were party, the governor will have lost much time.[36] Travel may have been an integral aspect of the governor's judicial function, but was certainly so in the case of military operations meant to keep peace in the countryside or to repress the plague of piracy upon the coast.[37] In short, the governor of the province was not invariably to be found within the province's capital.

Nonetheless, it would appear that the governor of Asia was intimately associated with Ephesus, on the usual reading of the evidence of a letter written by Cicero in mid-51 BCE. Reporting his arrival in Asia to Atticus, Cicero describes how he had been treated as though he himself were the governor of Asia. Rather than employ a standard formula, however, Cicero makes mention of *imperium* and refers to that pro-magistrate as *praetor Ephesius* (Cic. *Att.* 5.13.1):

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the capital to Ephesus." If so, this would have provided Caesar with yet another reason for emphasizing his own "protection" of the sacred moneys of Artemis of Ephesus.

33 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.33.1.

34 See especially A.J. Marshall, "Governors on the move," *Phoenix* 20 (1966) 231–246.

35 Cassiodor. *Chron. s.a.* 84 BCE (*CM* 2.132); Sartre 2004^2: 229, for the Sullan system; to note loss of three *conventus* in the period 56–48 BCE. This is one of a number of intriguing fragments to survive indirectly from Livy's account (thus Mommsen, plausibly, in the introductory comments at *Chron. Min.* 2.112) of the history of the late Republic. The criterion informing Cassiodorus' choice, however, baffles all ratiocination. See Santangelo 2007: 114–115 and more generally 107–124 for context and the political aspects of the new regime established by Sulla.

36 For an example, see the Sardis-Ephesus treaty published by U. Laffi, *Il trattato fra Sardi ed Efeso degli anni 90 a.C.* (Studi ellenistici, 22), (Fabrizio Serra: Pisa 2010).

37 Cf. Valerius Flaccus and piracy in late 60s BCE: Cic. *Flacc.* 32.

> Ephesum venimus a.d. XI Kal. Sext. … De concursu legationum, privatorum et de incredibili multitudine quae mihi iam Sami sed mirabilem in modum Ephesi praesto fuit aut audisse te puto aut quid ad te attinet? Verum tamen decumani ⟨quasi ad se⟩ venissem cum imperio, Graeci quasi Ephesio praetori, se alacres obtulerunt.
>
> We arrived at Ephesus on 22 July … As regards the crush of embassies and individuals and the unbelievable numbers that met me even at Samos and in wondrous fashion at Ephesus, I imagine that you have heard or why does it matter to you? However, the tax-farmers came forward rapidly ⟨as though it was for them⟩ that I had come with executive power, and the Greeks did likewise as if to encounter the governor of Asia.

Both Romans and provincials in Ephesus flocked to greet Cicero as though he had come to take up the government of Asia, rather than that of Cilicia. Although the expression *praetor Ephesius* is not antithetical to interpretation as "the chief magistrate of the Ephesians", the reference to *imperium* and parallelism between Romans and Greeks together strongly suggest that the usual interpretation is correct.[38]

Cicero's passage through Ephesus was the most natural means of arrival within his allotted province of Cilicia and is in all likelihood exemplary of the situation obtaining with most holders of *imperium* operative within the eastern Mediterranean in the last century of the Republic. Cicero himself passed through Ephesus not only on the way out to Cilicia, but also upon the return journey back to Rome.[39] The options were in fact essentially two, as is revealed by uncertainty over the route of return followed by his brother Q. Cicero in the spring of 58 BCE: either travel overland from Asia to Macedonia or a direct sea voyage from Ephesus to Athens.[40] From the evidence for Sulla's travel in 84 BCE, it would appear that the journey by sea might require as little as three days' sailing.[41] Possessed of an excellent harbour and lying upon the quickest route to Athens and Achaea, Ephesus also stood at the western end

38 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.80.3: *Androsthenes praetor Thessaliae*.

39 Cic. *Att.* 6.8.4; *Fam.* 5.20.9.

40 Cic. *Att.* 3.8.1.

41 Plut. *Sull.* 26.1; Arnaud 2005: 125–128. However, this looks suspiciously rapid and attention should be given to Cic. *Att.* 6.8.4 and 6.9.1, which together indicate two weeks' travelling time. Within that context, see also Cic. *Att.* 6.7.2, on the difficulty caused by adverse Etesian winds and the fact that travel from Ephesus to Athens was the most rapid option available.

of the "Common Highway" that traversed Anatolia so as to reach Mesopotamia and the heart of the former Achaemenid empire.[42]

The fortuitous possession of a central geographical location was naturally but one of the reasons for the importance of Ephesus in the last century of the Republic. Natural and human resources in all their variety also contributed in significant fashion to the importance of this Hellenistic metropolis, placing the city on a par with the long-standing capitals of Antioch and Alexandria.

As is so often the case for the Graeco-Roman world, there exists no statistic for the overall population of Ephesus in the mid-first century BCE. Indeed, in view of the known propensity for ancient sources to privilege certain numbers, even if one did survive, its credibility would not be a foregone conclusion. However, two or three items do provide illumination. First of all, the surface area included within the city wall constructed under Lysimachus in the early third century BCE came to 415 hectares.[43] The figure is comparable to that enclosed by the fourth-century "Servian" wall of Rome.[44] Despite the changes in population density over time and the elementary fact that not all surface area was utilized for residential purposes, this figure suggests an extraordinarily large population already at the start of the Hellenistic period. Secondly, pointing in the same direction, there is the testimony of Seneca the Younger, who pairs Ephesus with Alexandria as examples of populous *metropoleis*.[45] Alexandria is thought, perhaps with inadvertent chauvinism, to have numbered as many as one million souls in the late first century BCE.[46] Somewhat more modestly the third item points to a lesser population at Ephesus in the mid-second century CE. The physician Galen affirms that there were 40,000 men in Pergamum in his

42 Strab. 14.2.29 C663. For the "Common Highway", which linked Ephesus to the Euphrates, see Strab. 14.2.29; B. Levick, *Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor* (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1967), map following p. 256; cf. D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ*, 2 vols. (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1950), 1, 40. The overall geographical situation of Ephesus is well summarized by P. Trebilco, "Asia," 291–363, in: D.W.J. Gill and C. Gempf (eds.), *The Book of Acts in its First Century Setting. Vol. 2: Graeco-Roman Setting*, (Wm. B. Eerdmans: Grand Rapids 1994), 308–310.

43 J. Murphy O'Connor, *St. Paul's Ephesus. Texts and Archaeology*, (Liturgical Press: Collegeville 2008), 131.

44 T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome. Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000–264 BC)*, (Routledge: London 1995), 204, Table 3; F. Coarelli, *Roma*, (Guide archeologiche Laterza, 6), (Laterza: Bari 1995^{2}), 20.

45 Sen. *Epist.* 17.2.21.

46 Cf. Diod. 17.52.6; cf. P.M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*. 3 vols. (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1972), 1.91; 2.171–172 n. 358.

day.[47] The figure is not above suspicion. Nonetheless, modern extrapolation so as to constitute a population including women, children, and slaves arrives at a figure some three to six times that.[48] If allowance be made for gradual growth, then it is plausible to envision a population of 120,000–200,000 towards the middle of the first century BCE.

The pair of extensive natural water lakes situated in proximity to Ephesus were so abundant in fish as to provoke a fiscal dispute with international repercussions. The revenues from fishing in these lakes had excited the avarice of the former Attalid rulers, who had subtracted them from the shrine of Artemis of Ephesus. With the organization of Asia into a Roman province, they had reverted for a time to the goddess's shrine. However, the *publicani* were not inclined to countenance the loss of these "great revenues", and their seizure of these revenues in turn provoked the Ephesians to despatch an embassy to Rome. The leader of this embassy seeking redress was a certain Artemidorus. Typically elegant and exquisitely learned, as is shown by the surviving fragments of his poetry on geography, Artemidorus pled the Ephesian case successfully and the revenues were restored.[49] That incident belongs to the first decades of the Roman province, but epigraphic evidence from late in the reign of Nero demonstrates that the revenues from fishing continued profitable through the early Principate.[50] As a result of climate, currents, and habitat, the

47 Galen. 5.49 Kuhn. For damning criticism of the citation of a contemporary inscription as support for this figure, see P.D. Warden and R. Bagnall, "The Forty Thousand Citizens of Ephesus," *Classical Philology* 83 (1988) 220–223. The number of citizens to which that inscription refers is indisputably 1040, not the commonly claimed 40,000.

48 Murphy O'Connor 2008: 173–174; T.R.S. Broughton, "Roman Asia," in Volume 4, in: T. Frank (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 6 vols. (Johns Hopkins: Baltimore 1933–1940), here 813; L. Bürchner, "Ephesos," *RE* VB (1905) 2797; cf. S. Mitchell, *Anatolia. Land, men and gods in Asia Minor*, 2 vols. (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1993), 1.243–244, suggesting 180,000–200,000 inhabitants for the city of Pergamum. No one seems to have remarked that 40,000 is a typically recurring statistic within Graeco-Roman literature, hence what might be termed a "rhetorical number". However, as long as it is within the correct range (error ±5,000), extrapolation remains a defensible procedure. Unfortunately, as is shown by the debate between minimalists and maximalists for the population of the Italian peninsula in the late Republic and early Principate, there is much cause for uncertainty. In concluding, it is to be remarked that the figure furnished by Galen is more consistent with a minimalist view of ancient demography.

49 Strab. 14.1.26 C642.

50 G.H.R. Horsley, "A Fishing Cartel in First-Century Ephesos," 95–114, in: G.H.R. Horsley, *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity. Vol. 5: Linguistic Essays*, (Macquarie University: Sydney 1989).

Ephesian lakes constituted one of the foremost sites for the fishing industry in the ancient Mediterranean.

This remarkable fertility in wildlife and agricultural produce was wed to the fortune of setting in a union that proved most felicitous. Together they generated a sacred landscape at Ephesus that was renowned throughout the ancient Mediterranean and reckoned as one of the wonders of the ancient world. The Mycenaean origins of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus are lost in the mists of time, overwritten by later reconstructions and association with the mythological founder of the Lydian kingdom.[51] In view of the intervention of Croesus and the tendency to rewrite the past in terms of the present, that was only to be expected. The Archaic structure benefited from the economic revolution then taking place within the neighbouring sixth-century kingdom of Lydia as well as from the wealth accruing from Ionian exploration and colonization of other parts of the Mediterranean.[52] Burnt to the ground in the mid-fourth century, on the night of the birth of Alexander the Great according to certain sycophants, the Archaic structure was replaced by an even more grandiose and lavishly adorned Hellenistic building.[53] When lists of sites to visit began to be compiled, as of the late second century BCE, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus was invariably named.[54] The wealth of Ephesus, assisted by gifts from rulers and pilgrims, had given rise to an imposing, albeit incomplete edifice.

An indication of the sanctuary's pre-eminence is offered by the fact that its representatives were the first invited by the Senate to speak in defense of their right to the exercise of asylum, during a general review of this contentious matter under Tiberius. Contrary to popular belief, so they claimed, it was at Ephesus that were to be found the Cenchreus river and Ortygian grove where Latona gave birth to Apollo and Artemis. It was there, too, that Apollo took refuge from the wrath of Zeus after he had killed the Cyclopes and Dionysus subsequently showed mercy to the Amazons over whom he had been victorious in war. A temple had originally been created during Hercules' rule in Lydia, and

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51 A. Bammer and U. Muss, *Das Artemision von Ephesos. Das Weltwunder Ioniens in archaischer und klassischer Zeit*, (Philipp von Zabern: Mainz am Rhein 1996), 25–28.

52 Bammer and Muss 1996: 83, 89–90.

53 Plut. *Alex*. 3.3 (= Hegesias, *FGrHist* 142 F 3); Cic. *Nat. Deor*. 2.69 (= Timaios, *FGrHist* 566 f 150a).

54 Antipater of Sidon, *Anth. Pal*. 9.58; P.A. Clayton and M.J. Price, *The seven wonders of the ancient world*, (London 1988), 12. Overall, for useful modern introductions to the subject, see K. Brodersen, *Die Sieben Weltwunder. Legendäre Kunst- und Bauwerke der Antike*, (C.H. Beck: München 1996); Bammer and Muss 1996.

neither the dominion of Persians nor Macedonians had diminished its right of asylum. In establishing the province of Asia, the Romans had followed suit.[55]

In fact, it was the asylum pertaining to the temple of Artemis at Ephesus that in part made this sanctuary a welcome place of refuge for the exiled Egyptian monarch Ptolemy XII Neos Dionysos in 56–55 BCE. The monarch had initially made his way to Rome, in the expectation of a rapid resolution of the matter.[56] When the diplomatic situation proved intractable and competition within Roman ranks effectively blocked an expedition, Ptolemy XII withdrew from Italia to take up residence at the sanctuary of Ephesian Artemis.[57] Within striking distance of Alexandria, he awaited a change in the situation, which eventually came with the governor of Syria's bold decision to act on his own initiative.[58] There survives no record of benefactions made by the grateful monarch to the sanctuary of Ephesian Artemis, but normal practice and evidence from the similar site of Didyma together suggest that they did occur. From time immemorial, it was customary to present divinity with lavish, costly gifts in return for favours received.[59] More to the point, Didyma was the site of an oracle and Ptolemy XII gave 34 elephant tusks to the sanctuary there for the adornment of its doors in the wake of his restoration to power in Egypt.[60] Despite the silence concerning Ephesus, it is *a fortiori* probable that Ptolemy XII

55 Tac. *Ann.* 3.61: *Primi omnium Ephesii adiere, memorantes non, ut vulgus crederet, Dianam atque Apollinem Delo genitos: esse apud se Cenchreum amnem, lucum Ortygiam, ubi Latonam partu gravidam et oleae, quae tum etiam maneat, adnisam edidisse ea numina, deorumque monitu sacratum nemus, atque ipsum illic Apollinem post interfectos Cyclopas Iovis iram vitavisse. Mox Liberum patrem, bello victorem, supplicibus Amazonum quae aram insiderant ignovisse. Auctam hinc concessu Herculis, cum Lydia poteretur, caerimoniam templo neque Persarum dicione deminutum ius; post Macedonas, dein nos servavisse*. For this passage, see the commentary of A.J. Woodman and R.H. Martin, *The Annals of Tacitus. Book 3*, edited with commentary, (Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries, 32), (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1996), 435–437 ad loc.

56 R.W. Westall, "Date of the Testament of Ptolemy XII", *Ricerche di Egittologia e di Antichità Copte* 11 (2009) 79–94.

57 *FRH* 70 "Fenestella" F2 (= Peter F21 = Accornero F20 = Non. 385 M = 615 L); Cass. Dio 39.16.3; W. Huß, *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit, 332–30 v.Chr.* (C.H. Beck: München 2001), 688.

58 M. Siani-Davies, *Cicero's Speech Pro Rabirio Postumo*, (Clarendon Ancient History Series), (Clarendon Press: Oxford 2001), 24–32; Huß 2001: 688–691 (waiting in Ephesus), 691–695 (re-entry thanks to the intervention of Gabinius); C. Klodt, *Ciceros Rede Pro Rabirio Postumo. Einleitung und Kommentar*, (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 24), (B.G. Teubner: Stuttgart 1992), 23–30.

59 Or, conversely, to expect favours for gifts once given: *Iliad*. 1.35–42.

60 *Inschr. Didyma* 394, lines 13–18; Huß 2001: 698.

made a similarly costly gift to the goddess there. If Apollo foretold his return to Alexandria, Artemis gave the king shelter in his hour of need.

Another reason for the Ptolemaic monarch's sojourn at Ephesus during his exile will have been the consideration that the temple was in all likelihood the most important financial centre in the eastern Mediterranean.[61] Financial considerations played no small role in Gabinius' decision to restore Ptolemy XII to power. The sanctity of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus and the safety of the sacred moneys kept there had resulted in sizeable deposits being frequently made by individuals and communities having no especial tie to Ephesus other than the mere fact of physical passage through the city.[62] It may be readily granted that temples often stood at the centre of the major transactions of local economic life in the Graeco-Roman world. But there is a qualitative difference discernible in the case of Ephesus. The dimension of the amounts involved often manifestly exceeded what might be expected elsewhere, and it would appear that the principals to these transactions were frequently of non-local extraction. It was at Ephesus that M. Cicero chose to deposit the HS 2,200,000

61 Broughton 1938: 645. In general, see Magie 1950: 1021 n. 67, which furnishes an extensive list of ancient sources and modern bibliography on the subject of temples serving as banks in the Graeco-Roman world.

62 So, for example, the plot of the Plautine comedy *Bacchides*, which should represent plausible behaviour in the early third century BCE: Plaut. *Bacch.* 306–307. The fact that Plautus felt no need to modify this particular episode is itself significant, indicating how well known Ephesus would have been to a Roman audience. For references to the flourishing metropolis of Ephesus in this Plautine comedy, see Plaut. *Bacch.* 171, 231, 236, 249, 306–313, 336, 354, 388–389, 561, 776. Of particular note as well are lines 331–339, where Theotimus is characterized as tremendously wealthy and therefore deemed worthy of trust, and lines 270–272, where the sum on deposit is said to amount to 1200 golden Philippics (in theory, the equivalent of HS 1,200,000).

Another example is furnished by Caesar's contemporary Cicero, who had left HS 2,200,000 on deposit at Ephesus subsequent to his time as governor in Cilicia (Cic. *Att.* 11.1.2). That transaction, therefore, took place late in 50 BCE, and the money is mentioned by Cicero as still in the temple of Artemis as of January 48 BCE. The sum is eloquent testimony not only to the wealth to be had from a brief, one-year stint in a province, but also suggestive of the vast resources that lay within the sanctuary. Cicero's testimony in this instance is also of interest in that it clearly indicates the monetary form taken by this handsome sum: *cistophori*. The local coinages of Hellenistic Anatolia were utilized by the Romans until inopportunely dismantled in the wake of the crisis of the mid-third century AD. By not interfering with the local currencies, the Romans (intuitively) avoided the inflationary problems that come with the imposition of a unified currency. The hyperinflation that is documented in the East under Diocletian and throughout the fourth century AD is to be attributed to the mistaken Late Antique policy of monetary unification.

that he had acquired while serving as governor of Cilicia in 51–50 BCE.[63] As in the meetings with *publicani* and the many other affairs that had occupied Cicero's attention during his presence in the city a year earlier, in July 51, so here too is there visible the structural relevance of Ephesus to Roman finances.

3 The Ceremony and Rhetoric of Arrival

Invested with paradigmatic significance, the arrival of a ruler within a Graeco-Roman city was one of the constitutive moments in the life of that community. Whether returning after a lengthy sojourn abroad or arriving for the first time, ordinarily in the wake of a military victory, the ruler was in effect on display. The moment of arrival, or *adventus*, set the tone and thereby defined future relations between ruler and ruled.[64] First impressions exercise a strong influence, and the character of the ruler was visible for all to see. Thus, within the world of myth as recreated for classical Athens, the arrival of Agamemnon at Argos was overlaid with signs of that ruler's tyrannical bearing and imminent end.[65] Similarly, some seven centuries later, the Christian rhetorician Lactantius represents the emperor Diocletian as evincing distaste at the free discourse of the masses in Rome: the tyrant fled from the city as soon as was possible, thereby incurring the illness that would result in his abdication.[66] An antipathy for crowds betrayed a tyrannical nature or, in the case of those who allowed their *imperium* to expire unnoticed, utter incapacity to govern.[67] However, entry or departure by night need not be invariably interpreted as evidence of this. For example, Augustus explained his behaviour as rooted in a desire not to place a further burden upon the magistrates in Rome.[68] Perhaps plausibly so. After all, the elaborate preparations made to greet C. Caesar returning victorious from

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63 Cic. *Fam.* 5.20.9; M. Ioannatou, *Affaires d'argent dans la correspondance de Cicéron. L'aristocratie sénatoriale face à ses dettes*, (Romanité et modernité du droit), (De Boccard: Paris 2006), 128 n. 220. This is an extremely important book that has been unjustly neglected.

64 See S.G. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity*, (University of California Press: Berkely 1981), esp. 17–61.

65 Aeschyl. *Agam.* 905–930.

66 Lact. *De mort. pers.* 17.1–3.

67 Tac. *Ann.* 4.67 (for Tiberius); Cic. *Pis.* 22/53–23/55, 40/97 (for Piso).

68 Suet. *Aug.* 53.2 (*non temere urbe oppidive ullo egressus aut quoquam ingressus est nisi vespera aut noctu, ne quem officii causa inquietaret.*); cf. Cass. Dio 54.25.4. For this text and Augustus' practice, see C.H. Lange, "Augustus' Triumphal and Triumph-like Returns," 133–143, in: I. Östenberg, S. Malmberg, and J. Bjørnebye (eds.), *The Moving City. Processions, Passages and Promenades in Ancient Rome* (Bloomsbury: London 2015); D. Wardle, *Suetonius:*

his Spanish campaign against the sons of Pompeius Magnus cannot have been viewed with pleasure by his peers in the Senate, in all likelihood contributing to the unease that resulted in the dictator's assassination.[69] On the other hand, the occasion for the *Ara Pacis Augustae*, of especial relevance as commemorated in bas-relief and by inscriptions, was an *adventus* from which the emperor did not subtract himself.[70]

The ritual of *adventus* held significance in direct proportion to the power wielded by a ruler, but in inverse degree to the time that that ruler ordinarily spent within the city in question. Familiarity breeds contempt. It was the union of immense power with extraordinary presence that gave meaning to the *adventus*. As the local elite were well aware, the ruler's presence afforded the best chance for the creation or furtherance of a long-standing relationship between their community and that individual. In social terms, the ritual of *adventus* was effectively the negotiation of the present with a view to the future. Honours were showered upon the visitor in the hope of procuring future benefits, for the community as well as for oneself. For the visiting ruler to display boredom or to shun participation in this ritual was tantamount to expressing disinterest in or antagonism to the future welfare of the community. Augustus trod a fine line in choosing with particular care those moments on which to enjoy the celebration of his *adventus* at Rome. In the provinces, such discernment was neither expected nor altogether welcome.[71]

Life of Augustus / Vita Divi Augusti. Translated with Introduction and Historical Commentary, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014), 375–376; N. Louis, *Commentaire historique et traduction du Diuus Augustus de Suétone*, (Collection Latomus, 324), (Latomus: Bruxelles 2010), 382; C. Ronning, "Stadteinzüge in der Zeit der römischen Republik: Die Zeremonie des *Adventus* und ihre politische Bedeutung," 57–86, in: C. Ronning (ed.), *Einblicke in die Antike*. *Orte-Praktiken-Strukturen*, (München 2006); J.B. Meister, "*Adventus* und *Profectio*: Aristokratisches Prestige, Bindungswesen und Raumkonzepte im republikanischen und frühkaiserzeitlichen Rom," *Museum Helveticum* 70 (2013) 33–56, here 51–53. Aside from the incidental, passing references of texts and conscious decisions such as that of Augustus, perhaps the best evidence for the socio-political importance of the rituals of *profectio* and *adventus* is to be had from the visual evidence: G. Koeppel, "*Profectio* und *Adventus*," *Bonner Jahrbücher* 169 (1969) 130–194.

69 Plut. *Ant*. 11.1.

70 *RGDA* 12.2; A.E. Cooley, *Res gestae divi Augusti. Text, translation and commentary*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2009), 154–157.

71 Of course, attention might prove unwelcome. The hospitality provided to Romans might easily become a burden deemed exorbitant by the provincials. Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.31.4, for the case of the legionaries that Metellus Scipio quartered in Pergamum and other important cities in Asia during the winter of 49–48 BCE.

By the late Republic the ritual of *adventus* was many centuries old, not only in terms of the language utilized, but also as regards the elaborate ceremony of reception. The similes and metaphors deployed manifestly reach back to Homeric times and the most remote past of Hellenic literature.[72] These images and ideas had merely received codification in the Hellenistic period. But there had also occurred, presumably earlier, a similar, informal codification of social behaviour within Hellenic cities and, by virtue of emulation, their Italic counterparts. The crowds that greeted the visiting ruler were not heterogeneous masses, but rather socially differentiated according to age, sex, and status. Imagining the greeting accorded to Camillus, Caesar's younger contemporary Livy was to write in the mid-20s BCE, "All of the orders poured forth along the way, and the dictator's *adventus* was more attended that had ever been that of anyone else."[73]

Details are normally lacking for a description of the *adventus*, for the very simple reason that the ceremony was well known to all. Only the historical importance of a particular celebration of this ritual or unusual personal circumstances might serve to save it from oblivion. So, for example, it was on account of gravely wounded self-esteem and with a view to restoring his public image that Cicero described his own *adventus* in Italia in August 57 BCE.[74] Similarly, for the episode was deemed to foretell the future course of events, there survives a description of the *adventus* of M. Antonius in Ephesus in 41 BCE, in the wake of his victory at Philippi (Plut. *Ant.* 24.4–5):

> εἰς γοῦν Ἔφεσον εἰσιόντος αὐτοῦ γυναῖκες μὲν εἰς Βάκχας, ἄνδρες δὲ καὶ παῖδες εἰς Σατύρους καὶ Πᾶνας ἡγοῦντο διεσκευασμένοι, κιττοῦ δὲ καὶ θύρσων καὶ ψαλτηρίων καὶ συρίγγων καὶ αὐλῶν ἡ πόλις ἦν πλέα, Διόνυσον αὐτὸν ἀνακαλουμένων χαριδότην καὶ μειλίχιον. ἦν γὰρ ἀμέλει τοιοῦτος ἐνίοις …

72 MacCormack 1981: 17–22 (covering the period from earliest Greek literature through the Arabic conquest), 23 (comparing the receptions accorded to Demetrius Poliorcetes by Athens in 307 BCE and Caesar by the cities of Asia in 48 BCE). As regards the case of Demetrius, readers will now benefit from the detailed historiographical discussion of S. Diefenbach, "Demetrius Poliocretes and Athens: Ruler Cult and Antimonarchic Narratives in Plutarch's *Life of Demetrius*," 113–151, in: H. Börm (ed.), *Antimonarchic Discourse in Antiquity*, with the collaboration of W. Havener, (Studies in Ancient Monarchies, 3), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2015).

73 Liv. 5.23.2: *adventus quoque dictatoris omnibus ordinibus obviam effusis celebratior quam ullius umquam antea fuit.*

74 Cic. *Att.* 73.4; *Sest.* 131. See now S. Cole, *Cicero and the rise of deification at Rome*, (Cambridge Univesity Press: Cambridge 2013), 12, 65–66.

> At any rate, when he (i.e. Antonius) entered Ephesus, women attired as Bacchants and men and boys like Satyrs and Pans accompanied him. The city was filled with ivy and thyrsus-wands and lyres and pipes and flutes. They invoked him as Dionysus the Giver of Joy and the Beneficent. For such he was, at any event, to some …

In systematizing affairs in the East after the defeat of M. Brutus and C. Cassius, Antonius, like Caesar, passed through Ephesus, making a general declaration of intent. Such declarations were gravid with ideological significance, as Ephesus was the foremost city of Asia and economic capital of the East. Plutarch's account is not free of doubt as regards its historicity. The speech attributed to Hybreas further on in the same paragraph would appear to be an anachronism better situated during a subsequent visit in 39 BCE.[75] Yet, the overall description of Antonius' being received as a latter-day Dionsyus is compelling even at this earlier moment. Hence, without any damage to general historical vision, it would seem that Plutarch merely spliced accounts of two different visits, which must have much resembled one another in externals.

The situation obtaining in the wake of Philippi was analogous to that following Pharsalus. The provincials acutely felt the need to appease the victor, for they were in large part compromised by having provided financial support to the losing side in a Roman civil war. Whether willingly or under compulsion, the communities and local elites of Asia had furnished immense sums to the collaborators of Pompeius Magnus in 49–48 BCE and to M. Brutus and C. Cassius in 44–42 BCE. Hence, having given tangible proof of economic resources, they were open to further extortion. On the other hand, the victorious Roman generals felt no less acutely the need to reward their soldiers for success achieved on the battlefield. As a result, there was ample opportunity for widespread fiscal oppression. So, for example, M. Antonius is reported to have doubled the fiscal levy requested for 41 BCE.[76] In a similar vein, in 48 BCE, Pythodorus of Tralles paid a vast sum of money to Caesar in order to obtain pardon for having previously lent financial assistance to Caesar's enemies.[77] Money, together with an opportune word, might persuade the victor to take a more lenient view of the matter.

The victor's power of life and death, or rather the choice between fiscal oppression or leniency, was best made explicit in an appeal for benevolence.

75 C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Antony*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 179.

76 Plut. *Ant.* 24.7; Pelling 1988: 181.

77 Strab. 14.1.42.

With armed force the ruler might do as he pleased. To pretend otherwise was to invite disaster. Hence, the strategy of recognition of the current plight and the staging of a reception aimed at cultivating the ruler's good-will. The ruler was likened to a divinity, with an intentional blurring of the boundaries between rhetorical trope and religious ritual. Upon his entry into Ephesus in 41 BCE, M. Antonius was accosted as Dionysus "Giver of Joy and Beneficent" and people donned Dionysiac dress so as to confirm the force of their words. Whether these epithets or those of "Carnivorous and Savage" were to be found accurate would depend upon him. To treat the victor as a deity, as here and in Hybreas' speech of gentle reproof, was to provide a most flattering admission of his power and to invite moderation in its exercise.[78] In theory, if not in fact, such an appeal should have proved all the more potent in the case of Caesar in 48 BCE, for he not only claimed to desire that the provinces be administered with justice, but also preened himself upon his clemency.[79]

There survives an inscription at Ephesus that attests to the granting of divine honours to the victorious Caesar by the Ionian league (*koinon*) in the aftermath of Pharsalus. Speaking of Caesar as a "god made manifest" or come amongst them, the inscription documents the attempt to secure the benevolence of the victor of Pharsalus. Adorning the base for a statue that was in all likelihood situated within the sanctuary of Artemis of Ephesus, the inscription reads (Dittenberger, *Syll.*^{3} 760 = *CIG* 2957 = Raubitschek 1954: no. E):

αἱ πόλεις αἱ ἐν τῆι Ἀσίαι καὶ οἱ [δῆμοι]
καὶ τὰ ἔθνη Γάϊον Ἰούλιον Γαΐου [υἱ]-
ὸν Καίσαρα, τὸν ἀρχιερέα καὶ αὐτο
κράτορα καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ὕπα
τον, τὸν ἀπὸ Ἄρεως καὶ Ἀφροδε[ί]-
της θεὸν ἐπιφανῆ καὶ κοινὸν τοῦ
ἀνθρωπίνου βίου σωτῆρα.

78 Not irrelevant are the similar honours accorded to Demetrius Poliorcetes by the Athenians and the judgement of Plutarch: S. Diefenbach, "Demetrius Poliorcetes and Athens: Ruler Cult and Antimonarchic Narratives in Plutarch's *Life of Demetrius*," 113–151, in: H. Börm with the collaboration of W. Havener (ed.), *Antimonarchic Discourse in Antiquity*, Studies in Ancient Monarchies 3, (Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart 2015).

79 Naturally, clemency was to be shown only to those belonging to the company of civilized society. Pirates manifestly did not figure in that category (Suet. *Iul.* 4). Nor did those who had already benefited from clemency and failed to change their ways (Suet. *Iul.* 75).

The cities in Asia and the peoples
and nations ⟨honour⟩ Gaius Iulius the son of Gaius
Caesar, pontifex maximus and imperator
and consul for the second time,
descended from Ares and Aphrodite,
a god made manifest and common
saviour of humanity.

Both the explicit reference to Caesar's second consulate and omission of any allusion to his second dictatorship serve to date this commemorative inscription to the period of his presence in Asia in August/September 48 BCE.[80] The mention of his official roles as *pontifex maximus*, *imperator*, and *consul iterum* is standard. Likewise unremarkable is the flattering claim that Caesar was descended from Ares and Aphrodite, a claim advanced by Caesar himself and in tune with the pretentions of Roman politics in the late Republic.[81] However, the conclusion is unusual and worthy of especial attention. By coupling the concepts of divinity with saviour, the Asian communities not only recognized Caesar's power, but also expressed the hope that it would be exercised in a humane manner.

The inscription accords well with what is known of speeches of welcome from the late antique rhetorical handbooks of Pseudo-Dionysius and Menander and surviving examples.[82] The goal of such a speech was, as Pseudo-Dionysius observes, that the ruler should "think with affection" of those who were his subjects.[83] In the case of the communities of Asia, which had offered material and financial sustenance to Caesar's enemies in 49–48 BCE, this translated into an attempt to excuse themselves with the victor of Pharsalus and to claim that they had acted under duress. Only with Caesar's arrival, or, in a significant variation, its mere report, had they at last found liberation from their oppressors. Present joy was to be contrasted with past misrule, in the elegant formulation of Menander (Menander Rhetor 378.16–23 Spengl):

80 See Raubitschek 1954: 73 (for date), 75 (for Caesar as a "new Ares"); 70 (date for DICT. II).

81 Suet. *Iul.* 6.1, citing a passage from the funeral speech delivered for his aunt Julia, the wife of C. Marius.

82 For investigation of the historical circumstances of Menander and his work, see now: M. Heath, *Menander. A Rhetor in Context*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2004). See also D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 1981).

83 Ps.-Dionys. (Usener and Radermacher 2.1.272).

> εἶτα μετὰ τὸ προοίμιον τοῦτο ἥξεις εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπηκόων λόγον. διπλοῦς δ' οὗτος· ἢ γὰρ κακῶς πεπονθότων αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ μικρῶι πρόσθεν ἄρχοντος διατυπώσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις τὰ δυσχερῆ, μηδὲν βλασφημῶν τὸν παυσάμενον, ἀλλὰ ἁπλῶς τὴν δυστυχίαν τῶν ὑπηκόων λέγων, εἶτα ἐπάξεις, ὅτι ὥσπερ νυκτὸς καὶ ζόφου τὰ πάντα κατειληφότος αὐτὸς καθάπερ ἥλιος ὀφθεὶς πάντα ἀθρόως τὰ δυσχερῆ διέλυσας, καὶ ἐργάσηι τοῦτο καὶ οὐ παραδραμεῖς, ὅτι τοίνυν ἀνέπνευσαν ἅπαντες ὥσπερ νέφους τινος τῶν δεινῶν παραδραμόντων· ἢ οὐδὲν πεπονθότων ἐρεῖς·
>
> Next, after the preface, you will deal with the subject of the governed. There are two ways of doing this. On the one hand, if they were mistreated by the previous ruler, you will describe and expatiate upon their tribulations, but without speaking ill of the previous ruler. Rather, simply speaking of the misfortune of the governed, you will add that, as if night and darkness had enveloped everything, he (i.e. the new ruler) has appeared like the sun that completely chases away every trouble. Speak thus and do no omit to mention that in fact everyone has drawn a sigh of relief as though the calamities, like some storm-cloud, had passed them by. On the other hand, if they were not mistreated, you will say …

Without indulging in personal abuse of the past ruler—a sage bit of advice, for the future is ever uncertain—the rhetor spoke at length and in detail about the sufferings of the ruled. Like the sun or a brilliant star, the current ruler has arrived to dispel the darkness of the misery of his subjects. Like a god made manifest and come amongst the people, the ruler bestows salvation and redress. Thus a pagan rhetor in the late third or early fourth century, operating within a tradition of images and language that reached back to the origins of Greek literature. As is indicated by both circumstances and the surviving commemorative inscription, praise of this sort was pronounced in honour of Caesar at Ephesus in September 48 BCE.

The identity of the person or persons entrusted with the delicate task of greeting Caesar upon his arrival and winning the victor's good-will is not known, one of many circumstantial details lost in the flux of history. However, contemporaries who formed part of the social group to which that individual belonged are known and hence worth discussing.[84] Both the handbooks and

84 For the problem of Hellenic embassies to Rome, readers are referred to the erudite work of classical philology that offers an elegant, useful catalogue of all known instances: F. Canali de Rossi, *Le ambascerie dal mondo greco a Roma in età repubblicana*. Istituto italiano per

documented practice point to reliance upon a leading figure of the community, preferably someone who was a talented public speaker. So, for example, the orator Areios was charged with the unenviable task of greeting the victorious Caesar the Younger when the latter entered Alexandria in mid-29 BCE.[85] Eloquence and education, fortified by wealth, rendered him the most apt representative of the community at that difficult moment. Parallels in Asia are readily found. Of good family, Mithridates of Pergamum was priest of the temple of Athena at Tralles and had served as a representative of Asian interests in Rome in the 50s BCE.[86] Theopompus of Cnidus seems to have orchestrated the Delphic honours that were decreed to Caesar in the wake of Pharsalus and is reported to have worked hard on behalf of his native community of Samos.[87] Later in the decade similar figures are to be seen active in Asia or Cilicia. So, for example, Hybreas of Mylasa represented with force the case for a lightening of the fiscal burden imposed by M. Antonius.[88] Similarly, Boethus of Tarsus delivered an epic in 41 BCE, commemorating the battle of Philippi to the greater glory of the triumphant M. Antonius.[89] Of these individuals, in view of age and the fact that he personally led an expedition to Alexandria to rescue Caesar, Mithridates may well have delivered the speech of welcome on behalf of the league of Asia.[90]

Be that as it may, these people and many others from the ruling elite of the communities of Asia will have talked to Caesar upon an individual basis during the meals and other occasions of festivity connected with the victor's *adventus*. The official speech of welcome was not the only moment in which to mingle or plead one's case. Banquets, for instance, were a pillar of communal life, ordinarily accompanying the celebration of festivals. Despite his recorded lack of taste and interest, on occasion, not even Caesar could do without this

la storia antica: Roma 1997. That catalogue allows readers to undertake the necessary prosopographical work. For an overview of embassies in the imperial cosmopolis, see R. Westall, "Embassies of the middle and late Republic: Movement to, from, and within the city of Rome", pp. 23–36, in: I. Östenberg, S. Malmberg, and J. Bjørnebye (eds.), *The Moving City. Processions, Passages and Promenades in Ancient Rome*. London 2015.

85 Plut. *Ant.* 80; G.W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek world*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1965), 33–34, 39–41, 123.

86 Cic. *Flacc.* 17, 41.

87 Plut. *Caes.* 48.1.

88 Plut. *Ant.* 24.7–8.

89 Strab. 14.674. For the literary genre and social use of historical epic, see R. Westall, "Triumph and Closure: Between History and Literature," *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici* suppl. 45 (2014) 25–46.

90 *B Alex.* 26–28.

social amenity and its concomitant, the recounting of stories or anecdotes.[91] If the younger Cato was eagerly sought after for banquets in Asia subsequent to his being honoured by Cn. Pompeius lately victorious over Mithridates the Great,[92] how much more so will have been the victor of Pharsalus? Discussion of recent events, rather than debauchery, is likely to have been the result of these banquets. Speech was less formal within such a context, but not for that any less forceful. It is to be assumed that the victorious Caesar, present as consul for the year in course,[93] was informed repeatedly and at length of the various abuses of power committed by his enemies in Asia and the other eastern provinces during the years 49–48 BCE.

4 Caesar and the Sanctuary of Artemis of Ephesus

Most prominent in the case of the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesus, Caesar's salvation of sacred moneys is a recurring motif within the *Civil War*. On a naive reading, which is to accept Caesar's narrative on its own terms, it was the report of Caesar's arrival at Rome that had prevented the consul L. Lentulus from accomplishing the withdrawal of money from the *sanctius aerarium* of the Roman state.[94] Similarly, the money and costly dedications withdrawn from the temple of Hercules at Gades were supposedly restored in the wake of Caesar's arrival and bloodless victory over M. Varro.[95] In the case of Ephesus, however, salvation came not once, but twice from the mere report of Caesar's movements.[96] That this came to pass in the absence of Caesar is unusual and worthy of notice, indicative of a significant variation of the motif. The repetition as regards the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesus is also remarkable. In structural terms, this marks the communication of something fundamental. With especial emphasis upon his role as a benefactor of Artemis of the Ephesians,

91 Suet. *Iul.* 53. For the problems inherent in anecdotes, see R. Saller, "Anecdotes as historical evidence for the Principate," *Greece & Rome* 27 (1980) 69–83.

92 Plut. *Cat. min.* 14.1–3; Plut. *Cat. min.* 13; *Pomp.* 40.1–5; cf. S.M. Treggiari, *Roman freedmen during the late Republic*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1969), 184–185. Of interest, also, is the fact that those who wished to have information regarding Pompeius' plans talked to Demetrius: Cic. *Att.* 4.11.1 (dating to 26 June 55 BCE).

93 Which was a most unusual occurrence. Indeed, the last consul to have visited Asia while in office would seem to have been M' Aquillius in 129 BCE.

94 Caes. *B Civ.* 1.14.1.

95 Caes. *B Civ.* 2.21.3.

96 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.33.1–2, 105.1–2.

Caesar emerges as a ruler whose actions safeguard the sanctity of sanctuaries and the *pax deorum*.

Curiously, this motif of Caesarian historiography stands in stark contrast with what appears to have normally been the case in this period. That governors and their subordinates should ransack the sanctuaries of the provincials was hardly a novelty. C. Verres was not the exception that the youthful, ambitious M. Cicero portrayed, but rather a frequent occurrence.[97] In the ancient world, the temples of enemies and subjects were always fair game for the unscrupulous or those lacking in superstition. As exemplified by instances such as those of L. Calpurnius Piso (*cos*. 58) and C. Cassius (*pr*. 44), one man's sacrilege was another's enrichment.[98] Intervening in domestic disputes and with the fairest of ostensible motives, for instance, did C. Sosius crown the capture of Jerusalem by sacking the Temple of Yahweh in 37 BCE.[99] According to hostile reports, by contrast, Caesar consciously ignored pacific overtures by the locals so as to be able to sack cities and amass large sums from the despoliation of sacred sites.[100] Had this behaviour been universal, there would have been nothing left to steal. However, it was manifestly a structural element in the practice of imperialism in the late Republic.[101] Occurring with a frequency that was sustained but

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97 Cic. *Verr. passim*; T.D. Frazel, *The Rhetoric of Cicero's In Verrem* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 2009) 71–124.

98 For Piso, see Cic. *Pis*. 35.85; *Prov. cons*. 6–7; *Sest*. 94. For Cassius, see App. *B Civ*. 4.64.273–274; 73.311.

99 Ioseph. *Ant. Iud*. 14.16.3–4; Cass. Dio 49.22.3; cf. *BMCRR* 2.508. It is worth observing Pompeius, too, took the city of Jerusalem by storm in 63 BCE, but refrained from despoiling the Temple of its treasures: Cic. *Flacc*. 68; Ioseph. *Ant. Iud*. 14.4.4. This behaviour on Pompeius' part is likely to be ascribed not to any particular regard for the Jewish religion, but rather to cool calculation and circumstances. Fresh from successes against Mithridates the Great and the obeissance of numerous other rulers of Asia, Pompeius already disposed of funds with which to reward his troops handsomely for their efforts. Judaea was Sosius' principal source of potential revenue, as opposed to the whole of Asia for Pompeius. Moreover, allies in Judaea might be useful in the rear were Pompeius to go on to launch an invasion of Egypt and attempt the annexation of the Ptolemaic kingdom. In any case, the Temple of Jerusalem was indubitably profaned even if not despoiled of its treasures by Pompeius: priests were killed while engaged in carrying out the rites, and Pompeius himself (and his collaborators) entered the Holy of Holies and looked upon what was not to be seen by others than the High Priests.

100 Suet. *Iul*. 54.1–2, for his time both in Hispania ulterior and in Gallia comata.

101 And seemingly expected also within the domestic context of Rome itself: Plin. *HN* 33.14; cf. Varr. *De vita pop. Rom*. I, ap. Non., p. 338L; see E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus. Innere Geschichte Roms von 66 bis 44 v. Chr.* (Cotta: Stuttgart 1922[3]),

limited, the ransacking of temples generated a rhetorical vision that can be discerned in the writings of Caesar and his contemporaries.

Roman abuse of power in the provinces was common enough in the late Republic, even if legal redress was theoretically available for the provincials. Moreover, as the primary repositories of wealth, temples were appealing targets for malfeasance. Consequently, Caesar chose to describe at some length an unrealized attempt to rob the temple of Artemis at Ephesus in concluding a vitriolic attack upon Metellus Scipio, the governor of Syria in 49–48 BCE. Not content with the havoc that he had wreaked in Syria and amongst humankind, Scipio wished to desecrate the most revered shrine of Asia (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.33.1–2):

> Praeterea Ephesi a fano Dianae depositas antiquitus pecunias Scipio tolli iubebat. Certaque ei rei die constituta cum in fanum ventum esset adhibitis compluribus senatorii ordinis, quos advocaverat Scipio, litterae ei redduntur a Pompeio, mare transisse cum legionibus Caesarem; properaret ad se cum exercitu venire omniaque post [ea quae] haberet. His litteris acceptis, quos advocaverat dimittit; ipse iter in Macedoniam parare incipit paucisque post diebus est profectus. Haec res Ephesiae pecuniae salutem attulit.

> Moreover, Scipio ordered that the monies that had been deposited of old at Ephesus be withdrawn from the temple of Diana. When he arrived at the sanctuary on the date that had been fixed for this business and there were present a great many members of the senates of the cities of Asia, whom Scipio had summoned, he received a letter from Pompeius reporting that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions and urging Scipio to make haste to come to him with his army and to abandon everything else in which he was engaged. At the receipt of this letter, he dismissed those whom he had summoned. As for himself, he began to prepare his journey to Macedonia and set forth a few days later. This event brought salvation for the money at Ephesus.

Coming at the end of a detailed narration of Scipio's misdeeds in Syria and Asia, the episode would read simply as the coda to a speech for the prosecution but for the fact that the focus shifts from Scipio to the money of Ephesus, thereby emphasizing the salvific function of Caesar. That narrative focus would

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239 n. 2. If we are to choose from the sources listed by Pliny for Book 33, then the most likely candidate is Fenestella.

not have been appropriate for a speech for the prosecution, but might be at home within the world of invective and is indicative of this information's originating in the panegyrics that were delivered as the victorious Caesar descended through Asia in the wake of Pharsalus. Caesarian historiography is a mixture of genres.[102]

Recognition of that fact allows for re-assessment of this passage. Commentators have often remarked the improbability of news of Caesar's arrival as the cause for Scipio's laying aside plans to plunder the sanctuary of Artemis of Ephesus.[103] However, they have never dared to question the essential veracity of Caesar's attribution of intent to Scipio. Like Caesar's ancient audience, they have misconstrued plausibility of intent for demonstration of an actual plan. That is highly dubious, since Caesar is the only source to relate what Scipio had in mind. Caesar intensely disliked the man who had supplanted him as father-in-law to Pompeius Magnus. His partisan testimony cannot be taken as disinterested reporting of undisputed fact, especially when intentions alone are at stake. In fact, no intention to engage in plunder is required in order to explain Scipio's presence at Ephesus. The city's identity as the capital of Asia and the far-flung renown of the sanctuary of Artemis together more than suffice to justify the proconsul's visit.

Another issue meriting clarification, and no less relevant, is that of interpretation of the phrase *adhibitis compluribus senatorii ordinis quos advocaverat Scipio*. Caesar is normally understood to have been writing about Roman senators present in the province of Asia at the time. That is barely possible, but a more likely interpretation is that he is referring to the foremost men of the communities of Asia. In other words, the *senatores* in question are the βουλευτεῖς of the various cities in the province. That would be more in order with the claim that they had been summoned by Scipio and, after him, by T. Ampius Balbus.[104] It is also consonant with Caesar's use of *senatus* elsewhere to describe the local body to which he procured the adlection of the Allobrogic nobles Roucillus and Egus.[105] Lastly, this interpretation lends additional support to the view that Caesar's information derived from the local elites who pronounced panegyrics

102 It is worth highlighting the relevance of Menander's guidelines, as they are manifestly applicable to this circumstance.

103 E.g. J.M. Carter, *Julius Caesar: The Civil War, Book 3*, (Aris & Phillips: Warminster 1993), 172; Magie 1950: 405; cf. F. Kraner, F. Hofmann, and H. Meusel (eds.), *C. Iulii Caesaris Commentarii de Bello Civili*. Afterword and bibliography by H. Oppermann, (Weidmann: Berlin 1959[12]), 204 (on Caes. *B Civ*. 3.33), 290 (on Caes. *B Civ*. 3.105).

104 For the latter, see Caes. *B Civ*. 3.105.1 (cited below).

105 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.59.2; B. Kavanagh, "The citizenship and *nomen* of Roucillus and Egus," *AHB*

upon his arrival in Asia and thereby sought to exculpate themselves for what had occurred in the previous winter.

There was plenty requiring explanation and apology, as is demonstrated by the surviving commemorative inscriptions honouring Scipio and his daughter at Pergamum. The people of Pergamum sought to ingratiate themselves with an occupying military power and coolly calculated that material advantage and eventual victory lay with Pompeius and his father-in-law. Accordingly, they erected statues in honour of their distinguished visitors in the winter of 49–48 BCE. The inscription accompanying that for Scipio reads much like what was soon to be accorded to Caesar, eloquently proclaiming (*I.v.Pergamon* 2.411):

ὁ δῆμος
[Κό]ι̣ντον Καικίλιον Κοΐντου υἱὸν
Μ̣έτελλον Πίον Σκιπίωνα, τὸν αὐτο-
κράτορα, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ σωτῆρα καὶ
εὐεργέτην.

The people (honoured)
Quintus Caecilius the son of Quintus
Metellus Pius Scipio, the victorious
general, as its saviour and
benefactor.

That for the proconsul's daughter likewise suggests good relations (*I.v.Pergamon* 2.412):

ὁ δῆμος ἐτίμησεν
Κορνηλίαν Κοΐντου Μετέλλου ⟨Π⟩ίου
Σκιπίωνος τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος θυγατέ-
ρα, γυναῖκα δὲ Γναίου Πομπηίου Γναίου υἱοῦ
Μ̣εγάλου τοῦ ἀνθυπάτου, διά τε τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν
σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὔνοιαν.

The people honoured
Cornelia the daughter of the victorious general
Quintus Metellus Pius Scipio,

15 (2001) 163–171; cf. N. Schäfer, *Die Einbeziehung der Provinzialen in den Reichsdienst in augusteischr Zeit*, (HABES, 33), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2000), 17 n. 35.

> and the wife of the proconsul
> Gnaeus Pompeius the son of Gnaeus Magnus,
> on account of her moderation
> and goodwill towards the people.

Loyalty was on prominent display, perhaps in the hope that the provincial capital might once again be located at Pergamum. Yet, these dedications somehow escaped destruction despite their attesting to one of history's blind alleys. If not those personally responsable for them, then other members of the community spoke up in remembrance of the sufferings caused by Scipio's passage. Mithridates of Pergamum, for one, was well placed to attest that Scipio had quartered his soldiers in Pergamum and the wealthiest cities of Asia, handing these cities over to his men "to be sacked" so as to ensure morale for the coming campaign of civil war.[106]

Notwithstanding the existence of individuals such as Mithridates of Pergamum, manifest partisans of Caesar, the vast majority of the communities of Asia were deeply implicated in having provided support for the losing side. Hence, improbable repetition of the claim concerning the money within the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesus. Another inveterate opponent of Caesar is reported to have likewise made an attempt to profane the sanctuary (Caes. *B Civ*. 3.105.1–2):

> Caesar cum in Asiam venisset, reperiebat T. Ampium conatum esse pecunias tollere Epheso ex fano Dianae eiusque rei causa senatores omnis ex provincia evocavisse, ut his testibus in summam pecuniae uteretur, sed interpellatum adventu Caesaris profugisse. Ita duobus temporibus Ephesiae pecuniae Caesar auxilium tulit.

> Upon arrival in Asia, Caesar learned that T. Ampius had attempted to remove the money from the sanctuary of Dianae in Ephesus and that for that reason he had summoned all the foremost men of the province's communities so as to use them as witnesses to the amount of money, but that he had fled upon being interrupted by Caesar's arrival. Thus, Caesar twice brought assistance to the money of Ephesus.

106 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.31.4. Still of some use as a starting-point for a review of the evidence, see *RE* 15.2 (1932) 2205–2206 s.v. "Mithridates Nr. 15" (F. Münzer).

The language employed is similar to, but not identical with, that used in the prior episode to describe the failed machinations of Metellus Scipio. While readers might be tempted to supplement Caesar's text by imagining that Ampius' aim was that of procuring resources for the continuance of civil war, reflection shows that Caesar's report is again a perversion of historical reality.[107] Had Ampius had such an aim, then he would have followed through with his action and no sort of problem with witnesses would have stopped him. Conversely, failure to act is proof that there was no serious intention of this sort.

Which is not to deny Ampius' presence in Ephesus nor his mutual animosity towards Caesar. After his praetorship in 59 BCE, a date not without significance, Ampius had gone on to govern the province of Asia for the next couple of years.[108] Briefly directing the defence of Capua during the early days of 49 BCE, he subsequently re-appears in Asia as *legatus pro praetore* assisting that province's governor C. Fannius.[109] With the exception of his alleged attempt upon the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesus, nothing certain is known of his activities in Asia during that period. When he next re-surfaces, it is as one of those yet awaiting clemency from the victor of Pharsalus. Writing to Ampius around the time of Caesar's quadruple triumph, in the late summer of 46 BCE, Cicero explains why the delay in Ampius' being pardoned. Ampius had compounded the error of opposition by giving ample evidence of his views

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107 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.103.1,3, for the actions and plans attributed to Pompeius Magnus. Modern commentators are curiously silent as to this second episode at Ephesus. Yet, from their handling of the former episode (e.g. Carter 1993: 172), it may be concluded that they also believe in the historicity of the plan attributed to Ampius.

108 *MRR* 2.197. There was an unsuccessful candidature for the consulate in 55 BCE: Schol. Bob. 156 St. As regards this electoral failure, within a larger context, see T.R.S. Broughton, "Candidates defeated in Roman elections: Some ancient Roman 'Also-Rans'," *TAPA* 81 (1991) 1–64; C.F. Konrad, "Notes on Roman Also-Rans," 104–143, in: J. Linderski (ed.), *Imperium sine fine. T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic*, (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1996); G.D. Farney, "Some more Roman Republican 'Also-Rans'," *Historia* 53 (2004) 246–250.

For Ampius' activities in Asia, see Magie 1950: 383 (adherent of Pompeius; tr. pl. 63 BCE, proposed P. wear gold wreath at public games, governor of Asia in 58/7 BCE), 402 (aided Lentulus Crus [cos. 49 BCE] in raising money and soldiers in Asia), 405 (story of Ampius on point of robbing Temple of Artemis of the Ephesians), 1245 n. 15 (citing evidence of Cic. *Q. fr*. 1.2.8 and *cistophori* for T. Ampius Balbus as governor of Asia in 58/7 BCE), 1247 n. 29 (citing evidence of Cic. *Fam*. 1.3.2; 3.7.5 for transferral to serve as governor of Cilicia), 1256 n. 76 (activities as *legatus* of Lentulus Crus in Asia; see esp. Ioseph. *Ant. Iud*. 14.10, 13, §§ 228, 230, 234, and 236 f.), 1580 (listing him in *fasti* for province of Asia), 1595 (listing him in *fasti* for province of Cilicia).

109 Cic. *Att*. 8.11B.2; Ioseph. *Ant. Iud*. 14.229; 238.

during the years 49–48 BCE, wherefore certain of Caesar's partisans provocatively described him as *tuba belli civilis*.[110] Those preferring a milder policy, amongst whom figured Pansa, carried the day, and he eventually returned to Rome. Tribunes of the *plebs* in 63 BCE, Ampius and T. Labienus had collaborated in according special honours to Pompeius Magnus returning from the East.[111] Not surprisingly Ampius had shown loyalty to Pompeius in civil war and had persisted in offering opposition to Caesar as long as Pompeius was alive.[112]

Metellus Scipio and T. Ampius were both committed enemies of Caesar and liege collaborators of Pompeius Magnus. The accusation that they had individually sought on two distinct occasions to despoil the sanctuary of Artemis at Ephesus is manifestly not a faithful reflection of historical reality. However, to call Caesar's narrative into doubt is not enough. Two questions supervene. Whence the choice of these individuals? Moreover, why the repetition and consequent emphasis upon the salvation effected by the mere report of Caesar's arrival? These questions are all the more pressing because Caesar has visibly made his own what was originally the rhetoric of the local elites to be heard during his descent through the province of Asia. Recognition of this elementary fact is crucial to a just assessment of the goals informing Caesarian historiography.

First and foremost, it is to be observed that there exists an evident dialectic between Caesar and his opponents, one probably informed by a long-running desire to distinguish himself against L. Cornelius Sulla. Cn. Pompeius and Metellus Scipio were not merely the leading members of the senatorial opposition to Caesar, as manifested by their joint command of the army that fought at Pharsalus. In his own way, each was also an "heir" to Sulla and the Sullan establishment. Curiously enough, it was precisely at Ephesus, in the winter of 85–84 BCE, that Sulla had treated the Greeks of Asia with a fiscal savagery comparable to that attributed by Caesar to Metellus Scipio. Caesar makes no mention

110 Cic. *Fam.* 6.12.3.

111 Vell. 2.40.4. This fact may have a bearing upon Caesar's use of Labienus as a *legatus* in the Gallic campaigns of the 50s BCE. It may also have resulted in the subsequent military activities of Labienus' son in Asia in conjunction with the Parthians in the 40s BCE.

112 It is worth observing that opposition was continued with literary means after Caesar's assassination. Ampius wrote an account of the civil wars in which he vigorously criticized Caesar (Suet. *Iul.* 77). This work was in all likelihood composed in the chaotic period of liberty obtaining between Caesar's assassination and the commencement of the proscriptions. Thereafter, criticism of Caesar was unlikely to circulate in such fashion as to survive. Ampius himself disappers from the record and may well have fallen at Philippi, if not already a victim of proscription.

whatsoever of Sulla, but thirty-five years is merely a lifetime, not an eternity. Caesar's treatment of the Greeks of Asia will naturally have been favourably compared with that meted out by Sulla, of which Caesar was well aware. That a new era is epigraphically attested for Asia as of 85 makes the parallel secure. Had Caesar required reminding of how Sulla had treated them some thirty years earlier, the provincials would have fulfilled this task admirably. The Caesarian text is founded upon an explicit antithesis with Scipio and an implicit one with Sulla. No less could be expected of a politician who professed a desire for *quies Italiae, pax provinciarum, salus imperii*.[113]

There existed yet another reason, however, for insisting upon Caesar's protection of the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus. Multiple and enduring were the ties of blood, cult, and tongue that united the communities of the eastern and western halves of the Mediterranean. In particular, the city of Massilia was a colony of Phocaea.[114] Because that Ionian community had consulted the goddess at Ephesus prior to their expedition of colonization, Artemis was worshipped at Massilia in Archaic guise as she had formerly appeared at Ephesus.[115] Whence the Roman version of the goddess's cult upon the Aventine.[116] Moreover, the temple of Artemis at Massilia was known as "the Ephesium", i.e. the sanctuary of the Ephesian divinity.[117] Conscious of these links, Caesar's opponents had taken care to reward the metropolis Phocaea when the colony Massilia fell to Caesar.[118] Angered by what he deemed the Massiliote betrayal, Caesar was naturally touchy about the subject. What better way to

113 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.57.4.

114 Thuc. 1.13–14; Aristot. fr. 549 Rose = Athen. *Deipn.* 13.576A; Strab. 4.1.5 C180; Iustin. 43.3.4–12.

115 M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*. 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1974), no. 448.3; C. Ampolo, "L'Artemide di Marsiglia e la Diana dell'Aventino," *PdP* 25 (1970) 200–210. Paradoxically, the best evidence for the appearance of the cult image of Artemis of Ephesus worshipped at Massilia comes from a coin minted by the *tresvir monetalis* Hostilius in 48 BCE, in commemoration of the Caesarian victory over Massilia. Depicted as holding a spear in her left hand and a hind by the horns with her right hand, the goddess wears drapery that is unquestionably Archaic in style, for it exhibits the telltale geometric rendering of folds of hanging drapery. Corroboration for the interpretation that the image upon the coin represents the cult image worshipped at Massilia is to be had from Strabo's testimony that the Massiliotes yet venerated the sixth-century *xoanon* that the Phocaean colonists were said to have brought with them when led in their founding expedition by the Ephesian noblewoman Aristarche (Strab. 4.1.4 C179).

116 Strab. 4.1.5 C180; Cornell 1995: 295.

117 Strab. 4.1.4 C179. This, it is worth adding, is the testimony of a younger contemporary of Caesar.

118 Cass. Dio 41.25.3; Lucan. 5.53 (taking poetic liberty with the name).

recoup credit with the Greek world than by saving the money of an international shrine, indeed the very one that was intimately tied to the foundation of Massilia? The Caesarian narrative concerning Ephesus would appear, in certain aspects, to be a response to outrage at the treatment accorded to Massilia.

Finally, this narrative of intended misdeeds on the part of Metellus Scipio and T. Ampius Balbus served to deflect attention from the financial exactions of Caesar. These exactions are unambiguously documented by a historiographical tradition that is largely favourable in its judgement of Caesar's actions in Asia in September 48 BCE. As one of the consuls for that year, Caesar "pardoned" the inhabitants of Asia for having offered sustenance, material and financial, to his enemies.[119] Nevetheless, he did fine individuals for their participation in events, and exactions levelled upon communities are not to be excluded.[120] As was shortly to be revealed by his behaviour in Egypt, he stood in need of large sums of money in order to pay the soldiers who had won his battles and who were still needed for the foreseeable future. In short, even though Caesar is said to have lessened the rapacity of the *societates publicanorum* active in Asia, he himself was as active in gathering funds as had been his enemies, in so far as history written from the vantage-point of the victors permits us a glimpse of these affairs.

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119 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.106.4, where reference is made to the lictors carrying *fasces* who accompanied Caesar as a consequence of his being *consul iterum* in 48 BCE. As regards this emphasis upon Caesar's constitutional position, see M. Boatwright, "Caesar's Second Consulship and the Completion and Date of the *Bellum Civile*," *Classical Journal* 84 (1988) 31–40.

120 For the subject of fines levied in Asia Minor and the East, see Freber 1993: 106–107; cf. Plut. *Caes*. 48.1 (1/3 taxes removed); Cass. Dio 42.6.3, referring back to Cass. Dio 41.63.2; App. *B Civ*. 2.89.373 (embassies); 2.92.385 (arrangements regarding taxes).

CHAPTER 9

Aegyptus

1 Of Civil Wars Roman and Egyptian

As the text stands today, Caesar's *Civil War* does not possess a conclusion that is readily recognized as such according to any literary canons, past or present. The penultimate sentence of this account of a Roman civil war, conducted in the years 49–48 BC, is dedicated to Caesar's punishing the Egyptian eunuch Pothinus with death for secret correspondence urging the Ptolemaic general Achillas to intensify attacks upon Caesar's position in Alexandria.[1] The sentence that follows, which is the last according to the ancient division into books, blandly remarks: "Thus did the campaign in Alexandria commence". That, most surely, is spurious. Better to attribute such a perfunctory ending to an editor hard pressed to find an appropriate means for distinguishing between Caesar's account and the continuation written by an *epigonos*.[2] None of the expectations of readers have been met. The relevance of Pompeius' death to a potential end to hostilities is utterly overlooked.[3] And the narrative of events in Egypt does not agreeably submit to the bipartite division of wintertime inactivity in contrast with the pursuit of war in summer. Indeed, rather than bringing peace to Egypt as a potential arbiter,[4] Caesar seems by his very presence to have provoked to a further pitch the civil war that was already in progress there. Nothing would seem to have come to an end, despite the importance accorded to the victory won at Pharsalus.[5] War continues unabated, even if the geographical

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1 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.112.12: *Haec initia belli Alexandrini fuerunt.*

2 Ingenuity has not lacked for identification, e.g. L. Canfora, "La 'lettera a Balbo' e la formazione della raccolta cesariana," *ASNP* s.III, 23.l (1993) 79–103. Now see J.F. Gaertner and B.C. Hausburg, *Caesar and the Bellum Alexandrinum. An Analysis of Style, Narrative Technique, and the Reception of Greek Historiography*. Hypomnemata, 192. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen 2013.

3 It is worth recalling that Cicero had abandoned the cause of opposition to Caesar and landed at Brundisium by mid-October 48 BCE, an action that is congruent with his subsequent analysis that the desultory end of Pompeius after defeat at Pharsalus was a foregone conclusion. For Cicero's passage first from Dyrrachium to Patrae and thence to Brundisium, see *RE* VIIA1 (1939) 827–1091 "Tullius Nr. 29, A. Cicero als Politiker," (M. Gelzer), here 1003–1004.

4 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.109.1.

5 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.91.2.

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setting has changed. The laconic declaration of a new campaign's beginning provides no elements of closure. In fact, it is hard to conceive of a more artificial ending.

Yet, opportunities there were in abundance. One need merely glance at the work of subsequent historians and poets to see where a *caesura* might have been posited. The defeat of Caesar's enemies upon the field of Pharsalus would have been the most seemly. The choice of that scene had much to recommend itself. Caesar could have once more emphasized his *clementia*, which he and his agents had defined as "the new means to victory" from the very outset of the conflict.[6] Commemorated by senatorial decree and adopted by the Greek communities as the basis for reckoning the inception of a new era, the battle furnished a suitable conclusion to the conflict that ranged Pompeius against Caesar.[7] Alternatively, Caesar might have concluded the *Civil War* with his account of the death of Pompeius upon arrival in Egypt. With the death of Pompeius, or so it was thought for a time, hostilities were at an end.[8] The death of one of the two protagonists of events in 49–48 surely constituted an excellent occasion for narrative closure.[9] Or, as a last recourse, the celebration of Caesar's victory and the announcement of related omens at Ephesus would have constituted an appropriate end to the narrative of Book 3.[10] When Caesar set sail from Asia for Egypt in late September 48, civil war amongst Romans was seemingly over. The campaign for Macedonia that had begun with Caesar's embarkment of an expeditionary force at Brundisium had been fought and won. Although sailing to consolidate his victory at Pharsalus, Caesar was effectively beginning yet another chapter within the saga of Roman civil war.

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6 Cic. *Att.* 9.7C.1; cf. 8.16.2 (*huius insidiosa clementia*). For Caesar's preference of the expressions *lenitas* and *misericordia* to *clementia* and the Hellenistic antecedents, see M. Treu, "Zur *Clementia Caesaris*," *Museum Helveticum* 5 (1948) 197–217; M. Griffin, "*Clementia* after Caesar: from Politics to Philosophy," 157–182, in: F. Cairns and E. Fantham (eds.), *Caesar Against Liberty? Perspectives on his Autocracy*, (Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar, 11), (Francis Cairns: Cambridge 2003). As is well remarked by Griffin, there were positive, pragmatic reasons for Caesar's choice of language that corresponded with Hellenistic concepts regarding how a ruler might achieve personal security.

7 *Inscr. Ital.* 13.1.190–191, 208; W. Leschhorn, *Antike Ären. Zeitrechnung, Politik und Geschichte im Schwarzmeerraum und in Kleinasien nördlich des Taurus*, (Historia Einzelschriften, 81), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 1993).

8 See Cic. *Fam.* cited above.

9 Cf. the funeral for Hector at the close of the *Iliad*. See also O. Taplin, *Homeric Soundings. The Shaping of the Iliad*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1992), 253.

10 For the use of prodigies to achieve closure in annalistic accounts, see Tac. *Ann.* 13.58; 15.74.3; cf. 12.43; 15.47.

Caesar's failure to adopt any one of these three narrative strategies is all the more striking when the narrative finesse exhibited within the *Gallic War* is taken into consideration. In the construction of that narrative, which likely occurred by stages and over the years,[11] Caesar shows himself extremely attentive to the closure of each of the seven books that he wrote. Even when the classical bipartite division into summer and winter proves not feasible, he nevertheless manages to dispose of events in annalistic fashion. The division of the narrative into seven books emerges as a seemingly natural product of the events described. It is as though things had to occur just as Caesar related them. Such an impression is precisely the opposite of that conveyed by the conclusion to Book 3 of the *Civil War*. It is, however, exactly what we can perceive Caesar as accomplishing in the internal transitions between all three books of the *Civil War*. The apportionment of materials between Books 1 and 2 in accordance with theaters of war and the transition from one year to the next are masterful, depending as they do upon both arrangement and excision. It is only at the very end that the author fails in his task of fashioning a forceful dénouement.

The narrative perfection that characterizes Book 7 of the *Gallic War* can easily cause readers to forget the essential fact that that series of *commentarii* is likewise incomplete. Caesar was engaged in military operations in Gallia throughout the years 58–50; the *Gallic War* as composed by Caesar describes these events in seven books at the rhythm of one book for each year. History did not come to a halt with Caesar's victory over the Gauls assembled at Avaricum in 52, but continued its relentless march forwards. The following two years (51–50) were messy, anticlimactic, refractory to the presentation of a Roman general who had once and for all eliminated the Gallic threat. Had Caesar not chosen to write of the events of 49–48, the most economic of hypotheses would aver that the proconsul had been overtaken by death.[12] After all, statesmen are expected to employ their retirement in the writing of self-justificatory *mémoires*.[13] How-

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11 T.P. Wiseman, "The publication of *De Bello Gallico*," 1–10, in: K. Welch and A. Powell (eds.), *Julius Caesar as Artful Reporter. The War Commentaries as Political Instruments*, (Duckworth: London 1998). Particularly worth remarking is the observation (p. 2): "There is no *a priori* reason to suppose that Books 1–7 were already a unit before Hirtius collected and edited the 'complete Caesar'."

12 Cf. A. Klotz, "Zu Caesars *Bellum Civile*," *RhM* 56 (1911) 81–93, proposing this romantic explanation for the incomplete state of the *Civil War*.

13 For the memoirs of P. Rutilius Rufus, *FRH* 21 P. Rutilius Rufus (C.J. Smith): 1.278–281 (introduction); 2.458–471 (testimonia and fragments); 3.284–288 (commentary); J.M. Candau, "Republican Rome: Autobiography and Political Struggles," 121–152, in: G. Marasco

ever, Caesar did write again, only to abandon the project once more before having brought it to a proper conclusion. Although variations are visible in the execution, the pattern is most suggestive. Incomplete and undeniably partisan in nature, Caesar's *commentarii* seem to have been composed for the attainment of specific political goals at particular moments in his career. Written in a pellucid Latin readily comprehensible to the most rudimentary speakers of the language, these works described Caesar's accomplishments and defended his actions. When immediate circumstances no longer seemed to warrant composition, Caesar left off writing.

The goal informing the composition of the *Gallic War* is immediately visible to all and sundry. The proconsul was aiming for a second consulate as soon as was legally possible. Waiting for fulfilment of the ten-year period required by the *lex Villia annalis* and the *lex Cornelia annalis*,[14] Caesar recognized that the passage of time would tarnish the effect of his triumphs. Indeed, there was the risk that he would be compelled to wait ignominiously in the suburbs as had many another aspiring *imperator* in recent decades.[15] Refusing to allow his accomplishments to be misrepresented or fall into oblivion through the hostility of his peers in the Senate, Caesar presented his case directly to the Roman people. Even if composed at different moments, rather than all at one time in the latter half of 50, Caesar's *Gallic War* set forth in narrative fashion the reasons why he deserved a triumph and a second consulate.[16] For his deeds to the north of the Alps, he deserved to be treated well by the people of Rome.

(ed.) *Political Autobiographies and Memoirs in Antiquity. A Brill Companion*, (Brill: Leiden 2011), esp. 139–147. For Sulla's memoirs, see W.J. Tatum, "The Late Republic: Autobiographies and Memoirs in the Age of the Civil Wars," 161–187, in: *FRH* 22 L. Cornelius Sulla (C.J. Smith): 1.282–286 (introduction); 2.472–491 (testimonia and fragments); 3.289–299 (commentary); G. Marasco (ed.) *Political Autobiographies and Memoirs in Antiquity. A Brill Companion*, (Brill: Leiden 2011), esp. 163–174.

14 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.1.1: *per leges*; G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romani. Elenco cronologico con una introduzione sull'attività legislativa dei comizi romani*, (Società Editrice Libraria: Milano 1912) 278–279, 351; cf. E. Badian, "Caesar's *cursus* and the intervals between offices," *Journal of Roman Studies* 49 (1959) 81–89. For the *Lex Villia annalis*, now see M. Elster, *Die Gesetze der mittleren römischen Republik. Text und Kommentar*, (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 2003), 344–347 no. 164.

15 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 1.85.10; M. Pomptinus and Pompeius Magnus are merely the most pertinent of examples.

16 For the method of argumentation, still extremely good is M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César*, (Les Belles Lettres: Paris 1966[2]). As regards the original publication of the *Bellum Gallicum*, see now also T.P. Wiseman, *The Roman Audience. Classical Literature as Social History*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2015) 101–

By contrast, the goal informing Caesar's composition of the *Civil War* is not so immediately manifest. Political office can be excluded, since Caesar achieved election to a second consulate in the course of the events that he describes. Aside from the fact that there were various forms, the dictatorship was not something for which there existed an electoral race. Hence, the *Civil War* was not a pamphlet aimed at justifying why the Roman people should favour Caesar with a particular magistracy. Rather, it would seem that this work was composed with a view to justifying Caesar's actions in a world where such justification might be exacted. In other words, we seem to have something that is much closer to the *mémoires* that L. Cornelius Sulla composed towards the end of his life. The ideological presuppositions of the *Civil War* merit further scrutiny, but it may be opined that Caesar was writing with a view to the resumption of normal political life once civil war was at an end. Naturally, that implies that Caesar would have co-existed with M. Porcius Cato and L. Cornelius Lentulus (*cos*. 49), if not with Cn. Pompeius Magnus! Much of the *Civil War* could have been composed prior to his arrival at Alexandria and learning of the death of Pompeius. Writing for a world where Pompeius and other political opponents might yet exercise power or influence public opinion at Rome, Caesar wished to justify what he had done in the years 49–48.[17] Ironically, the death of Pompeius Magnus would seem to have rendered otiose that work's publication. Once his foremost opponent was dead, Caesar no longer felt the need to present his case to the Roman public.

Yet, as scholars have remarked on occasion, up through its surprisingly abrupt ending, the text of Caesar's *Civil War* is manifestly informed by Republican sentiment.[18] There can be no denying that the proconsul was particularly

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102. Although not susceptible of direct proof, the thesis of the public reading of Caesar's *commentarii* within theatrical spaces in Rome is extremely attractive. However, they were likely meant for dissemination throughout the whole of Italia.

17 On this view, the *Bellum Civile* is to be compared to Caesar's taking an early, unexpected offensive against his enemies both in 49 and in 48 BCE. Caesar well understood the importance of anticipating their actions. Literature was to be a prosecution of war by another means.

18 For review and detailed exposition, see M. Boatwright, "Caesar's Second Consulship and the Completion and Date of the *Bellum Civile*," *Classical Journal* 84 (1988) 31–40. For a development of her arguments, see now: M. Jehne, "Caesar und die Krise von 47 v. Chr.," 151–173, in: G. Urso (ed.), *L'ultimo Cesare. Scritti riforme progetti poteri congiure. Atti del convegno internazionale, Cividale del Friuli, 16–18 settembre 1999*, («L'Erma» di Bretschneider: Roma 2000). Alas, as has been pointedly argued from the numismatic evidence, *libertas* was not central to the visual and verbal propaganda employed by Caesar and his collaborators in the period intervening between early 49 and late 45: K. Raaflaub,

attached to his *dignitas*, to the dismay and disbelief of his peers.[19] Nevertheless, Caesar consistently links his *dignitas* to the *libertas* of his fellow-citizens. Addressing his soldiers at the outset of his invasion of Italia, he asserted that he was acting in defense of the tribunes of the *plebs* and on behalf of the freedom of all Roman citizens.[20] The dual theme of citizens' freedom and Caesar's honour, seemingly united in indissoluble fashion, is explicitly set forth again in a speech pronounced prior to the battle of Pharsalus.[21] Likewise emblematic of this Republican vision are Caesar's remarks concerning his second consulate. For instance, he takes care to note the constitutional mechanism used to permit those consular elections, as well as the fact that he was acting in accordance with the laws.[22] That is not what one would expect of someone for whom the Republic was a mere travesty! Similarly, when giving the rationale for the Apolloniates' transferral of allegiance to himself, Caesar explicitly refers to his being consul.[23] Caesar's enemies fail to secure assistance from the provincials for the simple reason that these latter have respect for the Republican institutions of Rome! Again, the report would not have been expected of an author for whom the Republic was a dead letter. Yet, Republican sentiment suffuses this work through to its very end. The tumultuous reception accorded to Caesar by the Alexandrians was allegedly due to his display of the consular *fasces*; he undertook to settle the dispute between Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII by virtue of the fact that he was *consul*.[24] Notwithstanding the revolutionary nature of his behaviour, Caesar manifestly still thought in terms of Republican institutions.

Of course, there was solid reason for Caesar to engage in such a self-representation, particularly in light of the Civil War. Political invective in the late Republic was highly developed, with a strong distaste for any politician who appeared poised to surpass his peers. Pompeius repeatedly suffered unfounded

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"Caesar the Liberator? Factional Politics, civil war, and ideology," 35–67, in: F. Cairns and E. Fantham (eds.), *Caesar Against Liberty? Perspectives on his Autocracy*, (Papers of the Langford Latin Seminar, 11), (Francis Cairns: Cambridge 2003).

19 Caes. *B Civ*. 1.7.1–7; cf. Cic. *Att*. 7.11.1: *Atque haec ait omnia facere se dignitatis causa. Ubi est autem dignitas nisi ubi honestas*?

20 See F.G.B. Millar, *The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic*, (University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor 1998), 207–208, for the likelihood that this represents an actual speech.

21 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.91.2.

22 See Caes. *B Civ*. 3.1.1, cited above.

23 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.12.2.

24 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.106.4, 107.2. Readers are invited to note the prominence accorded to the words *tumultus* (3.106.5) and *controversiae* (twice in 3.107.2) in this narrative of Caesar's arrival at Alexandria.

accusations of tyrannical behaviour: the offensive canards launched against him by L. Domitius Ahenobarbus on the eve of Pharsalus were but the last in a long series.[25] Caesar, too, was repeatedly accused of aspiring to tyranny, long before such a possibility materialized. Cicero, for example, claimed that Caesar was given to citing from Euripides' *Phoenician Women* lines that openly avowed a desire for tyrannical power.[26] On that view, Caesar's acceptance of lifelong dictatorial powers in early 44 represented nothing more than a rendering public of a long-cherished dream. Cicero will not have been alone. Others, for instance T. Ampius Balbus, were even more adamant in their denunciation of what they perceived as Caesar's tyrannical proclivities.[27] Aware of these accusations, Caesar wrote in part as a response to them. He could not hope to assuage his enemies, but he might expect that the Roman people would credit his attachment to Republican institutions.

It would appear that Caesar's sojourn in Egypt in 48–47 proved a turning-point in his political thought. As was remarked by the ancients themselves, Caesar began to comport himself in monarchic fashion only after Pompeius' death and the awareness that he now had no real rival. Particularly revelatory is the fact that Caesar delayed in Egypt rather than attempt to deal with the

25 Plut. *Pomp.* 67.2–4.

26 Cic. *Off.* 3.21/82; Suet. *Iul.* 30.5. This appears to be an instance of a widespread fashion in the late Republic of attributing dramatic lines to a political figure for the purpose of character delineation. Perhaps the best known of such instances are those regarding Caesar at the Rubicon in 49 BCE (Plut. *Caes.* 32.8; Suet. *Iul.* 33; discussed above in Chapter 3) and Pompeius at Pelusium in 48 BCE (Plut. *Pomp.* 78.4; App. *B Civ.* 2.85.358; Cass. Dio 42.4.3). A similar phenomenon, *mutatis mutandis*, is to be discerned at work in the citation of a couplet from the *Bacchae* of Euripides *vis-à-vis* the death of Crassus at Carrhae (Plut. *Crass.* 33.3). The origins of this phenomenon, it should be added, lie in the topical application of theatrical lines to the Roman politicians who were seated in the audience watching dramatic productions of this sort. Whereas we hear of Pompeius being lauded within the setting of the theatre of Mytilene, thanks in part to the careful preparations of Theophanes (Plut. *Pomp.* 42.4), we frequently read of politicians being upbraided or humiliated in the setting of the theatre at Rome, such as when the audience gave a topical interpretation to the line "*Nostra miseria tu es magnus*" and pressed for its repeat performance by the actor Diphilus to the discomfiture of the present Pompeius Magnus in mid-59 BCE (Cic. *Att.* 2.19.2).

27 It is perhaps worth adding that Atticus figures amongst those who expressed concern at the manner in which Caesar's tyrannical behaviour would manifest itself. Such is indicated by Cicero's correspondence with Atticus in the opening weeks of the civil war: Cic. *Att.* 7.12.2; cf. 7.20.2. Would Caesar behave as a Phalaris or a Pisistratus? That he would prove a tyrant was taken as a given.

remainder of those to flee from Pharsalus. As in his reliance upon an exiguous military force for visiting that kingdom,[28] so in his delay does Caesar display scant regard for the military capacities of his enemies.[29] As has long been recognized, albeit tacitly, the Etesian winds were nothing more than an excuse for remaining in Alexandria.[30] Caesar wished to exact money from Ptolemaic Egypt so as to cover his expenses, but he would have left that task to others had he thought that M. Cato and Metellus Scipio constituted a veritable menace. Perceiving the Ptolemaic monarchy at first-hand and meditating upon a Roman state in which there was no counterpoise provided by Pompeius Magnus, Caesar realized that he was in a position comparable to that of Alexander the Great. Now there was no one to challenge Caesar's pre-eminence. Having attained to supreme power, he could make dispositions as he saw fit. The disappearance of a rival in September 48 left Caesar without any need to explain himself to the Roman people. The *Civil War* must have been one of the first victims of Caesar's new understanding of himself; the transformation is best conceived as occurring early rather than late. Celebrated for his rapidity of comprehension, Caesar hardly required nine months and a cruise upon the Nile in order to arrive at the conclusion that publication of the *Civil War* was otiose.

Explanation of that project's abandonment, however, does not suffice to indicate why the *Civil War* ends in so desultory a fashion. Had Caesar completed Book 3, what would it have looked like? The question challenges us to think of history as something other than "cut-and-dried". Philology requires that we imagine a world in which the necessity of participating in an Egyptian civil war was not self-evident to Caesar. He claims that he thought arbitration might resolve the siblings' differences. Perhaps it is time to trust Caesar when he says something.

From the very beginning through the end of the *Civil War*, Caesar repeatedly proclaims that he was interested in nothing other than peace. The irony may lie undisturbed. What is of relevance to the present investigation is the fact that Caesar took this stance on more than one occasion. As the opening of the *Civil War* stands, Caesar's enemies refuse to consider in senatorial debate his proposals for a peaceful resolution of the conflict that thereupon became a civil war. Time and time again Caesar offered to engage in discussions aimed at a peaceful resolution, although tempered by the refusal to talk with those who were not

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28 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.106.3.

29 Cf. remark upon Pompeius' reputation based upon victories over Pontic armies; see also Caes. *B Civ*. 3.110.

30 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.107.1.

serious.[31] Informing this desire for peace, in the words of Caesar, was a desire for *quies Italiae, pax provinciarum, salus imperii*.[32] Confirmed imperialist, Caesar argued that the military forces of the Romans were better turned against their external enemies.[33] Operating within this ideological framework, Caesar disembarked at Alexandria and sought to intervene in the Egyptian civil war that was then in progress. In light of the scant regard that Caesar had for the Ptolemaic military—as we have had occasion to remark—he would seem to have thought that his offer of mediation would prove successful. At any rate, Caesar's promoting peace between Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII was anything but an innovation. Not only was he acting as consuls traditionally comported themselves when abroad, but Caesar was also maintaining an ethical stance that he had repeatedly adopted in the past couple of years. Interested in the well-being of the Roman empire, Caesar sought to re-establish peace between the heirs of a monarch who had been an ally of the Roman people.[34]

Had he managed to do so, then there would have been a most fitting closure to his narrative. At the beginning of the *Civil War*, readers are made witnesses to the intransigence of Caesar's enemies and the necessary recourse to arms. The consuls for 49—L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus—had refused to engage in discussion that might lead to a peaceful resolution. Rather, they had shown scant regard for the Republican institution of the tribunes of the *plebs* and their veto, preferring to have the Senate pass an emergency decree that effectively rendered Caesar an outlaw. By contrast, Caesar as consul in 48 showed himself disposed to engage the warring parties in discussion. His avowed aim was that of persuading the Ptolemaic rulers to resolve their dispute by recourse to

31 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.17.6. There exists no monograph nor article that deals with the issue overall for the Roman civil wars of 49–30 BCE or specifically for the years 49–48 BCE. Many excellent observations, however, are to be found in the work of K. Raaflaub, *Contentio Dignitatis. Studien zur Motivation und politischen Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius*, (Vestigia, 20), (C.H. Beck: München 1974); cf. K. Raaflaub, "Caesar und die Friedensverhandlungen zu Beginn des Bürgerkrieges von 49 v. Chr.," *Chiron* 5 (1975) 247–300; D.R. Shackleton Bailey, "The Credentials of L. Caesar and L. Roscius," *Journal of Roman Studies* 50 (1960) 80–83; K. von Fritz, "The Mission of L. Caesar and L. Roscius in January 49 B.C.," *TAPA* 72 (1941) 125–146. Aside from these signal contributions, the attempts to negotiate have received curiously little discussion, perhaps because scholars normally begin with fixed ideas regarding the good faith of the negotiators.

32 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.57.4; P.A. Brunt, "*Laus Imperii*," pp. 159–191, in P.D.A. Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1978).

33 Cf. Caes. *B Civ*. 3.31; not particularly brilliant, nor new.

34 Incidentally this was far more ambitious than the blatant opportunism of Pompeius.

law.[35] Given Caesar's status as a representative of Rome and his reputation as a general, there was every reason to think that he might succeed in resolving this conflict. Had he done so, then he could have concluded the Civil War with a fitting vignette of himself as a man of peace. The implicit contrast with his enemies—two of whom met their deaths while seeking assistance from the Egyptians—would have been particularly effective. C. Caesar, *consul iterum*, would have achieved once more that peace upon which the Roman empire depended. As things turned out, however, history outran him and peace was only to be realized after a long, hard-fought campaign. By the time that it came, Caesar had long since abandoned writing the *Civil War* and changed his ideas regarding the constitution of the Republic.

2 The Wealth of Egypt

The ultimate cause of Caesar's intervention within the domestic affairs of Egypt after his victory at Pharsalus lies not in *l'histore événementielle*, but is to be sought in the wealth for which Egypt had long been renowned. The great fertility and regular rhythms of the Nile valley rendered the country one of the most populous and wealthy areas within the ancient Mediterranean.[36] Thanks to the remarkable stability of its natural environment, as a rule,[37] Egypt possessed both the agricultural basis and the population density requisite for the long-term production of wealth upon a significant scale. For that reason did Pompeius go there and Caesar remain for a time. With the loss of his army and monetary resources, Pompeius needed a new basis for the production of a force with which to continue the Civil War. Caesar, on the other hand, had not only to prevent this move on Pompeius' part, but also to find the monetary resources with which to liquidate the debts that he had accumulated as a result of his prosecuting the Civil War. Seductive though it may be as a topic for

35 Caes. *B Civ*. 3.107.2.

36 Hdt. 2.5; 2.10; Arrian. *Anab*. 5.6.5; R.D. Sullivan, *Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100–30 BC*, (Phoenix Suppl., 24), (University of Toronto Press: Toronto 1990), 81.

37 For detailed consideration of the ancient evidence for the striking regularity of the Nile's flood, see D. Bonneau, *La crue du Nil, divinité égyptienne à travers mille ans d'histoire*, (C. Klincksieck: Paris 1964). See also Sullivan 1990. To be remarked is the impression that may be discerned amongst Romans of the late Republic and early Principate: Lucret. 6.703–737; Lucan. 10.188–192 (with the Egyptian priest's response following at 10.193–331). As is remarked by Bonneau 1971: 148 n. 714, this may in part be due to the influence of Poseidonios.

philosophical reflection, the length of Cleopatra's nose is immaterial to the eventual course of history.[38] The foremost *imperatores* of the late Republic—Pompeius Magnus, C. Caesar, M. Antonius, and Caesar the Younger—lie within one and the same tradition, all seeking to use the wealth of Egypt for the benefit of the Roman state and for their own private aggrandizement. While they *may* have taken different lines of approach towards Cleopatra VII—but the influence of political invective upon the formation of the historiographical tradition is not negligible[39]—there can be little doubt that the fundamental motivation to inform their actions was the possibility of their making use of the wealth of Egypt.

The wealth of Egypt was in fact frequently a matter of discussion at Rome in the late Republic. Naturally, the discussion was held in general terms, and reliable data hardly characterize what Romans and Greeks reported of this exotic world. In a lost speech delivered in the late 60s, Cicero claimed that the annual income of the Ptolemaic kingdom was 12,500 talents.[40] Writing of his own visit to Egypt a couple of years later, Diodorus of Sicily records that the annual income of Egypt was 10,000 talents.[41] Neither figure is to be taken as an objective report of Ptolemaic revenues: reckoning alternatively on the basis of a decimal (10) or duodecimal (12) system and in terms of thousands were cultural phenomena typical of the Graeco-Roman world, as was the addition of the number (5×10^n) to indicate a figure that surpassed a maximum.[42] The statistics offered to their ancient audiences by Cicero and Diodorus were meant

38 For the relevant text of Blaise Pascal's *Pensées*, see the following electronic critical edition: http://www.penseesdepascal.fr/I/I31-moderne.php. For the historical reality and its artistic representations, see now the meticulous and illuminating discussion of M. Cadario, "Il vero volto di Cleopatra," pp. 39–43, in: G. Gentili (ed.), *Cleopatra. Roma e l'incantesimo dell'Egitto*, (Skira: Milano 2013).

39 The best discussion remains that of K. Scott, "The Political Propaganda of 44–30 B.C." *MAAR* 11 (1933) 7–49.

40 Cic. *De rege Alexandrino* Test. Incert. 3 Crawford (= Strab. 17.1.13 [798]). Notwithstanding her decision to re-classify the passage in Strabo as a testimonium rather than a fragment, for the legitimate observation that Cicero delivered his speech in Latin and not Greek, the discussion of J.W. Crawford, *M. Tullius Cicero: The Fragmentary Speeches. An Edition with Commentary*, (Scholars Press: Atlanta 1994^2), 43–56, is compelling. Cf. C.P. Craig, *Classical Philology* 90 (1995) 383–388, here 385–386; A.H. Mamoojee, *Phoenix* 49 (1995) 168–170.

41 Diod. 17.52.5.

42 Cf. W. Scheidel, "Finances, Figures and Fiction," *Classical Quarterly* 46 (1996) 222–238; R. Duncan-Jones, *Structure and scale in the Roman economy*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1992); idem, *Money and government in the Roman empire*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1994).

to express the banal idea that the wealth of Egypt was immense, and they were understood as such. Likewise vitiated, from a modern point of view, are the statistics relating to the population of Egypt under the last Ptolemies. Alexandria was reported to have a population of 300,000 inhabitants, and the Egyptian countryside to have 6,000,000.[43] These figures may be upon the correct scale, but they are not to be taken as reliable representations of the demographic situation. Rhetorical purpose, not scientific enquiry nor fiscal exigencies, lie behind these reports. They are all aimed at representing Egypt as a fertile and prosperous country worthy of the attentions of the Roman ruling class.

That Egypt in truth surpassed most other regions of the ancient Mediterranean as regards both its agricultural production and population, with manifest consequences for the wealth that might be produced and accumulated by the Ptolemies, is not to be doubted. The Nile might not always flood as expected, but drastic failures were infrequent.[44] Hence, the Nile valley enjoyed a fertility that impressed even the Romans in terms of regularity and quantity. Naturally, mild winters and warm summers not only favoured agricultural production, but also combined with that fact to encourage a relatively high population density.[45] The exportation of grain and slaves—as well as luxury items on the order of ivory—brought the silver that was correspondingly utilized to create the tetradrachm monetary system deployed in Egypt by the Ptolemies.[46] For the first half of the reign of Ptolemy XII, the silver content of the Egyptian tetradrachm was 84.85%.[47] This phenomenon and the extensive reliance upon

43 Diod. 17.52.6. From this evidence, which is allegedly based upon contemporary documentation of the late 60s BCE and concerned solely with the ἐλεύθεροι present in Alexandria, scholars have tended to arrive at the conclusion that the city had a population of nearly 1,000,000: P.M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 3 vols. (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1972), 1.90–91, 2a.171–172 n. 358. Possibly, but what is of greater interest is Diodorus' claim that Alexandria was the most populous city within the Graeco-Roman world. Cf. Strab. 16.2.5 (C750), the similar representation of another, younger contemporary.

44 For the issue of ἀβροχία in these years, see D. Bonneau, *Le fisc et le Nil. Incidences des irrégularités de la crue du Nil sur la fiscalité foncière dans l'Egypte grecque et romaine*, (Cujas: Paris 1971), 145–146, 148–149.

45 For a synthesis that is yet valid, see A.K. Bowman, *Egypt after the Pharaohs, 332 BC–AD 642*, (British Museum: London 1986), 17–18.

46 S. von Reden, *Money in Ptolemaic Egypt, from the Macedonian Conquest to the end of Third Century BC*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2008), 7.

47 For metrological analysis and its implications for the financial health of the late Ptolemaic kingdom, see D.R. Walker and C.E. King, "Ptolemaic and Augustan Silver: The Evolution of the Tetradrachm of Roman Egypt," 1.139–157, in: D.R. Walker, *The Metrology of the Roman*

coinage for the collection of taxes reveal a highly monetized economy despite the lack of silver mines in Egypt.[48] In the absence of foreign invaders and in view of attested Egyptian religious sensibilities, it is to be expected that the temples and palaces of Egypt displayed a striking accumulation of wealth in the last century of Ptolemaic rule. It was this wealth that attracted the Roman *imperatores* of the late Republic. No useful statistics survive, but the telling detail may suffice. The process culminated with Caesar the Younger's being able to reduce significantly the cost of gold at Rome by virtue of his seizing the precious metals that Cleopatra and M. Antonius had stripped from the Egyptian temples.[49]

Diplomatic relations between the Ptolemaic monarchs and Rome are attested as of the late 270s BCE.[50] Naturally, their inception is recorded by Roman historians with due chauvinistic outlook.[51] Whether Ptolemy II Philadelphus or the Romans took the initiative is perhaps inconsequential. Of long-term significance, rather, is the fact that the Romans became aware of the wealth of Egypt and the possible relevance of that region to their own imperial enterprise. The coinage introduced at Rome in the second quarter of the third century was arguably modelled upon that of the Ptolemaic monarchs.[52] Be that as it may, the Romans indubitably requested assistance from the Ptolemies in

Silver Coinage, 3 vols. (British Archaeological Reports: Oxford 1976–1978), esp. 1.151; cf. O. Mørkholm, "Ptolemaic Coins and Chronology: The Dated Silver Coinage of Alexandria," *American Numismatic Society Museum Notes* 20 (1975) 7–24, esp. 7.

48 Von Reden 2008: 296.

49 Suet. *Aug*. 41.1; D. Wardle, *Suetonius: Life of Augustus / Vita Divi Augusti. Translated with Introduction and Historical Commentary*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014), 310. Cf. Cass. Dio 51.17.6–7, 21.5; Oros. 6.19.19. Of no little interest, too, is the fact that the mint of Alexandria ceased to produce silver coinage in the wake of Roman annexation: L. Capponi, *Augustan Egypt. The Creation of a Roman Province*, (Routledge: London 2005), 158.

50 A. Lampela, *Rome and the Ptolemies of Egypt. The Development of their Political Relations, 273–80 B.C.*, (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 111), (Societas Scientiarum Fennica: Helsinki 1998), 33–51, accepting without hesitation the traditional view that the Ptolemaic monarch initiated the exchange that produced an informal friendship.

51 Slightly different versions are given, with the first three surviving sources mentioning only the Roman embassy to Alexandria: Iustin. 18.2.9; Dion. Hal. 20.14; Val. Max. 4.3.9; Cass. Dio fr. 41; Eutr. 2.15; Liv. *Per*. 14. Cf. W. Huß, *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit, 332–30 v.Chr.*, (C.H. Beck: München 2001), 294–295. For the origins of diplomatic relations between the Republic and the Ptolemaic kingdom, see the revisionist study of R.W. Westall, "Rome and Ptolemaic Egypt: Initial Contacts", in: P. Buzi, D. Picchi, and M. Zecchi (eds.), *Aegyptiaca et Coptica. Studi in onore di Sergio Pernigotti* (Archaeopress: Oxford 2011) 1–16.

52 For another view, see E.S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, 2 vols. (University of California Press: Berkeley 1984), 673–674. For the thesis of Roman emulation of

terms of a chronic and serious shortage of grain at the height of the Second Punic War.[53] Conversely, the Egyptians were also cognizant of the political and military benefits to be had from association with the Romans. In 191, the Ptolemaic monarch offered gold and silver to the Romans, so as to assist them in the war that they were then conducting against Antiochus III.[54] The offer survives on the record solely because of the Roman refusal to accept it. Despite the distance that separated them, both the Romans and the Egyptians had begun to take the measure of one another. This meant, above all else, reflection upon the wealth and military power of the other.

Roman intervention within Egyptian internal affairs in the following century of diplomatic relations was based upon this acquired knowledge of the wealth and possible military power of Egypt. Sporadic but spectacular in its exercise, this intervention aimed at maintaining Egypt as an independent power within the eastern Mediterranean. On the morrow of L. Aemilius Paullus' victory at Pydna and the destruction of the Antigonid kingdom in 168 BC, a Roman ambassador had dramatically intervened in the ongoing war between Seleucids and Ptolemies.[55] Meeting with Antiochus IV Epiphanes in the Alexandrian suburb of Eleusis, C. Popillius Laenas had drawn a circle in the sand about the Seleucid monarch and demanded that he decide whether he wished war or peace with Rome, prior to stepping out of that circle. Having destroyed the military might of the Antigonids in Macedonia, the Romans were not about to contemplate the creation of a similar might through the union of Egypt with Syria.[56] Rather, they desired that Egypt remain under the control of the Ptolemies, whose incompetence was subsequently remarked by Scipio Aemilianus.[57] Following within this tradition, Sulla in many ways provided the last

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the coinages of Magna Graecia, see A. Burnett, "Early Roman Coinage and its Italian Context," 297–314, in: W.E. Metcalf (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Greek and Roman Coinage*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2012); cf. A. Burnett, "The Romano-Campanian silver," 21–48, in: A. Stazio and M. Taliercio Mensitieri (eds.), *La monetazione romano-campana. Atti del X Convegno del Centro Internazionale di Studi Numismatici, Napoli 18–19 giugno 1993*, (Istituto Italiano di Numismatica: Roma 1998); A. Burnett, "The beginnings of Roman coinage," *AIIN* 33 (1989) 33–64.

53 Polyb. 9.11a; cf. P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World. Responses to Risk and Crisis*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1988), 186–187; Huß 2001: 420 (with further literature).

54 Liv. 36.4.2.

55 See Gruen 1984: 655–660, 690–692.

56 Thus Gruen 1984: 660: "The 'day of Eleusis' must be kept in perspective. Rome had asserted herself to assure the integrity of Egypt and the stability of the region."

57 Diod. 33.28a.3; Huß 2001: 607 n. 85.

generation of the Republic with a model for their political aims and actions. His according the throne to Ptolemy XI Alexander II in 81 was not done for altruistic reasons. Recognition came at a price, and it may well be inferred that this—as much as any brutality displayed towards his new consort—was responsible for that ruler's extraordinarily brief reign. In the considered judgement of one ancient historian, Sulla had acted with a view "to gaining possession of the wealth of Egypt".[58]

Embassies not only provided the occasion for the execution of these policies, but also afforded the circumstances for their formulation. There occurred numerous visits and delegations, few of which had any immediate or discernible influence upon the course of events.[59] As chance would have it, fragments of the Classical historians and documents in papyrus survive to attest the preparations of the Egyptians and the impression that these visits might make upon the Romans. Telling is the comment ascribed to Scipio Aemilianus, who visited Egypt in 140/139. According to the historian Polybius, who accompanied him upon this embassy, the son of the victor at Pydna expressed surprise that a country so wealthy should be so poorly governed.[60] Nothing came of the embassy, but the impression of wealth and indolence abided. As emerges with clarity from the preparations attested for the visit of L. Memmius in 119, as well as a brief literary account of the visit of L. Licinius Lucullus in 85/84, the Egyptian monarchs and their officials took great pains to dazzle visitors with the wealth and potential might of the region.[61] However, since the Ptolemies consistently refused to send large expeditionary forces abroad, this attempt to impress proved only partially successful. Romans came away with the impression that the monarchs had immense resources, but were simply incapable of

58 App. *B Civ.* 1.102.476. For Timagenes as the likely source for this information, see R.W. Westall, "The Sources of the *Emphylia* of Appian of Alexandria", pp. 106–148, in: K. Welch (ed.), *Appian's Rhomaika. Empire and Civil War*, (Classical Press of Wales: Swansea 2015), 156. For bibliography on Timagenes, see Westall 2015: 167 n. 107.

59 There is urgent need for an instrument comparable to that furnished by F. Canali de Rossi, *Le ambascerie dal mondo greco a Roma in età repubblicana*, (Studi pubblicati dall'Istituto italiano per la storia antica, 63), (Istituto italiano per la storia antica: Roma 1997), but for the embassies that the Romans sent to the various nations with which they dealt. Diplomacy is a two-way street, at the very least. Cf. H. Heinen, "Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Ptolemäerreich von ihren Anfängen bis zum Tag von Eleusis (273–168 v. Chr.)," *ANRW* 1.1 (1972) 633–659; E. Olshausen, *Rom und Ägypten von 116 bis 51 v.Chr.*, (Diss. Erlangen 1963).

60 Diod. 33.28b.1–3; Athen. *Deipn.* 12.549d–e.

61 See Olshausen 1963: 6–10 (visit of L. Memmius), 12–21 (visit of L. Licinius Lucullus).

properly tapping them so as to conduct a more ambitious policy at the international level. The Romans were quick to attribute this failing to manifest physical defects (e.g. Physcon) and personal idiosyncrasies (e.g. Auletes).[62] Knowledge of Egypt brought both contempt and avarice.

More than two decades passed before official recognition was accorded by the Roman state to the successor of Ptolemy XI Alexander II.[63] Neither Sulla nor his partisans and closest collaborators were disposed to recognize the man who had benefited from the destruction of their candidate. Publicly styling himself Ptolemy XII Philopator Philadelphos Neos Dionysos, the new monarch soon acquired the less congenial sobriquet of Auletes, or "the flautist".[64] His succession to the throne was swift and seemingly without internal opposition, at least in the initial months of his reign.[65] Nevertheless, his position was precarious precisely because the Roman state did not accord him recognition as an allied king. Other members of the family sought to use this situation to their own advantage. In 75, Cleopatra V Selene came to Rome with her two sons, presumably by Antiochus X Eusebes, to claim the throne of Egypt for them.[66] Leery of uniting the kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, whose wealth and

62 For an alternative explanation of these sobriquets, see P. Van Nuffelen, "The Name Game: Hellenistic Historians and Royal Epithets," 93–111, in: P. Van Nuffelen (ed.), *Faces of Hellenism. Studies in the History of the Eastern Mediterranean (4th century B.C.–5th century A.D.)*. (Studia Hellenistica, 48). (Peeters: Leuven 2009), esp. 107–108.

63 A comprehensive review of the evidence from a viewpoint sympathetic to the circumstances of the Egyptian monarch is offered by M. Siani-Davies, "Ptolemy XII Auletes and the Romans," *Historia* 46 (1997) 306–340; eadem, *Cicero's Speech Pro Rabirio Postumo*, (Clarendon Ancient History Series), (Clarendon Press: Oxford 2001), 1–38.

64 See also E. Bloedow, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Ptolemaios XII.*, (Diss. Würzburg 1963), 89; cf. Huß 2001: 675 (writing of *Spitznamen* and taking a less engaged view of the matter); cf. F. Muccioli, *Gli epiteti ufficiali dei re ellenistici*, (Historia Einzelschriften, 224), (Franz Steiner: Stuttgart 2013), 288, designated Auletes "a scherno". Surely this was also the Roman view of matters, in the light of how the Roman elite judged performative skills. For denigration of the *consularis* L. Calpurnius Piso on account of his dancing, see Cic. *Pis.* 18, 22, 89; cf. 20 (mentioning the *crotola* or castanets appropriate to a professional performer); *Red. Sen.* 13; *Dom.* 60; *Planc.* 87. Cf. R.G.M. Nisbet, *Cicero: In L. Calpurnium Pisonem*, edited with an introduction and commentary, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1961), 78–79.

65 For possible problems from Memphis, see D.J. Thompson, *Memphis under the Ptolemies*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1988).

66 For the genealogyof the Ptolemies, see Huß 2001: 854–855; G. Hölbl, *Geschichte des Ptolemäerreiches. Politik, Ideologie und religiöse Kultur von Alexander dem Großen bis zum römischen Eroberung*, (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1994), stemmata 1–3 prior to p. 379; cf. R.D. Sullivan, *Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100–30 BC*, (Phoenix Suppl. 24), (University of Toronoto Press: Toronto 1990), stemma 7.

power might constitute a bulwark against Roman interests in the region, the Senate refused to let them make their case. Instead, after waiting for more than a year, the young princes were informed that they were well within their ancestral rights in asserting control over Syria—end of the matter.[67] Their subsequent experience in Sicilia of the brutal hospitality of C. Verres and their failure to assert themselves in Syria need not occupy us. Ptolemy XII had not been superseded, but neither was he granted recognition. Indeed, there is clear evidence that on at least two occasions, in 65 and in 63, politicians in Rome proposed legislation that would have resulted in the annexation of Egypt by the Roman state. If the evidence of an invented letter by the historian Sallust be accepted—the letter is allegedly a composition written by the Pontic king Mithridates the Great to the Parthian ruler Arsaces in the early 60s to warn him of the threat posed by the Romans—then Ptolemy actually resorted to bribing members of the Senate so as to avoid the possibility of hostile action being taken against himself.[68]

The motivations offered for the proposals of annexation made in 65 and 63 are illuminating. In the former instance, it was while he was reviewing the fiscal situation of the Roman state that M. Licinius Crassus as censor proposed that Egypt be annexed.[69] It was not a question of moral principle, but of cold economic calculation. In the latter case, the annexation of Egypt and the sale of that country's agricultural lands figured amongst the measures proposed by the tribune of the *plebs* P. Servilius Rullus. Thereby money might be raised for the purchase of lands upon which to settle veterans in Italia.[70] Again, any moral or political aversion for the Ptolemaic monarch was utterly eclipsed by the economic gains that might be realized from the brutal exercise of Roman power. In neither instance did the proposal meet with confirmation, for the gains to be had were so significant as to engender distrust of those who were to oversee these projects.

Political discussions are often fatuous, resulting in no concrete results. However, the serious nature of these proposals to annex Egypt finds confirmation not only in the lack of recognition for Ptolemy XII, but also in three closely related cases of annexation. First, the Romans annexed Cyrene in 75.[71] This

67 Cic. *2 Verr.* 4.61.

68 Sall. *Hist.* 4.69.12.

69 Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.44; Suet. *Iul.* 11; Plut. *Crass.* 13.1–2; *MRR* 2.157; *RE* 13.1 (1926) 295–331 s.v. "Licinius Nr. 68" (M. Gelzer), here col. 310.

70 Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2.38–39, 41–43.

71 Sall. *Hist.* 2.43. The date is not without problems: W.V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C.*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1979), 267 (Additional Note XIV).

action directly involved the Ptolemaic monarchy since the territory in question had been a Ptolemaic possession for the last two centuries and the operation was legitimized by reference to the testament of Ptolemy Apion.[72] Doubts concerning the legitimacy of Ptolemy XII might serve to justify a similar operation with regard to the vastly more rich prize of Egypt itself. Second, during his sojourn at Antioch late in 64, through a justification of that very sort, Pompeius refused to recognize either of the Seleucid princes contending for dominion over Syria.[73] Rather, he determined upon annexation of Syria as a Roman province, which proved a source of considerable income for the Roman state. Descent by blood was insufficient to render an individual a monarch; he needed to display control of an army that might command respect, all the while hoping not to run counter to Roman interests in the region. Third and last, in 58, the Romans annexed Cyprus, thereby putting an end to the reign of Ptolemy XII's homonymous brother.[74] Again wealth provided the incentive and alleged royal incompetence before pirates—or connivance with them—the pretext.[75] The operation involved protagonists from across the political spectrum at Rome. The tribune of the *plebs* P. Clodius was the author of the plebiscite calling for the annexation of Cyprus, and the avowed optimate M. Porcius Cato saw to its execution.[76] Once more the operation proved lucrative for the Roman state, and presumably also for those personally involved.[77]

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72 D.C. Braund, "Royal Wills and Rome," *PBSR* 51 (1983) 16–57, here 23–24. For further, detailed discussion of the sources, see S.I. Oost, "Cyrene, 96–74 B.C.," *Classical Philology* 58 (1963) 11–25. For motives for the delay in the Roman annexation of Cyrene, see Harris 1979: 154–155.

73 Plut. *Pomp.* 39.2.

74 Plut. *Cat. min.* 34–40.

75 Cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.112.3, for the Alexandrians' piratical behaviour from time to time. Overall, for a useful introduction to the issue of pirates and their relationship to the Hellenistic kingdoms, see P. de Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1999), 108–115, 119. It should be added, however, that the terms of *pirata* and *latro* were regularly deployed in order to delegitimize political enemies: I. Opelt, *Die lateinischen Schimpwörter und verwandte sprachliche Erscheinungen. Eine Typologie*, (Carl Winter Universitätsverlag: Heidelberg 1965), 132–133.

76 See respectively W.J. Tatum, *The Patrician Tribune. P. Clodius Pulcher*, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill 1999) and R. Fehrle, *Cato Uticensis*, (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1983).

77 Cf. D. Van Berchem, *Les distributions de blé et d'argent à la plèbe romaine sous l'empire*, (Georg: Genève 1939), for the financing of grain for Rome. Opportunely, both sets of accounts compiled by Cato in accordance with the *lex Iulia de repetundis* disappeared in the course of his returning to Rome.

Considered together, these three cases of annexation demonstrate that talk of annexing Egypt itself was other than purely fatuous.

There also exists numismatic evidence for a Roman concern with Egypt at this time. Twice during the 60s did moneyers (*tresviri monetales*) produce coins that ineluctably alluded to Egyptian affairs. The bust of an allegorical female figure whom modern scholars identify as Isis appeared upon one series of coins minted under the oversight of M. Plaetorius Cestianus in 67.[78] Since other series supervised by Cestianus in that same year included female allegorical figures representing other regions of the Mediterranean world, the concern in this instance was not exclusively with Egypt.[79] Hence, a direct tie between the imagery chosen by Cestianus and the question of whether or not to recognize Ptolemy XII cannot be postulated. Better, perhaps, a connection between that senator's business interests and the choice of imagery. A presumed relative, C. Cestius, who was a contemporary or a generation later commemorated his connection with Egypt by means of the monumental tomb in the form of a pyramid that is yet to be seen near the beginning of the Via Ostiensis.[80] More precise, and more suggestive, is an issue minted under the oversight of M. Aemilius Lepidus in 61.[81] Upon the obverse of the coin in question there appears the bust of an allegorical female figure wearing a turreted crown and identified by the legend as being ALEXANDREA. Upon the reverse of this same coin there occurs the frontal image of two standing figures. The taller of the two figures is togate and holding a crown over the shorter of the two, who is wearing a chiton and holding a sceptre. The legend associated with this group reads: M. LEPIDVS / TVTOR REG / PONT MAX. By the late Republic, there circulated more than one version of a story that claimed that M. Aemilius Lepidus (*cos.* 187, 175; *pont. max.* 180–152) had served as guardian to one of

78 M.H. Crawford, *Roman republican coinage*, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 1974), 1.87, 414–418 no. 405.1–2 (female bust l., draped and wearing winged diadem). No such label upon these coins, issued in 69 BC. Rather, in cases of 3–4, clear depiction of Proserpina. However, the family of the Cestii derived from Praeneste; cf. Huß 2001: 679–680. It is worth adding that M. Plaetorius Cestianus belonged to a family that derived from the Latin city of Praeneste (where, perhaps not by chance, the celebrated Nilotic mosaic was created to adorn a public space in the late second or early first century BCE) and was related in some way to the Cestius whose pyramid still stands alongside the Via Ostiensis (see below). We should also remark other possible Ptolemaic influence in Crawford 1974: 1.436–437 no. 409.1.

79 Crawford 1974: 1.436–437 no. 409.2 (Cybele, linked to *Ludi Megalenses*).

80 *LTUR* 4.278–279 s.v. "Sepulcrum C. Cestii" (C. Krause).

81 Crawford 1974: 1.443 no. 419.2.

the Ptolemaic monarchs.[82] The appearance of but a single Ptolemy within the image of the reverse indicates that we are dealing here with that version which identified the ruler as Ptolemy V. Entirely without legal foundation, the story is an anachronistic attempt to re-interpret the historical fact of an embassy performed in 201, so as to provide a more secure basis for Roman intervention within the internal affairs of contemporary Egypt.[83]

Pompeius' establishment of Roman hegemony over Syria rendered all the more urgent a decision regarding the Ptolemaic rulers of Cyprus and Egypt. As was shortly to be demonstrated by A. Gabinius' intervening to restore Ptolemy XII in 56/55, the Romans were now within ready striking distance of Egypt should they decide that action was imperative or desirable. Indeed, since Pompeius is known to have advanced as far south as Jerusalem in 63, it has been argued that he went on to visit Egypt briefly in that same period.[84] Based upon the untrustworthy testimony of Lucan, such a reconstruction is highly unlikely. However, the new geopolitical fact of Roman proximity to Egypt is certain, and can be seen to have influenced the actions of Ptolemy XII at the time. Whereas his predecessors had merely talked of aiding the Romans, the king acted, reportedly sending Pompeius military assistance in the form of 8,000 cavalry.[85] Moreover, he despatched an embassy carrying gifts to Pompeius and his army. These included a golden crown reputedly worth 4,000 talents and 1,000 golden *potoria* and *fercula*.[86] Ptolemy XII may conceivably have hoped to call upon the aid of Pompeius for repressing internal dissent within Egypt, but the immediacy of Pompeius suffices to explain this noteworthy change of policy and enticing display of wealth.[87] If the Romans had seen fit to put an end to the Seleucid monarchy, they might well do the same with the Ptolemaic monarchy. The proximity of Roman power posed a manifest threat. Hence,

82 For a thorough review, see Gruen 1984: 680–682.

83 G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, 4 vols. in 8, (Fratelli Bocca: Torino 1907–1964), here 4.1.23 n. 57; 4.3.101 n. 49.

84 A. Piganiol, "Un épisode inconnu de la vie de Pompée," 1.135–138, in: *Studi in onore di Aristide Calderini e Roberto Paribeni*, 3 vols. (Ceschina: Milano 1956–1957). The thesis is seductive, but ought in all likelihood to be dismissed. It is hard to believe that Diodorus Siculus or Appian of Alexandria—to name merely those most interested in the affairs of Egypt and Pompeius Magnus—would have passed over in silence such a momentous occasion. As we have seen in the case of Caesar's alleged visit to Ilium, scepticism is preferable and salutary.

85 Plin. *HN* 33.136.

86 App. *Mithr.* 114.557; Ios. *Ant. Iud.* 14.35 (= *FGrHist* 91 Strab. F14); Plin. *HN* 33.136.

87 For the nature of this internal dissent, see Huß 2001: 682.

the joint display of wealth and arms in order to procure a change of mind on the part of the Roman general who was engaged in making radical alterations to the political landscape of the eastern Mediterranean.[88] For the immediate future, the gambit was to prove successful. Thanks to lobbying and adroit constitutional action on the part of Pompeius and his political allies in 59, Ptolemy XII was at long last recognized as the legitimate ruler of Egypt. This recognition, however, allegedly cost the Egyptian monarch 6,000 talents.[89]

3 Banking and Imperialism

More than one consideration led Caesar to make the dangerous voyage to Egypt. Although the desire to take possession of Pompeius' person and thereby compel an end to hostilities was indubitably foremost amongst these, the wealth of Egypt and the weakness of that country's rulers furnished additional, equally valid reasons for the journey. Had Caesar's interest in Egypt been limited to the threat posed by Pompeius, then he should have departed soon after arrival, as in fact the ministers of Ptolemy XIII invited him to do.[90] Whether it was Ptolemy XIII or his sister Cleopatra VII who proved victorious in the Egyptian civil war then unfolding, there no longer obtained a situation in which the Ptolemaic kingdom posed a threat to Roman interests in the eastern Mediterranean. However, on this occasion, as so often, banking and imperialism were intimately associated in the decisions that influenced the course of events. Writing more than two centuries later, the historian Cassius Dio plausibly attributes to Caesar the *bon mot* that "there are two things that enable, protect, and increase sovereignties—soldiers and money—and these depend upon one another".[91] The loans that Ptolemy XII had incurred in the early 50s BCE—with the complicity of Pompeius and Caesar *inter alios*—assumed a new relevance in the aftermath of a costly Roman civil war.

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88 Detailed discussion of Pompeius' revision of the political landscape of the eastern Mediterranean: A.N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1*, (University of Oklahoma Press: Norman 1984); Sullivan 1990; R. Seager, *Pompey the Great. A political biography*, (Blackwell: Oxford 2002^2), 58–62.

89 R.W. Westall, "The Loan to Ptolemy XII, 59–48 BCE", *Ricerche di Egittologia e di Antichità Copte* 12 (2010) 23–41; R.W. Westall, "Date of the Testament of Ptolemy XII", *Ricerche di Egittologia e di Antichità Copte* 11 (2009) 79–94.

90 Plut. *Caes.* 48.9; C.B.R. Pelling, *Plutarch: Life of Caesar.* Clarendon Ancient History Series. (Clarendon Press: Oxford 2011), 385.

91 Cass. Dio 42.49.4.

Cognizant of the immense wealth of Egypt and its relevance to their conflict with Pyrrhus, the Romans had initiated diplomatic relations with Ptolemy II as of the late 270s BCE.[92] Relations had remained cordial but distant, until Ptolemaic military disasters and Roman concern for a balance of powers in the East resulted in the immortal "day of Eleusis".[93] Victories achieved at Magnesia in 189 and Pydna in 168 left the Romans the undisputed masters of the Aegean sea.[94] However, intervention in Egypt came only when Antiochus IV Epiphanes was poised to take Alexandria and unify the Seleucid and Ptolemaic kingdoms. Subsequently, visiting the country in the retinue of Scipio Aemilianus, the historian Polybius had occasion to reflect upon the inordinate wealth at the disposal of the Ptolemies.[95] As emerges from evidence for the hospitality accorded to C. Memmius and Lucullus four and six decades later, the Ptolemaic rulers took care to overawe official visitors.[96]

Internal dissensions and cultural differences, however, undercut the force of this propaganda, rather causing it to whet Roman appetite for the financial profit to be realized from annexation of the kingdom. As of the late 60s, there was considerable talk at Rome about the annual income of the Ptolemaic kingdom. As has already been remarked, examples include Cicero's assertion that figure stood at 12,500 talents and Diodorus Siculus' citation of local informants for the figure of 10,000 talents.[97] Neither figure is above suspicion, but

92 Westall 2010: 23–41.

93 Polyb. 29.27.1–10; Cic. *Phil.* 8.23; Diod. 31.2; Liv. 45.12.4–6; Val. Max. 6.4.3; Vell. 1.10.1; App. *Syr.* 66; Iustin. 34.3.1–4; Plin. *HN* 34.24; Plut. *Mor.* 202F; Porphyry, *FGrHist* 260 F 50.

94 For a convenient summary and analysis, still reliable is the account offered by J.-L. Ferrary, "Rome, les Balkans, la Grèce et l'Orient au deuxième siècle av. J.-C.," 729–788, in: C. Nicolet (ed.), *Rome et la conquête du monde méditerranéen. Tome 2: Genèse d'un empire.* (Nouvelle Clio: L'histoire et ses problèmes), (Presses universitaires françaises: Paris 1978), in particular 737–766. The vision of an aggressive Roman imperialism—notwithstanding deadlock within the Senate over the consequences of victories achieved abroad—has much to commend it.

95 Posidonius, *FGrHist* 87 F6; Diod. 33.28a; Plut. *Reg. et Imp. Apophth., Scipio Minor* (*Mor.* 200E–201A); Iustin. 38.8.8–11. For the visit and its context, see Lampela 1998: 200–204; Huß 2001: 607–608.

96 For L. Memmius, see *P. Tebt.* 1.33. As for Lucullus, see the testimony of Plut. *Lucull.* 2.5–3.2.

97 Strab. 17.1.11 (798); Diod. 17.52.6. It is to be added that in the surviving speeches Cicero animadverts again to Egypt when talking of the revenues needed in order to acquire the land in the Italian peninsula that was to be redistributed. As regards Diodorus and the date at which he was writing, see now R.W. Westall, "In Praise of Pompeius: Re-reading the *Bibliotheke Historike*", 91–127, in L. Hau, A. Meeus, and B. Sheridan (eds.), *Diodoros. Shared Myths, World Community and World History*, (Studia Hellenistica), (Peeters: Leuven 2017).

the Roman taste for statistics of this sort when debating whether the kingdom's annexation might finance land redistribution in Italia is most significant, providing the immediate context for the loan incurred by Ptolemy XII with a view to rewarding senators for recognizing the legitimacy of his government.[98]

Likewise ultimately self-defeating was the envoy of military assistance and financial resources or costly gifts. With a view to securing recognition as a legitimate monarch, Ptolemy XII sent a cavalry force and lavish gifts to Pompeius Magnus during the latter's sojourn in 63–62 BCE.[99] Whereas he had convoked the Seleucid descendants to Antioch to strip them of power and declare Syria a Roman province, Pompeius did not descend upon Alexandria for a repeat performance with Ptolemy XII. To that extent, the diplomatic gesture was a success. But it showed what might be had from the kingdom. Hence, when amassing resources for the prosecution of civil war in 49–48 BCE, Pompeius despatched his older son to Egypt in order to procure men and materials. From Caesar's scattered references, it emerges that the heirs to Ptolemy XII furnished 500 cavalry from the Gauls and Germans whom A. Gabinius had left at Alexandria as a garrison, 50 warships, and considerable quantities of grain and money.[100] In making this contribution, they were most certainly influenced by the same concern for recognition that had troubled their father. However, the gesture once more proved revelatory of the kingdom's immense resources. These, it may be opined, were the *reliquae opportunitates* to which Caesar referred as making Egypt an attractive place of refuge for Pompeius in defeat.[101]

Although scrupulous in describing the alliance that accompanied recognition of Ptolemy XII as the legitimate ruler of Egypt and thereby justifying his presence in the country in the wake of Pharsalus, Caesar fails to mention the transaction of the loan that facilitated matters.[102] Needless to say, the bribery

98 For salutary dubiety regarding statistics, see Scheidel 1996: 222–238. Contrary to what had been previously thought, the statistics reported by Greek and Latin authors are not the product of random generation. Rather, the multiples of certain numbers appear with a frequency that is far too high, symptomatic of the rhetorical "stylization" that lies behind what is to be found within literary accounts.

99 Ioseph. *Ant. Iud.* 14.35 (= Strabo, *FGrHist* 91 F14); App. *Mithr.* 114/557.

100 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4.4, 5.3, 111.3.

101 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.106.1. It is to be remarked that Cleopatra VII felt the need to travel to Rome personally in 45, so as to reassure herself of recognition as a legitimate monarch. This was in spite of the dispositions made by Caesar as *consul tertium* in the spring of 47 BCE.

102 For the Ptolemaic embassy involved in these transactions of 59 BCE, see Canali de Rossi 1997: 586–588 no. 645; cf. R.W. Westall, "Embassies of the middle and late Republic:

of Roman senators made possible by this loan and performed with a view to procuring their support for the alliance is likewise omitted from Caesar's historical retrospective. Rather, it was left for contemporaries and enemies to condemn this perversion of legal forms in public administration for private gain in 59 BCE. Manifestly drawing upon a hostile source such as T. Ampius Balbus, Suetonius reports of Caesar's first consulate (Suet. *Iul.* 54.3):

> In primo consulatu tria milia pondo auri furatus e Capitolio tantundem inaurati aeris reposuit. Societates ac regna pretio dedit, ut qui uni Ptolemaeo prope sex milia talentorum suo Pompeique nomine abstulerit.
>
> During his first consulate, he stole 3,000 lbs. of gold from the Capitol and put in its place an equal weight of bronze covered with gold. He sold alliances and kingdoms, as he stole nearly 6,000 talents from one of the Ptolemies in his own name and that of Pompeius.

Amounting to HS 144,000,000, the second "theft" in question is the loan that was then distributed amongst those senators persuaded to vote in favour of recognizing Ptolemy XII as an *amicus atque socius* of the Roman people. Not surprisingly, given both the gains that were to be made and the disrepute that attached, Caesar himself accuses his enemy L. Cornelius Lentulus of having the same motivation as consul in 49 BCE (Caes. *B Civ.* 1.4.2):

> Lentulus aeris alieni magnitudine et spe exercitus ac provinciarum et regum appellandorum largitionum movetur seque alterum fore Sullam inter suos gloriatur, ad quem summa imperi redeat.
>
> Lentulus was moved by the enormity of his debts and by the expectation of an army and provinces and the gains to be had from the recognition of kings as allies. He boasted amongst his friends that he would be another Sulla whose lot it would be to enjoy supreme power.

Corruption was a recognized aspect of political life at Rome in the late Republic, but only to be attributed to one's enemies in order to bring them into discredit. The ostentatious honesty of Cicero's administration of the province of

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Movement to, from, and within the city of Rome", pp. 23–36, in: I. Östenberg, S. Malmberg, and J. Bjørnebye (eds.), *The Moving City. Processions, Passages and Promenades in Ancient Rome*, (Bloomsbury: London 2015).

Cilicia was the obverse of the same coin, making all the more clear the distinction between oneself and one's political enemies.[103] As is usually the case, historical reality was far more complicated.

The sum involved in obtaining recognition for Ptolemy XII was enormous. Evaluation of its historical significance and worth depends upon contextualization through other contemporary statistics that are in theory more secure. First and foremost, it is worth observing that the minimum census required for *equites* and senators was yet HS 500,000 in the late Republic.[104] Secondly, reports of the numbers of those then participating in votes in the Senate indicate a body that oscillated between 450 and 525 members present.[105] Had the whole sum been apportioned equally, which would have been an overly optimistic and implausible scenario from the outset, each senator could easily have gained HS 250,000. But there is also the question of the vote by the *populus Romanus*, with a *lex* confirming the *senatus consultum*. If the Senate had divided the sum amongst its members after allowing half of the spoils to go to the masses, each and every senator still could have reaped a profit of HS 125,000 at the very least.[106] Naturally, as is the way of corruption, the money was shared amongst a restricted group and both the gains and expenses involved in lobbying will have been exponentially large. Inordinately large though the figure of HS 144,000,000 or 6,000 talents is, it accords well with the practical realities of political life in the late Republic. In short, the scale seems both correct and plausible.

Of course, complications arose. The fiscal burden that this loan entailed led to popular protest in Alexandria and Ptolemy XII chose to abandon his capital and kingdom. Flight to the West, however, proved expensive and long incon-

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103 Indeed, Cicero describes his predecessor as little better than "a wild beast". It is to be observed that not even Cato the Younger emerges altogether unscathed from the Cypriote episode. Romulus' cesspool would appear to have affected all and sundry.

104 C. Nicolet, *L'Ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (312–43 av. J.-C.)*. 2 vols. (Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 207), (E. de Boccard: Paris 1966–1974).

105 For the issue of whether or not a quorum was required for the passage of a *senatus consultum*, see the detailed discussion of M. Bonnefond-Coudry, *Le sénat de la République romaine de la guerre d'Hannibal à Auguste. Pratiques délibératives et prise de décision*, (BEFAR, 273), (École française de Rome: Roma 1989), 401–413.

106 Cf. Plut. *Cat. min.* 44.5–6, for HS 125,000 to be jointly deposited with Cato by candidates for all public offices. It may also help to put this figure in perspective by remarking what seems to have been the amount of rent normally paid by the elite residing in Rome: Vell. 2.10.1; S. Demougin, *L'ordre équestre sous les Julio-Claudiens*. (École française de Rome: Roma 1988), 95.

clusive. The exiled monarch borrowed further amounts during his sojourn at the Alban villa of Pompeius Magnus. While the Senate procrastinated over the appointment of someone to restore Ptolemy XII to his throne, envoys from Alexandria arrived to express their dissent and the monarch's agents resorted to the non-diplomatic arts of physical assault and murder so as to hinder this embassy. As a result, the king found it opportune to abandon Rome and withdrew to the splendid isolation of Ephesus, to enjoy the safety of asylum and to wait upon events.[107] Since Ephesus was the foremost banking centre of Asia, the choice was felicitous from this perspective as well. When the governor of Syria, A. Gabinius, finally effected Ptolemy's restoration in 56–55 BCE, the cost involved was allegedly 10,000 talents, or HS 240,000,000.[108] The precise relationship between this figure and that alleged for initial recognition in 59 BCE is unclear, but the cost of friendship with the Romans had manifestly proved more expensive than expected.

Paradoxically, it is likewise clear that Roman financiers suffered an immense loss in having decided to loan money to Ptolemy XII in the first half of the 50s BCE. To be sure, C. Rabirius Postumus is described by one Egyptian source as "selling everything that had been stored up over the years and at the same time, with a view to plunder, ordering that the most useful and efficient of administrators (*dioiketai*) be replaced".[109] Similarly, Postumus is documented as having received at Puteoli a large number of ships carrying Egyptian merchandise.[110] Yet, Postumus is also credibly reported to have been thrown into a prison by Ptolemy XII during his time in Egypt.[111] This treatment of Postumus and the subsequent claim advanced by Caesar in 48 BCE that the heirs of Ptolemy XII yet owed him money together render it likely that the monarch defaulted on repayment of the loan when it became clear that attempts to raise the sum required would only undermine any future possibility of rule. The terror that accompanied military restoration by Gabinius could not be prolonged indefinitely. Consequently, when engaged in defending Postumus in a trial *de*

107 It is worth recalling the similar circumstances of the sojourn of Ptolemy's younger daughter Arsinoë IV in the 40s BCE: Sullivan 1990: 259–260, 265.

108 Cic. *Rab. Post.* 8/21. The fact that Cicero utilises sophistry in dealing with the amount of the sum may be deemed by a modern audience an admission of the fundamental truth of the charge. Likewise, there is the consideration that the jury returned a guilty verdict despite the open recourse to bribery.

109 *P. Med. Inv.* 68.53; Siani-Davies 2001: 33, slightly modified translation.

110 Cic. *Rab. Post.* 14/40.

111 Cic. *Rab. Post.* 14/39.

repetundis in late 54 or early 53 BCE, Cicero was able to portray Postumus dramatically, and convincingly for the jury, as a victim who had lost everything in financial dealings with the Ptolemaic monarch.

In so doing, Cicero at the same time named Caesar as the saviour of Rabirius Postumus, asserting that Caesar had taken upon himself the crushing debts incurred by the *eques* in dealing with Ptolemy XII. Confirmation of Caesar's involvement is perhaps furnished by Caesar's own behaviour soon after arrival in Alexandria on 2 October 48 BCE.[112] With little concern for alienating the Ptolemaic court, Caesar cited a past outstanding debt, seeking to collect on it. The response of the royal *tutor* Ganymedes was not slow in coming (Plut. *Caes.* 48.7–8):

> … πρὸς δὲ τὰ δεῖπνα σκεύεσιν ἐχρῆτο ξυλίνοις καὶ κεραμεοῖς, ὡς τὰ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ πάντα Καίσαρος ἔχοντος εἴς τι χρέος. Ὤφειλε γὰρ ὁ τοῦ βασιλεύοντος τότε πατὴρ Καίσαρι χιλίας ἑπτακοσίας πεντήκοντα μυριάδας, ὧν τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἀνῆκε τοῖς παισὶν αὐτοῦ πρότερον ὁ Καῖσαρ, τὰς δὲ χιλίας ἠξίου τότε λαβὼν διαθρέψαι τὸ στράτευμα.

> … as for dining, use was made of wooden and clay vessels, on the excuse that Caesar had taken everything made of gold or silver to cover a debt. For the father of the king then reigning owed Caesar 17,500,000 drachmae. Although Caesar had previously forgiven that man's children the rest of this debt, he now demanded that he receive 10,000,000 drachmae to maintain his army.

The two figures of 17,500,000 drachmae and 10,000,000 drachmae are the equivalents of one-half and one-third respectively of 6,000 talents. The temptation to posit a direct relationship between 59 and 48 BCE, to the exclusion of 56–55 BCE, is strong, but to be resisted. Caesar, like Pompeius Magnus, is most unlikely to have loaned to any king money free of interest.[113] Moreover, the vision of an immense debt that remained stationary at 3,000 talents, despite evidence that substantial payments had been effected, should give pause for

112 For the date of 2 October 48 BCE, see Liv. *Per.* 112; cf. Caes. *B Civ.* 3.106.4; *Fasti Ostienses* s.a. In view of the inherent imprecision of Livy's language, on a par with the expression "a couple of days" in English, the date must be taken as approximate.

113 See J. Andreau, *Banque et affaires dans le monde romain* (*IVe siècle av. J.-C.–IIIe siècle ap. J.-C.*), (Editions du Seuil: Paris 2001) 262–264, for the rarity of free loans or gifts of money. Indeed, the uncle of Atticus charged interest even when dealing with those to whom he was closely tied by blood and friendship.

thought. Even if the figures presented by Plutarch be accepted as accurate, there is something wrong.

Indeed, the magnanimity displayed by Caesar in the matter of the delinquent loan owed by the father of Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII is behaviour typical in the practice of usury. Asserting that he had a right to HS 70,000,000 but was willing to accept merely HS 40,000,000, Caesar would appear to have sought to arrogate to himself a generosity that had no basis in fact. Frequently, in direct contravention of the laws as well as flouting commonly accepted morality, the usurer relies upon the specious claim of generosity to justify the high interest-rate that he exacts. Thus, according to the partisan and hostile testimony of Caesar himself, those of his enemies' agents who were engaged in collecting taxes for the Romans in Asia and Syria in 49–48 BCE asserted that they were making a gift by delaying the collection of money due.[114] Benign nonchalance in monetary matters is nothing more than a façade hiding the brutal reality of power.

On occasion, however, the interests of *Realpolitik* may be served by drawing back the veil so as to reveal precisely how things stand. Accordingly, in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of civil war at Rome, Pompeius Magnus offered the startling judgement that Caesar was facing bankruptcy (Suet. *Iul.* 30.2):

> Gnaeus Pompeius ita dictitabat, quod neque opera consummare, quae instituerat, neque populi expectationem, quam de adventu suo fecerat, privatis opibus explere posset, turbare omnia ac permiscere voluisse.
>
> Pompeius frequently asserted that (Caesar) wished to throw everything into a state of utter confusion because he was neither able to bring to completion the projects that he had begun nor capable of fulfilling with his own wealth the People's expectations that he had fostered regarding his return.

The two men's intimacy due to their political collaboration over the previous decade renders the judgement credible, notwithstanding the statement's timing and its being a *topos* in the political invective of the late Republic. Pompeius had been a party to the negotiations with Ptolemy XII and in fact hosted the monarch during the latter's time in Italia.[115] Pompeius had also been married

114 Caes. *B Civ.* 3.32.5.

115 Cass. Dio 39.14.3, cf. 39.16.1–2; Cic. *Rab. Post.* 3.6; Siani-Davies 2001: 127.

to Caesar's daughter Julia during the 50s.[116] Accordingly, he was in a position to know, or to guess accurately, how Caesar's finances stood.[117] Therefore, the claim was credible at the time and merits serious consideration.

Inevitably, this claim stands irreconcilably at variance with the affirmation that the conquest of Gallia had rendered Caesar inordinately wealthy, awash in gold. Hence, in view of the undeniable military success that Caesar enjoyed cumulatively during the campaigns of the 50s, there has been a nigh unanimous dismissal of the evidence of Pompeius.[118] Cool reflection, however, reveals the evidence for Caesar's putative wealth to be far from disinterested and open to serious doubt.

Caesar and his agents, for instance C. Oppius, C. Matius, and L. Cornelius Balbus the Elder, encouraged the belief that the war in Gallia was fantastically lucrative.[119] Hence, many thought that they need only make an appearance in order to receive money more than sufficient to resolve their debts or guarantee a continued political career at Rome. So, for example, C. Trebatius Testa went to join Caesar in the avowed expection that he would be "covered in gold".[120] Balbus did nothing to lessen this belief, writing to M. Cicero that Testa would

116 *RE* 10.1 (1917) 894–895 s.v. "Iulia Nr. 547" (F. Münzer); *RE* 21.2 (1952) 2062–2211 "Pompeius Nr. 31" (F. Miltner), here 2130 and 2155–2156.

117 Although alien to post-modern Western society, sight ought not to be lost of the fundamental importance of the dowry and the negotiations involved in its arrangement. See S.M. Treggiari, *Roman Marriage. Iusti Coniuges from the time of Cicero to the time of Ulpian*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1991), 323–364; eadem, *Roman Social History*, (Classical Foundations), (Routledge: London 2002), 57–58, 61, 64, 65–66, 67.

118 E.g. I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics*, (Collection Latomus, 142), (Latomus: Bruxelles 1975), 350. On the other hand, implicit if not explicit doubts underlie the analyses of some of the more authoritative voices of the last 150 years of scholarship: T. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, (Weidmannsche Buchhandlung: Berlin 1889[8]) 3.378–379; T. Frank, *Rome and Italy of the Republic*, Vol. 1, in: idem (ed.), *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, 6 vols. (Johns Hopkins: Baltimore 1933–1940), here 1.337; R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1939), 70.

119 For these individuals and their activities, see *RE* 18 (1939) 729–736 s.v. "Oppius Nr. 9" (F. Münzer); *RE* 4 (1901) 1260–1268 s.v. "Cornelius Nr. 69" (F. Münzer); *RE* 14.2 (1930) 2206–2210 s.v. "Matius Nr. 1" (F. Münzer). It is worth recalling that the announcement of the spectacular victory over Pharnaces was made by means of a letter addressed to Matius, who was then present in Rome: Plut. *Caes.* 50 (in need of emendation from Amantius to Matius); Münzer 1930: 2208; C. Cichorius, *Römische Studien. Historisches, epigraphisches, literargeschichtliches aus vier Jahrhunderte Roms*, (B.G. Teubner: Stuttgart 1922), 245–250. For this figure, see also esp. Cic. *Fam.* 11.27 and 28.

120 Cic. *Fam.* 7.13.1, written in April 53 BCE.

in fact become wealthy.[121] Likewise figuring amongst those who went to Caesar for enrichment was Q. Tullius Cicero, who served Caesar as a *legatus* in the years 54–53 BCE.[122] The liquidation of his debts and support for an eventual candidacy for the consulate motivated Q. Cicero's decision to endure the privations and displeasures of military life in Gallia Transalpina.[123] The evidence, such as it is, does not demonstrate the rapid and effortless acquisition of immense wealth by these or other individuals associated with Caesar's conquests.

It is not to be denied that at Rome and abroad a wide variety of individuals and communities did draw financial benefit from Caesar's conquests. For instance, late in the decade Athens received 50 talents towards the construction of what was to become the Roman agora in the city.[124] It may have been towards this same moment that the community of Tralles set up a statue of Caesar in the temple of Nike in thanksgiving for some benefaction.[125] Moreover, if hostile reports are to be believed, Caesar did confer substantial sums upon L. Aemilius Paullus (*cos.* 51) and C. Scribonius Curio (*tr. pl.* 50) in return for the favours that they rendered in directing political life at Rome.[126] However, just as in the case of the Forum Iulium, all of these instances have the appearance of strategic investments that served both to protect Caesar's personal interests and to further the public image of an immensely successful general. Six years later, in mid-44 BCE, M. Antonius was to claim that Caesar's estate was bankrupt, despite an uninterrupted string of military victories and undisputed possession of the Roman state.[127] In view of Pompeius' judgement and the lack

121 Cic. *Fam.* 7.16.3, reporting, with a characteristic blend of Roman earthiness and philosophical banter, a conversation with the elder Cornelius Balbus on the prospects of Trebatius. Like its Greek counterpart ολβιος (e.g. Hdt. 1.30.2), *dives* was an adjective subject to misunderstanding. Of course, sight must not be lost of the initial context in which Cicero "recommended" Trebatius to Caesar, in response not only to the need of Trebatius but also to a light-hearted missive from Caesar received in April 54 BCE. Commenting upon how he had easily satisfied an earlier request, Caesar encouraged Cicero to send him others: Cic. *Fam.* 7.5.2: *si vis, tu ad me alium mitte quem ornem.*

122 T.P. Wiseman, "The ambitions of Quintus Cicero," *Journal of Roman Studies* 56 (1966) 108–115.

123 For the liquidation of debts, see Cic. *Q. fr.* 2.15.3. As regards ambitions for the consulate, see Cic. *Q. fr.* 3.6.1; Wiseman 1966: 108–109.

124 Cic. *Att.* 6.1.25. It is to be remarked that Pompeius was annoyed, for he felt that Caesar was spending money that was owed to himself.

125 G. Dobesch, "Caesar und Kleinasien," *Tyche* 11 (1996) 51–77, here 54–55.

126 See Shatzman 1975: 288 and 395 respectively.

127 App. *B Civ.* 3.17.63–64, 20.73–75, 28.110.

of evidence for widespread largesse, it would appear that the wealth allegedly deriving from the Gallic conquest was nothing more than a chimera.

In such circumstances, the financial crisis that afflicted Rome in the late 50s BCE becomes comprehensible. There was a shortage of credit so acute that the Senate felt moved to intervene, declaring 12 % annual interest to be the maximum allowed. The extraordinary nature of this *senatus consultum* of late 51 or early 50 BCE is not to be overlooked, for the Senate was traditionally averse to setting any limits whatsoever upon the economic behaviour of its members.[128] Indeed, the matter was deemed so important that certain of the tribunes of the *plebs* had secured the decree's passage as a plebiscite in 50 BCE.[129] Whether seeking to obtain new loans or merely trying to repay old ones, people from all levels of society were experiencing considerable difficulties.[130] The aim of this legislation was to restore greater liquidity to the Roman financial market. Encouraged by the success of Roman arms, far too many bad loans had been made and the elite had nonchalantly spent money that they did not yet have, thereby incurring debts that could not easily be liquidated through the sale of property.

The monarch of Egypt was not the sole ally of the Romans to countenance defaulting upon money owed to Roman creditors. Cicero's correspondence from his time as governor of Cilicia abounds with references to Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia and other problematic debtors in Asia Minor.[131] Ptolemy XII, however, carried through with his intentions and expelled Rabirius Postumus and his lot from the country. Punishment failed to materialize. For one thing, the monarch secured the support of the troops who had been left behind by Gabinius. For another, the debacle of M. Licinius Crassus' expedition against

128 Cic. *Att.* 5.21.13; cf. K. Verboven, "54–44 BCE: Financial or Monetary Crisis?" 49–68, in: E. Lo Cascio (ed.), *Credito e moneta nel mondo romano. Atti degli incontri capresi di storia dell'economia antica* (*Capri 12–14 ottobre 2000*), (Edipuglia: Bari 2003), here 50.

129 Cass. Dio 41.37.2.

130 For Cicero's difficulty in finding a loan that would allow him to repay HS 800,000 to Caesar, see Cic. *Att.* 5.1.2; 5.4.3; 5.5.2; 5.6.2; 5.9.2; 5.10.4; 5.13.3; 7.3.11; 7.8.5; H.-P. Benoehr, "Finanzielle Transaktionen zwischen Cicero und Caesar in den Jahren 54 bis 50 v. Chr.," 21–43, in: H.-P. Benoehr (ed.), *Iuris Professio. Festgabe für Max Kaser zum 80. Geburtstag*, (Böhlaus Nachfolger: Wien 1986), here 30–35; the very fact that he planned to borrow money to repay another credit is symptomatic of an endemic problem.

131 Cic. *Att.* 5.18; 6.1.3–4; 6.2.7; 6.3.5; cf. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus* (Cambridge 1968) vol. 3, p. 83; Sullivan 1990: 178; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ*, 2 vols. (Princeton University Press: Princeton 1950), 390, 396, 1249–1250 n. 41, 1256 n. 78.

the Parthians rendered Roman rule in neighbouring Syria precarious. Possessing the courage to expel the Romans in 54 BCE, Ptolemy XII ceased payments. He may in fact have repaid the principal of the loan, but the cessation of payments occurred far earlier than anticipated by his Roman creditors. That incontrovertible fact is of fundamental importance for understanding what followed.

Caesar and Pompeius, together with the now deceased Crassus, had been intimately involved in the financial manoeuvres that resulted in Roman recognition of the legitimacy and then the restoration to power of Ptolemy XII. When the king defaulted, theirs were the interests that were affected, whether directly or indirectly. The problem was exacerbated by a credit supply that was already constricted. Pompeius was in a better position than Caesar, for his properties were immense and might serve as collateral at worst. However, both men had urgent need of fresh supplies of income on a scale that was only possible through the holding of public office. Without public office, Caesar faced certain default and disgrace. Caesar could be safe only if he achieved a second consulate, with the ineluctable concomitant of a provincial command in the East. Unwilling to brook a situation that would make Caesar his equal or superior, and just possibly in worse financial shape than seems to have been appreciated by contemporaries, Pompeius opposed such a solution. At that point civil war was inevitable.

Conclusion

It remains to write a book on the grammar of political discourse in the late Republic. Yet, what has gone before should have served to lay the basis for such a work and at the same time to have shed light upon topics that are of fundamental and far-reaching importance, albeit often neglected. The indissoluble bonds between Roman imperialism and commercial expansion and monetary policy should now be more clear than before. So, too, the ways in which the truth might be subverted or re-fashioned so as to mislead and persuade should now be far more evident. No small amount of Caesar's success as a general and as a politician lay in his ability to mould public discourse in a manner that would leave an abiding and overall positive image of his achievements as a Roman statesman. Corresponding to the majestic material remains of the Forum Iulium and other buildings situated in proximity to the ancient heart of Rome, the *commentarii* describing the Gallic campaigns of the 50s BCE and the Civil War of 49–48 BCE ultimately served the goal of creating a lasting memory of the victorious general Caesar. These writings, like the monuments adorning the landscape of Rome, were carefully crafted works of polemic conducive to a positive judgement of the actions and achievements of Caesar, and as such they were conceived with a view to defining how he was to be perceived by contemporaries and posterity.

Far too often have modern readers been content to take Caesar at his word and to accept the Caesarian version of events. In this, they have resembled the vast majority of their ancient predecessors. The Caesarian lieutenant C. Asinius Pollio was rather unique in giving voice to public criticism of Caesar's *commentarii*, even if he did so at a remove of more than a decade from the events concerned. Apparently basing his testimony upon a reading of Pollio's *Historiae*, which were likewise dedicated to the theme of Roman civil war in the 40s BCE, the biographer Suetonius describes Pollio's criticism thus (Suet. *Iul.* 56.4):

> Pollio Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se, vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit; existimatque rescripturum et correcturum fuisse.

> Pollio Asinius thinks that they (i.e. the *commentarii*) were composed with little concern for care or accuracy, since Caesar often rashly believed what had been done by others and falsely reported many things that he

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> did, whether on purpose or through forgetfulness. He also reckons that (Caesar) would have revised and corrected them.

Far from being a dispassionate, neutral observer of the events of the 40s BCE, Pollio was the author of a narrative meant to correct and replace that of Caesar as the authoritative version of what had occurred. While Pollio's self-interest and apologetic design may be suspected when it is a matter of choosing between alternative versions of the disastrous execution of Curio's campaign in Africa, the substance of Pollio's claim merits serious reflection and eventual agreement. Pollio was in a position to be informed as to the facts, and his critique appears justified. Those few occasions on which the evidence permits truly independent verification of the narrative of Caesar's *Civil War* do little to instil confidence in the forthright and reliable nature of Caesar's testimony.

Perhaps the most striking instance of all of Caesar's mendacity that may be discerned regards the *aerarium* of Rome and Caesar's theft of its contents. As we have had occasion to see, Caear's claim that the consuls left the *aerarium* open in their precipitate flight from Rome upon receiving a false report of Caesar's imminent arrival is demonstrably false. Indeed, from the contemporary evidence of Cicero's correspondence, not only is Caesar's self-serving narrative seen for what it is, but the popular discontent evinced at Caesar's illegal behaviour is also put on the record.[1] But there is more to be gained than mere identification of a *faux pas* in Caesar's historical testimony. It is possible to see the method whereby Caesar transforms an episode from a public relations fiasco into an exculpatory justification of his behaviour. As the victorious general who claimed to have conquered the whole of Gaul, Caesar was well positioned to argue that there no longer existed any need to reserve the contents of the *sanctius aerarium* for the eventuality of an emergency posed by conflict with the Gauls. Coolly attributing to the consuls an action that would have obviated the need to break down the doors to the *aerarium*, and it should be added an action that would have been incredible even in a time of the most profound peace, Caesar invites readers to conclude for themselves either that his taking of the funds located there was pacific and justified or else that alternative accounts are malicious inventions spread by his enemies. The damage that Caesar did to his cause may be inferred not only from Cicero's testimony, but also from the insistence with which Caesar returns to the theme of scrupulous handling of moneys on public deposit at Corfinium, Massilia, and Ephesus. Scholars have tended to accept Caesar's testimony or,

1 For the evocative description of Tiro's edition of Cicero's letters to Atticus as *historia contexta*, see Nep. *Att.* 16.3; Osgood 2006: 26.

in a semblance of equity, to claim a judgement of *non liquet*, but cool reflection reveals the tissue of lies, strategic omissions, and specious assertions for what they are, and Caesar's repeated insistence on how he saved other moneys is further proof of what occurred at Rome early in April 49 BCE. Events at one end of the Mediterranean were linked to and had consequences at the other.

Notwithstanding Caesar's mendacity, which may now be taken an established fact and ought not to cause scandal, serious work with the text and testimony of the *Civil War* is still possible. Moreover, this work need not be limited to the analysis of Caesar's language merely as rhetoric and evidence for the grammar of political discourse at the close of the Republic. Once rhetorical and psychological mechanisms have been identified, it is possible for the modern historian of ancient Rome to look at the sources and production of Caesar's *Civil War* as well as what it has to tell us about the Mediterranean world in Caesar's day. In spite of its dubious regard for the truth, or perhaps for that very reason, Caesar's testimony for the years 49–48 BCE offers invaluable insight into the cultural and socio-economic milieux of the Roman empire on the eve of the Principate.

From the perspective of literary analysis, various items of interest and relevance have come to light in the foregoing analysis. For instance, it is possible to perceive Caesar using the mechanisms of false report, innuendo, and reversal as regards the destiny of the gladiators that Caesar had gathered in large numbers at Capua in the late 50s for the purpose of offering spectacles to the populace of Rome upon his return from Gaul. These rhetorical and psychological instruments deployed in the service of political polemic serve to characterize L. Cornelius Lentulus (*cos.* 49 BCE) as a perilous incompetent and Cn. Pompeius Magnus as tantamount to Spartacus. Similar invective, likewise insidiously veiled by the seeming garb of artless reporting, permeates the whole of the *Civil War*, even if sometimes stretching the limits of credulity for the most receptive of readers. For instance, few if any modern readers are willing to accept the claim that the mere report of Caesar's arrival (*adventus*) twice brought salvation to the moneys stored within the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus. Aside from indicating one of the key functions of that Hellenistic sanctuary, however, Caesar's claims afford insight into how the text of the *Civil War* came to be. Such reports are manifestly based upon local claims. Caesar, moreover, can confidently be placed in Ephesus prior to setting sail for Egypt so as to continue with his pursuit of the defeated Pompeius. Since poetry and speeches of panegyric for the Roman victor or governor were a well-established part of the cultural landscape of the East, it follows that Caesar is relating for the edification of his Roman readers what was said to him upon his reception in the Asiastic metropolis of Ephesus in September 48 BCE.

From the perspective of socio-economic history, likewise, various items of great significance can be derived from a careful reading and analysis of Caesar's *Civil War*. Whether it is determining the nature of *clientelae* or a question of the sources of grain for Rome in the late Republic or the relevance of Ptolemaic Egypt's resources to Roman rule of the Mediterranean, the testimony of Caesar's *Civil War* sheds important light, often clarifying things that may be intuited from other sources. Caesar, it is true, does not offer any statistics regarding the annual revenues of the Ptolemaic kingdom or the amount of grain contributed by Sardinia for the populace of Rome, but that information which he does provide suffices to illustrate in striking clarity the issues at stake. As for statistics, those furnished by Caesar likewise prove illuminating, if only we are willing to connect them to their larger context so as to make sense of what would have been obvious to Caesar's contemporaries. For instance, Pompeius is reported to have turned his own shepherds and slaves near Luceria in Apulia into an impromptu cavalry force early in 49 BCE. Establishing that the number involved was in all likelihood 800 and that the shepherds were probably by and large slaves gives insight into the flocks of animals possessed by Pompeius, and that in turn points to a tremendous imbalance in the distribution of wealth in the late Republic. That, in turn, corroborates the conclusions to be drawn from Caesar's report of the amount of land that L. Domitius Ahenobarbus promised to his soldiers when besieged and desperate at Corfinium in February 49 BCE. Had the system of Roman government not engendered vast imbalances and thereby encouraged an indebted elite to look to places such as Egypt for its economic and social salvation, it is quite probable that the Roman civil wars of 49–30 BCE would never have occurred.

In the final analysis, it must be remarked once again that Caesar's *Civil War* is the most detailed historical work that we possess for this period of transition from the late Republic to the early Principate. Covering some twenty-two months (January 49 BCE–October 48 BCE) within the span of ca. 150 OCT pages, the *Civil War* is unrivalled in terms of generosity of coverage and offers details rarely to be found elsewhere. Indeed, only on occasion do historical works proper (e.g. Plutarch's biographies or Appian's *Emphylia*) furnish details of socio-economic significance that are not to be found in Caesar. Moreover, of the surviving historical works to deal with the transitional period of the Roman civil wars of 49–30 BCE, Caesar's is virtually the only one to have been written by a contemporary and a protagonist in those events.[2] Indeed, as has been

2 Unless, of course, we wish to include the *RGDA* by virtue of its wealth of historical detail. Readers will also recall the fact that Cornelius Nepos' biography of T. Pomponius Atticus is

argued here, Caesar was active writing the *Civil War* in 49–48 BCE, abandoning the project when other matters caught his attention and such a narrative no longer seemed needed or desirable. A product of its time, Caesar's *Civil War* is a work of polemic that nevertheless often casts a clear, penetrating light on the cultural and socio-economic realities of the Roman empire.

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a historical work written by a contemporary. That work, however, is far less informative than Caesar's notwithstanding the interest of its subject and epoch.

Weights, Measures, and Currencies

1 Greek medimnos of wheat = 6 Roman modii = 51.7 litres = 40 kg = 127,400 kcals.
1 hectare = 4 Roman iugera = 11 Greek plethra
1 Attic talent = 6,000 drachmas = 36,000 obols
1 Attic drachma ≈ 1 Roman denarius
1 Roman aureus = 25 denarii = 100 sestertii = 400 asses

Source: Garnsey 1988: xiv

MAPS

Theatres of War in 49–48 BCE

MAP 1 *The Mediterranean world of 49–48* BCE

Ancient World Mapping Center 2017
NORICUM
TRANSPADANAE
COLONIAE
Cremona
Placentia
GALLIA CITERIOR
Curicta
Curicum
Ravenna
Ariminum
Pisaurum
Fanum
Ancona
Auximum
Cingulum
Arretium
Iguvium
PICENUM
Camerinum
Firmum
Asculum
ILLYRICUM
Salona
Issa
HADRIATICUM MARE
Igilium
Cosa
MARRUCINI
Corfinium
Alba
Sulmo
Roma
FRENTANI
MARSI
PAELIGNI
Larinum
Luceria
Tarracina
APULIA
Casilinum
Canusium
Capua
Puteoli
CAMPANIA
Compsa
Neapolis
Brundisium
LUCANI
Sardinia
Thurii
BRUTTII
Caralis
Vibo
Sicilia
Messana
Fretum
Siciliae
Elevation
High : 8,000
Low : 0
0
200
400 km

MAP 2 *Italia*

MAP 3 *Hispania*


Ancient World Mapping Center 2017
GERMANIA
BRITANNIA
GALLIA
GALLIA CITERIOR
SALLYES
Varus
ALLOBROGES
GALLIA ULTERIOR
ALBICI
Alesia
Arelate
Massilia
Taurois
HELVII
Rhodanus
Avaricum
Gergovia
VOLCAE
ARECOMICI
Narbo
RUTENI
AQUITANI
Pyrenaeus Saltus
HISPANIA CITERIOR
HISPANIA
OCEANUS
Elevation
High : 8,000
Low : 0
0
200
400 km

MAP 4 *Gallia*


Ancient World Mapping Center 2017
Sardinia
Utica
Castra Cornelia
Clupea
Anquillaria
Hadrumetum
Leptiminus
Bagradas
AFRICA
NUMIDAE
MAURETANIA
HISPANIA CITERIOR
HISPANIA ULTERIOR
Elevation
High : 8,000
Low : 0
0
200
400 km

MAP 5 *Africa*

MAP 6 *Macedonia*


Ancient World Mapping Center 2017
THRACIA
Mytilenae
Pergamum
Ephesus
Tralles
ASIA
BITHYNIA
PONTUS
GALLOGRAECIA
CAPPADOCIA
CILICIA
Amanus Mons
Antiochia
SYRIA
PHOENICE
Ptolomais
PARTHIA
Cyprus
Rhodus
Creta
0
260
520 km
Elevation
High : 8,000
Low : 0

MAP 7 *Asia*



MAP 8 *Aegyptus*

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